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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 192 Records
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1993 (12) TMI 241 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f the provision itself. 15. Insofar as W.P. Nos. 2530, 2532, 2534, 2536 and 2539 of 1993 filed by the petitioners under the WT Act, 1957, challenging the orders of the assessing authority applying the provisions of s. 17B of the Act levying interest are concerned, the petitioners shall have liberty to move the concerned assessing authority or the CBDT under s. 10(2) of the Act which is almost akin to the powers of the Board under s. 119(2) of the IT Act, 1961. In the light of my conclusions arrived at on the nature and scope of powers under s. 119(2) of the IT Act, the ratio of which, in my view, also applies to the claims and applications that may be made under s. 10(2) of the WT Act, 1957, the concerned authorities shall consider the claims, if any, made by the petitioners and pass appropriate orders on merits and in accordance with law after giving an effective opportunity, as laid down and directed in the batch of cases dealt with above arising under the IT Act. No costs.
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1993 (12) TMI 240 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d in the share, one fails to understand as to how it would be available for the emergencies which the Union might face or might have faced. Undoubtedly, the learned Member has made reference to Section 15 of the Act and Clause 14 of the Constitution of the Association. However, merely because the general body has approved of this transaction, the learned Member sees no lack of bonafides in the whole affair. This is not a case where the bonafides have to be inferred. On the face of the transaction offends against the spirit of the Act. Even if, therefore, the general body approved of this transaction, it could not give the transaction the colour of legality. The order, therefore, is patently illegal and incorrect. It has to be set aside. The Industrial Court shall decide the application within one month from today in the light of the observation made from today in the light of the observations made by this court. With these observations, the petition stands allowed with costs.
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1993 (12) TMI 239 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he decree-holder has derived no advantage to which he was not entitled and the judgment-debtor has lost nothing and in either event he had to discharge and satisfy the decretal debt due from him, the question of applying the principle of restitution does not arise. Their Lordships held (at p. 139) "The sale being inevitable under the amended decree, the judgment-debtor was clearly not entitled to restitution." Applying the aforesaid principle to the case in hand, I have no doubt in my mind that the relief of restitution could not have been granted. The two Courts below committed gross error in allowing restitution merely on a finding that there has been a variance of the decree as the rate of interest was reduced from 12 per cent to 6 per cent. The said judgments and decrees of the two Courts below cannot be sustained. In the result, the judgments and decrees of the two Courts below are set aside and the Second Appeal is allowed. There would be no order as to costs.
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1993 (12) TMI 238 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on became the possessor of a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque if payable to bearer, or the payer or endorse thereof, if (payable to order), before the amount mentioned in it became payable, and without having sufficient cause to believe that any defect existed in the title of the person from who he derived his title. 8. If there is nothing to show that the complainant is a payee or a holder in due course, the Court could not have taken cognizance, and on this short ground alone, petition required to be allowed. Mr. Nanavati, learned Advocate appearing for original-complainant read out the complaint but could not point out from the complaint as to who is the payee or holder in due course of the cheque. 9. In absence of this positive averment in the complaint the Court ought not to have taken cognizance of the offence and therefore, the process issued against the petitioners requires to be quashed on this limited ground only. Rule is made absolute in all the matters.
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1993 (12) TMI 237 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... early that Section 13A was intended to bite in full from the outset. If the position were otherwise it would follow that, although Parliament has accepted the advice of all those who had urged that this objectionable system should be brought to an end, and has grasped the nettle and provided a remedy, it has reconciled itself to the continuation of arbitral proceedings already irrevocably stamped with a risk of injustice. I find it impossible to accept that Parliament can have intended any such thing, and with due respect to those who have suggested otherwise I find the meaning of Section 13A sufficiently clear to persuade me that in the interests of reform Parliament was willing to tolerate the very qualified kind of hardship implied in giving the legislation a partially retrospective effect. Accordingly I agree with Beldam LJ that the arbitrator did have the powers to which he purported to exercise. I would therefore allow the appeal and restore the award of the arbitrator.
