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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 252 Records
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1995 (4) TMI 300 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ock. If that is so, it is difficult to appreciate how non-inclusion of any other area falling within the Rajnandgaon municipal limits in the block can help the appellants. It is obvious that for the local area of Rajnandgaon which is within the municipal limits but which is not included in the constituted block under Section 130 of the Act, the Janapada Panchayat may not have any jurisdiction to impose tax but so far as the appellants' theatres are concerned as they are situated under Patwari halka 37 which forms part of the Rajnandgaon Block as per notification under Section 130 of the Panchayats Act the appellants' theatres have to bear the theatre tax imposed by the Janapada Panchayat. In the light of the above discussion, we find no substance in any of the contentions raised on behalf of the appellants. The result is that these appeals fail and are dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case there win be no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1995 (4) TMI 299 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... complete code in itself and is meant to serve public purpose. We are, therefore, inclined to think, as presently advised, that by necessary implication the power of the civil court to take cognizance of the case under s.9 of CPC stands excluded, and a civil court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity or legality of the notification under s.4 and declaration under s.6, except by the High Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. So, the civil suit itself was not maintainable. When such is the situation, the finding of the trial court that there is a prima facie triable issue is unsustainable. Moreover, possession was already taken and handed over to Housing Board. So, the order of injunction was without jurisdiction. The injunction granted by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court are thus illegal. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed and the orders of the courts below are set aside, but, under the circumstances, without costs.
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1995 (4) TMI 298 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tantial reasons to do so When it is urged that the view already taken by this Court should be reviewed and revised it may not necessarily be an adequate reason for such review and revision to hold that though the earlier view is a reasonably possible view, the alternative view which is pressed on the subsequent occasion is more reasonable. In reviewing and revising its earlier decision, this Court should ask itself whether in the interests of the public good or for any other valid and compulsive reasons, it is necessary that the earlier decision should be revised.......". o p /o p (at page 921 of SCR) (emphasis supplied) o p /o p 11.In our opinion, the test indicated in Keshav Mills (supra) for reconsideration of a decision of this Court is not satisfied in the present case and, therefore, we are unable to entertain the plea for reconsideration of the decision in Rama Prabha. o p /o p 12.The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed for the above reasons. o p /o p
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1995 (4) TMI 297 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... uiry that he signed a blank paper. He admitted that the signature in the joint statement was his but stated that the contents of Ex.-B were not explained to him. The High Court minutely examined the evidence of all the witnesses and concluded that their claim of oral protest is belied by the written agreement Ex.-B. The High Court also has gone into the evidence on merits and found that award of compensation to the paddy fields and other lands at the rates of ₹ 60 to ₹ 40 per sq. meter was highly excessive and reliance upon unregistered sale deeds in relation to other homestead lands was illegal. It is credulous to believe that agricultural lands would be sold and purchased on square meter basis. o p /o p Even without going into the merits, we hold that the finding of the High Court that the reference application itself is not maintainable, is perfectly legal and does not warrant interference. o p /o p The Special leave petition is accordingly dismissed. o p /o p
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1995 (4) TMI 296 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... sed it with dignity, deference and devotion. If the profession is to survive, the judicial system has to be vitalised. No service will be too small in making the system efficient, effective and credible. The casualness and indifference with which some members practise the profession are certainly not calculated to achieve that purpose or to enhance the prestige either of the profession or of the institution they are serving. If people lose confidence in the profession on account of the deviant ways of some of its members, it is not only the profession which will suffer but also the administration of justice as a whole. The present trend unless checked is likely to lead to a stage when the system will be found wrecked from within before it is wrecked from outside. It is for the members of the profession to introspect and take the corrective steps in time and also spare the courts the unpleasant duty. We say no more. The contempt proceedings are disposed of in the above terms.
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1995 (4) TMI 295 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... inasmuch as they departed from truth to bolster their case and went to the extent of not complying with the desire of the trial judge in allowing aforesaid Kamal to be examined even as a court witness. Such parties who pay foul with equity cannot be allowed to use the shield of equity to protect them. 30.The result of the foregoing discussions is that we allow the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the Letters Patent Bench and restore that of the trial Judge and decree the suit for specific performance. The respondents or their successors- in- interest would reconvey the property mentioned in Schedule 'A' of the plaint within a period of 1 month, failing which it would be open to the trial Judge to execute the required document(s). In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs throughout. A. Nos. , 2 & 5 of 1994 31.I.A. Nos. 1 and 2 are dismissed. I.A. No.5 is allowed; the cause title may be amended accordingly.
