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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 292 Records
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1992 (1) TMI 364 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ntrusted to the incumbents of the three posts mentioned in the Agreement, and in that view it is not necessary to decide the question debated by the parties as to whether the arbitrators had neglected to conclude the arbitration proceeding justifying the appointment of an arbitrator or arbitrate by the Court. We, therefore, set aside the orders passed by the courts below and direct the trial court to refer the dispute 'or decision of the present Chief Engineer, Srisailam Project, Deputy Secretary to Government, Finance Department and Director of Accounts, Sriramsagar Project with a direction to them as well as to the parties to cooperate in concluding the proceeding expeditiously. As a result of this judgment the Award made by the sole arbitrator being dependent on the impugned judgments which are being set aside, automatically stands set aside and accordingly the same will now be ignored. The appeal is allowed, but in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.
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1992 (1) TMI 363 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... arassment 7. The plea of the respondent-authorities that all the pleas taken in the present petition had been decided by this Court in a petition u/s.438 Cr. P.C. is not supported by Annexure B. 8. It is conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the DRI does not have any office at Chandigarh, but has its office at Jalandhar. I hereby give a direction that the petitioner shall be examined at Jalandhar on a date to be fixed by the investigating officer, by giving an advance notice of 15 days. The petitioner shall have the right to have the assistance of an Advocate's presence at the time of recording his statement, who will, however, not interfere with the recording thereof. The respondent-authorities shall also send the money to defray the travelling expenses of the petitioner to Jalandhar and back. It shall, however, also be open to them to examine him at Chandigarh if it is so convenient. With these directions, the criminal miscellaneous stands disposed of.
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1992 (1) TMI 362 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r the working and functioning of the respondents Council vests in the Working Committee. The Government has a very limited role to play in the functioning of the Council. The Government no doubt provides some funds to the Council but the control of the Government is limited to the extent that the Government checks misuse of funds provided by it. None of the functions of the Council can be described as Governmental functions or functions of public nature. The council's activities affect only a small segment of the society and the activities are not such, which were earlier being carried by a department of the Government. It cannot therefore, be held to be an agency or instrumentality of the State. 23. In view of my finding on the preliminary objection, I do not consider it necessary to deal with the controversy raised by the petitioner on the merits. 24. The preliminary objection raised by the respondents is sustained and therefore the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.
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1992 (1) TMI 361 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 5. In the spite of our best efforts and great deal of pondering over the matter, we find absolutely no reason, much less compelling reason to disagree with the conclusion of the High Court since the organic synthesis of the events, circumstances and facts of the case lead only to one conclusion, namely, that the prosecution has established that this preplanned and cold blooded murder, executed in very cowardly and dastardly manner at a helpless and defenceless young girl was perpetrated by the appellants. 46. We, quite apart from the reason of the High Court, even on our independent assessment and evaluations of the evidence hold that the finding of the Trial Court is not reasonably sustainable and that the prosecution has satisfactorily proved the guilt of the accused beyond any shadow of doubt and consequently the judgment of the High Court does not call for any interference. 47. In the result, the impugned judgment of the High Court is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed.
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1992 (1) TMI 360 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... thereby directed to pay is called the 'drawee'. " 9. A document is stated to be made when recorded and signed by the maker thereof. A cheque shall be deemed to have been made on the day it is filled in and signed by the drawer without reference to the date it carries. The date it carries at its face is only recorded to determine if it is an ante-dated or post-dated cheque. If there be no such allegation, then there will be a presumption under Section 118 that the cheque was drawn on the date it carries at its face. I follow the observations of the learned judge of the Madras High Court in Babu Xavier's case 1992 74 Comp Cas 716. 10. Since admittedly, the disputed cheques were presented to the bank more than six months after the date they were made, no criminal offence under Section 138 of the Act is made out. In this situation, I accept all the three criminal miscellaneous petitions, enumerated above and quash the impugned complaints and the summoning orders.
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1992 (1) TMI 359 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... eld or against any other person shall lie by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of such property. It is well settled that an appeal is a continuation of suit and in the present case the appeal was pending before this Court There is no manner of dispute that the present suit had been filed by the plaintiff-respondent claiming that he was the real owner of the property and the names of the defendants-appellants were mentioned in the sale deeds as benami. In our view, Section 4 of the Benami Act is a total prohibition against any suit based on benami transaction and the plaintiff-respondent is not entitled to get any decree in such suit or in appeal. 10. As a result of the above discussion, we allow this appeal, set aside the Judgment and decree of the High Court and dismiss the suit In view of the fact that the suit is dismissed on account of legislative change brought about during the pendency of the appeal in this Court, there would be no order as to cost.
