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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 241 Records
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1985 (4) TMI 286 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ct, made available invoices along with the RT-12 returns is not clear. If, in fact, they had, they would be justified in their stand. The Price Lists covering the subject goods during the relevant period would also have helped to throw some light on the question. But these are not before us. Given this position, we think the best course, in the interests of justice, would be to set aside that part of the impugned order relating to the II group of appeals in so far as it relates to actual duty liability consequent on redetermination of assessable value. We order accordingly and direct the Collector (Appeals) to determine the issue of limitation and duty liability afresh after affording the appellants a reasonable opportunity to put forth their case. Since the matters are pretty old, the Collector (Appeals) shall endeavour to dispose them of within 3 months from the date of communication of this order. 10. The appeals are disposed of with the above observations and directions.
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1985 (4) TMI 285 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... edly (because of change in forms) within the same factory and under the same Tariff Item 18A “Cotton yarn, all sorts”. As already pointed out by us, such repeated taxation at intermediary stage would make the total exemption given to hank yarn meaningless and render that part of the exemption notification nugatory. It is settled law that an interpretation which makes any part of the statutory provision nugatory ought to be eschewed. The object of incorporating an extended definition of manufacture’ in Section 2(f) of the Act was to collect the duty if hank yarn was cleared after availing full exemption from duty and was later converted into some other form of cotton yarn. This is clearly evident from clause (iii) of the Proviso to Notification No. 131/77-C.E., dated 18-6-1977. 6. In the light of our above discussions, we are unable to find any fault with the impugned order of the Collector (Appeals). Accordingly, we uphold that order and reject this appeal.
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1985 (4) TMI 284 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cel of the chit agreement, Ex.A-1 for the instalments in respect of which default is committed, the plaintiff is entitled to interest at 12 per cent per annum. In my view, this must govern from the date of the first default, namely, the date of the ninth instalment being 15.4.1974. The plaintiff would be entitled to interest from the ninth instalment upto the fortieth instalment from the respective dates when they became due, at the rate of 12 per cent per annum, till the date of suit. Due credit should be given to the various amounts paid. The plaintiff would be entitled to interest on the principal at 6 per cent per annum from the date of the suit till date of realisation. The memorandum of cross-objections filed by the plaintiff is allowed in the above terms and the decree of the Court below will stand modified to the above effect and extent. 25. The plaintiff, respondent in the appeal, is entitled to costs. However, I disallow costs in the Memorandum of Cross Objections.
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1985 (4) TMI 283 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... there had been contravention on the part of the appellants of the relevant provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act and the rules made thereunder, with intent to evade payment of duty. The contention of Shri Chidambaram that there had been no intent to evade duty and, therefore, the provisions of the proviso to Section 11A are not satisfied, is not acceptable. Evasion need not involve concealment. Contravention of Law (like the failure of the appellants in this case to take out a licence and file a classification list) calculated to make duty uarealisable would also amount to evasion of duty. We, therefore, hold that the authorities were entitled to take action as provided under the proviso to Section 11A. We, therefore, further hold that there is no question of time-bar in the proceedings before the department. 16. The quantum of penalties levied do not also appeal to be excessive. In the circumstances, the order under appeal is confirmed and this appeal is dismissed.
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1985 (4) TMI 282 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... at the relevant time, they did not form part of the capital investment. In the present instance, it appears that some part of the capital investment was dismantled and removed and had been replaced by new machinery. It would not be proper to include, the value of dismantled machinery as well as the new machinery in arriving at the total value of the capital investment. The view to the contrary of the lower authorities does not appear to be correct. It was evidently to make this position clear that the Explanation to Notification No. 105/80 had been formulated in the manner extracted earlier. 7. We, therefore, hold that for purpose of Notification No. 89/79-CE the value of any machinery which had been dismantled and was not part of the plant at the material time should be excluded. We further hold that if by such explanation the appellants are entitled to benefit of Notification No. 89/79-CE they shall be given consequential benefit. The appeal is allowed in the above terms.
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1985 (4) TMI 281 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... was not acting as an adjudicating authority in deciding whether an appeal was to be filed or not. He was in the position of a litigant only to decide whether an appeal was to be filed or not. The fact, that the Trade Advice of the Board was also referred to in this connection for arriving at the decision, does not mean that the Collector was guided by the Trade Advice only or that he could not refer to the same in coming to his conclusion. The Trade Advice had been brought to the notice of the Collector by the office and he had taken that also into consideration, as he was entitled to. 13. We, therefore, hold that the Collector had, after taking into consideration the relevant material, decided to file an appeal against the order of the Appellate Collector and that the correctness of this decision is not open to challenge. 14. Accordingly, the preliminary objections raised by Shri Chandra-sekharan are over-ruled and the appeal is directed to be posted for hearing on merits.
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1985 (4) TMI 280 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there are relevant materials on which a reasonable belief or conviction could have been entertained by the detaining authority on the grounds mentioned in section 3(1) of the said Act?
