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Showing 1 to 20 of 240 Records
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1992 (11) TMI 295 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ity, validity or correctness of the order, unless such party is a minor, an insane person or is suffering from any other disability which law recognises as sufficient to permit another person e.g. next friend, to move the Court in his behalf Similar view was expressed in the Janta Dal's case(supra), and Simarjit Singh Mann v. Union of India and Anr. 1992 II SLR 231 11. It has not been proved as to how any legal right or right legally protected has been invaded so as to give a cause of action for the petitioner to move this Court for interference. It is not disputed that the property in respect of which action has been taken belongs to Om Prakash. It is the assertion of the petitioner that being his wife she has interest in the property. That even if correct per se does not clothe the petitioner locus standi to seek exercise of power Under Section 482, Cr.P.C. The irresistible conclusion is that the petitioner has no locus standi to file this application which is rejected.
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1992 (11) TMI 294 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to individual disputes and hence, if at all relate to the "law and order" and not the "public order" cannot be accepted. The distinction between the two is well crystallized by judicial pronouncements made from time to time and therefore it is necessary to deal with the various decisions cited by learned Counsel for the parties. In case the activities creates terror in the minds of the peace-loving people of society and thereby disturb the even tempo of society, they would be prejudicial to the maintenance of "the public order" irrespective of the persons involved. The gist of the incidents have been noticed. There is enough material to come to the conclusion that on account of the activities of the detenu, the even tempo of the locality was disturbed and there were possibilities of recurrence also in future. The last point also, therefore, cannot be accepted. 11. To conclude, the petition is dismissed and rule discharged. 12. Petition dismissed.
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1992 (11) TMI 293 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the suit was not something which the plaintiff undertook for the sake of satisfying a craving for litigation. The suit was forced upon the plaintiff and the transaction being of a commercial nature there is no reason why plaintiff should have been deprived of interest at the rate claimed Even for the pendente lite and future, the rate of interest will be 12 per cent, though of course, on the principal sum adjudged. 6. The result of the foregoing discussion is our allowing the appeal, setting aside the dismissal of the suit and substituting the said dismissal by a decree worded thus -- Defendant Corporation (defendant 2) do pay unto the plaintiff a sum of ₹ 51,732/- together with proportionate costs in both the Courts and bear its own. Rest of the plaintiff's claim is disallowed with the balance of the costs. ₹ 37,800/- from out of the decretal amount to carry interest at rate 12 per cent per annum from the date of the suit until realisation. Order accordingly.
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1992 (11) TMI 292 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the impugned order of transfer was implemented with immediate effect, the formal publication could not be made on the very same day but was made on January 5, 1991, namely, on the very next day. It appears from the records that the decision to declare equivalence was taken prior to the impugned order of transfer and the formal publication by way of statutory requirement was made in order to give effect to the decision to declare equivalence already taken. In such circumstances, we do not think that the formal declaration made on January 5, 1991 invalidates the impugned order of transfer. The Tribunal is justified in holding that infraction, even if any, in making publication formally on January 5, 1991, is only a technical violation for which no interference is called for. In the result, we do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal and the appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed but without any order as to costs.
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1992 (11) TMI 291 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... ars were the "casual" workers of the assessee. The decision in the case of A. Mukherjee & Co. (P.) Ltd. ( supra) is not relevant for deciding the present issue since that squarely pertains to the question whether the assessee whose operations are partly conducted outside the factory premises with the aid/help of others would be entitled to the benefit of sections 80HH and 80-I and that being an issue which has already been concluded in favour of the assessee. To the same effect is the decision of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of CWT v. Radhey Mohan Narain 1982 135 ITR 372. In the final analysis. we uphold the action of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) in rejecting both the claims concurring with him in the view that it is the direct employment of the stipulated number of workers which is relevant and not otherwise. The relevant grounds in the assessee’s appeal are accordingly rejected. 9. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1992 (11) TMI 290 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er Rule 3 in prescribed Form-A and registration is granted in prescribed Form-B which specifies the goods for the purposes of sub sections (1) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act and the sale of those goods in the course of inter-State trade to the dealer shall be taxable at the rate specified in that sub-section subject to the provisions of sub-section (4) of that section Specified goods are those which are used in the manufacture and processing of goods for sale. Khandsari sugar is produced through a crusher and generator is required to run the crusher In view of this the Sales Tax Tribunal was justified in holding that the generator is not required in the case of sugarcane crusher for the manufacture of goods. It is the crusher which is required to manufacture khandsari sugar and the generator is required to run that crusher Thus a generator is not directly involved in the manufacture of Khandsari sugar. 3. In view of the above, the revision has no substance and is dismissed.
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1992 (11) TMI 289 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... oing into the question whether there should be interim relief or injunction granted in the instant cases for, an affidavit has been filed on behalf of the defendant stating that 'at present the respondent-company is not using the label as found in the plaint document No. 3' and further 'the respondent undertakes to inform this Hon'ble Court and the appellant if for any reason they propose to use the said label for their tea business'. The undertaking, in our opinion, is more than enough for the present for the plaintiff. 13. For the reasons and conclusions aforementioned O.S.A. No. 279 of 1989 is allowed. Consequently Application No. 505 of 1989 in C.S. No. 79 of 1989 is allowed. The suit shall proceed for all the causes of action aforementioned and shall be disposed of in accordance with law. O.S.A. No. 278 of 1989 is disposed of in terms of the undertaking aforementioned. On the facts of this case, there will be no order as to costs in both the appeals.
