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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 273 Records
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1985 (7) TMI 228 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Benefit of exemption notification ... ... ... ... ..... ssential identity subject to the effect of the manufacturing process carried out, the benefit of the Notification under reference would be available (reference paragraph 23). 15. emsp On observation of the samples, sent by the appellants, the authenticity of which has not been disputed by the respondent, we find that the present is a case, which happens to be one of such cases, where the essential identity of the article (Brass Rods in this case) is not lost, and the same is kept intact, after the intended manufacturing process has been carried out. We, thus, find that the facts, here are entirely different from the facts of the case before the Larger Bench. On the other band, the situation falls within the contingencies contemplated in that judgment itself, and is analogous to the cases decided by Gujarat, Calcutta, Madras and Bombay High Courts, and so the appellants cannot be denied benefit of this Notification. We, accordingly, allow the appeal, with consequential relief.
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1985 (7) TMI 227 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Levy of Additional Duty of customs on imported PVA ... ... ... ... ..... India pays only 10 is an assumption one cannot accept. Furthermore, the 10 is not the duty leviable on PVA but is the duty leviable on PVA manufactured in a particular manner. 34. emsp The argument confuses duty levied with duty leviable. The duty of 10 may have been levied, as claimed by the learned Counsel, on all PVA produced in India. But there is another higher duty leviable, and which would have been levied in certain circumstances. The 10 duty is not leviable except on goods manufactured from duty paid monomer and even if this has been so far the only duty levied, it is not the duty leviable on PVA made from monomer which had not paid the (Indian) excise duty. This excise duty has not been shown to have been paid by the monomer from which this PVA was produced. Therefore, 10 is not the leviable rate of duly and plays no part in determining the additional duty leviable under section 3 of C.T.A. 35. I therefore, agree with learned brother Sankaran and allow this appeals.
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1985 (7) TMI 226 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Application to the High Court ... ... ... ... ..... Section 188 are similar to the provisions of Section 35 of the Central Excises and Salt Act. Thus there is a direct decision of the Supreme Court that with reference to provisions as contained in Section 35 of the Central Excises and Salt Act where there is no specific provision for preferring the appeal by post it would be the date of actual receipt in the office of the Appellate authority that would be the date of filing of the appeal and not the date of presentation to the post office of the envelope containing the appeal for onward transmission. 10. emsp Since, therefore, we find that the question of law which is required to be referred to the Hon rsquo ble High Court at Allahabad has already been answered by the Supreme Court, and the judgment of this Tribunal dated 17-4-1984 is in accordance with the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court, there are no grounds to make any reference to the High Court as requested by the petitioner. 11.The petition is accordingly dismissed.
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1985 (7) TMI 225 - CEGAT, MADRAS
Gold -Declaration of gold owned, possessed, held etc. by licensed dealer liable to contravention
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1985 (7) TMI 224 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Manufacture ... ... ... ... ..... t a raw material as mentioned in amended rules 9 and 49 of the Excise Rules. Rule 56-A talks of material while Rules 9 and 49 talk of raw material which in the case of paper would be substances like pulp, rags etc. and wrapping paper cannot be said to be a raw material used in the manufacture of other varieties of paper. It is neither a component part as it does not become an integral part of the packed paper nor it is a raw material for the manufacture of finished product i.e. other varieties of paper and therefore, respondents are not entitled to take the benefit under the amended Rules 9 and 49. They can however, take the benefit under Rule 56-A of the Central Excise Rules if conditions mentioned therein are fully satisfied. The Collector (Appeals) has gone wrong while extending the benefit of amended Rules 9 and 49 of Central Excise Rules, to the respondent and therefore, I set aside the order passed by the Collector (Appeals) and accept the appeal filed by the Collector.