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1993 (12) TMI 236 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sed, cannot be accepted. I need not make an elaborate discussion on the subject in view of the order dated September 9, 1993, passed by me in Company Petition No. 6 of 1991--Union of India v. Krishna Mills Ltd. 1994 81 Comp Cas 50. In that case, I have considered the entire matter at length and have not found merit in the submission made that the company petition is liable to be dismissed as soon as the provisions of Section 22 are attracted. It has been held in the said case that the proceedings under the Companies Act or such like statutes are to be frozen till the matter is finally decided by the Board or by the Appellate Authority, as the case may be. 9. In view of the above, the application filed by the respondent-company is allowed and it is ordered that the proceedings of Company Petition No. 8 of 1993, shall remain in abeyance till the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction decides the reference made by the respondent-company under Section 15(1) of the Act.
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1993 (12) TMI 235 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r the charges of misconduct levelled against him and also had for no valid reason refused to participate in the disciplinary proceedings. A Bank employee who had refused to avail of the opportunities provided to him in a disciplinary proceeding of defending himself against the charges of misconduct involving his integrity and dishonesty, cannot be permitted to complain later that he had been denied a reasonable opportunity of defending himself of the charges levelled against him and the disciplinary proceeding conducted against him by the Bank-employer had resulted in violation of principles of natural justice of fair hearing. 5. Hence we are constrained to hold that the order of the High Court impugned in this appeal is liable to be interfered with and set aside. 6. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the Order of the High Court and dismiss the Writ Petition filed by the-respondent in the High Court, 7. However, in the facts of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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1993 (12) TMI 234 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of the judgment, Therefore, it being a discretionary relief and the Act having left that discretion to the Tribunal, it appears to have felt that it would be just to give relief from the date of judgment to meet the ends of justice. The appellant is not, as of right, entitled to the relief. No doubt the statute postulates that the relief cannot be granted anterior to the date of the complaint. That does not mean that the tribunal is always bound to grant relief from the date of the complaint. By operation of Sub-section (2) of Section 38 the Tribunal has been invested with the discretion to grant such relief as is warranted. The Tribunal having thus exercised the discretion and limited the relief from the date of the judgment, it cannot be termed it as illegal. It cannot also be held that it arbitrarily or unjustly exercised the discretion. Accordingly we do not find any compelling reasons warranting interference under Article 136. The appeal is dismissed, but without costs.
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1993 (12) TMI 233 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... (whether ginned or unginned)” within the meaning of item I of Schedule B to the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953, as amended by Act 10 of 1954, and it is therefore liable to tax under the residuary entry covered by item 80 of Schedule S. 21. Therefore both these cases go to show that the present item ‘absorbent cotton wool I.P.’ which is commercially known as surgical cotton is prepared after certain process and it will fall in entry 56 us pharmaceutical product and it wilt not be covered by entry 16 i.e. cotton of all kinds (indigenous or imported), whether ginned or unginned. 22. In this back-ground 1 think the view taken by the Tribunal is correct and the absorbent cotton woo I.P. or surgical cotton is covered by entry 56 of the notification dated 27.6.1990 and not by entry 16. The petitioner’s liability of tax shall be assessed at the rate of 6% under entry 56 of the notification dated 27.6.1990. 23. In the result, the writ petition is allowed in part.
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1993 (12) TMI 232 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of Articles 19(1)(g) and not saved by Article nfba 19(6) /nfba of the Constitution of India. o p /o p (4) The Act and the Ordinance are violative of Article nfba 301 /nfba read with Article nfba 304(b) /nfba of the Constitution. o p /o p 13. Accordingly, it is declared that the "Bihar Restoration and Improvement of Degraded Forest Land Taxation Act, 1992", and the earlier Ordinance to that effect, is unconstitutional and void. o p /o p It is further declared that all action taken under the said Act, Ordinance and the Rules framed thereunder, are unconstitutional and void. There will be a writ of mandamus directing the Respondents and their Officers not to give effect to the said Act or the ordinance or Rule or any order or direction or instruction or notification issued thereunder in any manner whatsoever. o p /o p 14. All these applications are allowed accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. o p /o p pjudge C.S.N. Mishra /pjudge , J. o p /o p 15. I agree.
