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Showing 1 to 20 of 271 Records
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1987 (11) TMI 404 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 397(3) Cr.P.C. should have been taken note of to reject the revision at the instance of the State Government or action taken by the High Court in exercise of its inherent power has to be sustained. It is not disputed by counsel appearing for the State that the move before the High Court was really on application for revision of the order of the Magistrate releasing the truck. That is exactly what is prohibited under Section 397(3) Cr.P.C. Merely by saying that the jurisdiction of the High Court for exercise of its inherent power was being invoked the statutory bar could not have been overcome. If that was to be permitted every revision application facing the bar of Section 397(3) of the Code could be labelled as one under Section 482. We are satisfied that this is a case where the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the revision. The appeal is allowed and we set aside the order of the High Court. The Order of the Magistrate as affirmed by the Session Judge is upheld.
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1987 (11) TMI 403 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion. It is hoped that under such circumstances the State ought not to have evinced interest in the matter. It ought to have left the matter to the accused Mahadeva only. The State Public Prosecutor submitted that the State was misled as Mahadevaiah had been described in the complaint itself as Sub Divisional Magistrate. But whatever be the reason, the State ought not to have filed the revision as the complaint has been filed describing the accused as A. Mahadeva. The other contentions raised by the State Public Prosecutor regarding want of sanction contemplated by Section 197 Cr.P.C. is not decided in this case, as the matter is disposed of only on the said technical ground. The other contentions also have not been decided in this case and they are kept open. 14. In the result, the order passed by the Magistrate is set aside. The revision is allowed. The matter is sent back to the Magistrate for fresh disposal in accordance with law in the light of the directions given above.
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1987 (11) TMI 402 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... y the detaining authority to pass an order of detention if the reach, effect and potentiality of the act are such that disturbs public tranquillity by creating terror and panic in the society or a considerable number of the people in a specified locality where the act is alleged to have been committed. Thus it is the degree and extent of the reach of the act upon the society which is vital for considering the question whether a man has committed only a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause disturbance to public order. 11. It is pertinent to note in this connection that the Criminal Appeals Nos. 826 and 827 of 1985 arising out of the same incident and identical grounds of detention, filed by Ashok Arora and Ashok Kumar Sonkar have been allowed by this Hon'ble Court by its order dated November 29, 1985 and the appellants were directed to be set at liberty forthwith. 12. For the reasons aforesaid, we allow the appeals without any order as to costs.
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1987 (11) TMI 401 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s "right up to the highest post". Moreover the writ petitioner has challenged the decision of a co-operative society in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. No writ will lie against a Co-operative Society and the writ petition should have been dismissed on that short ground. For both the reasons, the appeal has to be allowed. 37. The counsel for the appellant, however, submitted that the appellant-Bank will consider the matter afresh in accordance with our decision on the scope and content of R. 200. For this purpose, the 2nd respondent can make a representation before the appellant within one month from today and the Bank has undertaken to pass fresh orders and not to revert the 2nd respondent till such decision is rendered In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the learned single Judge is set aside, the Original Petition is dismissed subject to the above observations. Parties will bear the costs. A reproduction from ILR (Kerala Series)
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1987 (11) TMI 400 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... over, we have already upheld the finding of the High Court that the order of detention is illegal and bad for non-supply of vital documents to the detenus to enable them to make an effective representation against the grounds of detention and as such their right to make an effective representation as contemplated under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India has been infringed rendering the impugned order as illegal and bad. Furthermore, the non-production of relevant materials i.e. the statement of the under-trial prisoners in their application in the court that the detenus had been falsely implicated in the crime case No. 450 of 1985 under Section 307/34 I.P.C. as mentioned in ground No. 3 and also the statement to that effect in the bail petition and the police report thereon, before the detaining authority for his consideration before passing the order of detention, renders the order of detention invalid and illegal. 15. For the reasons aforesaid we dismiss the appeal.
