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Showing 21 to 40 of 290 Records
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1990 (3) TMI 364 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... es, namely, commercial banks for levying interest on the loans advanced to agriculturists on the security of agricultural lands. Such a direction was a direction issued to commercial banks, and as such it did fall within the ambit of section 21 of the Banking Regulation Act. Therefore, the said decision cannot have any bearing on the question concerned in these appeals. Hence, the learned single judge is justified in distinguishing the decision in Gowda's case, . 23. All the contentions raised by the petitioners fail. Consequently, the writ appeals fail and the same are dismissed. 24. After we pronounced judgment, Sri Gurumath, learned counsel for the appellants-petitioners made an oral application for grant of a certificate under article 134-A read with article 133 of the Constitution. We are of the view that the judgment does not involve a substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. Hence the certificate is refused.
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1990 (3) TMI 363 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f the detenu to commit offences. In support of this contention reference was made to the decision in Mehboob Khan Nawab Khan Pathan’s case (ibid). No denial is made in the counter filed on behalf of the first respondent. This latter submission, in our opinion, cannot be rejected as having no force. In the result, we without going into the merits of the other contentions allow this appeal, quash the detention order and direct the detenu to be set at liberty forthwith. ORDER The Writ Petition is connected with the Criminal Appeal No. 219 of 1990 arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2473/89. The detention order under challenge in both the proceedings is the one passed by the District Magistrate, Allahabad on 31.3.1988 under Section 3(.3) of the National Security Act 1980. As we have now set aside the order of detention in the Criminal Appeal, no order is necessary in this Writ Petition. The Writ Petition is disposed of accordingly. T.N.A. Appeal allowed and Petition disposed of.
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1990 (3) TMI 362 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... In view of the facts found as narrated in paragraphs 7 to 9 of the order of the Appellate Tribunal dated 1-2-1988 and found by the Tribunal, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal came to the correct conclusion and the order cannot be interfered with. The appeal is, accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1990 (3) TMI 361 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rection given by the IAC. But the Tribunal has come to a conclusion that the ITO had made enquiries about the sale of the silver utensils. Therefore, the Commissioner was not right in coming to the conclusion that the order passed by the ITO was prejudicial to the interest of the revenue because he had not made the necessary enquiry in this regard. So long as this finding of fact stands, it has to be held that the Commissioner's decision to revise the order of the ITO under section 263 was erroneous. 15. In that view of the matter, even though we are of the view that the Tribunal had wrongly decided the question of law as to the jurisdiction of the Commissioner raised before it, the order of the Tribunal cannot be said to be erroneous because of the finding of fact made by it on the merits of the case. Under these circumstances, any answer given to the question raised would be academic and we, therefore, decline to answer the question. There will be no order as to costs.
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1990 (3) TMI 360 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ut so that litigation may be cheap and the forum of ventillating grievance may not be difficult to approach. Keeping that in view which is a legitimate consideration it would be appropriate for the State Government to consider, firstly, increase in the number of Benches of the Tribunal and secondly, to locate them not at the same station but at various sectors or depending upon the number of institution of disputes and pendency at the level of independent Commissionerate or by clubbing two or three of them together. This, of course, is a matter which would require further examination at the administrative level and, therefore, we express no opinion regarding location of such Tribunal although we are of the definite view that there should be Tribunals available in different parts of the State and all the Benches of the Tribunal should not be located at one place. The writ Petitions and the civil appeals are disposed of with these directions., Petition and Appeals disposed of.
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1990 (3) TMI 359 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 6 is continued, it would be appropriate for the State of Uttar Pradesh to change its manning and a sufficient number of people qualified in Law should be on the Tribunal to ensure adequate dispensation of justice and to maintain judicial temper in the functioning of the Tribunal. We find that in Writ Petition No. 373 of 1989 relating to the self-same question a Bench of this Court has issued notice wherein the proposal for additional Benches at places like Allahabad, Meerut and Agra apart from the seat at Lucknow have been asked to be considered. We are of the view that if the Services Tribunal is to continue, it is necessary that the State of Uttar Pradesh should plan out immediately diversification of the location of the Benches for the Tribunal so that service disputes from all over the State are not required to be filed only at Lucknow and on account of a single tribunal disputes would not pile up without disposal. There would be no order as to costs. Appeal disposed of.
