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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 263 Records
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1981 (9) TMI 266 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... reholders. We are, therefore, in agreement with the learned single judge and hold that the properties of the appellant-company cannot be said to be the properties of the Central Government and similarly the appellant-company cannot be said to be the Central Government. The learned counsel for the appellant also sought to argue the case on merits and contended that the learned single judge should have gone into the matter whether the disposal of salvage matter was a part of the business of the appellantcompany or the same was incidental to the appellant s business of general insurance. These are questions of fact and can be gone into by the authorities under the Act. It would be premature for us to pronounce on merits of the case at this stage without the facts having been found. For the reasons recorded above, we do not find any merits in this appeal which is dismissed. Considering the circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1981 (9) TMI 265 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... not change the essential characteristic of the dyes and would bring into existence a new and a distinct commodity which is recognised as such in the commercial sense. Even after the reduction of the strength of the dyes the dyes remain the dyes and do not lose their essential characteristic. In that view of the matter, therefore, this reference must be rejected and the question must be answered by holding that the act of addition of gobar salt, etc., in the dyes purchased by the assessee of diverse quality and concentration is not an act of manufacturing and the reselling of dyes with reduced strength would amount to resales and, therefore, the assessee is entitled to claim deduction as claimed before the Sales Tax Officer. The reference is, therefore, rejected by answering that sales were merely resales, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the State Government. The State Government shall pay costs of this reference to the assessee. Reference answered accordingly.
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1981 (9) TMI 264 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the article of the description bar and the omission of the article rod is opposed to the very direction and purpose of section 3(2), besides putting a wrong construction of the entry itself. We must, therefore, reject the contention of the learned Government Pleader as wholly untenable. For all the above reasons, we hold that the sales turnover of the assessee in aluminium rods does not fall within entry 64 of the First Schedule and hence sales of aluminium rods by the assessee must be properly brought to tax under section 3(1) of the Act. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner was right in taking this view of the nature of the commodity and the appropriateness of the charge under section 3(1) of the Act. The Board s order to the contrary is not in accordance with law. In the result, this appeal succeeds the Board s order is set aside and the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is restored. The assessee is entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Appeal allowed.
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1981 (9) TMI 263 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e turnover, the gross profit of 25 per cent was added to the cost of materials. The estimate of turnover made by the assessing authority was reasonable and does not call for interference. Sri C.N. Kamath, the learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that brass cradle could not be regarded as furniture. In our opinion, the Tribunal was justified in holding that brass cradle was an article of furniture. Sri Kamath drew our attention to the amendment of item No. 108 of the Second Schedule to the Karnataka Sales Tax Act so as to restrict the scope of that entry to wooden furniture only. But that amendment was made subsequent to the assessment year in question and hence has no application to the present case. We do not see why furniture manufactured out of wood only should be regarded as furniture and furniture manufactured out of metal should not be regarded as furniture. We do not see any good ground to admit this petition and accordingly we dismiss it. Petition dismissed.
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1981 (9) TMI 262 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 1st December, 1973, tax was liable to be levied at 3 frac12 per cent on the turnover in respect of ice-cream. The learned counsel for the assessee, on the other hand, contends that this notification has not superseded the carrier Notification No. ST-911/X dated 31st March, 1956, which exempted milk products. I do not find that there is much substance in this contention because this notification of 1st December, 1973, is in supersession of all previous notifications in so far as they relate to the goods mentioned in column II of the schedule to this notification . It would be taken, therefore, that in respect of the goods mentioned in the schedule to this notification all the previous notifications stand superseded. Ice-cream is one of such goods which had been made liable to tax under this notification. Hence, the turnover in respect of ice-cream with effect from 1st December, 1973, will be liable to tax. The revision is hence allowed with costs which is assessed at Rs. 200.
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1981 (9) TMI 261 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ey would not fall within entry 15 of Schedule C to the Bombay Act but would be liable to be taxed under entry 22 of Schedule E to the said Act which is a residuary entry subjecting the goods which are not specified in other schedules to tax. The contention which has, therefore, been urged is not well-founded and we must hold that the Tribunal was right in allowing the set-off because of the goods required for diverse processes constituting the activity of manufacturing or processing would be the goods used in the manufacture of the goods for sale and if they are not prohibited goods the assessee paying tax thereon would be entitled to claim set-off. The second question, therefore, also should be answered in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the State Government. The reference of the State Government is, therefore, rejected. The State Government shall pay the costs of this reference to the opponent-assessee. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1981 (9) TMI 260 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... being disposed of as an appeal, have both been disposed. The entire matter is now under revision before the Board of Revenue. No useful purpose would be served by invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under article 226 of the Constitution. This Court will also not pass an order which will only be academic in nature and which would rather complicate the matter than solving the problem. The position of law has been stated, but it does not appear just and proper at this extremely belated stage to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under article 226 of the Constitution and quash the orders dated 10th April, 1970. Under these circumstances, we decline to invoke our jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution. The position of law has been stated and subject to the observations made above the writ petition is dismissed. However, looking into the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.