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1993 (12) TMI 231 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... en necessary steps in that behalf. Be that as it may, we dispose of this writ petition with a direction that the petitioner may move the Tribunal for an early hearing of the stay application/appeal. If such an application is filed, the Tribunal is directed to decide the stay application, if for some reason it is not possible to decide the appeal itself, within a period of three weeks, a certified copy of this order is filed before it along with the necessary application. We further direct that, in the meanwhile, the respondent No. 3--Branch Manager, Allahabad Bank, Bindki, Fatehpur--shall not act upon the notice dt. 18th Nov., 1993 issued under s. 226(3) of the IT Act (Annexure-4 to the writ petition) for a period of one month from today, unless he has already remitted the amount in pursuance of the said notice. However, the bank account of the petitioner with the said bank shall remain under attachment. Subject to the above the writ petition shall stand finally disposed of.
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1993 (12) TMI 230 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... manufacture and sale of staples and synthetics blended yarn of various specifications. On this finding, the Tribunal has held that in such a case the plant and machinery was used for the purpose of the business and, therefore, the assessee is entitled to investment allowance under section 32A. 20. It is also relevant that the income-tax authority have themselves allowed depreciation on the plant and machinery. Such depreciation can be allowed only if the plant and machinery has been used for the purpose of the business. If the plant and machinery is allowed depreciation, such plant and machinery shall as well be entitled to investment allowance or development rebate as the requirement of both the allowances is that the plant and machinery shall be used for the purpose of the business. 21. For the reasons aforesaid, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. 22. There will be no order as to costs. Chowdhury, J. - I agree.
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1993 (12) TMI 229 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sed against C Form under the Central Sales Tax Act and he has not paid Tamil Nadu Sales Tax, he will not be absolved to taxing liability under this Act in Rajasthan. Relevant is the entry into local area of the motor Vehicle and whoever is the importer, he has to pay the tax. Only rebate in the tax can be given to him of the amount of tax paid on the vehicle. The incidence of tax is not the payment of tax by the incumbet under the General Sales Tax Act of the other State. The incident of tax is entry of the vehicle in the local area. It is only the rebate which is given to him of the amount of tax which he has paid in that State under the Sales Tax Act of that State. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel that he has purchased the dumpers against C Form issued under the Central Sales Tax Act, therefore, he is not liable to pay this tax is not well founded and the same is overruled. 28. Hence, all these writ petitions have no merit and the same are hereby dismissed.
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1993 (12) TMI 228 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of six months from the date of the receipt of this order. The State Government should on receipt of the recommendation, make appointments in the order mentioned in the selection list within a period of two months thereafter. Since the respondents have been continuing as ad hoc doctors, they shall continue till the regularly selected candidates are appointed. They are also entitled to apply for selection. In case any of the respondents are barred by age, the State Government is directed to consider the cases for necessary relaxation under Rule 9(3) of the age qualification. If any of the respondents are not selected, the ad hoc appointment shall stand terminated with the appointment of the selected candidate. The direction sought for by Dr Vinay Rampal cannot be given. His appeal is accordingly dismissed and the State appeal is also dismissed. The appeals of the PSC are accordingly allowed but in the circumstances parties are directed to bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.
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1993 (12) TMI 227 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to be cancelled. The fact that it was revived is of no consequence if due regard is to be had to clause 17 of the agreement which has been extracted above. Section 2(g) of the Consumer Protection Act states as follows "(g) 'deficiency' means any fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner of performance which is required to be maintained by or under any law for the time being in force or has been undertaken to be performed by a person in pursuance of a contract or otherwise in relation to any service;" 19. Insofar as there is no privity of contract between the appellant and the consumer no 'deficiency' as defined under Section 2(g) (quoted above) arises. Therefore, the action itself is not maintainable before the Consumer Forum. For all these reasons, we set aside the judgments of the authorities below. Civil Appeal will stand allowed. However, in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.