Held that:- In this case there was evidence before the authorities concerned that 60 gold biscuits of foreign origin without any explanation of their importation were found in the possession of the father-that is undisputed. Venilal could not give any explanation of their being in there possession. These were smuggled. Secondly , there was evidence in view of the subsequent other facts independent of the confessions of the father and the sons and the daughter that the father was in contact with persons who were buying smuggled gold from him and buying at high prices. Their telephone number were found and they could be identified from the papers seized during the search at his hotel room.
In the background of the facts and circumstances of this case the procedural safeguards have been complied with as far as practicable. There are no merits in the fancied grievances of the detenus. Appeal dismissed.
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1985 (4) TMI 279 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... not even arise where a suit has been filed claiming title in a civil court and the question whether any title has been acquired by the plaintiff, the alleged transfer being a fraudulent transaction, arises for consideration. 4.. Learned counsel for the appellant then contended that the plaintiff should have at least been given a notice before proceeding to recover sales tax dues from the suit house. There is no basis to hold that the plaintiff was entitled to such a notice on the basis of her claim to ownership of the suit house by virtue of the aforesaid gift deed. It was for the plaintiff to assert and prove her title when action was taken to recover the amount due and this she attempted to do by first filing an objection before the recovery officer and then by the suit after rejection of her objection by the recovery officer. 5.. There is no ground to interfere in this appeal. It is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee according to schedule, if certified. Appeal dismissed.
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1985 (4) TMI 278 - HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... A.M. Ansari) the word dealer was defined in a different manner. In the present case by the Amendment Act the definition of the word dealer specifically states that the business of such dealer may be regular or otherwise. Hence in view of the definition under the Act as is incorporated by the Amendment Act, the appellants will be considered to be dealers because they had been admittedly auctioning the forest produce twice in every year and were carrying on this business regularly or otherwise. In these circumstances, the notice demanding sales tax from the respondent is valid and the same is not liable to be quashed. It cannot be held that the respondent is not liable to pay the sales tax. No other point was urged before us. As a result of the above discussion, the judgment of the learned single Judge is set aside and the present appeal is accepted. The writ petition filed on behalf of the respondent is dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.
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1985 (4) TMI 277 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s adverted clinches the point against the assessee because the payment was acknowledged to be a commission paid to an agent and the State Government was admitted to be one of such agents. However, even apart from pinning down the assessee to the concession, on an analysis of the various provisions of law and the peculiar nature of the transaction involved in such purchase, I am of the opinion that the charges paid to the State Government by the petitioner under the expression administrative charges do essentially partake the character of payment made to commission agent. Consequently, it cannot escape the trappings of purchase price and such amount must be included in the turnover. I am inclined to agree with the view expressed by the Division Bench of this Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., Lucknow v. Jagroop Ram Bhagwati Prasad, Sutterhatti, Jaunpur 1980 UPTC 1043. 8.. In the result I find no force in this revision and it is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1985 (4) TMI 276 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... notice till the correct amounts payable by the petitioner have been ascertained by the officer concerned. Since applications made by the petitioner for refund are also pending we are of the opinion that while determining the amount payable by the petitioner in pursuance of this order it would be appropriate in the ends of justice that pending applications for refund made by the petitioner may also be simultaneously disposed of. In the result the writ petition succeeds and is allowed to this extent that the proceedings for recovery on the basis of the impugned notice (annexure I to the writ petition) are quashed and the respondents are directed to redetermine the amount payable by the petitioner in the light of the observations made above and to proceed to recover such amount only which is found payable by the petitioner on a redetermination made in the manner stated above. In the circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs. Writ petition allowed.
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1985 (4) TMI 275 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed by the Special Secretary to Government, Commercial Taxes Department. It is mentioned in annexure 1 that a newly set-up industry will be exempted from both the general sales tax and special sales tax for a period of five years since after it starts production. This has also been held by a Division Bench of this Court in Bihar Udyog v. State of Bihar 1981 RLJ 103 that the period of five years shall be counted from the date the industry starts its production and the industry will be entitled to exemption for a period of five years from the date it starts its production even if that period may go beyond the life of the notification. 6.. In this view of the matter, the sales tax authority had no authority in law to issue the notice as contained in annexure 3. The petitioner is entitled to exemption for the period from 11th December, 1974, to 10th December, 1979. 7.. In the result, the petition is allowed and annexure 3 is hereby quashed. The parties shall bear their own costs.
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1985 (4) TMI 274 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... adjournment. The party, however, did have a right to have his application considered. It was not considered. Indeed, the Sales Tax Officer proceeded to record differently in his order of May 5, 1980, which we have extracted above. There is a clear nonapplication of mind and casual approach to the assessment. It is surprising that even the appellate and the revisional authorities did not examine this aspect. In this view of the matter we are persuaded to hold that the petitioner has been assessed ex parte without an adequate opportunity being granted to it. The impugned orders of assessment, the appellate orders and the revisional orders are, therefore, quashed. The respondents will be free to make assessment again in accordance with law. We direct the petitioner to appear or cause appearance to be put in before the Sales Tax Officer on May 6, 1985, for further proceedings in the assessment for the year 1976-77. In the circumstances of the case we make no orders as to costs.