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1987 (11) TMI 399 - ITAT JAIPUR
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... ... ..... the authorities below is that the places at which the purchases were made was very different from the place of business of the assessee. As per the Board's Circular No. 220 dt. 31st May,1977 sub-cl. (4) is the circumstances which would invoke the applicability of r. 6 DD(j). According to this, if the transactions are made at a place where either the purchaser or the seller does not have a bank account would be an exceptional circumstance. It also provides that in case of a seller who is acting as commission agent he is required to pay cash in turn to the person from whom he had purchased the goods. Since the place at which the purchases were made assessee did not have a bank account and that place being not the place of business of the assessee, it would be squarely covered by exception of the circumstances spelt out in r.6DD(j) and accordingly the purchases so made should not have been disallowed. We, therefore, allow the claim of the assessee and the appeal is allowed.
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1987 (11) TMI 398 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he explanation properly with reference to the stock position of the coal held by the assessee during the relevant period in these two years. The findings of the Sales Tax Tribunal that the assessee had operated its brick kiln in the disputed periods, are not based on any relevant material. In these circumstances, such findings cannot be sustained. Since, the turnover for the first and second seasons have not been worked out separately and the estimate has been made for the entire year, it is necessary to refer back the matter to the Sales Tax Tribunal which shall redetermine the question of turnover afresh. 8. - The Sales Tax Tribunal while giving effect to this judgment under Section 11 (8) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, shall restore the assessee's appeals giving rise to these revisions to their original numbers and shall decide them afresh keeping in view the observations made above and in accordance with law. 9. The revisions succeed in part and are allowed accordingly.
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1987 (11) TMI 397 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the Industrial Disputes Act and that Act must prevail. In the premises, there is no conflict between the two Acts and there is no question of repugnancy. The High Court was, therefore, right in holding that the respondent was workman and in granting relief on that basis. Before we conclude we note that our attention was drawn to certain observations of this Court that interference by the High Court in these matters at the initial stage protracts adjudication and defeats justice. Reference was made to certain observations in P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Admn. & Ors., (supra). But as mentioned hereinbefore in this case, the interference was made by the High Court not at the initial stage. In the premises, we are of the opinion that the High Court was right in the view it took. These appeals, therefore, fail and are accordingly dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. The reference before the Tribunal should proceed as expeditiously as possible. Appeals dismissed.
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1987 (11) TMI 396 - HIGH COURT ORISSA
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... ... ..... ion of the Act, the executor is not required to wait for the grant of the probate but can ipso facto being the legal representative prosecute the lis in view of the devolution of the interest under Order 22, Rule 10 of the Civil P.C. inasmuch as the testator's title stands vested in the executor on the his death. The case of an administrator may, however, be different, because he has to wait until grant of the letters of administration in his favour by the court. The proposition is well settled, and if any authority is needed I may refer to a case of the Patna High Court in Ramcharan Singh v. Mst. Dharohar Kuer 5. The learned Subordinate Judge, therefore, has committed an apparent error of jurisdiction in rejecting the application of the petitioners. The revision application therefore, must succeed and is accordingly allowed. The trial court is directed to transpose the petitioners to the category of plaintiff. I shall, however, leave the parties to bear their own costs.
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1987 (11) TMI 395 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board." Thus it is open to the petitioners to apply to the Board and obtain its consent on the facts of this case in its own and in the interest of the properties as stated, in the present petition for permitting the Receiver to be appointed. Without such consent as stated in this section, it would not be proper to further continue the present proceedings in view of Section 22. On the facts of this case and on the basis of affidavits filed by the parties, I am of the, opinion that the circumstances are such which lead to irresistible inference that enquiry is pending under Section 16 of the Act. 14. In view of the aforesaid position, it is not possible to this Court to grant any relief, or reliefs (b) and (c), at this stage. 15. With these observations, the present application is disposed of. 16. A copy of this order may be given to the learned counsel for the parties on payment of usual charges within three days.
