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Showing 21 to 40 of 213 Records
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1982 (7) TMI 252 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion. 3.. This Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Truel Tubes 1980 46 STC 473 and Commissioner of Sales Tax v. lisco Stanton Pipe and Foundry Co. Lid., Ujjain (M.C.C. No. 94 of 1980 decided on 3rd July, 1981) 1982 50 STC 207 has held that pipes which are not used for sanitary fittings would not be taxable under entry 56, Part II of Schedule II appended to the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958. In the instant case the Tribunal had already remanded the case for proper enquiry about the use of the cement pipes sold by the assessee. 4.. In the circumstances we answer the question in the negative and against the revenue and hold that under the facts and circumstances of the case cement pipes are not necessarily taxable under entry 56 of Part II of Schedule II appended to the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958, and the question will have to be decided on the facts of each case. 5.. There will be no order as to costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1982 (7) TMI 251 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Directors, etc. not to hold place of profit ... ... ... ... ..... ond respondent is concerned, there is violation of section 314(1)(a) of the Act. Now, turning to the third respondent, I must hold that here also, the applicant has no case. I have already held that section 314(1)(a) does not apply to a relative of any ordinary sitting director holding any office or place of profit carrying even a monthly remuneration of Rs. 500 and more but applies to the relative of a director who holds any office or place of profit. In this case, the applicant has not succeeded in establishing that the third respondent was a relative of such director holding any office or place of profit. It is true that the third respondent is the son of the second respondent, but then, the second respondent is only an ordinary director, but not one holding any office or place of profit as defined in section 314(3) of the Act. If that is so, there can be no violation of section 314(1) (b) of the Act. The result is, the application fails and is dismissed but without costs.
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1982 (7) TMI 242 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Compromise and arrangement ... ... ... ... ..... nd it is scheduled for today. Mr. Chinoy also drew my attention to a decision of this court in Laljibhai C. Kapadia v. Lalji B. Desai 1973 43 Comp. Cas. 17 1972 74 Bom. LR 85, which, inter alia, dealt with the question of the validity of a requisition when the explanatory statement accompanying the requisition was lacking in material particulars. I am not concerned with this aspect of the matter at present. I am prima facie of the view that once the members of the company have approved of the scheme in the manner laid down under section 391, it is not open to the shareholders to requisition a meeting for the purpose of passing a resolution asking the company to withdraw the petition filed by it for sanctioning the scheme. In any case this is a matter which requires further consideration in detail after the parties file their affidavits. In the premises, I direct that the meeting which is to be held today be adjourned sine die pending the final disposal of the judge s summons.
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1982 (7) TMI 241 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
Winding up – Fraudulent preference ... ... ... ... ..... No. 128 of 1977 are required to be rejected. It is contended that the Indian Overseas Bank has been described as a preferential creditor. This does not appear to be the correct position. In any event, the transaction between the bank and the company in liquidation was a transaction against the hypothecation of the machinery and in that position, if it was a secured creditor and it ceased to be the secured creditor the moment the pledged machineries were redeemed by the mode of pledging the same to Mr. Challam and Challam discharging the debt to the bank. Therefore, the creditor and debtor relationship itself with the bank and the company in liquidation had ceased. I must not fail to make a reference to the fact that in a petition under section 433 of the Act, a party should be cautious when the company petition is closed, before the same is allowed to be revived as in the instant case. With these observations, all the company applications are disposed of as not maintainable.
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1982 (7) TMI 227 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Winding up – Powers of tribunal on hearing petition, Fraudulent preference ... ... ... ... ..... itioners. This is a case of a winding-up and in the event of an order of winding-up being made the order is to take effect from the date of the presentation of the petition. The payments made by the company to the petitioners are during the pendency of the petition and, therefore, the payments are not antecedent to the winding-up but made during the course of the winding-up proceedings. The court has, therefore, jurisdiction to pass order for depositing the amount received during the pendency of the petition. The petitioners are/therefore, directed to deposit in court the amount of Rs. 68,510.64 on or before 31st March, 1982. Further hearing of the petition is adjourned to 31st March, 1982, before me. The petitioners have failed to carry out the directions regarding deposit of the money in court. They submit to the orders of the court. I think the ends of justice would be met if the petition is dismissed with no order as to costs. Petition dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1982 (7) TMI 219 - ITAT PUNE
Capital Gains, Profit On Sale ... ... ... ... ..... separate houses. Each is separately let and separately occupied, and has no connection with those above or below except in so far as it may derive support from those below instead of from the ground, as in the case of ordinary houses (Per Jessel M.R., Yorkshire Insurance v. Clayton 8 QBD 424, cited with approval by Halsbury C., and Lord Brampton, in Grant v. Langston). 30. Therefore, on limited point, i.e., ground no. 2, we set aside the orders of the authorities below and restore the matter to the file of the ITO with a direction that he should give a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee and also allow it to produce relevant material to come to a conclusion as to what is the market value of the plot and what is the value of the building and then he may arrive at a correct figure of the capital gain which was earned by the assessee and then deal with the assessee s claim for relief under section 80T. 31. In the result, the assessee s appeal is partly allowed.
