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Case Laws
Showing 241 to 249 of 249 Records
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1984 (1) TMI 9 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
HUF, Impartible Estate, Net Wealth, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... t of partition of the sale proceeds of the jagir bonds amongst the members of the joint family could not be included in the wealth of the assessee under section 4(1)(a) of the Act. It may be pointed out that in the Income-tax Act, there was already a provision raising a legal fiction in respect of income arising out of house property in section 4(1)(a) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and thereafter in section 27(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 but there was no similar provision in the Wealth-tax Act until March 31, 1965. As we have already observed above, at the time when the provisions of section 4(6) were introduced in the Wealth-tax Act with effect from April 1, 1965, there was no impartible estate of the assessee in existence and, therefore, the question of deeming such an estate as a separate property of the holder of the impartible estate could not arise. In this view of the matter, we would answer the question referred to us in the negative and against the Revenue.
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1984 (1) TMI 8 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Association Of Persons ... ... ... ... ..... ng been made on one of its members on his share of the profits, no assessment of association as such can be made subsequently, but without considering the question whether the Income-tax Officer would have made such an assessment under section 4 of the Income-tax Act of 1961. We cannot, therefore, consider that to be a correct view of section 4. The decision in CIT v. Pure Nichitpur Colliery Co. 1975 101 ITR 79, no doubt supports the contention of the assessee. But that decision was not followed by a Bench of the Patna High Court in Mahendra Kumar Agrawalla v. ITO 1976 103 ITR 688 and was expressly dissented from in Rodamal Lalchand v. CIT 1977 109 ITR 7 (P and H). For the reasons which we have mentioned above, we prefer to follow the decision taken in Mahendra Kumar Agrawalla v. ITO 1976 103 ITR 688, and (not in ?) CIT v. Pune Nichitpur Colliery Company 1975 101 ITR 79. We accordingly answer the first question also in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No costs.
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1984 (1) TMI 7 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s under the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, Division Bench of this court has held in Bankatlal Tody v. CWT 1982 138 ITR 754, that the jurisdiction of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner for the purpose of imposing penalty arises on a reference made to him and if the reference was not validly made, then it follows that the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction to impose penalty. In the instant case, the reference was made by the Income-tax Officer on January 4,1978, when the provisions of section 274(2) of the Act requiring the Incometax Officer to refer the case to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner were deleted. Therefore, in our opinion, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, it must be held that the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction to impose penalty. Our answer to the question referred to this court is in the negative and against the Revenue. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1984 (1) TMI 6 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Business Profits, Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... exercised for acting upon the reports in the press. It may be that on occasions, the courts may draw on the ordinary experience of those who read newspapers at the present day as did Lord Fraser of Tullybelton in the Sikh Boy s Turban s case. (See 1983 2 WLR 620 at page 625). Referring to Law Lords of the House of Lords in that context, Lord Denning, in his latest book The Closing Chapter made the following statement (see page 82) I am tempted to suggest that if they do not read the newspapers, they must be sitting in an ivory tower. To my mind, that is not the right place for judge to sit. As observed by Virginia Woolf, the daily paper is history in the raw . I have considered the issues involved herein, bearing in mind the above aspects. It is sufficient to note that the press reports are, in the circumstances of the case, inadequate to establish, even prima facie, a mala fide exercise of power by the 1st respondent-Commissioner of Income-tax. I dismiss the writ petition.
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1984 (1) TMI 5 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Accrual, Income ... ... ... ... ..... ince the assessee has not maintained any accounts, he should be taken to be a non-trader and that in the cases of non-traders, interest income can be assessed on cash basis. We are not inclined to accept the said contention for the reason that the decisions in Whitworth Park Coal Co. Ltd. v. IRC 1960 40 ITR 517 (HL) and Mewar Industries Ltd. v. CIT 1963 47 ITR 72 (Raj) dealt with cases arising out of contract and not in respect of interest income arising out of a statutory liability. The decision in CIT v. Chunilal V Mehta and Sons (P.) Ltd. 1971 82 ITR 54 (SC) also related to a case where the court awarded interest on damages for wrongful termination of the managing agency agreement which cannot be said to be a statutory liability. The principle of those decisions cannot, therefore, apply to the case on hand. In this view, we have to agree with the decision of the Tribunal in this case. The question referred is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and against the Revenue.
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1984 (1) TMI 4 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , clearly distinguishable and cannot apply to this case. We are unable to agree that the mere fact that the business had been actually carried on by one of the heirs in partnership with another, after the dissolution of the prior partnership, in accordance with another deed of partnership, with liability to be taxed on its business profits, would suffice to attract the application of section 78(2) of the Act without reference to the other requirements thereof. We are unable to read either section 78(2) of the Act or the observations of the Supreme Court in Executors of the Estate of J K. Dubash v. CIT 1951 19 ITR 182 at p. 189 (SC) in the manner suggested by the learned counsel for the assessee. Having regard to these considerations, we hold that the Tribunal was right in concluding that the assessee was riot entitled to claim set off of business loss. We, therefore, answer the question in the affirmative and against the assessee. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1984 (1) TMI 3 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 4-65 in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. Regarding the assessment year 1966-67, it does not appear that the Explanation had been invoked by the Revenue in the course of the proceedings for levy of penalty. However, we had found earlier that there has been concealment and furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income by resorting to bogus credit entries in the account books. That would suffice to attract s. 271(1)(c) of the Act without any need to invoke the Explanation. For that year also, the Tribunal was not in order in cancelling the penalty without any materials. We, therefore, answer questions Nos. 1 and 2 for the assessment year 1966-67 in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. Inasmuch as before the Tribunal one of the creditors had been accepted to be a genuine creditor, effect will be given to such recognition in the course of the penalty proceedings. The Revenue will be entitled to recover the costs of this reference. Counsel s fee Rs. 500 (one set).
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1984 (1) TMI 2 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Casual And Non-recurring Receipt ... ... ... ... ..... ot arising from the exercise of any profession, vocation or occupation. That decision cannot, therefore, be pressed into service by the assessee to claim that, on the facts of this case also, the receipts would be exempt under section 10(3) of the Act. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Tribunal was quite correct in its conclusion that arbitration work was the occupation of the assessee and the receipts arose from the exercise of such occupation within the meaning of section 10(3) of the Act and, therefore, such receipts are taxable, as they are excluded from the purview of section 10(3) of the Act. We do not think it necessary to go into the question whether the receipts could be subjected to tax even if they happen to be casual and non-recurring, for, once the receipts are held to arise from the exercise of occupation , they will be taxable. We, therefore, answer the question in the affirmative and against the assessee. There will be, however, no order as to costs.
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1984 (1) TMI 1 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Penalty, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... delay in filing the return by his order dated March 2/6, 1974. It appears, in making the assessment, the penalty was fixed as if there was delay in filing the return on the date when the order was passed or on the date when the return was filed. This is patently wrong (sic). The penalty, if any, could be fixed for the period of assessment year as may be fixed under the Wealth-tax Act or the Finance Act as the case may be (sic). Be that as it may, the order itself is not a speaking order. From that order, it is very difficult to consider what led the Wealth-tax Officer to pass the relevant order. As this is a quasi-judicial proceeding, the authority concerned must pass a speaking order. Not having passed a speaking order, the order cannot be sustained and must be set aside which I hereby do. The matter is remitted to the competent authority for rehearing and decision in accordance with law. I have not decided the merits of the case at all. There will be no order as to costs.
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