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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 240 Records
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1993 (1) TMI 296 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... possession to the society the amount of development charges will have to be returned back.This shows clearly that possession was taken over by the Housing Board. Indeed the very tenor of the letter is, asking the Housing Board as to what development work they had carried out on the land and how much expenditure they had incurred thereon, which could not have been done unless the Board was in possession of the land. The Housing Board was asked to send the full particulars of the expenditure and not to carry on any further development works on that land. Reading the letter as a whole, it cannot but be said that the possession of the land was taken by the government and was also delivered to the Housing Board. Since the possession of the land was taken, there could be no question of withdrawing from the acquisition under section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. For the above reasons, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeals allowed. Petition dismissed.
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1993 (1) TMI 295 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the consent of the court under Section 321 or when an offence is validly compounded during trial under Section 320, but Section 227 being designed for a particular stage of the judicial proceeding one cannot revert to that provision when that stage has already been crossed. I am therefore clearly of the opinion that the Court of Session has no power to discharge an accused under Section 227 once a charge under Section 228 has already been framed. The learned Additional Session Judge was, therefore, clearly in error in discharging the accused opposite party under Section 227 Cr.P.C, by his impugned order dated the 20th November, 1990 after charge had already been framed against the accused under Section 228 Cr.P.C. at an earlier stage. The impugned order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge is accordingly set aside and the learned Additional Sessions Judge is directed to proceed with the trial in accordance with law. The revisional application stands allowed accordingly.
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1993 (1) TMI 294 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... P. Singh, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1993 (1) TMI 293 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ess, of course, the notification calling for applications itself specifies such a date. 10. For the above reasons, we set aside the judgment and order of the Tribunal, remit the matter back to the Tribunal for deciding the O.A. afresh, in accordance with law, after hearing the parties and on a consideration of the material on record. It is made clear that nothing said in the judgment shall be treated as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case. Whether Dr. Nair was eligible and whether Dr. Bhatnagar was entitled to an offer of relaxation are matters for the Tribunal to decide hereinafter. Whatever we have stated above constitute merely the reasons for our order. It is further directed that pending the decision of the Tribunal in pursuance of this order Dr. Nair shall continue in the post of Director. His appointment to the said post shall of course be subject to the final orders that may be passed by the Tribunal in this matter. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1993 (1) TMI 292 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ation both that the qualifications will be relaxed and also the conditions on which they will be relaxed, the relaxation will be illegal. D. The University/Selection Committee must mention in its proceedings of selection the reasons for making relaxations, if any, in respect of each of the candidates in whose favour relaxation is made. E. The minutes of the meetings of the Selection Committee should be preserved for a sufficiently long time, and if the selection process is challenged until the challenge is finally disposed of. An adverse inference is liable to be drawn if the minutes are destroyed or a plea is taken that they are not available. 7.Although, therefore, for reasons stated above, we deem it inadvisable to interfere in the selections made in the present case, we direct that the University and its Selection Committee should observe the above norms in all future selections. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed subject to the above directions. Petition dismissed.
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1993 (1) TMI 291 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hension of breach of the peace. It is, therefore, not correct to say as held by the High Court that the property continues to remain under attachment of the Magisterial order till the rights of the parties are decided finally by the competent Court of law. That appears to be the purport of the High Court’s order since in the present case the appellate civil Court has already passed an order of injunction against the 1st Respondent and her husband by virtue of which the possession continues to be with the appellants. In this view of the matter, the Magistrate had not erred in withdrawing the attachment by his order dated 17th October, 1978. 6. For both these reasons, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order of the High Court is set aside. It is necessary to add that the suit as filed by the Appellants is only for a permanent injunction. The appellants must amend the plaint for claiming also the declaration of their title to the property in question. Apppeal allowed.
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1993 (1) TMI 290 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... one direction or another." 205. To the same effect, Micheal J. Perry in Morality Politics and Law 1988 Edn. states at page 129 as under "According to the view of democracy that underlies originalism, it is illegitimate for the judiciary to go beyond the enforcement of policy choices to the making of policy choices at least, it is illegitimate unless the judiciary is authorized to do so by the legislative and executive branches. And it is illegitimate in extremism for the undemocratic judiciary to oppose itself, in constitutional cases, to the democratic branches and agencies of government on the basis of beliefs never constitutionalized by the gratifiers. " 206. Therefore, this Court cannot concern itself with the moral aspect of the impugned Amendment. The impugned Amendment is the will of the people expressed through Parliament. 207. In view of the foregoing discussion, these petitions are liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, these petitions stand dismissed.
