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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 375 Records
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1995 (3) TMI 503 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... proof. Neither the marking of an exhibit number can be postponed till the document has been held proved; nor the document can be held to have been proved merely because it has been marked as an exhibit. (16) This makes the position of law clear. Any practice contrary to the above said statement of law has no sanctity and cannot be permitted to prevail. (17) Every Court is free to regulate its own affairs within the framework of law. Chapter Xiii Rule 3 above said contemplates documents admitted in evidence being numbered in such manner as the Court may direct. I make it clear for this case and for all the cases coming up before me in future that the documents tendered and admitted in evidence shall be marked with numerical Serial numbers, prefixed by Ex.P if filed by plaintiff or petitioner and prefixed by Ex.D if filed by defendant or respondent. (18) Reverting back to the case before me, let the report of Notary Public be endorsed with an exhibit number by the Court Master.
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1995 (3) TMI 502 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 8(2), attracting residuary Article 182 of the old Limitation Act. Contrary views of the High Courts, are not good law. A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Smt. Kotipalli Mahalakshmamma v. K. Ganeswara Rao, AIR 1960 AP 54, correctly decided the question of law which held that the limitation begins to run only after a final decree is engrossed on stamped papers. 13. Accordingly, the appeals arc allowed. The judgments and orders of the High Court arc set aside and that of the trial court stands confirmed. The trial court is directed first to pass the final decree and then to engross the same on the stamped papers already supplied by the appellants; if further stamped papers be needed, reasonable time would be given to supply the same. The final decree would then be drawn thereon. The court would, thereafter, proceed with the execution of the final decree in accordance with law. 14. In the circumstances, the parties am directed to bear their own costs throughout.
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1995 (3) TMI 501 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s respect shall be taken after hearing Mr. Mehta and other learned Counsel for the parties. 3. Mr. Mehta has also placed on record the interim site visit report dated October 18, 1994 of the committee constituted by the Ministry of Environment and Forest, Government of India for inspection of violations of norms and guidelines prescribed for developmental activities for beach/resorts/ hotels etc. in the Coastal Regulation Zone of the State of Goa. We have examined the report and we find that the committee has done a useful work. We issue notice to the Ministry of Environment and Forest, Government of India through its Secretary and also to the State of Goa to file affidavits indicating the action taken in respect of the report of the committee. The Government of India shall furnish copy of the report to the State of Goa if it has not already been done. The affidavits shall be filed by the Government of India and the State of Goa within two weeks of the receipt of this order.
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1995 (3) TMI 500 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... cumstances, we find it difficult to place implicit reliance on the evidence of PW-1 to hold that the accused obtained illegal gratification in the manner spoken to by him and that at his instance PW-1 placed the money in the drawer of the table. By preponderance of probabilities, the accused has sufficiently shown that the plea put forward by him, namely, that in his absence somebody else might have put the tainted money in his drawer, is plausible. Further, we are at a loss to understand as to why the Dr. S.P. asked the accused to touch the currency notes and then made him dip his fingers in the solution. This also creates some suspicion so far as the version of PW-1 is concerned, namely, that at the instance of the accused he put the currency notes in the drawer, which circumstance is vital and decisive in this case. 10. For the foregoing reasons, we are constrained to give the benefit of doubt to the appellant and/accordingly, acquit him. The appeal is, therefore, allowed.
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1995 (3) TMI 499 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is liable to sale for realisation of his decree debt? In that context the relevancy or validity of the gift is immaterial. It was admitted therein that they had executed possessory mortgage in favour of Ibrahim, plaintiff therein. On that basis, the only question would have been whether he would be entitled to resist the execution of the decree obtained against Maqdoom by the 6th defendant therein? The oral gift or sale of 4 acres under Ex.D-3 was not the subject-matter of OS No. 3/1/1951. The High Court, therefore, committed gross palpable error of law in applying the doctrine of res judicata between codefendants relying upon the decree in OS No.3/1/1951 dated September 24, 1951, even if it could be pressed into service in the second appeal. 12. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The judgment and decree of the High Court are set aside and that of the appellate court stands restored, in consequence the suit of the respondents 1 & 2 stands dismissed with costs throughout.
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1995 (3) TMI 498 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... a half year, the said period in our vie is sufficient for the Central Government to exhaust the select-panel of the type with which we are concerned in this case. We have already indicated the time-bound pro- cedure to be followed in dealing with the select-panel of this type. 14. Sri Murgod who was at No. 1 of the select-panel did not accept the appointment. Sri S.P. Singh Chaudhary has already withdrawn his appeal and he is out of run. We arc not sure about the stand of the person who is at No.3 of the select-panel. Under the circumstances it would not be appropriate to issue any direction at this point of time in favour of the appellant who is at No.4 of the select-panel. 15. While reversing the findings given by the Central Administrative Tribunal, to the extent indicated above, we dismiss this appeal. In the circumstances of this case, we direct the respondent, Central Government, to pay cost of these proceedings to the appellant, which we quantify as ₹ 30,000/- .