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1992 (11) TMI 288 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... . Anand, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1992 (11) TMI 287 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed to determine whether the contractual rate was contained therein, in our view, it would be a reasonable rate of interest within the meaning of section 34 of the C.P.C. if we were to direct the defendant No. 1 to pay to the plaintiff Bank simple interest at the rate of 8 P.A. from the date of the suit till realisation. The said interest would be as stated above upon the principal sum of ₹ 1,53,000/-. The decree of the learned trial Court thus need to be modified. 28. In the result, the instant appeal is partly allowed. A decree in the sum of ₹ 2,81,574.38 ps. is passed against the defendants jointly and severally. As regards the future interest, the claim of future interest is decreed against the defendants jointly and severally 8 P.A. (Simple Interest) from the date of the suit still realisation upon the principal sum of ₹ 1,53,000/-. The rest of the decree of the learned trial Court is maintained. Costs of both the courts are saddled upon the defendants.
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1992 (11) TMI 286 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ier contemptuous writings of the contemnor. We need not reproduce other ; expressions, which are equally objectionable and couched in intemperate language. We are satisfied that the criticism by the contemnor in this latest communication also is motivated and a calculated attempt to bring down the image of the judiciary in the estimation of the public and it also tends to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The said communication merits no further discussion as instead of providing any extenuating circumstance, it bristles. with the defiant and objectionable attitude of the contemnor aimed at brow-beating the court. 18. We, accordingly, having found the contemnor guilty of having committee gross criminal contempt of this Court, sentence him to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of four months and to pay a fine of ₹ 1000/- (one thousand). In case of default in the payment of fine, he shall further undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 15 days.
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1992 (11) TMI 285 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d. It is not unlikely that Justice G.G. Sohani may have resigned forming the same opinion when his appointment was challenged. However, the State of Madhya Pradesh did not choose to reflect and reconsider the legality of its action in spite of the resignation of Justice G.G. Sohani and it continued to move in the wrong direction by making another invalid appointment of Justice Kamlakar Choubey. 34. Consequently, these appeals are dismissed and the impugned judgment of the High Court quashing the notifications dated 10.7.1991 and 9.1.1992 is sustained for the aforesaid reasons given by us. The State of Madhya Pradesh shall, in view of the retirement of Justice S.T. Ramalingam as a Judge of the Madras High Court in the meanwhile, take necessary action to finalise his terms and conditions in accordance with the guidelines issued by the Government of India in this behalf. Such action be taken promptly to avoid any undue delay in completion of the Commission's task. No costs.
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1992 (11) TMI 284 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... icial separation' cannot be understood in technical sense of grant of decree under Section 10 of H.M. Act. The word 'judicial' according to Chambers dictionary means, 'arising from process of law.' It has at times been contrasted with administrative, ministerial or executive." We are unable to agree with the ratio of this judgment. As already stated it is not correct to say that there are no provisions for Muslims or the Christians for obtaining orders of judicial separation in a court of law. Apart from that if under any personal law the person is not entitled to get any order of a court for a judicial separation it would only mean that they would not be entitled to the benefit of exclusion provided under the definition. We are unable to agree with the learned Judge that separation other than the one which was in pursuance of an order of court could be recognised for the purpose of Section 3(7). In the result the appeals fail and they are dismissed.
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1992 (11) TMI 283 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on of incorrect legal principles to the facts of this case. 29. We set aside the order of the Court of first instance, relating to the order for furnishing of security and admission. The winding-up application shall remain permanently stayed. 30. We are not, however, interfering with the order whereby the petitioning creditor was relegated to a suit. 31. Mr. Sen, appearing for the petitioning creditor, submits that the now continuing order of injunction restraining the petitioning creditor from instituting a suit may be continued for a further period of three weeks. On such prayer, the order of injunction restraining the petitioning creditor from instituting the suit will continue for a further period of three weeks from to-day. 32. There will be no order as to costs. 33. In view of the above order, there need be no separate order on the cross-objection filed by the respondent, which is also disposed of on the above terms. Prabir Kumar Majumdar, J. - I agree. Appeal allowed.