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1993 (1) TMI 289 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... he awards. That in my view does not alter the position. It matters not whether the ticket money paid for the whole or part of the trophies or merely contributed to the entire expense of the evening including, as a vital part, the supply of the trophies. Either way there was a sufficient direct link between the sum the diners paid for their tickets and the supply of the awards. Nor does it matter in my view whether the diners knew or considered whether the price which they paid included or constituted the cost of the awards. Such price in fact contributed to the cost of the evening which included the provision of the awards. That in my view is a sufficiently direct link. It follows that here there was consideration for the provision of the trophies and no VAT is payable separately on the cost of the trophies. Accordingly I would dismiss this appeal. Appeal dismissed with costs. Solicitors Solicitor for Customs and Excise Commissioners George Davies and Co., Wilmslow. C. T. B.
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1993 (1) TMI 288 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... cated. As a matter of fact, the learned Subordinate Judge who made the award a rule of the court has clearly noted that the plaintiff claimed interest and the learned arbitrator allowed Rs 63,186 without noting the period or the rate of interest. Therefore, it is difficult to infer that the interest awarded includes interest during the pre-reference period as well as the period during which the arbitration proceedings were pending (pendente lite). Therefore the question of remanding it to the arbitrator does not arise. Even otherwise this matter was referred to the arbitrator in respect of an agreement entered into in the year 1971 and we do not think that at this distance of time it is in the interest of justice to set aside the impugned,. judgment and reopen all the proceedings, particularly when there is no clear indication that the impugned award included the interest during the prereference period. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1993 (1) TMI 287 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in a case where an industrial concern makes any default in repayment of any loan or advance or any instalment thereof or otherwise fails to meet its obligations under the terms of any agreement with the Financial Corporation, such as the respondent herein, can the latter take recourse to sections 29 and/or 31 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 notwithstanding the bar of Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985?
Held that:- difficult to accept the view of the High Court that where the creditors of a sick industrial concern happen to be Banks or State Financial Corporations different considerations would come into play. It must be realised that in the modern industrial environment large industries are generally financed by banks and statutory corporations created specially for that purpose and if they are permitted to resort to independent action in total. disregard of the pending inquiry under sections 15 to 19 of the 1985 Act the entire exercise under the said provisions would be rendered nugatory by the time the BIFR is able to evolve a scheme of revival or rehabilitation of the sick industrial concern by the simple device of the Financial Corporation resorting to section 29 of the 1951 Act. We are, therefore, of the opinion that where an inquiry is pending under section 16/17 or an appeal is pending under section 25 of the 1985 Act there should be cessation of the coercive activities of the type mentioned in section 22(1) to permit the BIFR to consider what remedial measures it should take with respect to the sick industrial company. The expression 'proceedings' in section 22(1) therefore, cannot be confined to legal proceedings understood in the narrow sense of proceedings in a court of law or a legal tribunal for attachment and sale of the debtors's property. Appeal allowed.
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1993 (1) TMI 286 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rmed by this Court. On verification, we find that in Deputy Commissioner (Law) v. B. Thampan 1995 96 STC 631 a Bench of this Court, has endorsed the view of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal that pencil slats is nothing else than timber cut into small pieces of planks and this finding of the Appellate Tribunal is a finding of fact and also it is fortified by the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. 1985 60 STC 213 and the decision of this Court in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law) v. Kunhalavi and Co. 1987 66 STC 100. The Appellate Tribunal was justified in stating that by converting soft wood into pencil slats no new commodity emerges and the turnover relating thereto cannot be taxed under section 5A of the Act. The order passed by the Appellate Tribunal does not merit interference in revision under section 41 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act. 3.. The tax revision case is without merit. It is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1993 (1) TMI 285 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... efore the High Court on the aforesaid date of coming into force of section 6(1). That provision of section 6(1) came into force on February 27, 1989, on which day this Tribunal started exercising its jurisdiction under section 6(1). On that date the pending matter in this case was a second appeal. Therefore it cannot stand transferred to this Tribunal under section 15. As already stated, a matter not pending before the High Court is not contemplated to be transferred to this Tribunal under section 15. Therefore, in both the ways, the present matter is not entertainable by this Tribunal Accordingly, it is directed that the records be returned to the court from which those were received together with a copy of this order. Let the order sheet and the paper book containing the judgments of the courts of the learned Munsif, learned Additional District Judge and the learned High Court be also preserved. The matter be treated for statistical purpose of this Tribunal as disposed of.
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1993 (1) TMI 284 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... evaluating whether the original commodity has ceased to be and a new commodity or goods has resulted or is produced with a new label or user as understood in common parlance or in the commercial world. 36.. Therefore, I hold that chilli powder is distinct and different from chilli - spice , purchased and which was taxed. As chilli powder is a distinct and different commodity, it could be taxed again. The said stand taken by the Revenue is plainly right. Ambika Provision Stores case 1987 67 STC 170 and Rani Food Products case 1988 68 STC 446 were decided on their own facts and there is no conflict in the principles laid down in those decisions. The said decisions do not require reconsideration. 37.. This original petition is without merit. It is dismissed. No costs. ORDER OF COURT In view of the order of the majority, the writ petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Order of C.M.P. No. 5325 of 1983 in O.P. No. 1647 of 1983-E dismissed. Writ petition allowed.