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1987 (11) TMI 394 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... shifting we direct the decree for eviction shall not be executed before 30.6.1988 provided the appellant files the usual undertaking in this Court within four weeks from today. Mesne profits will be payable from 1st of December 1987 ₹ 7,000 per month until the possession is delivered. 1. That the appellant will hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the premises to the respondents on or before 30.6.1988 from today. 2. That the appellant will pay to the respondent arrears of rent, if any, within one month from today. 3. That the appellant will pay to respondent further compensation for use and occupation of the premises month by month before 10th of every month. 4. That the appellant will not induct any other person in the premises. The Court further directs that in default of compliance with any one or more of these conditions or if the undertaking is not filed as required within the stipulated time, the decree shall become executable forthwith. Appeal dismissed.
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1987 (11) TMI 393 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... aterial to the detaining authority which was a vitiating factor. This Court had occasion to deal with them in Pushpadevi M. Jatia v. M.L. Wadhawan, Additional Secretary, Government of India and others, 1987 3 SCC 367 in para 12 of its judgment. These decisions proceed on the well settled principle that if 'material and vital facts' which would influence the mind of the detaining authority one way or the other on the question whether or not to make the detention order, are not placed, it would vitiate the subjective satisfaction rendering the detention order illegal. That is not so in the present case. There was ample material before the District Magistrate for him to base his subjective satisfaction as to the necessity for passing impugned order as stated by him in his affidavit. 12. We do not find any merit in the case for quashing the impugned detention order and accordingly both the writ petition and the special leave application are dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1987 (11) TMI 392 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nuary 31,1985 and Juris 5, 1985 issued under Section 4 (a) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, the question whether H. D. P. E. fabrics were liable to be treated as artificial silk fabrics and, therefore, exempt from levy of sales tax under the notification dated November 25, 1968, was considered by this Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. M/s. Kanpur Plastic Pack (P.) Ltd., 1984 UPTC 641. This court was of the opinion that H. D. P. E. fabrics fell within the ambit of the notification aforesaid. The view of the Sales Tax Tribunal in this regard was upheld. 15. In conclusion, we hold that H. D. P. E. fabrics are liable to be considered, for purposes of levy of sales tax, under clause (a) of Section 3-A (1) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act and not under clause (e) thereof. 16. The petition succeeds and is allowed in these terms. The matter shall now be decided by the Sales Tax authorities in accordance with law as declared by us. We leave the parties to bear their own costs in this Court.
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1987 (11) TMI 391 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Article 30(1) of the Constitution is not violated, if a minority school is ordered to be closed when an epidemic breaks out in the neighbourhood, if a minority school building is ordered to be pulled down when it is constructed contrary to town planning law or if a decree for possession is passed in favour of the true owner of the land when a school is built on a land which is not owned by the management of a minority school. In the same way if a dispute is raised by an employee against the management of a minority educational institution such dispute will have necessarily to be resolved by providing appropriate machinery for that purpose. Laws are now passed by all the civilised countries providing for such a machinery." We accordingly hold that the impugned Act does not violate petitioners' rights guaranteed under Article 30( l) of the Constitution. In the result petitions fail and are accordingly dismissed but there will be no order to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1987 (11) TMI 390 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... lack of promptitude in holding the test identification, we are construed to say, enures to the appellants The evidence of test identification lacks the requisite element of re-assurance to support the conviction. A reasonable doubt arises. 27. Accordingly, these appeals are allowed, the conviction and sentence of the appellants in S.T. 168 of 1974 on the file of the First Additional Sessions Judge, Jaunpur, and affirmed in the Criminal appeal No. 14 of 1979 on the file of the Allahabad High Court are set aside and the appellants are directed to be set at liberty forthwith. The conviction and sentence of the non-appealing accused, namely, Pheku Singh cannot also be sustained consistent with the findings in and the result of these appeals as the findings are inter-dependant and inextricably integrated. The conviction and sentence of Pheku Singh are also set aside and the said Pheku Singh, the accused No. 3 in S.T. No. 168 of 1974 is also directed to beset at liberty forthwith.
