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1991 (7) TMI 389
... ... ... ... ..... ment filed against Mst. Radha Bai and Govind Rao Harshe was also decreed in favour of the appellant Mahila Vidyalaya. In execution of the decree for ejectment Mahila Vidyalaya was trying to obtain possession. Thus by no stretch of imagination can it be said that Mahila Vidyalaya was a trespasser in the facts and circumstances mentioned above. The High Court in our view did not consider the case in a proper perspective and took a wholly erroneous view in holding that the appellant was a trespasser and Govind Rao Harshe could have filed a suit for possession. The plaintiff Govind Rao Harshe himself had come forward with a plea that the execution proceedings and sale was null and void and unless he was able to succeed in this regard, which he did not in the present case, no decree for possession could at all have been passed in his favour. 18. Thus, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court dated 12th December, 1974 and dismiss the suit with costs.
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1991 (7) TMI 388
... ... ... ... ..... ction 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the petitioners, who are really the wrong doers according to the first respondent, would escape scot free. This is not correct. It would be open to the first respondent to show upon evidence in the trial of his first complaint, Criminal Case No. 745 of 1984, that the present petitioners are guilty of the offences alleged and persuade the Court to exercise its powers under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the Court is satisfied by the evidence led before it in the trial of Criminal Case No. 745 of 1984, that there is a case of offence made out against the petitioners, it may be open for the Court to exercise its powers under Section 319 of the Code against the petitioners. 7. I am, therefore, of the view that the proceeding pending against the petitioners in Criminal Case No. 1004 of 1986 needs to be quashed. 8. Rule is accordingly made absolute in terms of prayer (a) with no order as to costs. 9. Order accordingly.
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1991 (7) TMI 387
... ... ... ... ..... ground alone. 11. Our conclusions therefore are that the Controller must rehear the appeal and determine the following issues -- (i) Whether the petitioner is manufacturing and selling a pre-packed commodity within the meaning of the 1977 Rules? (ii) Whether the petitioner is entitled to exemption under Rule 34. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 17th July 1981, passed by the Controller (Annexure-5 to the writ petition) in so far as its decision on the third issue is concerned, is quashed. The Controller shall now dispose of the petitioner's appeal afresh in accordance with law keeping in view the observations made in this judgment. He shall dispose of the appeal within a period of two months from the date on which a certified copy of this order is submitted before him. Needless to add that before deciding the appeal, the Controller shall give a hearing to the petitioner. There shall be no order as to costs. 12. Petition allowed.
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1991 (7) TMI 386
... ... ... ... ..... ompromise is not binding on the parties, any recital is of no much value as evidence. The parties are often willing to make admissions for the purpose of affecting a compromise to which it would be unfair to hold them if the compromise falls through. 11. In view of the above discussions, there is no doubt in my mind that the statements made in the compromise petition even if treated as valid admissions, were not intended to be treated as evidence by any of the parties because of failure of the compromise petition. In view of this both the orders dated 9-8-89 and 19-8-89 passed by the learned trial Court in the suit rejecting the petitions for recalling P.W. 7 and D.W. 5 for the purpose of getting the compromise petition exhibited and for getting the admissions on the record, as evidence being contrary to Section 23 of the Act, it justified. In the result, the Civil Revisions Nos. 889 and 890 of 1989 are dismissed, but in the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1991 (7) TMI 385
... ... ... ... ..... al Excise, Madras, reported in which in turn is based on Supreme Court's judgment in the case of CIT v. Bijli Cotton Mills Private Limited . He submits that compulsory payment of Dharmada has been very pointedly dealt with by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment of Bijli Cotton Mills. After considering the arguments of the Department in the earlier case of M/s. Mohan & Co., the Tribunal had passed the considered decision. The same should be followed now. He, therefore urges that the appeals of the Collector deserve to be dismissed in view of the earlier judgment of the Tribunal. 5. We have carefully considered the pleas advanced on both sides. Having regard to the judgment of the Tribunal in the case of M/s. Mohan & Co. mentioned supra, we do not find any merit in the plea of the learned, SDR for the Appellant-Collector. Accordingly, all the three appeals are dismissed. Cross objections dismissed as not maintainable. (Dictated and pronounced in open court)
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1991 (7) TMI 384
... ... ... ... ..... ho decided the dispute of title were competent in law to decide such a dispute. The first respondent has rather acted in a curious manner. While respondents 2, 3 and 4 heard the parties and went in to the question of title, the first respondent decided to do it without even issuing any notice to the petitioner and without even issuing any notice to the petitioner and without affording any opportunity of being heard. The order of the first respondent is in the teeth of the well-known principle of natural justice that no one should be made to suffer or visited with a civil consequence unless he is provided with adequate opportunity of being heard. His order for the said reason is without jurisdiction. 8. In the result, the applications are allowed, the order of the first respondent in pa.Mu-(I) 497/84, dated 28.5.1985 is quashed. Respondents are restrained from interfering with the possession of the petitioner except in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1991 (7) TMI 383
... ... ... ... ..... he assessing officer is excessive or unreasonable having regard to the fair market value of the goods, services or facilities for which the payment is made. Now, in the present case, the payment cannot be said to be made for any services rendered, since it is clear that what is paid is a rebate or commission worked out after the sales are effected at a certain percentage of sales. Secondly, the persons referred to in clause (a) are specified in clause (b) and as pointed out above in the case of a company, the person is a director of the company, partner of the firm, or member of the association or family, or any relative of such director, partner or member. In the present case, the payees are firms and not any individuals which can fall within any of these categories. Therefore, in our opinion, section 40A(2) has been wrongly invoked for disallowing the commission in the present case. We would reverse the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and allow the appeal.