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1993 (1) TMI 283 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... encement of the provision, it shall carry interest at the rate of 18 per cent. Admittedly, the sales tax was in arrears against the petitioners when section 8(1-A) came into force and it remained unpaid after the expiry of six months from 25th of January, 1964, when the provision came into force. Interest, therefore, started automatically running on the arrears irrespective of the years to which they related. There is thus no force in this contention. The provision made under section 11-D of the Act, as reproduced above, is almost on the similar lines as was made in the U.P. Sales Tax (Amendment) Act. In view of the discussion above, the question referred is answered in the affirmative in both these references, i.e., section 11-D(2) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act would cover the assessment framed or demand created after induction of the aforesaid provision into the Act, in respect of the year of assessment, prior to such amendment. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1993 (1) TMI 282 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... ned orders dated May 21, 1985, quashing the registration certificates issued to the Siliguri division of the applicant-company under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 and West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1954. There will be no order for costs. The interim orders stand vacated to the aforesaid extent. 24.. The challenge of the applicants in respect of the order dated May 21, 1985, regarding the registration certificate under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, has not been considered by us, since this Tribunal does not exercise jurisdiction in matters directly coming under that Act of 1956. Let xerox copies of the record received from the High Court, Calcutta be retained in the Tribunal and the original record as received be returned to the High Court, Calcutta, with a copy of this judgment and order for necessary action in so far as the registration certificate under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, is concerned. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1993 (1) TMI 281 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mission that the estimate of turnover was excessive is not acceptable. The transactions recorded in the loose papers were for a period of 27 days and the suppression was found to the extent of Rs. 7,000. The Sales Tax Tribunal while sustaining the assessment order has taken these matters into consideration. A perusal of the order of the assessing authority further reveals that there existed a number of other circumstances which warranted rejection of assessee s account books and enhancement to the returned turnover. Considering the totality of the circumstances, it cannot be said that the order of the Sales Tax Tribunal suffers from any legal infirmity so as to call for any interference by this Court. The turnover on which the assessment has been made, cannot be said to be excessive, arbitrary or unjust. The second contention also fails and is rejected. The revision is devoid of any merit and is, accordingly, rejected. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1993 (1) TMI 280 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... not be termed as a machinery within the meaning of entry 15 of Schedule C to the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. It would be machinery only if such structure, complete in itself, has moving parts in relation with others when they move interdependently by application of force-mechanical or manual-with an avowed object to produce a given product. In other words, in order to be a machinery, the following four factors must exist, namely (1) a complete and integrated collection of several objects or articles (2) these objects or articles should interact in unison upon or with each other (3) this interaction is prompted by application of force which may be manual or motive power and (4) the movement should be with a view to do some specific activity or to obtain specific or, definite result. For the reasons given above, I allow the revision, set aside the order of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Tribunal, Ajmer and restore that of the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) I, Jaipur. Petition allowed.
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1993 (1) TMI 279 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... urt found that the milkfood powder remained the same and it was not used or consumed within the limits of Bangalore City, and only it was transferred from big packets to small packets. Ultimately the test would boil down to determine the question whether the commodity had undergone such vital changes by processing that it lost its character and became a different commodity. As the Supreme Court held in the context of sales tax legislation, if goods to which some labour is applied, remained essentially the same commercial article, it cannot be said that the final product is the result of manufacture. 10.. In view of the aforesaid principle pronounced by the Supreme Court in its various judgments and followed by this Court earlier the question raised in this reference will have to be answered in the affirmative in favour of the opponent and against the Revenue. 11.. The question is answered accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1993 (1) TMI 278 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... inting of paper for supply of printed paper to the textile mill would involve manufacture and would bring into existence a different taxable commodity. A similar view had also been taken earlier by another Division Bench of this Court in Navgujarat Paper Industries v. Superintendent of Central Excise 1977 ELT (J. 67) and the court had observed in para 17 that Similarly mere printing of designs and monograms and other description of goods regarding to quality (sic) of the name of manufacturer does not convert packing or wrapping paper into another kind of paper. It still continues to be printing or wrapping paper on which something has been printed. Hence the question involved in this reference is directly covered by the earlier judgment of this Court. 10.. In this view of the matter the question requires to be answered in the affirmative and it is answered accordingly. There will be no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1993 (1) TMI 277 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... condition was imposed by the Tribunal that on delayed payment of 50 per cent the petitioner would be liable to pay interest as well and then his appeal would be decided by the appellate authority on merits. We are of the view that at this stage no direction with regard to payment of interest on delayed payment could be given by the Tribunal. It is left to the appellate authority to decide this question of payment of interest on delayed payment at the time of decision of the appeal. Since the petitioner has stated that he has already deposited 50 per cent of the tax as assessed by the Assessing Authority, the appellate authority will decide the appeal on merits.
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