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1985 (7) TMI 223 - CEGAT, DELHI
Appellate Order enforceable ... ... ... ... ..... d discussing the case law on the point it was held that under proviso to Notification No. 46/71, dated 24-4-1971 corrugated board produced out of kraft paper or kraft liner or corrugating medium of a substance equal to or exceeding 65 grammes per sq. metre on which excise duty has been paid at the rate of 37.5 ad valorem shall be exempt from payment of duty. Thus, the condition for availing exemption under this notification was payment of duty on the raw material at the rate of 37.5 and not just indeterminate rate of duty. In the present case, the appellants did not pay duty on such kraft paper from which the appellants have manufactured corrugated boards/rolls at the rate of 37.5 ad valorem and therefore, the authorities below are justified in holding that the corrugated boards/rolls made out of such kraft paper are not eligible for the full duty concession under Notification No. 14/78-CE, dated 24-1-1978. 14. We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal and dismiss the same.
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1985 (7) TMI 221 - CEGAT, MADRAS
Gold dealer’s licence ... ... ... ... ..... ew of this conclusion, it is not necessary to go into the further question whether the period of work in Ramesh Jewellery in a honorary capacity on the part of the respondent would be employment as mentioned in proviso (f) to Rule 2(f). 7. emsp Since we hold that the respondent was not entitled to the benefit of proviso (f) to Rule 2(f), his application ought to be considered under Rule 2(a) to (f) without benefit of the proviso (f) to Rule 2(f). As earlier mentioned, the number of licensed dealers had continuously increased from 1980 to 1982 without any proportionate increase in the total turnover, to justify the grant of further licences, this is what has been held by the Deputy Collector and upheld by the Collector (Appeals) also. We, therefore, hold that the respondent was not entitled to grant of the licence applied for. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the order of the Collector (Appeals) is set aside, restoring the order of the Deputy Collector referred to supra.
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1985 (7) TMI 213 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Exemption Notifications are prospective in character ... ... ... ... ..... ulated at a flat rate, though it appears, that there were various rates of duty during the period covered in the show cause notice. 11.In the result, we allow the appeal partially, in the following terms - (i)The demand, insofar as it relates to the period from 2-2-1972 onwards, is set aside on the ground of time-bar under rule 10 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 (ii) emsp On the question of rate applicable as well as computation of the duty on the appropriate assessable value for the period prior to 2-2-1972 the matter is remanded to the Collector (Appeals) of Central Excise, Madras with directions to re-assess the duty in the light of the observations contained in this order as well as other decisions of this Tribunal in Orders No. 633/83-D, dated 15-10-1983 (M/s. Ruby Rubber Works Ltd., Changanacherry, Kerala v. Collector of Central Excise, Cochin) and No. 756/83-D, dated 21-11-1983 (M/s. Rani Rubber Factory, Changanacherry, Kerala v. Collector of Central Excise, Cochin).
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1985 (7) TMI 212 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Cotton fabrics ... ... ... ... ..... is misplaced because no question of Ejusdem Generis arises here. No question of going into the historical evolution of tariff entry 19 arises also because, as already stated by us, bed-sheets etc. were named as a specific excisable article in the tariff entry before the amending Act of 1980 and they continue to be so named even thereafter. Since there is no ambiguity in the tariff entry so far as bed-sheets etc. are concerned, no question of contemporanea expositio also arises, nor could the two Tariff Advices of the Central Board of Excise and Customs be given the status of contemporanea expositio. In fact, the Tariff Advices related to towels and blankets-two different products which are not named in the tariff entry. The Advices were themselves issued long after the inclusion of bed-sheets etc. in the tariff entry. 11. emsp Summing up, we find no merit in any of the arguments put forth by the appellants. In the result, we uphold the impugned orders and reject this appeal.
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1985 (7) TMI 211 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
“contraband goods” ... ... ... ... ..... msp Shri Harbans Singh then referred to the questions 5 and 6 and contended that even apart from the retraction the very contents of the statements alleged to have been made by the petitioner would not suffice to make out a case against him and that there are circumstances to show that the alleged statements could not have been voluntarily made. But this would again raise a question of fact only as to the sufficiency of the circumstances to make out the unvoluntary nature of the statement recorded. There is no question of law involved on this matter also. 14. emsp As earlier mentioned though the application refers to 21 questions, Shri Harbans Singh confined his submissions to the questions mentioned above only and did not refer to the other questions during his arguments. Since we have already held that the questions with reference to which Shri Harbans Singh made submissions are not questions of law to be referred to the Hon rsquo ble High Court, we reject this application.