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1991 (7) TMI 382
... ... ... ... ..... l the High Court could not, nor can we, interfere with their acquittal, but as rightly pointed in Brathi's case this Court is not bound by the facts found proved on the appreciation of evidence by the courts below and is, in law, entitled to reach its own conclusion different from the one recorded by the court's below on a review of the evidence. In that view of the matter we think that the conviction of the appellant can be sustained with the aid of Section 34 or 149, IPC, as the case may be. In the present case we feel it safe to confirm the conviction of the appellant with the aid of Section 34, IPC. We, therefore, cannot agree with the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant that at best the conviction can be recorded under Section 324, IPC. We confirm the conviction of the appellant under Section 302, IPC, with the aid of Section 34 and maintain the sentence awarded to him. 17. For the above reasons we see no merit in this appeal and dismiss the same.
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1991 (7) TMI 381
... ... ... ... ..... by the detaining authority and its Marathi translation supplied to the petitioner. We have already pointed out above that the said discrepancy is innocuous. Not only this, but even excluding the portion of the ground pertaining to the said application, there is independent material which was sufficient for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority to issue the impugned order of detention. It is stated in the said ground that on 1st of January, 1990, a country made revolver and ten live cartridges - were recovered in the presence of panchas at the behest of the petitioner. Considering the entire material on record we find that the arguments advanced by Mr. Tripathy do not hold much water that by supplying the defective translated copies of the five documents vitiated the impugned order of detention and, therefore, the same is liable to be struck down. 26. In the result, this petition fails and the same is dismissed. Rule stands discharged. 27. Petition dismissed.
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1991 (7) TMI 380
... ... ... ... ..... ot in dispute. The only limited question referred to this court is whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the capital contributed by the minors should be treated as consideration for the gift of interest surrendered in favour of the minor. On the facts and circumstances in this case. It is so and so we answer the question referred in the affirmative and against the Department. The reference is answered accordingly. Even though this will dispose of the original petitions as well, it is necessary to re-examine the question of liability to gift-tax of the petitioners in the original petitions. Therefore, we quash the impugned orders in the original petitions and direct the Gift-tax Officer to pass fresh assessment orders according to law and in the light of this judgment. 11. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench. A reproduction from ILR (Kerala Series)
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1991 (7) TMI 379
... ... ... ... ..... JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1991 (7) TMI 378
... ... ... ... ..... he conclusion of the Full Bench must not be sustained. We accordingly allow the appeal and reverse the decision of the High Court. 7. There is no dispute that there has been improvement of the property by the respondent No. 1. We are aware of case where transferee to overreach the law and taking recourse to fraudulent methods, take property and make improvement. In a case of that type it may be that no compensation would be payable. In this case, perhaps, it may be appropriate to direct that the respondent No. 1 should be compensated for the improvement. We, therefore, require the Deputy Commissioner of Gumla to get the improvement appropriately valued and fix the quantum of compensation payable to the respondent and require the appellant to pay the sum within such reasonable period which he may fix in his discretion. Dispossession may not be made a condition precedent to the deposit of the money but care should be taken to ensure payment. There will be no order as to costs.
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1991 (7) TMI 377
... ... ... ... ..... or registration the respondent authority was not justified in rejecting the claim of the petitioner only on account of late deposit. Normally, we would have remanded this matter before the authority concerned to reconsider the matter after quashing the order but since, we find, on identical facts that power has been exercised by the U. P. Sales Tax Officer in the case of the petitioner and on the same reason granted registration retrospectively from 1st April, 1981, we direct the respondent authority to pass afresh order granting registration from 1st April, 1981 to 23rd August, 1981 under the Central Sales Tax Act in the light of the observations made by us above. 6. Accordingly, this petition is allowed with costs. The order dated 30th January, 1986 (Annexures 2 to the writ petition) and the notices dated 5th May, 1984 (Annexures 3 and 4 to the petition) are hereby quashed. The respondent No. 2 is directed to pass a fresh order in terms of the directions given by us above.