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1982 (7) TMI 216 - ITAT PATNA
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... ... ..... Court or Allahabad cited by the ld. Deptl. Rep., we are inclined to follow the later ruling of the Hon ble High Court of Delhi which was given after considering the earlier rulings on this issue, including the ruling of the Hon ble High Court of Allahabad cited by the ld. Deptl. Rep. We, therefore, hold that while no appeal lies against the charge of interest alone, it is open to an assessee in an appeal filed on other grounds as well to object to the charge of interest also in the appeal filed. Viewed in this context, it is not under dispute that an appeal was filed also on the ground of the disallowance out of travelling expenses and in this appeal the assessee has also objected to the charge of interest under s. 139(8). The AAC, therefore, in our view, wrongly declined to entertain this issue raised before him. We, therefore, direct the AAC to take a decision on this issue on merits and in accordance with law after hearing both the parties. 6. The appeal is partly allowed.
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1982 (7) TMI 214 - ITAT NAGPUR
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... ... ..... enue. This is clear from the portion of his order reproduced by us and also the portion. 6. It is also a moot point whether the newly constructed building, when sold along with the old plot on which it was constructed, the nature of the capital gains will have to be determined with reference to the date of construction of the building. Obviously in a case like this the building cannot be sold without the land. If the building is new, is it possible to say that the appurtenant land also has to be considered as a new acquisition? Or is it possible to say that the land and building are sold separately, and while the gain from the transfer of land is a long term capital gain, the gain from the transfer of the building is a short-term gain? Unless all these questions are answered by the authority invoking s. 263 and a definite finding given that the order of the ITO is erroneous, it cannot be modified. In the circumstances, we set aside the order of the CIT. The appeal is allowed.
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1982 (7) TMI 211 - ITAT MADRAS-D
Deemed Gift, Textile Mill ... ... ... ... ..... t of succession or having a claim to a share in the property in dispute. The assessee is, therefore, entitled to succeed merely on the ground that it is a bona fide family arrangement. In this view, it is not necessary to go into the merits of different valuations placed by GTO and the AAC in any detail since even as concluded in the immediately preceding paragraph, valuation being subjective, the variations as between assessee and revenue are not such as to warrant an inference of gift in the fact of assessee s case. The assessee is, therefore, entitled to succeed in any view. Hence, on the facts even without admitting the memorandum, we infer a family arrangement and on the basis of the above reasonings, the appeals deserve to be dismissed. As mentioned earlier even without the inference of family arrangement the appeals have no merit for the reasons stated in the immediately preceding paragraph. 5. In any view the appeals have to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed.
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1982 (7) TMI 209 - ITAT MADRAS-C
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... ... ..... o us that the revenue cannot take an inconsistent stand between the two enactments only on the ground that there would be a fiction in respect of the IT Act whereas the GT Act would be applied without regard to such a fiction. In our considered opinion, the fiction created by applying s. 171 of the IT Act cannot be ignored for the purpose of the GT Act and the transaction has to be considered in the light of the treatment of the asset for the purpose of the IT Act and WT Act. Since the asset in question is treated as belonging to HUF in spite of the claim that it is the separate property of the assessee-individual, we must hold that the transfer of the rights by the assessee-individual must be regarded as a release of the undivided coparcenary interest which does not amount to a transfer liable to gift-tax though he purported to transfer his separate interest. In the circumstances, we accept the appeal of the assessee a d annual the gift-tax assessment. The appeal is allowed.