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1992 (1) TMI 358 - INDORE
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... ... ..... epartment from time to time. From this it is established that the Noticee No. 1, 2 and 3 had not suppressed manufacture of coolers from Central Excise Department. The Central Excise Officers were aware of the manufacturing activities of Noticee No. 1, 2 and 3. Under these circumstances I hold that extended period of limitation will not be applicable in this case. Show cause notice was issued to the Noticee No. 1, 2 and 3 on 1.6.1990 in which Central Excise duty was demanded for the period 15.10.1986 to 31.3.1989 which is beyond 6 months and is time barred. Ordered accordingly. In view of the foregoing discussions, I pass the following order -- Order I order that Noticee No. 1, 2 and 3 are separate and independent entities and the clearances of their products cannot be clubbed for charging Central Excise Duty. The demand is also time barred in absence of any suppression of facts. The show cause notice bearing F. No. V (CH. 48) 15-1/90/Adj. I dated 1.6.1990 is hereby set aside.
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1992 (1) TMI 357 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... R Appeal dismissed.
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1992 (1) TMI 356 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s own conclusions upon the evidence before it. If a trial Court does not properly understand the pleadings, it is for the appellate Court to reverse the findings and give its own findings; again, if an issue has been decided by the trial Court in a very perfunctory manner. But power to order retrial after remand, where there has already been a trial on evidence before the Court of first instance, cannot be exercised merely because the appellate Court is of the view that the parties who could lead better evidence in the Court of first instance have failed to do so. 6. The foregoing discussion would show that the order of remand is unsustainable. The lower appellate Court has not disposed of the case on merits. I, therefore, direct the lower appellate Court to dispose of the case on merits. The parties will bear their respective costs. Appeal is allowed as above. The parties will appear before the lower Court on 3rd March, 1992. Issue photo copy of this judgment on usual terms.
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1992 (1) TMI 355 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... nd of appeal is relating to disallowance of ₹ 59,359 in respect of presentation of articles. The Income-tax Officer had made the disallowance by invoking Rule 6B. On appeal, the CIT(Appeals) has opined that though Rule 6B is inapplicable yet deduction could not be allowed without verification. Assessee had thus been asked to give details of persons to whom presents were made. Some of the items were found to be expensive items costing ₹ 16,800 and ₹ 10,750. The details were not furnished. The CIT(Appeals) has thus resorted to an estimate. He allowed a deduction to the tune of ₹ 20,000 and made disallowance of ₹ 39,359. Assessee is aggrieved. 26. We have heard the rival contentions. In the absence of evidence in support of the contention that the expenditure was incurred for the purposes of business, the disallowance is warranted. We accordingly confirm the disallowance. 27. to 30. These paras are not reproduced here as they involve minor issues .
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1992 (1) TMI 354 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... able to the petitioner and instead of availing the same, he should not have approached this Court. As the reference made to us is of a limited scope in view of the specific question framed, we decided to proceed further and express our opinion. We have considered it unnecessary to decide the question of maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of availability of an efficacious alternative remedy. 63. We have no hesitation in answering the question referred to us in the negative and holding that the judgment of the Full Bench in Tamilarasan v. Director of Handlooms and Textiles (1991) 2 L.W. 409 (1981) I L.L.J. 588, is not per incuriam or obiter dicta and the views taken by the Division Bench in A. Natarajan v. Registrar of Co-operative Societies and Ors. 1991) 2 L.W. 420 (1989) II L.L.J. 296. is not correct. We hold that the judgment of the Full Bench is a valid precedent binding on the Division Benches and single Judges of this Court as well as subordinate courts.
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1992 (1) TMI 353 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of such security with workmen and payment of his portion of the expenses to the liquidator for preserving the security cannot be taken away by any court in its endeavour or anxiety to place a construction on such provisions as could benefit the workmen. 19. For the foregoing reasons, we are not left in doubt that the permission granted to the Karnataka State Financial Corporation, a secured creditor of the company (ICBL) in winding up, to sell that company's assets, which are already in its possession and constitute security for repayment of the loan, and realise its security subject to payment of workmen's dues as undertaken by it by standing outside such winding up, is well in accordance with the provisions of Section 529, as amended, and Section 529A, as inserted in the Companies Act and Section 29 and Section 46B of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951. 20. In the result, we dismiss the appeal, however, without costs, having regard to the facts of the case.
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1992 (1) TMI 351 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the petitioner submits that there are six assessment years 1978-79 to 1983-84 which are involved in this writ petition. Of these the Deputy Commissioner has passed orders in revision only in three years, namely, 1978-79 to 1980-81. In respect of the other three years there are assessment orders more or less on the same lines. For the latter three years the appeals have to be preferred to the first appellate authority. The petitioner will be at liberty to file these appeals within a month along with applications for condonation of delay. The first appellate authority may not immediately dispose of these appeals but keep them pending until the Appellate Tribunal disposes of the appeal for the first three assessment years. Thereafter, the first appellate authority should dispose of the appeals within a period of one month in the light of the Tribunal's order. 5. As already stated this writ petition is adjourned for six months. It may be listed in the 3rd week of July, 1992.