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1991 (7) TMI 376
... ... ... ... ..... lity or any action contrary to law does not become in accordance with law because it is done at the behest of the Chief Executive of the State. No one is above law. In a democracy what prevails is law and rule and not the height of the person exercising the power. For these reasons the entire proceedings before the State Government suffered from absence of jurisdiction. Even the exercise of power was vitiated and ultra vires. There- fore the orders of the Government to convert the site re- served for public park to civic amenity and to allot it for private nursing home to Bangalore Medical Trust and the resolution of the Bangalore Development Authority in compli- ance of it were null, void and without jurisdiction. Leave granted. ORDER In the result this appeal fails, for the reasons stated by us in our separate but concurring judgments, and is accordingly dismissed. We further direct that the respond- ents shall be entitled to their cost throughout. N.P.V. Appeal dismissed.
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1991 (7) TMI 375
... ... ... ... ..... ly notice under Section 21 was, in fact, issued by the Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Jhansi and the case since thereafter was transferred to the Sales Tax Officer, Jhansi by means of an order passed under Rule 81 (2) of the U. P. Sales Tax Rules and thus it cannot be said that proceedings subsequent to the intial proceeding cannot be taken by the officer to whom the case has been transferred. In this view of the matter, it cannot be urged that the proceedings under Section 21 of the Act taken by the Sales Tax Officer, Jhansi is either without jurisdiction or illegal. 14. For the foregoing discussions, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. The interim order dated 7-2-1979 passed by this Court is hereby vacated with directions that in case the assessment proceedings against the petitioners for the assessment year 1973-74 have been completed but the order has not been yet signed, the respondent/authority concerned may pass appropriate order in accordance with law.
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1991 (7) TMI 374
... ... ... ... ..... as the power of Court of appeal under Sec. 423 of the Code, it is now well settled that normally the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 439 is to be exercised only in exceptional cases when there is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law which has consequently resulted in flagrant miscarriage of justice. Inspite of the wide language of Section 435, the High Court is not excepted to act under Section 435 or Section 439 as if it is hearing an appeal." The High Court of Orissa referred to the said observation and rightly held that the High Court cannot be expected to re-appraise the evidence as a court of appeal. This Court hearing an appeal by special leave cannot consider and reappraise the evidences once again in the face of concurrent findings of facts arrived at by all the courts below. For the reasons aforesaid we dismiss the appeal and uphold the conviction and sentence as found by the High Court. Appeal dismissed.
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1991 (7) TMI 373
... ... ... ... ..... ial leave granted. No orders on application for stay.
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1991 (7) TMI 372
... ... ... ... ..... petition is two-fold, namely, (a) to grant a mandamus to the appropriate Government for the premature release of the petitioner by exercising constitutional power with the aid of 1958 Rules and (b) to declare the petitioner's continued detention as illegal and void. The petitioner has not completed 14 years of actual incarceration and as such he cannot invoke sections 432 and 433 of the Code. His continued detention is consistent with section 433A of the Code and there is nothing on record to show that it is otherwise illegal and void. The outcome of his clemency application under the constitution is not put in issue in the present proceedings if it has been rejected and if the same is pending despite the directive of the High Court it would be open to the petitioner to approach the High Court for the compliance of its order. Under the circumstance no mandamus can issue. The writ petition must, therefore, fail. It is hereby dismissed. Rule discharged. Petition dismissed.
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1991 (7) TMI 371
... ... ... ... ..... assessee adopted a fluctuating method of accounting for the interest income. Another reason rendered by the Tribunal for holding against the bona fides of the change-over is that the assessee's representation as regards the debtors' inability to pay the interest is not an honest representation. The Tribunal found that the assessee never wanted in confidence that the debtor-company would clear both the loan and the interest thereon nor did it show that the financial position of the company is bad. This finding also goes unchallenged. 17. In our view, on the above facts and circumstances, the Tribunal came to a correct conclusion that the change which was made by the assessee could not be permitted. In this case, the debtor was not only solvent to pay the principal but also the interest due. 18. For the reasons aforesaid, we answer this question in this reference in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. 19. There will be no order as to costs. Sen, J. - I agree.
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1991 (7) TMI 370
... ... ... ... ..... osts. 3. We are fully satisfied that the above action taken by the Central Government was done in the larger interest of the economy of the country and in public interest. As we are taking the view that the above explanation given by the respondents has been taken in larger public interest, the decision given in M.J. Bhatusha's case is fully applicable in these cases also. 4. In Bharat Surfactants's case it has been held that the rate of duty and tariff valuation has to be determined in accordance with Section 15(1) of the Customs Act. Under Section 15(1)(a), the rate and valuation is the rate and valuation in force on the date on which the Bill of Entry is presented under Section 46. Thus all the contentions raised in the cases in hand before us are fully covered by the above-mentioned cases decided by the Constitution Bench of this Court. In the result we find no force in any of the grounds raised in these cases and the same are dismissed with no order as to costs.
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