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1982 (7) TMI 208 - ITAT MADRAS-C
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... ... ..... of the IT return could not be taken as a reasonable cause for failure to file the WT return in time. But, we are unable to accept this contention because apart from the decision of the Madras High Court, the proviso to s. 14(1) also enables the assessee to file the WT return during the time allowed for filing the it return, thus recognising the statutory principle behind the decision of the Madras High Court. The WT Act, therefore, does not prescribe the imposition of penalty in the case of delay in filing the WT return if the delay is occasioned by the filing of the IT return because if such delay is condoned it has to be confined in the WT proceeding also, and if such delay is penalised, then again there could not be a further penalty under the WT Act for the same delay. In the circumstance, we cannot find fault with the AAC for following the decision of the Madras high Court and cancelling the penalties imposed. We accordingly confirm his order. The appeals are dismissed.
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1982 (7) TMI 205 - ITAT MADRAS-C
Approved Gratuity Fund ... ... ... ... ..... n 8-12-1977 as against the imaginary dead-line of 31-3-1977 set by the revenue. Our decision also accords with the view of the Special Bench, Madras Bench C , in the case of ITO v. Sri Krishna Tiles and Potteries (Madras) (P.) Ltd. 1982 1 SOT 305 though the issue in that case related to the question of incremental vis-a-vis initial liability. In the said decision it was pointed out that rule 2 of part C of Schedule IV of the Act enables the Commissioner to withdraw the approval already granted to a fund when such withdrawal is warranted by circumstances and it stands to reason that the non-payment of the amount provided in the accounts within a reasonable time should be such a circumstance. We are pointing this out as it gives a clue for the intention behind the provision which allows a mere provision towards a pre-existing gratuity fund. In any view of the matter, the assessee is entitled to the deduction. Under the circumstances the appeal is allowed. Relief due Rs. 80,621.
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1982 (7) TMI 204 - ITAT MADRAS-C
Delay In Filing Wealth Tax Return, Income Tax Return, Late Filing, Reasonable Cause ... ... ... ... ..... are unable to accept this contention because apart from the decision of the Madras High Court, in Babulal s case, the proviso to section 14(1) of the Act also enables the assessee to file the wealth-tax return during the time allowed for filing the income-tax return, thus recognising the statutory principle behind the decision of the Madras High Court in Babulal s case. The Act, therefore, does not prescribe the imposition of penalty in the case of delay in filing the wealth-tax return, if the delay is occasioned by the filing of the income-tax return because if such delay is condoned it has to be condoned in the wealth-tax proceedings also, and if such delay is penalised, then again there could not be a further penalty under the Act for the same delay. In the circumstances we cannot find fault with the AAC for following the decision of the Madras High Court in Babulal s case and cancelling the penalties imposed. We, accordingly, confirm his order. The appeals are dismissed.
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1982 (7) TMI 203 - ITAT MADRAS-C
Gift Tax, House Property, Income Tax Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... n 21 of the Wealth-tax Act. It seems to us that the revenue cannot take an inconsistent stand between the two enactments only on the ground that there would be a fiction in respect of the Act whereas the Gift-tax Act would be applied without regard to such a fiction. In our considered opinion, the fiction created by applying section 171 cannot be ignored for the purpose of the Gift-tax Act and the transaction has to be considered in the light of the treatment of the asset for the purpose of the Income-tax Act and the Wealth-tax Act. Since the asset in question is treated as belonging to HUF in spite of the claim that it is the separate property of the assessee-individual, we must hold that the transfer of the rights of the undivided coparcenary interest which does not amount to a transfer liable to gift-tax though he purported to transfer his separate interest. In the circumstances, we accept the appeal of the assessee and annul the gift-tax assessment. The appeal is allowed.
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1982 (7) TMI 196 - ITAT MADRAS-B
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... ... ..... uld confine his claim to reduction of quantum of penalty with reference to the extended time given by the ITO to file the return in response to the notice under s. 148. It is pointed out that the assessee had been allowed time to file the return up to 22nd Dec., 1976 and the assessment was made on 14th Feb., 1977 and the period involved in terms of completed months is only one month and therefore the penalty should be reduced accordingly. The de. rep. had no arguments to make except relying on the orders of the departmental authorities. 3. In view of the facts stated above and the submission of the ld. Representative of the assessee, we consider it fair and reasonable to sustain in the facts of this case the penalty for the period of one completed month between the date by which the assessee was allowed to file the return in response to notice under s. 148 and the date of assessment, namely, 14th Feb., 1977. The penalty is accordingly reduced and the appeal is partly allowed.