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1990 (3) TMI 358 - SUPREME COURT
Validity of notifications dated 28th November, 1974 and 11th July, 1975 (Annexures 8 & 9) issued by the Central Government in exercise of its power under sub-section (3-C) of section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 challenged - Held that:- What the learned Judge had in mind was an order by which the "amount" was calculated in terms of sub-section (3-C) in respect of each individual producer and not an order determining the "price of sugar". While the former is non-legislative, the latter, by the very test adopted by the learned Judge, is legislative in character. We, therefore, understand the observation of the learned Judge on this point as applicable only to the individual order fixing the "amount" in terms of the sub-section and not to orders determining the "price of sugar" which are what the impugned orders are. Any other construction of the sub-section would conflict with what was adopted by the Constitution Bench in Panipat (1972 (11) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT) and would, therefore, be unsustainable.
The individual orders, calculating the "amounts" payable to the individual producers, being administrative, orders rounded on the machanics of price fixation, they must be left to the better instructed judgment of the executive, and in regard to them the principle of audi alteram partem is not applicable. All that is required is reasonableness and fair play which are in essence emanations from the doctrine of natural justice. Petitions dismissed.
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1990 (3) TMI 357 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... ing Nandini Ganguly and the applicants were not interested in getting back the generator set transported in her name and also that the taxing authorities are free to deal with that generator set in accordance with law. According to him, the applicantcompany had already sold the set to Nandini Ganguly. 24.. Accordingly, we direct that the State respondents of RN-573 of 1989 are free to deal with in accordance with law the seized generator set which was transported in the name of Nandini or N. Ganguly. We also make it clear that the contentions and allegations of transportation of the goods by a dealer merely using the names of casual buyers have not been decided by us and the taxing authorities are free to take appropriate steps in that regard in accordance with law. 25.. The main applications in RN cases 525 and 573 of 1989 are thus disposed of and allowed but without costs. B.C. CHAKRABARTI (Chairman).-I agree. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree. Applications allowed.
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1990 (3) TMI 356 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t for exhibit P3 notice, in all seriousness. 16.. For the various reasons given above, we hold on point No. 1 that the petitioner is not entitled to avail tax exemption to an extent of 90 per cent of the capital investment in each of the five years. The total exemption which he can avail of in the five years is limited to the 90 per cent of the cumulative capital investment for the entire period of five years. We hold on point No. 3 that exhibit P2 is not liable to be quashed and it is perfectly in accordance with law. We hold that exhibit P3 is also not liable to be quashed as claimed by the petitioner. The sales tax authorities may consider the question of imposing penalty in the light of the explanation that might be submitted by the appellant and in the light of the remarks in this judgment and in the judgment of the learned single Judge in the O.P. 17.. In the result, the writ appeal is dismissed with costs, advocate s fee fixed at Rs. 1,500. Writ application dismissed.
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1990 (3) TMI 355 - JAMMU AND KASHMIR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y disregards the material available before it without applying mind it amounts to violation of principles of natural justice, and the court can interfere with it. Taking into consideration all the abovesaid facts, circumstances and the law the orders of the respondents are quashed. The inspectors deputed by the assessing authority, as pointed out above, have come to the conclusion on the basis of local enquiry and documentary proof about the sales of the assessee to be between 60 to 65 thousand rupees. I find no ground to deviate from it and in fact the learned counsel for the petitioner also accepts it to be just and proper and at the same time the learned counsel for the respondents has also no answer to rebut it. As such, it is directed that this estimated amount between 60 to 65 thousand rupees shall be considered as taxable turnover and the assessing authority, respondent No. 1, shall proceed to recover the sales tax on it without imposing any penalty. Petition allowed.