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1995 (3) TMI 497 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ₹ 300/- per marla in execution with interest. So the appellants are liable to restitute the excess amount realised in execution of the decree of the reference court or appeal under Section 54 with interest. Granting of interest or damage or compensation is consequential to the variation, reversal or setting aside of the enhanced compensation under Section 23(1) and computation of statutory interest under Section 28 on enhanced compensation and interest on solatium if paid as per the decree or order of the Court. The State is entitled to restitute of the benefit accrued to the owner in the original decree. Direction to restitute the amount with interest is within the powers conferred on the court under Section 144 of the Code. Therefore, the High Court rightly directed the appellants to refund the enhanced amount with interest since the appellants had the benefit of the money after the realisation till date of return or restitution. 6. The appeal is dismissed. No costs.
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1995 (3) TMI 496 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ecessary to deal with them. They all refer to rules of estoppel and question of good faith under Section 27 of the Sale of Goods Act. They may have relevance when the suit may come up for final hearing but they do not lay down any principles of use for deciding the question of rejection of plaint. (29) The learned counsel for the plaintiff has cited Full Bench decision in Raghunandan Rai vs R. Pandey, Air 1921 All 353 and a Division Bench decision in Dinanath Rai vs Rama Rai, AIR1926Pat512 holding that the tender of mortgage money was not a condition precedent to institution of suits but in my opinion such reliance is misconceived because the two rulings lay down law by reference to S.60 of the Transfer of the Property Act which cannot be stretched to bear on the issue as to redemption of pledges. (30) For all the foregoing reasons, no case is made out for rejection of plaint. I.A. No. 10044/94 (under Order 7 Rule 11 Civil Procedure Code filed by defendant No.4) is rejected.
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1995 (3) TMI 495 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rue that they are left with virtually notime to approach the appeal Court but more importantly because appellants in the event of the appeal Court taking a view contrary to the one which this Court has taken, the respondent No. 1 company should in that event not be subjected to the lengthy and expensive exercise of reconvening the meeting. It shall therefore be permissible for them to adjourn the meeting for such period of time as they consider reasonable to approach the appeal Court. If the appeal Court grants permission to either to hold the same meeting or to continue with it, the respondents shall be entitled to do so. On the contrary, if the appeal Court were to confirm the view of this Court, the question of reconvening the meeting will not arise. The second application made by Mr. Holla is accordingly granted and respondent No. 1 is permitted to adjourn the meeting covnened for 2-3-1995. The Appeal is allowed, the injugued order is set aside. No costs. Appeal allowed.
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1995 (3) TMI 494 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... istrar of the Company was in patent error in referring the Appellant to the civil court in the facts and circumstances of the present case. He should have himself held an enquiry into the matter Under Section 84(4) of the Companies Act read with the Companies (Issue of Share Certificates) Rules, 1960 and taken a decision himself in the matter 4. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order of the civil court and consequent order of the High Court and remand the case back to the Registrar, Respondent 2 to decide the matter in accordance with law in the first instance. The appeal is disposed of. No costs.
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1995 (3) TMI 493 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... haban Sahu vs. The King). In the case in hand, Do doubt the prosecution witnesses claiming to have seen the occurrence have named all the appellants and the approver has even named those acquitted by the High Court., but in our view it would be safe only to convict those who are stated to have taken active part and about whose. identity there can be no reasonable doubt" 48.For the foregoing discussion the impugned convictions and sentences against the three appellants must be upheld. Incidentally we may also mention that the plea of alibi taken by each of the three appellants was found by both the Courts below, on proper consideration of the evidence adduced in support thereof, to be wholly unsustainable, indeed Mr. Jethmalani did not challenge this finding. 49.In the result, the appeals are dismissed. CRL. MP. NO. 2423 AND CRL. MP Nos. 2424-25194 50.Since the Criminal appeals stand dismissed these miscellaneous petitions filed in connection therewith stand disposed of.