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1982 (7) TMI 193 - ITAT MADRAS-B
Discretionary Trust, Flat Rate ... ... ... ... ..... ence to clause (i) of section 164(1) under the option available to it (sic), because as we have already pointed out, in the present case, the revenue has adopted the alternative flat rate of 65 per cent. It is possible that even in the case of the same assessee the revenue may find it necessary in some of the years to adopt the rate provided by the option in clause (i), in which case different considerations may arise and possibly the revenue s stand may be vindicated having regard to the concession made by the learned counsel that the association of persons contemplated by the provisions of section 80L(3) is one made up of husband and wife governed by the community of interest as stated therein. Our finding, therefore, must be held to be confined to the assessment for the year under appeal before us. 9. In the result, the claim of each of the assessees is accepted and the revenue authorities are directed to grant appropriate relief under section 80L. The appeals are allowed.
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1982 (7) TMI 192 - ITAT MADRAS-B
Accumulated Profits, Partnership Deed, The Constitution ... ... ... ... ..... the wakfs created prior to it. It is, therefore, not correct for the department to contend that the wakf would take effect only from the date of registration and not from any earlier point of time. According to us, on a consideration of the facts and circumstances in this case, the creation of the wakf by the assessee in 1947 is evidenced by the deed dated 30-9-1965, which is long before the relevant previous years. This is not to say that the wakf came into existence only by the deed of that date. All it means is that the existence of the wakf created in 1947 is evidenced by the document, namely, the deed dated 30-9-1965, and there can be no dispute on the question of its existence from that date onward. In these circumstances, we upheld the claim of the assessee that the inclusion of the income from the property concerned, in respect of which there was already a wakf created, is not justified. The addition is, accordingly, deleted. 5. In the result, the appeals are allowed.
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1982 (7) TMI 187 - ITAT MADRAS-A
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... ... ..... case. In that case the donor was a resident but not ordinarily resident person. He obtained drafts in U.S.A. where he was residing in favour of his father in Salem with a direction that the amount should be handed over to his brothers. It was held that the property gifted was money in American currency and delivery of the gifted property took place in America when the assessee obtained drafts from the American Banks. We consider that the position obtaining in the case before us is similar, fixed deposits are property situated in the foreign country and the delivery of the properties took place in the foreign countries when the instructions from the assessee reached its bankers in the foreign country. We, therefore, hold that the assessee is entitled to the benefit of s. 5(1) (ii) in respect of the impugned items for both the assessment years. We would allow the assessee rsquo s appeal for the asst. yr. 1975-76 and dismiss the revenue rsquo s appeal for the asst. yr. 1976-77.
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1982 (7) TMI 186 - ITAT MADRAS-A
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... ... ..... ment has in the case of CIT vs. M.N. Rajam (1982) 31 CTR (Mad) 85 (9182) 133 ITR 75(Mad) pointed out that a house property can be brought within the charge to the extent that its value exceeds Rs. 1 lakh and therefore it could not be asserted that it is a property in respect of which wealth-tax is not chargeable and consequently the entire loan outstanding in respect of that property could be deducted. A perusal of the form prescribed under the ED Act reveals that the revenue has understood the scope of the proviso to s.44 in the same light and it is specifically provided that the debts which are to be listed in Sch. 3 are to be deducted from the value of the gross immovable property in account No. 1 to arrive at the value of the net immovable property which alone is aggregated before deduction of the exemptions available u/s 33. This, in our opinion, will be sufficient to accept the view of the Appellate CED and reject the contentions of the revenue. The appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (7) TMI 185 - ITAT MADRAS-A
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... ... ..... ) on this point must therefore be reversed. 6. The assessee has pleaded for fresh opportunity to argue the merits of the appeal before the CIT(A). It was submitted that the Authorised Representative who appeared is no more and the assessee apprehends that because the appeal was allowed on a question of jurisdiction, all the aspects of the merits of the case might not have been presented properly. As an instance, it is pointed out that the question whether the inflation in the cash balance on the first day of the previous year could be considered to be concealment of that year or the earlier year has not been discussed in the order though such a question arose from the facts of the case and could have been put across. We see some force in this contention of the assessee and in the interest of justice, we set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restore the appeal to his file for fresh disposal in accordance with law. The appeal is treated as allowed for statistical purposes only.
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