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1990 (3) TMI 354 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT]
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... ... ..... der as to costs. After the judgment was delivered, the learned counsel for the appellant has prayed for leave to make an application before the honourable Supreme Court. In the facts of the case, we do not find that such leave should be granted as we do not think that any important question of law which requires an authoritative pronouncement by the honourable Supreme Court is involved. The prayer is, therefore, refused. A prayer for stay of the operation of the judgment has been made. Such prayer has been opposed by the learned counsel for the respondent. We, however, grant a stay of operation of this judgment for a period of four weeks from today on condition that the appellants and/or their officers will not raise any demand from the writ petitioner-respondent on the footing that no eligibility certificate has been issued. Let the certified copy of this judgment be given expeditiously, if application for such copy is made. SACHI KANTA HAZARI, J.-I agree. Appeal dismissed.
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1990 (3) TMI 353 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... ue by imposing tax at the rate of 16 per cent on these goods. The need of the State to have more revenue for the public good or in the general public interest is too obvious to be said. Accordingly, there is a rational nexus of the measure complained against with the object sought to be achieved by the impugned law. The object is to raise more revenue for better functioning of the State in the interest of common good. 13.. In the context of our views as above, we hold that there is no hostile discrimination, no unreasonable discrimination and no violation of article 14 in the impugned amendment of section 5(1)(d1) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, by which sanitary wares and sanitary fittings were included in Schedule IV to be taxed at the higher rate of 15 per cent with effect from April 1, 1989. As a result, the application fails and is dismissed without costs. B.C. CHAKRABARTI (Chairman).-I agree. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1990 (3) TMI 352 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT]
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... ... ..... per cent, thus sustaining damage. The residuary article 55 in respect of suits on contract, and not article 14, is applicable in the present case. As the suit was within 3 years from the date of the breach of the contract, i.e., 9th January, 1976, it must be held that it was within time and not barred by limitation. The cross-objection being not pressed, the appeal must succeed. Upon calculation it appears that the appellant is entitled to a sum of Rs. 21,970 approximately and not Rs. 22,165.76 as per annexure A to the plaint. The appeal is, therefore, allowed in part with proportionate costs and the cross-objection be dismissed. The judgment of the court below on the issue of limitation and the decree of dismissal are hereby set aside. The suit stands decreed in part for Rs. 21,970 with proportionate costs. The decretal amount will bear simple interest at the rate of 6 per cent from today till the date of realisation. MUKUL GOPAL MUKHERJI, J.-I agree. Appeal partly allowed.
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1990 (3) TMI 351 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... imagination, it can be said that rose water is a concentrated preparation. In the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles-Third Edition-Volume I, the meaning for essence is given as follows an extract obtained by distillation or otherwise from a plant or drug, and containing its specific properties in a reduced form. Apart from this, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the Tribunal that rose water will fall under item 139. In our view, in common parlance, rose water will not be considered as an essence which has got a definite meaning. It is not in dispute that rose water is obtained by adding little essence of some flavour to a large quantity of water. Therefore, it cannot be said that rose water by itself is an essence. Accordingly, we hold that rose water will not fall under item 139 of the First Schedule to the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act. The revision is, therefore, allowed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1990 (3) TMI 350 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on the basis of which such an inference can be drawn that there existed any contract of sale in pursuance of which goods were transported from the State of Rajasthan. Thus the essential requirements or ingredients of inter-State sale are lacking in the present case. It may be mentioned that no such opportunity was even sought before the Board of Revenue by the Revenue that the case may be sent back to the assessing authority for production of evidence and material. At this stage now it would not be proper for this Court to grant such indulgence to the petitioners. Thus, on the basis of material on record, in my opinion, the Board of Revenue was right and justified in holding that it is not established that the transactions in question were inter-State sales and as such the orders of the Board of Revenue calls for no interference. In the result these revision petitions have no force and these are, therefore, dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1990 (3) TMI 349 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... der the Arms Act is required. In common parlance, air rifles and air guns are understood as articles or things of entertainment which are generally used in fairs and sports. The Kerala High Court has construed a similar entry in the Kerala Act and held as under The purpose for which the implement is primarily intended is the criterion to determine whether the implement in question is arms or not. Air guns which are not adapted for use with explosive substance and which have been classified as toys, will not come within the meaning of arms. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Kerala High Court in the decision supra. 8.. Consequently, the question referred to is answered in the affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. In view of the fair attitude of the learned counsel for the Revenue, especially in the absence of anyone representing the dealer-non-applicant, there shall be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1990 (3) TMI 348 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ng dealer paying the tax entitled to set-off would upset the whole scheme of the provision contained in the said proviso. The Tribunal in its opinion rightly observed that the words by him in proviso (vii) of sub-section (1) of section 3 would become superfluous if the intention was to cover cases of payment of entry tax by anyone in the series of dealers effecting sale of the same goods. We are also clearly of the opinion that set-off under proviso (vii) can be claimed only by that dealer who has effected the entry of the goods and paid the tax and by no other purchaser from him because indirect modes of payment of entry tax are not entitled to set-off. 8.. Consequently, the reference is answered in the affirmative in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Since the assessee has not entered appearance himself or through his counsel in spite of notice and has not contested the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1990 (3) TMI 347 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... than the mill or factory premises and receive reduced prices, the charges paid to the sugarcane growers to bring the cut sugarcane to the mill site is liable to be included in the taxable turnover even though separate voucher is given to which they are entitled to, there is no reason for holding that since transport charges were paid by the assessee to the third party lorry owners to transport the sugarcane to the factory, in order to assist the cane growers, it should not be included in the taxable turnover of the assessee. Hence, we are in agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench in 1985 60 STC 113 (Mad.) (Kallakuruchi Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu). The Appellate Tribunal is justified in applying the ratio laid down in the above decision and dismissing the appeals. We see no reason to interfere with the order of the Appellate Tribunal, in these revisions. In the result, three revisions fail and stand dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1990 (3) TMI 346 - SUPREME COURT
Whether an instrumentality of State can suddenly, arbitrarily, unreasonably, without any relevant factors and without any notice and determination or proceeding stop supplies of products which, according to him, had been supplied more than-1 crore 11 lacs litres/kg of product continuously and uninterruptedly over a period of more than 18 years?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The case of the respondent be put to the appellants, and let the respondent authorities consider afresh the submissions made by the appellant firm, namely, that the existing arrangement amounts to a contract by which the distributorship was continued in case of the appellant firm without any formal contract and further that the new policy of the Government introduced in December, 1982 would not cover the appellant firm and as such the appellant should continue. It will be sufficient, having regard to the nature of the claims, for the respondent authority to consider this aspect after taking the appellant firm into confidence on this aspect. Nothing further need be stated or required to be done and we give no 'directions as to whether reasons should be recorded or hereinafter should be given. In the facts and circumstances, it is not necessary to give oral hearing or record the reasons as such for the decision. The decision should be based on fair play, equity and consideration by an institution like IOC.
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1990 (3) TMI 345 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... incumbent upon the respondents to comply with the said order of this Court. The counsel for the respondents has not been able to show or produce any order or direction of the Supreme Court staying the operation of order of this Court. Mere filing a special leave petition by the respondents in the Supreme Court would not operate as stay order. Under these circumstances, the respondents are directed to implement the order of this Court passed in Civil Writ Petition No. 199 of 1983 on 4th December, 1985 , within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In case the registration number of the petitioners concern is not cancelled and the tax deposited by them earlier for the period in dispute is not refunded, the petitioners shall be entitled to claim interest on the said amount from the respondents at the rate of 10 per cent per annum. In the result, the writ petition is allowed accordingly. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Writ petition allowed.
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