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1981 (9) TMI 259 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he (the dealer effecting the subsequent sales) had purchased the goods . The words as they are have been rightly construed by the Division Bench of the High Court to mean a registered dealer from whom the goods were (originally) purchased or from whom the goods were purchased (at the first stage) . Such construction is in consonance with the dominant intention of the legislature to impose a levy on the sale at the first stage. Faced with the aforesaid authoritative enunciation, Mr. Sethi, the learned Additional Advocate-General, Punjab, fairly conceded that the matter is now concluded in favour of the petitioner-assessee. 5.. Accordingly, we render the answer to the question referred by the Tribunal (in paragraph No. 2, above), in the negative, that is, in favour of the petitioner-assessee and against the revenue. In view of the earlier divergent judicial opinion, the parties will bear their own costs. TEWATIA, J.-I agree. TIWANA, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1981 (9) TMI 258 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the Act the dealer becomes liable to pay sales tax on his turnover. The position under section 9-A of the Act would be very different. Here, there is no liability with reference to section 4 of the Act and before the dealer becomes statutorily liable to pay tax, with a view to deriving advantages provided under the statute he makes an application for voluntary registration. In such a case, if the liability is made to run from the date of the application, certainly the dealer would have prejudice instead of deriving any advantage. We are, therefore, inclined to take the view that the ratio of the decision in Bhanja Bhandar s case 1976 37 STC 169 would not apply to a case of this type and the appropriate way to fix liability is from the date when the certificate of registration is received by the dealer. Our answer, therefore, in the instant case is that liability would commence from 12th May, 1972, and not earlier. No costs. DAS, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1981 (9) TMI 257 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... me Court in the case of Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa 1970 25 STC 211 (SC) in a case of this type and to knock off the penalty by saying that there was no material placed on record by the assessing officer that on the date when the cheque was issued the dealer did not have sufficient funds in its account to cover the cheque amount. On the question of law as presented, we must answer against the assessee by saying that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and keeping the explanation to section 11(3) of the Act in view, the Tribunal was not justified in knocking off the penalty. 5.. The counsel for the assessee pointed out that since the penalty amount was knocked off in its totality the Tribunal never applied its mind to find whether the quantum of penalty required interference. We leave it to the Tribunal, while taking steps under section 24(5) of the Act to look into this aspect of the matter. No costs. DAS, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1981 (9) TMI 256 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n rare cases where it is found that the breach is technical and the conduct of the assessee is bona fide. In this case it has been seen above that the finding of the appellate authority and the Tribunal is that the breach was not only bona fide but also in ignorance of law. There could be no better proof of bona fide than in this case where the assessee had to pay additional demand along with interest from its own pocket. In fact, on facts found the Tribunal should not have reduced the penalty but should have discharged the notice as the non-deposit of tax due was not without reasonable cause. It was a fit case in which it could be held that failure was covered by the expression reasonable cause used in sub-clause (a) of section 15-A(1). But the assessee having not filed any revision the only order that can be passed is to maintain the order passed by the Tribunal. In the result this revision fails and is dismissed with costs which is assessed at Rs. 200. Petition dismissed.
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1981 (9) TMI 255 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... shirts, 20 pants, 20 socks, etc. He receives goods for sale, say, 10 in each item. The total, therefore, becomes thirty. He has sold each item in the course of the day. The closing stock shows remaining 15 in each. All this is shown in the account book. No cash memo is issued. Can the maintenance of account book be said to be defective. The answer has to be in the negative. According to the learned standing counsel it would frustrate the entire objective if it is held that non-issuance of cash memo does not result in rejection of account books. The apprehension is baseless. It is a statutory requirement. Its breach has been made penal. Its maintenance is in the interest of a dealer. It assists in verifiability of the account book. But failure to issue it cannot by itself furnish ground for rejection of account books where the account books are otherwise verifiable. In the result the revision fails and is dismissed with costs which is assessed at Rs. 200. Petition dismissed.
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1981 (9) TMI 254 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n as gospel truth when the assessee denies that there was any offer of the order of assessment to him. Since the mandatory provision in Order 5 of the Code which applied has not been complied with, we are inclined to agree with the assessee s submission that there was no valid service of the order of assessment, and therefore, the first appellate authority was not correct in dismissing the appeal as barred by limitation on the ground that it had not been presented within 30 days from the date of service of the order of assessment. The Tribunal went wrong in adopting the same reasonings to hold that the dismissal was proper. 6.. We accordingly answer the question in favour of the assessee by saying that there had been no valid service as provided under rule 84(1) of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules so far as the orders of assessment are concerned. The assessee shall have his costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 100 (one hundred). PATNAIK, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly
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1981 (9) TMI 253 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... al Commissioner. With regard to question No. (1), the Financial Commissioner did observe that it was a question of fact. In our opinion, that is not so. The question whether on the admitted and proven facts and in the circumstances of this case the sale took place at Delhi, is a question of law. For the reasons recorded above, we allow this petition and direct the Tribunal, which has taken the place of the Financial Commissioner, to refer the first three questions of law, set out in the opening part of this order, for our opinion along with the statement of the case. The attention of the Tribunal should be drawn to the fact that a proper statement of the case should be submitted because we have come across a large number of cases where the Financial Commissioners have not stated a case under section 22(4) properly thereby necessitating our remitting the cases back to the Tribunal for a proper statement of the case. There will be no order as to costs. SANDHAWALIA, J.-I agree.