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1985 (7) TMI 202 - CEGAT, MADRAS
Accountal of - Accountal of gold ornaments held by licensed dealer, in such capacity, at premises even other than his licensed premises, in subsidiary GS 12 register, obligatory
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1985 (7) TMI 199 - ITAT PUNE
... ...
... ... ..... s . Lockers are available to all on fulfilment of the conditions regarding payment, etc. The locker-holder need have any in link with the banking activities. The locker hiring activity is only because of the permissive cl. 6(1)(A) of Banking Act. In this respect (1983) 149 ITR 438 (MP) is clearly distinguishable. What applies to commission or brokerage in respect of banking does not apply by implication to other activities and the present one. Past history may be persuasive but does not operate as estoppel. 8. Analogy regarding take over of business through nationalisation is not apt. What was taken over was not banking business but the undertaking of the banking companies. Such undertaking covered all activities which could fall under business of the banks including executor and trustee, consultancy etc. Thus the undertaking included lockers and vaults through not part of the business of banking. We therefore uphold the view of AAC on this point. 9. Appeal is partly allowed.
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1985 (7) TMI 198 - ITAT PUNE
... ...
... ... ..... atio of that case does not apply to the facts of the present case. In S. K. Dutta, ITO vs. Lawrence Singh Ingty (1968) 68 ITR 272 (SC) their Lordships were concerned with the income earned and not the source from which the recruitment is made. Admittedly there can be no distinction between the income earned as salaried employee of the govt. on one hand and non-Govt. on the other, as far as tax liability is concerned, in view of Art. 14 of the Constitution. There can, however still be a distinction the basis of the persons entitled to get selected for employment in Govt. service. As the persons entitled to become beneficiaries do come from a cross section of the public, we hold that the respondent fund is for the benefit of the public even during the years when the new scheme was not operative. in view of this position, we need not examine other contentions raised by either side. Accordingly we hold that the AAC was justified on the facts before him. 10. Appeals are dismissed.
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1985 (7) TMI 197 - ITAT PUNE
... ...
... ... ..... Shri Srinivasan submitted that as long as one partner continues before the change and after the change the provisions of s. 187 are attracted. 5. On behalf of the respondent Shri Nerkar relied on the orders of the authorities below and also submitted that there is actually dissolution deed showing clearly the new firm is entirely different from the old firm. 6. On an examination of the facts, we find that it is not necessary to examine the case law relied upon by the two sides. From the partnership deed and the dissolution deed, it is clear that at the end of 30th Jun, 1980, for a short period, the business became the proprietary concern of Shri Dhondiram Kasture, What came into existence from 1st July., 1980. Therefore, a new partnership. The conditions is, of s. 187 are, therefore, not fulfilled on facts, This is a case actually of conversion of proprietary concern into a partnership from 1st July, 1980. The order of the AAC is therefore correct. 7. The appeal is dismissed.
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1985 (7) TMI 191 - ITAT MADRAS-D
... ...
... ... ..... n that case the excess that was paid to the retiring partner was not considered as a capital gain in the hands of the retiring partner. When that was the case there is no question of considering any capital gains in the present case as no transfer is involved when the price of the capital asset was adjusted in the capita accounts of the two retiring partners. When there was no transfer there was no question of computing the capital gains. No distinction can be drawn between the retirement of a partner and the dissolution of a firm as both of them are treated on the same footing as per the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Therefore, there was no scope of computing the capital gains under law. When there was no scope to compute the capital gains the question whether it should be long term capital gains or short-term capital gains does not arise. 7. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the orders of the lower authorities on the point of capital gains are set aside.
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1985 (7) TMI 190 - ITAT MADRAS-D
... ...