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1987 (11) TMI 389 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... trict Judge was illegal and improper. If we reiterate the order of the High Court as it is setting aside the order of the Prescribed Authority in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution then no exception can be taken. As mentioned hereinbefore, justice has been done and as the improper order of the Prescribed Authority has been set aside, on objection can be taken. In the premises there is no scope for interference under Article 136 of the Constitution. Our attention was drawn to certain observations of this Court about the power of the State Government under section 7-F of the old Act in Shri Bhagwan and Anr. v. Ram Chand and Anr., 1965 3 SCR 218. In the view, we have taken of the facts of this case, it is not necessary to deal with this decision in any detail. In the aforesaid view of the matter, this appeal must fail and is accordingly dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we however, make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1987 (11) TMI 388 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e certificate did not preclude the authorities from taking steps to cancel it in accordance with law but for such time as the certificate was in force, it was not open to them to assess the petitioner to tax. In the present case there is no dispute between the parties that so far the certificate dated April 11, 1983 has not been cancelled or modified in any manner. It is obvious that the Sales Tax Officer would not be entitled in law to proceed with the assessment proceedings during the currency of the certificate. Of course, it is always open to the respondents to take such steps, as are available in law, to modify or cancel the certificate. 4. The petition is finally disposed of by quashing the notice dated December 26, 1985 issued by the Sales Tax Officer, Sector II, Dehradun and restraining him from taking any assessment proceedings against the petitioners for such time as the certificate dated April 11, 1983 issued in favour of the petitioner is valid. Costs on parties.
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1987 (11) TMI 387 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... far as the Unit in whose favour this certificate has been granted, is concerned. It is common ground that the aforesaid certificate dated December 12, 1983 has not yet been modified or cancelled by the respondents. If that be so, it is clear that the respondents are not entitled to take any proceedings for assessing the petitioner to tax either under the U. P. or the Central Sales Tax Act, in terms of the certificate dated December 12, 1983. Since the second respondent initiated proceedings by issuance of notices to the petitioner, he is liable to be restrained from making assessment for such time that the certificate in favour of the petitioner is valid. We direct accordingly. We also quash the various notices issued to the petitioner for assessment to tax in the meanwhile. The petition shall stand disposed of finally in these terms. Costs on parties. 4. A copy of this order may be given to the learned counsel for the parties within 48 hours on payment of necessary charges.
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1987 (11) TMI 386 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... uance of a notification under s. 6 of the land Acquisition Act. In view of this, it cannot be said that the conduct of respondents nos. 4-7 was such as warrants an inference of relinquishment by a known existing legal right. There is no question of estoppel, waiver or abandonment. There is no specific plea of waiver, acquiescence or estoppel, much less a plea of abandonment of right. That apart, the question of waiver really does not arise in the case. Admittedly, the tenants were not parties to the earlier proceedings. There is, therefore, no question of waiver of rights by respondents nos. 4-7 not would this disentitle the tenants from maintaining the writ petition. The objection that there was undue delay in moving the High Court cannot prevail. The reservation has lapsed, acquisition upon such reservation is bad and the delay in filing the petition, such as it is, can make no difference to this position in law. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1987 (11) TMI 385 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... gning it. In such a situation the judgment delivered has to be taken as final and the writ petition should not have been placed for fresh hearing. The subsequent order dismissing the writ petition was not available to be made once it is held that the writ petition stood disposed of by the judgment of the Division Bench on 28.7.1986. The record of the proceedings of the High Court which is before us does not contain the judgment delivered in court on 28.7.1986 but there is no dispute that the writ petition had been allowed. On the conceded position that the appellant's writ petition was allowed by the High Court, the University is directed to admit the appellant to the Master's Course in Law in the current session. We understand that the University's courses of study have now been changed. The University shall take such steps as are practicable to give effect to this decision. The appeal is accordingly allowed. There will be no order for costs. S.L Appeal allowed.
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