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1993 (12) TMI 226 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e can arise." The High Court of Gujarat applied the ratio of the above-referred judgment of the High Court of Madras in the case of Janaki Ammal Ayya Nadar Trust (supra) . The learned counsel for the assessee also rightly relied upon the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT v. Trustee of H.E.H. The Nizam's Supplemental Religious Endowment Trust (1981) 127 ITR 378. 10. Having regard to the undisputable facts of the case and interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Act referred to hereinabove in the light of the judgments of the High Courts of Madras, Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh and our own High Court in the above-referred cases, we have reached the conclusion that the question referred to us must be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. We, accordingly, answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. 11. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1993 (12) TMI 225 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d to hold the land. By operation of Section 6 though its lease had expired by efflux of time, the lease did not stand terminated. In other words, his possession remains juridical possession under the Act. Therefore, on its being prohibited to remain in possession, the company was enjoined under Section 79-B(2) to furnish declaration and accordingly he did furnish to the Tehsildar, though mistakenly done by quoting Section 66(1). Quotation of a wrong provision does not take away the jurisdiction of the authorities to inquire under Section 79-B(3) of the Act. The Tribunals, therefore, had jurisdiction to inquire into and publish the declaration as enjoined under Section 79- B(3) of the Act. The demised 600 acres land held by the company stood vested in the State free of encumbrances. 7.Accordingly the order of the High Court is clearly illegal. It is set aside and the action of the Deputy Commissioner under Section 79-B(3) is upheld. The appeals are allowed, but without costs.
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1993 (12) TMI 224 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 2/201 IPC and 3/4/5 TADA (P) Act, Police Station Rupnagar, District Ropar with immediate effect. We further direct the Senior Superintendent of Police, Ropar and the Station House Officer, Police Station Rupnagar to assist the CBI in conducting the investigation. The CBI shall exercise all the powers available to it under the Criminal Procedure Code and any other provision of law. The State of Punjab through its Home Secretary is further directed to provide all assistance to the CBI in this respect. 11. We direct the Director, CBI to depute a responsible officer to hold the investigation as directed by us. This may be done within one week from the receipt of this order. The CBI shall complete the investigation within three months from the date of receipt of this order by the Director and submit its report in accordance with law. The proceedings before the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ropar, shall remain stayed till March 31, 1994. The appeal is, thus, disposed of.
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1993 (12) TMI 223 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e test for heroin. (27) Thus the appellant was found in possession of narcotic drug possession of which is prohibited by Section 8 of the Act except for the purposes specified therein. It is in the evidence that the appellant failed to account for his possession and indeed, he never took any plea that he was authorised to possess the contraband. Section 54 of the Act also permits a presumption that a person who possesses any narcotic drug has committed an offence under Chapter-4 of the Act,if he fails to explain his possession satisfactorily. (28) Under these circumstances, the irresistible conclusion is that the appellant has committed offences punishable under Sections 21 and 28 read with Section 23 of the Act for unauthorised possession of the heroin and he has been rightly convicted and sentenced by the Court below. The appeal is,therefore, dismissed. The conviction and the sentences passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge are confirmed. The appeal is disallowed.
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1993 (12) TMI 222 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... counsel for the Revenue urged that the petitioner had alternative remedy by challenging the assessment orders in appeal. Ordinarily this Court does not entertain the petition under article 226 where the statutory remedy of appeal was available to the petitioner. However in the facts and circumstances of the case when the petitioner had approached this Court at the threshold before the reassessment orders were passed and the matter has been examined on merit after hearing both the parties, and the issue raised in the petition is squarely covered by principles enunciated by the apex Court. I am not inclined to entertain objection as to entertaining this petition on the ground of availability of alternate remedy at this stage. Accordingly the petition is allowed. The impugned notices annexures 4 and 5 dated May 11, 1992 under section 12 of the Act and the assessment orders dated June 2, 1992, passed in pursuance thereof are quashed. No order as to costs. Writ petition allowed.
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