... ... ..... capital of the firm and actual amount contributed by the partners and, therefore, there was no need for agreement to contribute capital as a consideration for admission of new partners. 9. The Tribunal in the case of Smt. G. Sarawathi Ammal (1984) 10 ITD 198 (Mad) cited supra in similar circumstances held likewise by relying on the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Ali Hussain M. Jivaji after duly noting the earlier decision of he Madras High Court in the case of Ayya Nadar, cited supra. Even the decision of Madras High Court in the case of M.K. Kuppuraj, cited supra is not applicable to the assessee rsquo s case, as we have pointed out earlier there is not only consideration but also adequate consideration. 10. In this view of the matte we set aside the order of the AAC and the GTO and direct that the transaction in this case was not liable to gift-tax as there was not only consideration but also adequate consideration. 11. In the result the appeal is allowed.
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1985 (7) TMI 187 - ITAT MADRAS-D
Partner In Firm ... ... ... ... ..... of the deed of partnership narrates the total capital of the firm and the actual amount contributed by the partners and, therefore, there was no need for agreement to contribute capital as a consideration for admission of new partners. 9. The Tribunal in the case of Smt. G. Saraswathi Ammal in similar circumstances held likewise by relying on the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Ali Hussain M. Jeevaji after duly noting the earlier decision of the Madras High Court in the case of V.A.M. Ayya Nadar. Even the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of M.K. Kuppuraj is not applicable to the assessee s case, as we have pointed out earlier there is not only consideration but also adequate consideration. 10. In this view of the matter, we set aside the orders of the AAC and the GTO and direct that the transaction in this case was not liable to gift-tax as there was not only consideration but also adequate consideration. 11. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1985 (7) TMI 185 - ITAT MADRAS-C
... ...
... ... ..... e basis that the assessee has received the salary/remuneration from the partnership firm for the services rendered by him individually and such a remuneration is not the income of the HUF which is a partner through him. As a natural corollary I have to hold that the remuneration paid to the assessee as an individual cannot be held to be a mere method of distribution of profits. It is a salary/remuneration which the assessee gets for the services rendered in his individual capacity. This being so, I am of the view that its character in the hands of the assessee is nothing but salary and, therefore, he is entitled to statutory deduction under s. 16(1). For these and other reasons given by the ld. Accountant Member with which I agree. I held that the remuneration is assessable in the hands of the assessee as salary which qualifies for standard deduction under s. 16(1). 3. The Third Member order will now go to the Division Bench for deciding the appeal according to majority view.
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1985 (7) TMI 184 - ITAT MADRAS-C
... ...
... ... ..... t is again the task of the ITO or the AAC to satisfy himself whether the circumstances which emerged from the record indicate any reasonable cause or not. In such case, the task of the officer concerned in reaching a decision becomes very light. When, however, some reasons have been advanced, it is his duty to examine and find out whether it is reasonable or not in the circumstances of the case and the situation of the assessee. CIT vs. Dargapandarinath Tuljaya and Co. (1977) 107 ITR 850 (AP) (FB). In this case the assessee advanced a reasonable cause which was accepted by the AAC. Thus, on considering the facts appearing in this case and the explanation offered by the assessee, we are of the opinion that the AAC was quite correct and reasonable in cancelling the penalty levied under s. 271(1)(c). In that view of the matter, we confirm the order passed by the AAC and dismiss the appeal filed by the Department. 4. In the result, the appeal filed by the Department is dismissed.
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1985 (7) TMI 181 - ITAT MADRAS-C
Exemptions, Gifts For Education Of Children ... ... ... ... ..... igh Court held that (i) that as the local statutes prohibited the performance of marriage during the continuance of a prior marriage, G was not the lawful wedded wife of the assessee and their children were not legitimate (ii) that wife in section 16(3)(a)(iii) meant legal wife, and Child in section 16(3)(a)(iv) meant legitimate child and (iii) that, therefore, the income derived by G and her children from the assets transferred by the assessee were not covered by section 16(3)(a)(iii) and (iv) and could not be included in the assessee s total income. 8. But, however, in the absence of any definition given by the Act to the expression children occurring in section 5(1)(xii), we prefer to follow the interpretation given by the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Narayani Ammal in understanding the word children occurring in section 5(1)(xii). Accordingly, we uphold the order passed by the AAC on this point and dismiss the appeal filed by the department.
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