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1985 (4) TMI 273 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed shrouded in mystery. The assessee was never told who was the person who gave information and in the absence of any material to that effect, the books of account could not be rejected on mere guess-work until and unless the department disclosed the source of information or particulars about the enquiry. That having not been done by the department I am of the opinion that the books of account of the assessee were wrongly rejected and they are liable to be accepted. Since the books of account have been held to be acceptable, the turnover has to be fixed by the Tribunal again treating the books of account as acceptable. In the result the revision succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by the Tribunal is quashed and it is directed to fix the turnover of the assessee treating the books of account as acceptable. However, there will be no order as to costs. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Tribunal concerned as contemplated under section 11(8) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act.
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1985 (4) TMI 272 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nd has also not been able to point out anything in the fixation of turnover. However, he argued that the imposition of tax was not justified on the assessee inasmuch as on the purchases made by him the tax had already been paid. He contended that the mere fact that no form III was issued could not give rise to presumption against the assessee. The Tribunal has recorded a finding of fact that the assessee did not furnish any proof regarding the payment of tax on the purchases made by him. It may be that the mere fact that it did not produce any form III was not enough to raise a presumption against the assessee but it was the duty of the assessee to have produced the materials and details about the purchases made by him. That having not been done by the assessee, the Tribunal was wholly justified in imposing the tax on the assessee. No other point has been pressed in this case. In the result, the revision fails and is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1985 (4) TMI 271 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... launched against the petitioner. We find much substance in these contentions. Even otherwise, under section 69 the Commissioner is authorised to compound the offences. This compounding could be either before or after the institution of the proceedings, and in the case of minor offences if the Commissioner thinks it fit to issue a show cause notice so as to consider as to whether the offence is a fit one which could be compounded, obviously if the accused is ready to do so, it cannot be said that there is anything illegal in the said procedure. It cannot universally apply to all cases. Further, it was also open to the petitioner to approach the Commissioner, if he was ready and willing to compound the offences. Compounding of offences must ultimately depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no general rule can be laid down in that behalf. 8.. In the view which we have taken, therefore, we do not find any substance in this writ petition. The rule is discharged.
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1985 (4) TMI 270 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... or alloy other than brass or aluminium, from two paise per rupee to three paise per rupee at all points of sale. A perusal of the aforesaid notification indicates that the intention to enhance the rate of tax was in respect of the turnover of wares made by any metal or alloy other than brass or aluminium. The commodity manufactured by the assessee in this case was admittedly not wares. On the other hand the counsel for the assessee has invited my attention to Notification No. S.T.-1366/X-990-1956 dated 1st April, 1960, and has contended that the tax has rightly been imposed by the Sales Tax Officer in view of the aforesaid notification dated 1st April, 1960. Since in the instant case the commodity manufactured was not wares, in my opinion, the notification dated 21st May, 1963, will not apply and tax would be levied according to the notification dated 1st April, 1960. In the result the revision fails and is accordingly dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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1985 (4) TMI 269 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ld not be dismissed on that ground. Non-compliance of rule 67(2) has been held to be directory and not mandatory and if the said defect can be cured before the appeal is heard by the Tribunal, the requirement of rule 66(5) can also be fulfilled before the appeal is heard and non-compliance of rule 66(5) is not so fatal which may result in the dismissal of the appeal itself. In the instant case an application was made by the State Representative that the mistake was inadvertent. In view of the aforesaid fact the Tribunal was not justified in rejecting the appeal on that ground. In the result the revision succeeds and is allowed. The order of the Tribunal is quashed and the case is remanded back to the Tribunal to decide the appeal afresh in the light of the observations made above. Since the assessee is not represented through any counsel, there will be no order as to costs. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Tribunal concerned as required under section 11(8) of the Act.
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1985 (4) TMI 268 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tunity was granted in this behalf to the respondents to explain the circumstances in which the said application could not be decided so far, no counter-affidavit has been filed. As such, we are of opinion that a case has been made out for issuing a direction to respondent No. 2 to decide the application now without any further delay. In the result this writ petition succeeds and is allowed to this extent that the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial), Sales Tax, Ghaziabad, respondent No. 2, is directed to decide the aforesaid application made by the petitioner under section 22 of the Act on 2nd November, 1979, within two months of the production of a certified copy of this order by the petitioners before him. This order, however, shall not be applicable in the aforesaid application has already been decided. There shall be no order as to costs. A copy of this order may be supplied to counsel for the parties within three days on payment of necessary charges. Writ petition allowed.
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1985 (4) TMI 267 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... te was produced from the raw materials purchased at concessional rate or from raw materials purchased without concessional rate. Even assuming that an assessee is required to maintain an account in a particular manner and if he has failed to do it, the only consequence would be that his accounts be not accepted and be liable to a best judgment assessment, but that failure to maintain the accounts would not ipso facto warrant a conclusion as contended by the learned Advocate-General on behalf of the department. The matter of penalty would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case in the light of the discussion made by us hereinabove while discussing question No. (1). 14.. In the above view of the matter, question No. (2) has also to be answered in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the department. 15.. In the result, the reference is disposed of as indicated hereinabove. We make no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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