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1995 (4) TMI 294 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... (iii)A person who buys goods and use them himself, exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood, by means of self employment is within the definition of the expression "consumer". 25.So far as the present case is concerned we must hold (in agreement with the National Commission), having regard to the nature and character of the machine and the material on record that it is not goods which the appellant purchased for use by himself exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood by means of self employment, as explained hereinabove. 26. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed but without costs. If the appellant chooses to file a suit for the relief claimed in these proceedings, he can do so according to law and in such a case he can claim the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to exclude the period spent in prosecuting the proceedings under the Consumer Protection Act, while computing the period of limitation prescribed for such a suit.
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1995 (4) TMI 293 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ustice K. Jayachandra Reddy Appeal dismissed.
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1995 (4) TMI 292 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ndra Reddy, JJ. Appeal dismissed
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1995 (4) TMI 291 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... r, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1995 (4) TMI 290 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ate Emblem in their parent organisation are permitted to wear them. The Manual does not provide for the wearing of two stars and the State Emblem by Commandants (Selection Grade) who are otherwise not entitled to do so. In any event, looking to the instructions issued as far back as in 1981 and the resultant litigation, this aspect throws little light on the question before us. In the premises, for the reasons which we have set out above, a Commandant (Selection Grade) does not get the benefit of a higher age of retirement under Rule 9. The appeal is allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court dated 25.8.1994 is set aside. The appellants are entitled to retire the respondent on his completing the age of 55 years. The appellants, however, shall not recover from the respondent any emoluments received by him during his continuance beyond the age of 55 years as a result of any orders of this Court or the Delhi High Court. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1995 (4) TMI 288 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... one, the petitioner is rightly aggrieved. There is, thus, inherent lack of jurisdiction in proceeding under Regulation 21(2). Since the order itself is without jurisdiction this petition would be maintainable. It is not clear as to when the investigation would be complete, when show cause notice issued and adjudication completed and order passed. There appears to be no time limit for that. But then everything has to be done with utmost expedition and any unexplained delay will make the order void. Again that may not be relevant for our purpose as we find provisions of sub-regulation (2) of Regulation 21 have been violated. The petition is, therefore, allowed with costs. Order dated 7 January, 1994 suspending the Custom House Agent Licence of the petitioner is set aside. Counsel fee ₹ 1,000/-. We, however, make it clear that this order will not bar the authorities from taking action against the petitioner after following procedure under Regulation 23 of the Regulations.
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1995 (4) TMI 287 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... given, all the previous acts done or actions taken in anticipation of the approval gets validated and the publications made under the Act thereby becomes valid. The question then is whether present is a fit case for our interference under Art.136. On similar facts when the appellant itself has compromised with others and the same has not been extended to the respondents, we think that it is not a fit case for our interference. The respondents' society also consist of the members who need sites for construction of their houses. Right to shelter is a fundamental right, which springs from the right to residence assured in Art.19(1) (e) and right to life under Art.21 of the Constitution. No doubt their construction has also to be in accordance with lay out and building rules but that would not be a ground to refuse permission to them when they approached the authorities to sanction the same in accordance with law. The law is declared accordingly, but the appeal is dismissed.
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1995 (4) TMI 286 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d along with this appeal on the ground that the points arising in this appeal are similar to those arising in its writ petition. We told Sri Kapil Sibal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that while we are not inclined to transfer the said writ petition to this Court, we may hear him as an intervenor in this appeal, We did hear him for sometime but then we found that the learned counsel was raising several issues and contentions which arc outside the purview of the writ appeal and which were not put forward or argued before the High Court. We, therefore, did not permit Sri Sibal to raise those contentions. It is not necessary to set out the learned counsel's submissions nor is it necessary to express any opinion thereon. Suffice it to say that our decision is confined to the issues arising in the appeal before us and will obviously not govern the issues and questions not raised in this appeal. 37. Accordingly, the Transfer Petition is dismissed as unnecessary.
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1995 (4) TMI 285 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... en occasion arises therefore. It is unnecessary to pronounce on those questions at this stage, in view of the fundamental infirmity regarding the competency of the State Legislature to enact Orissa Act 36 of 1992 as stated by us earlier. Mr. Shanti Bhushan, senior counsel, submitted that M/s. Mahanadi Coal Fields Ltd. should be afforded sufficient time to return the amounts collected from the traders and consumers of coal, as, more than one crore of rupees has been collected and unless sufficient time is given, it will cause irreparable hardship. We see force in this plea. We are of the view that it is only appropriate to afford a breathing time to Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. in that behalf. In our opinion, the amount so collected may be refunded to persons entitled to the same, within a period of one year from today, failing which they shall pay interest at 18% p.a. on expiry on one year. All the above civil appeals and the special leave petitions are disposed of as above.