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1981 (9) TMI 252 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... or under any order of a court, the tax shall be levied upon and recoverable from such Court of Wards, Administrator-General, Official Trustee, Receiver or Manager, in like manner and in the same terms as it would be leviable upon and recoverable from the dealer as if he were conducting the business himself, and all the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder shall apply accordingly. The effect of this section is that a dealer whose property is in the custody of an official appointed by a court and is put under attachment then the liability to pay the tax is on such person or manager or official of the court. In view of this provision even accepting the argument of the learned standing counsel that the right of the assessee to carry on business was not affected, the liability to pay tax shall rest not on the assessee but on the supardar. In the result both these revisions fail and are dismissed with costs which is assessed at Rs. 200 one set. Petitions dismissed.
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1981 (9) TMI 251 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... from his buyers. The State Government must be estopped from raising the contention as advanced by the learned standing counsel in the facts and circumstances referred to above. Support is available for the stand of the assessee from the fact that in 1974 the State Government was not satisfied by specifying in entry 61 the description of goods to be machineries only. When rate of 10 per cent was prescribed, it clearly indicated sewing machines and component parts. 5.. For the reasons we have indicated above, we must hold that the Sales Tax Officer was right in assessing the turnover at 5 per cent and entry 60 of the 1957 notification could not be relied upon for applying the enhanced rate of tax as done by the Commissioner. 6.. The appeal is allowed with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 200 (two hundred) to be paid to the assessee by the department. The order of the Commissioner is set aside and that of the Sales Tax Officer is restored. DAS, J.-I agree. Appeal allowed.
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1981 (9) TMI 250 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e assembled together at the workspot, constructed into cranes and installed in the site at the spot required by the customers. It was then, not earlier that the property in the cranes as such became the property of the customers. Indeed, there was no crane in existence before that point of time to be named as the property of the assessee. Besides the task of fitting together the component parts, constructing them into full-fledged cranes and erecting the cranes at the site, the assessee had also the responsibility for commissioning them and seeing it to it that they worked properly, for some time. The erection of the cranes is thus a fundamental and integral part of the contract. The whole process can be designated properly as the entering into and performance of a works contract. For all the aforesaid reasons, the appeal is allowed and the revision is allowed to the extent indicated earlier. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1981 (9) TMI 249 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nded that the proportion of sub-items (11) and (12) to the other items is very small. But, the notification does not call for any specific proportion or particular percentage of the listed chemicals so as to fall within sub-item (24) in item 22 of the First Schedule. So long as there is some percentage of the articles of chemical fertilisers listed in the notification, which have been mixed with or without the addition of other articles it would fall within sub-item (24). As the nature of the notification is somewhat different from what has been considered in relation to the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax assessments, we do not think it necessary to go into those cases. The assessee will be eligible for the benefit of the concessional rate of tax with reference to the turnover of Rs. 4,69,520, i.e., the rate of tax to be adopted is 1 per cent instead of 21 per cent. The revision is allowed and the assessee will be entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition allowed.
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1981 (9) TMI 248 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... therefore, not covered by entry 18(a) of Schedule II of Part A to the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969, but are covered by entry 13 of Schedule III to the said Act as held by the sales tax authorities? We answer this reframed question as under The second part of the question, namely, whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that tarpaulins are covered by entry 13 of Schedule III to the Gujarat Sales Tax Act in the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue by holding that the goods should be classified as cotton fabrics falling under entry 37, Schedule I, and therefore not liable to tax. The first parts of the questions in both the references are not required to be answered in view of the matter which we have taken because it is in our opinion academic. The State Government shall pay costs of Sales Tax Reference No. 12 of 1978 to the assessee. There should be no order as to costs in Sales Tax Reference No. 9 of 1978. References answered accordingly.
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1981 (9) TMI 247 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Winding up - Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... ). The balance should be in favour of the appellant on some occasions and on the other occasions in favour of the respondent. There should be reciprocal demands between the parties and the accounts should be transactions giving rise to independent obligations. In the account in question, there are no shifting balances on any occasion at any rate after 1959. There are only payments against the loan and interest in this account. There are no independent transactions which create independent obligations. The learned judge, therefore, was not justified in holding that the account represented reciprocal and independent transactions between the company on the one hand and Smt. Puri on the other. There is total absence of mutuality. Since we are certain that the suit is barred by limitation, we need not go into the question whether the amount was actually paid to the appellant and whether all these entries were made in the name of Smt. Puri fictitiously or otherwise. Appeal allowed.
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