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1992 (1) TMI 350 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 19 and A-l, containing the recital of surrender of possession of the land by S.N. Vadiyar to R. Ayyar, the other documents material for the purpose were the orders exhibits B-4 and A-2 made in the eviction proceedings by the Revenue Court when the matters were taken up by the Revenue Court on 25-6-1962 and dismissed on the basis of the compromise accepted by the parties who were present. Ignoring these orders Exhibits B-4 and A-2 and overlooking the logical effect thereof and basing the conclusion on the question of possession only on the oral evidence adduced by S.N. Vadiyar did cause an infirmity in the finding of fact which justified interference in second appeal. We have been taken through the discussion of the evidence made by the High Court and we are satisfied that there is no infirmity therein to permit any interference in these appeals. 4. Consequently, these appeals fail and are dismissed. Since none appeared for the respondents, there will be no order as to costs.
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1992 (1) TMI 349 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... umstances of this case we set aside the High Court judgment and direct that respondent No. 1, the State of Tamil Nadu shall pay to the appellant a sum of ₹ 50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand) with interest at 12 per annum from January 1, 1990 till the date of payment. The amount shall be paid within six weeks from today. It will be open to the State of Tamil Nadu to take appropriate proceedings to claim the said amount or any part thereof from any of the respondents or any other authority which might be responsible for keeping the sewerage tank open. The claim, if made, will be decided in accordance with law. The appeal is allowed in the above terms. There will be no order as to costs.
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1992 (1) TMI 348 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ts. But Rule 8 was available for taking action for misconduct but was not availed. Therefore, the impugned order terminating the services of the appellant is illegal. What would be the consequence? Normally the appellant is entitled to reinstatement but in our view the ends of justice would be met by directing the respondent to pay him ₹ 1,00,000 as compensation, instead of reinstatement and further continuance in service. The compensation awarded would be staggered between the year 1973 till date for the purpose of income tax and given the appropriate relief. In this view it is not necessary to deal with other contentions or decisions cited across the bar. Before parting with the case it is necessary to mention that march of service jurisprudence necessitates the respondent to recast the rules in tune with the constitution and the law. The appeal is allowed but without cost. The intervention application filed by Sri S.S. Onkarmal Harlalka is dismissed. Appeal allowed.
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1992 (1) TMI 347 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r in his order dated 17 - 12 - 1991 (Annexure 9 to the petition). We accordingly dispose of this petition with the direction that the petitioner may be allowed to unload the goods at the Mohan Nagar Check Post Godwon and upon the goods being unloaded at that godown the petitioner shall be entitled to take away the trucks (No. P J E. - 9897 and PAT - 1822) without being called upon to furnish any security for the same. This order does not, however, govern the release of the goods which is not the subject - matter of this petition. 2. A copy of this order may be given to the learned counsel on payment of requisite charges today.
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1992 (1) TMI 346 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 1) shall not in the first instance exceed three months. The proviso, therefore, has nothing to do with the period of detention of a detenu. The maximum period of detention is prescribed under Section 13 of the Act which lays down that a person may be detained in pursuance of any detention order made under the Act, which has been confirmed under Section 12 of the Act. It is, therefore, futile to contend that the order of detention in the instant case was vitiated because it was for a period of more than three months. The second argument, therefore, also fails. 24. We are, in the facts and circumstances of the case, satisfied that the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court rightly dismissed the Criminal Writ Petition No. 597 of 1991 and that order does not call for any interference. The Appeal fails and is dismissed. 25. Writ Petition No. 1247 of 1991 also fails and is hereby dismissed since the order of detention does not suffer from any infirmity. Appeal Petition dismissed.
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1992 (1) TMI 345 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r of accounts. There is also no dispute that in order to claim of relief on account of bad debt, the amount must be written off in the books of account of the assessee. It has been claimed on behalf of the assessee that it has written off the amount in his books of account. This manner of accounting is in consonance with well-established accounting practice. Mr. Bagchi has contended that the account has not been written off. The Tribunal has also referred in accounting practice and has relied on a judgment of the Gujarat High Court to come to the conclusion that the amount has actually been written off in the accounts. 8. We are of the view that it is basically a question of accounting practice. The Tribunal has taken a reasonable view of the matter, we are disinclined to interfere in the matter in the facts of this case. Both the questions are, therefore, answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. 9. There will be no order as to costs. Banerjee, J. -1 agree.
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1992 (1) TMI 344 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion to forbid any inferior authority from continuing the proceedings, a total want of jurisdiction on the part of the authority concerned must be demonstrated. We are not satisfied that in the present case a total want of jurisdiction is made out. The case in hand is not an appropriate case where this Court should interfere and interdict the proceedings at this stage. It needs no mention that the petitioner shall have an ample opportunity to state his case before the Assessing Authority in pursuance to the impugned assessment notice and to take all such objections as may be available to him under law including the objections, which are raised in this petition. If and when such objections are raised they shall be decided by the Assessing Authority, i. e the third respondent in accordance with law. 8. Subject to the above the writ petition is dismissed, without going into the merits of question canvassed before this Court. The stay order dated 23-1-1987 shall stand discharged.
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