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1995 (3) TMI 492 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ise we see no prejudice has been caused to the accused since the graveman of the charges under the relevant provisions of both the Acts in respect of these offences are the same in substance and at any rate the appellant cannot raise such a contention for the first time in this Court when in fact no prejudice has been caused to him. 10. Now coining to the question of sentence, the offence took place in the year 1981. All these years the appellant has undergone the agony of criminal proceedings uptil now and he has also lost his job and has a large family to support. It is also stated that he has become sick and infirm. He has been in jail for some time. For all these special reasons, while confirming the conviction of the appellant, we reduce the sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone. However, we confirm the sentence of fine with default clause. Accordingly, subject to the modification of sentence of imprisonment, the appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1995 (3) TMI 491 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ssion made at the Bar and in view of catena of cases decided by the Apex Court on the question referred to us, we are of the opinion that the answer to the question referred by the learned Single Judge is in negative and we are further of the view that the ratio laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in Smt. Indu 's case (supra) and the Division Bench in Rajasthan Pul Nigam 's case (supra) does not lay down correct law and we specifically overrule the aforesaid decisions. We are of the opinion that for violation of the provisions of Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or violation of the principles of natural justice, the normal course is to pursue the remedy provided under the Act and power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in such cases should be sparingly exercised. 40. It the answer to the question referred by the learned Single Judge be placed before him for deciding the case in view of the judgment rendered by us. Order accordingly.
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1995 (3) TMI 490 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sugarcane into the premises of the factory is not valid. The notifications impugned in that case imposed cess on entry of sugarcane during a crushing season in the area comprised within "such of the factories in which the total quantity of cane entering for consumption, use or sale to the factory during such reason exceeded 10 lack munds See also Diamond Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of M. P., AIR 1961 SC 652 and Shakti Kumar's case (1995) 96 STC 659. In the present case, no entry tax has been levied on entry of goods into the premises of a factory. It is sought to be levied on entry of goods in a local area inside which the factories are situated. This contention must necessarily fail. 33. Many of the aforesaid a contentions raised with reference to limestone have also been raised with reference to copper and for the reasons indicated, these contentions must also fail. 34. In the result, the petitions are dismiss ed with costs. Advocate fees ₹ 500/- in each case.
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1995 (3) TMI 489 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... uiring that the matter be referred for determination to the court and the provisions of Sections 18 to 28 have been made applicable to such reference. This would show that after an application has been submitted under Section 28-A(l) for re-determination of the amount-of compensation the process of such re-determination results in making of an award by the Collector and a person not accepting the said award can move the Collector to refer the matter to the Court for determination and such reference is governed by Sections 18 to 28. If that is so Section 34 of the Act would be applicable to the award that is made by the Collector under sub-section (2) of Section 28-A and it would be permissible for him to award interest under Section 34 on the additional amount of compensation awarded by him. The second contention urged by Shri Goswamy is, therefore, rejected. In the result, we find no merit in the Review Petitions and the same are accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1995 (3) TMI 488 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... accused and we see no reason to come to a different conclusion. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to go into the question whether the statement made by A-2 which is in the nature of a confession by a co-accused be used against A- 1. 19. Coming to the sentence we find that there are good grounds to reduce the same. The offence itself is said to have been committed in the year 1987 and both the appellants have lost their jobs and have undergone the agony of facing the criminal proceedings all these years. We find that they have been in jail for quite some time and we think it is not a fit case where they should be sent back to jail. Therefore while confirming their convictions we reduce the sentence of imprisonment under, each count, which are directed to run concurrently, to the period already undergone. The sentences of fine with default clause are, however, confirmed. Subject to this modification of the sentence of imprisonment all these appeals arc dismissed.
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1995 (3) TMI 487 - INCOME-TAX SETTLEMENT COMMISSION, BOMBAY (SPECIAL BENCH)
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... ... ..... s of section 234B(2) safeguard the interest of all assessees including applicants before the Settlement Commission. If at the stage of making an application under section 245C(1), the applicant makes a full and true disclosure of his total income, the interest liability which would attach itself to him will substantially come down as the taxes paid in pursuance of the application would also qualify as the taxes paid 'otherwise' referred to in section 234B(2). No special lenience may need to be shown to an applicant who, by definition, has failed to disclose the full and true income before the Assessing Officer and even before the Commission, merely because he has made an application to the Commission. This will also be in line with the conclusion already reached by the Commission in Ashwani Kumar Aggarwal's case (supra). In view of section 245BD of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the order of the Special Bench shall be the order of the majority of Members of the Bench.
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1995 (3) TMI 486 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... a, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1995 (3) TMI 485 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... that it was a mistake and proceed to invoke the Arbitration clause. If this is permitted the sanctity of contract, the settlement also being a contract, would be wholly lost and it would be open to one party to take the benefit under the settlement and then to question the same on the ground of mistake without having the settlement set aside. In the circumstances, we think that in the instant case since the dispute or difference was finally settled and payments were made as per the settlement, it was not open to the respondent unilaterally to treat the settlement as non est and proceed to invoke the Arbitration clause. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was wrong in the view that it took. In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned order of the High Court and hold that it was not open to the respondent to invoke the Arbitration clause in relation to the dispute/difference settled under the terms of the settlement with no order as to costs.
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1995 (3) TMI 484 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... , JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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