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1992 (11) TMI 282 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... claim being left without a remedy. Such a view would result in gross injustice. The Tribunal has the power to lay down its own procedure and as stated earlier Section 18(1) does not preclude it from invoking the provisions of Order XXXIII of the Code if the ends of justice so require. When an indigent person approaches the Tribunal for compensation for the wrong done to him, the Tribunal cannot refuse to exercise jurisdiction merely because he does not have the means to pay the fee. In such a situation we think the ends of justice require that the Tribunal should follow the procedure laid down in Order XXXIII of the Code to do justice for which it came to be established. 6. In the result we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the Claims Tribunal and remit the matter to the Claims Tribunal to deal with the appellant's claim-application in the light of the principle enunciated hereinabove. In the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
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1992 (11) TMI 281 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... force. o p /o p By operation of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 the rules laid on the floor of each House of the Parliament. There were no suggestions or alterations made by either House of Parliament. Under the circumstance we have no hesitation to hold that the failure to consult all the State Governments or Union Territories on the proviso to rule 3(3)(ii) or (iii) of the First Amendment Rules does not render the proviso ultra vires, invalid or void. Accordingly, we do not find any merit to issue the writ as prayed for in the writ petition. The Writ Petition and Civil Appeal arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 12469/90 are dismissed. The appeal arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 13823/91 is allowed and the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench at Lucknow is set side. But in the circumstance parties are directed to bear their own costs throughout. o p /o p VPR. WP (C) No. 499/91-dismissed. o p /o p C.A. No. 4794/92-dismissed. o p /o p C.A. No. 4788/92-allowed. o p /o p
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1992 (11) TMI 280 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s not that of a civil court exercising original, or any appellate or revisional, jurisdiction. Therefore, the powers and jurisdiction of the High Courts, and in certain cases of the Supreme Court, are those which are expressed and conferred upon them and also those which inhere in the exercise of that jurisdiction or are ancillary or those which subserve the exercise of that function and jurisdiction of giving advice. The appeal is kept pending before the Appellate Tribunal." (pp. 672-673) 21. In our view, therefore, a question of law does arise out of the order of the Tribunal and we direct the Tribunal to state a case and refer the following question for the opinion for this Court "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in upholding the order of the Commissioner (Appeals), Agra whereby he annulled the assessment order dated 29th May. 1980 by following the Tribunals order dated 31-12-1979?" 22. No order as to costs.
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1992 (11) TMI 279 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... date of facility to be given to such unit. Any subsequent expenditure in the same unit under this Act would not disentitle such unit for the grant of exemption for a period he is entitled, if otherwise qualified on that date. Any subsequent investment may be in a given case a case of addition or extention. Thus on the overall consideration we are of the view for the purpose of deciding the capital investment made by the unit whether it is less than ₹ 3 lacs or more than ₹ 3 lacs would be the date on which facility of exemption is permissible under this Act, which admittedly in the present case is 9th August, 1985, and an investment in that date is less than rupees three lacs. 10. In view of the findings recorded by above, we allow this writ petition, quash the impugned order dated 7th July, 1990 (Annexure 11 to the petition) and direct the said authority to modify the eligibility certificate for a period of four years from the 9th August, l985. Costs on parties.
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1992 (11) TMI 278 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s the case may be. Where, however, the stay orders inhibiting the authorities from taking further proceedings are vacated, the period referred to in the said s. 269UD(1) shall be reckoned with reference to the date of such vacating of the stay orders. This clarification and further direction shall be supplemental to and be treated as parts of the main judgment. 4. The second clarification sought is in respect of matters pending before the authorities and which though not agitated in Courts of law, are pending at various stages before the authorities in all such cases. We direct that Form 37-I shall be deemed to have been filed as on the date of the judgment of this Court dt. 17th Nov., 1992 for purposes of completion of proceedings in terms of s. 269UD(1). This further direction shall also be a part of the main judgment. Certified copy of the main order as well as this order of clarification shall be made available to all those who seek such certified copies against payment.
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1992 (11) TMI 277 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... if the reservation may be continued or not. 699. Valuable assistance was rendered by Shri K.K. Venugopal and Shri N.A. Palkhiwala the learned senior counsel, who led the arguments and placed one view. They were ably supported by Shri P.P. Rao and Smt. Shyamala Pappu, senior advocates. Arguments were also advanced by Smt. Hingorani, Mr. Mehta, Mr. K.L. Sharma, Mr. S.M. Ashri, Mr. Vishal Jeet. Shri K.N. Rao and Col. Dr. D.M. Khanna appeared in person as interveners and were of assistance. 700. Shri Ram Jethmalani, the learned senior advocate appearing for the State of Bihar was equally helpful in projecting the other view. Shri K. Parasaran, the learned senior counsel for the Union of India while supporting. Shri Jethmalani placed a very dispassionate view of the entire matter. Shri Rajiv Dhawan was also very helpful. Shri R.K. Garg, Shri Shiv Pujan Singh, Shri J. Siva Subramaniam, Shri Poti, Smt. Rani Jethmalani also made submissions. Shri Ram Avadhesh Singh argued in person.
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1992 (11) TMI 276 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , and very rightly to my mind, that there is virtually no distinction between admissions contained in the 108 statement and these admissions made by the accused that the parcels in question are the very ones which were despatched by him and he therefore submits that such material can never come under the head of independent corroboration. The learned counsel is fully justified and perfectly right in this submission in so far as the corroboration required for the purpose of basing a conviction on 108 statement alone must necessarily be independent which pre-supposes that it is distinct and separate from statements and admissions made by the accused. 9. On a very careful and thorough consideration of the material placed before me, I am of the view that the appellate judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge does not deserve any interference with. The appeal fails and accordingly stands dismissed. The bail boad of the respondent to stand cancelled. 10. Appeal dismissed.
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