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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 403 Records
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1997 (4) TMI 506 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... se of P. Vittal Pai v. Agrl. ITO 1976 104 ITR 794. 9. In view of the above discussion we have no hesitation in holding that not only the notice under section 143(2) issued and served upon the assessee after the expiry of the period prescribed under the proviso (supra) shall be bad in law, but even, the directions issued by CIT (Appeals) before or after the expiry of such period shall also be bad in law. In the result we hold that the CIT (Appeals) had no jurisdiction or power (1) to direct the Assessing Officer to issue notice under section 143(2) for making assessment under section 143(3), (2) to go beyond the subject matter of the proceedings in appeal before him and (3) to enlarge the limitation period for issuing and serving the notice under section 143(2). Consequently, the directions given by the CIT (Appeals) in para No. 7 of his order are declared bad in law and ab initio void and the same are deleted and expunged. 10. In the result, assessee's appeal is allowed.
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1997 (4) TMI 505 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f the premises in which the person for whom it is intended is known to have last resided or carried on business or personally worked for gain. 5. From a plain reading of the above Section it is manifest that service under Clause (b) that is by affixation, would be permissible if the notice or order cannot be served in the manner provided in Clause (a). Therefore, without making any effort to serve in terms of Clause (a) the respondents could not have invoked service by affixation under Clause (b). As, admittedly, no step was taken to serve the order passed under Section 7 by tendering or sending it by registered post, and, on the contrary, within 3 days of the making thereof it was sought to be served for the first time by affixation, it must be said that there was no valid service within the meaning of Section 12(4). 6. We therefore, allow these appeals, set aside the impugned order and direct the Appellate Tribunal to hear and dispose of the appeals in accordance with law.
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1997 (4) TMI 504 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ducational qualification because such interpretation will violate the very purpose to give incentive to the employee to acquire higher education. In the instant case, there is no dispute that the rule for promotion to 5O quota came into effect in 1982 and in 1987 and thereafter only some ad hoc promotions were given, Therefore, there is no occasion to proceed to proceed on the footing that the Rule for promotion since effective from 1982 has been followed differently by giving an interpretation of the Rule as was noted in the decision in Suresh Nathan's case. Therefore, in our view, the decision in Suresh Nathan's case, which is an exception to the accepted principle of interpretation of the Rule on the plain language, only under special circumstances, has no manner of application in the facts of the case. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the ultimate decision of the Tribunal. This appeal, therefore fails and is dismissed without any order as to costs.
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1997 (4) TMI 503 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... advocate, who issued notice. Under these circumstances, tendering the amount within 30 days to the agent on behalf of the principal, is a legal tender of the amount of arrears of rent. Thereby , by operation of sub-section (3) (a) of section 12, the appellant has tendered the amount. Thereby, he has not committed any default in the payment of rent on account of which he is not liable to be ejected from the demised premises. The respondent man by issuing a notice at the earliest to the appellant calling upon him to pay the rent to him. Instead, he waited for two years obviously to created a condition of default and then got the notice issued. His conduct is not worth reckoning. Considering the whole aspect of the matter, it cannot be said that tenant was not ready and willing to pay arrears of rent or that he neglected to make payment thereof in terms of the notice. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The judgment of the High court as well as the courts below stand set aside.
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1997 (4) TMI 502 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... l act of manufacturing cannot be said to be the essence of the definition of the word 'manufacturer'. For instance, a person who supplies yarn to a handloom or powerloom owner for weaving cloth according to his specifications/design/pattern on payment of labour charges is a "manufacturer". We are, therefore, of the view that an exporter, like the petitioner who may not himself employ any labour for the purpose of manufacture of textiles and/or textile machinery being exported by him but gets these manufactured through an independent contractor or agent, would also fall within the purview of the Act. We may add that inclusion of the expression "exporters" in Section 12 of the Act by the Act 51 of 1973 also makes the legislative intent abundantly clear that the exporters are also covered under the Act. For the reasons aforesaid there is no merit in the petition and the same is accordingly dismissed with costs, which we quantify at ₹ 5,000.00 .