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1995 (4) TMI 284 - SUPREME COURT
Whether video games require to be regulated under the respective Mysore Police Act, 1963 and the notifications issued thereunder and the Madras City Police Act, 1888 and the orders of the Tamil Nadu Government in GOMs No. 166-0 dated 18-1-1993 and the allied?
Held that:- The Karnataka appellants urgument that the High Court having severed para 3(2) of the Order being inapplicable to the video games, the whole order must be struck down as being inseparable is not acceptable as it has already been held that the orders are statutory in character. Though the delegated authority under the Act made a general order, it may well be that a part thereof is not applicable, or is bad, in relation to a particular trade or business. Partly good and partly bad legislation cannot be struck down as a whole. To the extent it becomes applicable to a particular trade or business, it would be valid and operative and the balance remains either inapplicable or invalid. Diverse situations may arise in a particular trade or business. For that reason, the delegated legislation cannot be, condemned as a whole unless the invalid part is inextricably interconnected with the valid. The Court is, therefore, entitled to consider whether the rule as a whole or in part is valid or becomes invalid or inapplicable. On its finding that to the extent the rule is not relevant, the Court is entitled to set aside or direct to disregard the irrelevant or inapplicable part leaving the rest intact and operative.
The condition in para 4 of the Bangalore order envisages thus "(5) The licensing authority shall in deciding whether to grant or refuse licence for conducting public amusements does not provide for a right of hearing. Appeal dismissed.
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1995 (4) TMI 283 - SUPREME COURT
When an order for preventive detention is passed by an officer especially empowered to do so by the Central Government or the State Government, is the said officer required to consider the representation submitted by the detenu?
Held that:- Since the appellant had submitted a representation to the detaining authority, name- ly, the officer who was specially empowered to make an order of detention, and the said officer did not consider the representation there has been a denial of the constitutional safeguard guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. As a result the detention of the appellant has to be held to be illegal and the said appeal has to be allowed.
The detenues, namely, Ishwardas Bechardas Patel [father of the appellant] and Jayantilal Somchand Shah [husband of the appellant] are ordered to be set free unless they are required in connection with any other matter.Appeals allowed.
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1995 (4) TMI 282 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... assessee, the turnover could not be disclosed in the monthly return. But at the same time, it was disclosed in the statement prior to completion of the assessment. Therefore, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that there is bona fide on the part of the assessee in not disclosing the turnover in the monthly returns. Further, according to the Tribunal when once the assessee filed a revised statement disclosing the turnover prior to the completion of the assessment, penalty is not exigible as per rule 5-A of the Act. Considering the facts arising in this case, and the explanation offered by the assessee, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was correct in coming to the conclusion that penalty is not exigible under section 12(5) of the Act, 1959 read with section 9(2-A) of the Act. Accordingly, we are not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the Tribunal in cancelling the penalty. 7.. In the result, the revision is dismissed. No costs. Revision petition dismissed.
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1995 (4) TMI 281 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... the Constitution of India and consequently the notification is also violative of article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Therefore, assessments at the rate of 15 per cent sales tax on TV sets imported by the applicant from outside the State of West Bengal are invalid and unconstitutional. 7.. Accordingly, the application is allowed, the impugned Notification No. 1022 dated March 29, 1984, levying a higher rate of tax at the rate of 15 per cent on sales of TV sets imported from outside the State of West Bengal is quashed. The impugned two assessment orders dated December 30, 1991 for the periods from June 10, 1987 to August 30, 1987 and from August 31, 1987 to September 30, 1987, under the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1954 in respect of the applicant and the corresponding appellate orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner on December 1, 1993 and August 25, 1993, respectively are quashed. The main application is thus disposed of without any order for costs. Application allowed.
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1995 (4) TMI 280 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the assessment year 1988-89 and the proper course for the petitioner would be to file his objections and pursue the matter before the authorities concerned. 2.. So far as the objection raised by the petitioner for the assessment year 1989-90 is concerned there is hardly any justification for the authority to initiate proceedings under section 12-A of the Act when the authority was already in possession of the relevant material on the day the assessment order was made. The assessment order was made on April 19, 1993 whereas the inspection report was available on May 11, 1992 itself. In that view of the matter it would merely amount to change of opinion and not a proceeding initiated on the basis of the material made available for the first time which was not originally available to the authority. In that view of the matter, the proceedings initiated under annexure E shall stand quashed. 3.. The petitions shall stand disposed of accordingly. Petitions disposed of accordingly.
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