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1997 (4) TMI 501 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e claim of the appellants. No ground is made out for interfering with the decision of the National Commission that respondent No.3 in receiving the bearer cheque for ₹ 2,730/- from the insured was not acting as an agent of the LIC. But keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case we direct the LIC to refund the entire amount of premium paid to the LIC on the four insurance policies to appellant No. 2 along with interest 15 per annum. The interest will be payable from the date of receipt of the amounts of premium. We are also of the opinion that having regard to the fact that the appellants had succeeded before the State Commission and the questions raised by them are of sufficient importance requiring a decision by this Court respondent No.1 shall pay to appellants a sum of ₹ 10,000/- Rupees ten thousand only as costs. The amount of premiums with interest and the costs shall be paid within a period of one month. The appeals are disposed of accordingly.
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1997 (4) TMI 500 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e that in Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1386) 3 SCR at 558 this Court had pointed out that when the writ petition was dismissed by this Court in limine, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is not precluded. The dismissal of the writ Petition under Article 32 does not operate as res judicata. That principle is entirely different from the review of an order under Order 47 Rule 1. Under these circumstances. we are of the view that the High Court is well justified in refusing to review the order passed in the revision. However, since the records have been called by the High Court and the matter is pending, the trial Court could not dispose of the matter within the time limit, specified earlier, by this Court.' Therefore, we cannot find fault with the trial Court for non-disposal of the matter. However, the civil court is directed to dispose of the suit as indicated earlier within six months from now. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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1997 (4) TMI 499 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... application for condonation of delay is dismissed. Consequently the Civil Appeal stands dismissed.
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1997 (4) TMI 498 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... facts in this case. It is also true that in Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya’s case (supra), this court had also observed that it would enure the benefit to those petitioners. In view of the fact that the notification under Section 4(1) is a composite on e and equally the declaration under Section 6 is also a composite one, unless the declaration under Section 6 is quashed in toto, it does not operate as if that the entire declaration requires to be quashed. It is seen that the appellants had not filed any objections to the notice issued under Section 5-A. Under these circumstances, there is no need to consider their objections, as pointed out by the Division Bench of the High Court in Delhi Development Authority case (supra) which, relied on by Mr. Sachhar, has no application. Thus we hold that the declaration qua the appellants has not been barred by proviso to Section 6 nor is it vitiated by any error of law warranting interference. The appeal is dismissed. No costs.
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1997 (4) TMI 497 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... itional amount under Section 23(1) from the date of notification till date of passing of the award or delivery of the possession at the rate of 12% per annum, whichever is earlier. The appeals are, accordingly allowed. The judgment of the High Court stands set aside. The award and decree of the reference Court in respect of villages stand modified. In view of the facts and circumstance of the case , parties are directed to bear their own costs. If the amount has already been deposited as per the award of the reference Court to the extent of variation, the Meerut Development Authority is entitled to restitution. It is open to the Meerut Development Authority to enforce the award for seeking restitution. In view of the increase in the case of valuation of the lands, necessarily, enhanced compensation would from a component for charging the said amount from the purchaser in respect of the respective plots or buildings, as the case may be, towards the developmental expenses.
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1997 (4) TMI 496 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ration before this Court in Kheria Brothers v. Assistant Commissioner 1995 UPTC 593 and it was held that the judgment of the honourable Supreme Court in the case of Annapurna Biscuit Manufacturing Co. v. State of U.P. 1973 32 STC 1 was not rendered ineffective by the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kasturi Lal Harlal v. State of U.P. 1987 64 STC 1 1987 UPTC 135. In the latter case, the honourable Supreme Court was dealing with section 29-A, as introduced by the Amendment Act of 1969 which stood repealed by the Amendment Act of 1971. It was section 29-A, as introduced by the 1971 Act that was declared unconstitutional by the honourable Supreme Court and, therefore, no refund can be withheld by taking recourse to the said section that has been invalidated by the Supreme Court. The Tribunal was, therefore, right in directing the refund. For the above reasons, both the revision petitions lack merit and are hereby dismissed with costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1997 (4) TMI 495 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y to pay interest under section 8(1) of the U.P. Trade Tax Act read with the Central Sales Tax Act, the Tribunal has held that up to May 25, 1983, the assessee was raising a bona fide dispute about the taxability of the inter-State sales of IMFL to the Canteen Stores Department and, therefore, it did not admit its liability up to that date and was not liable to pay any interest. This view is in accord with the judgment of the honourable Supreme Court in J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. Commercial Taxes Officer 1994 94 STC 422 1994 UPTC 893, which was followed by this Court in Annapurna Biscuit Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax 1995 UPTC 1192 and United Coplex (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Trade Tax 1995 UPTC 168. The Tribunal s order on this point also requires no interference. The revision petition thus has no force and is hereby dismissed. Petition dismissed. Reported in 2203 133 STC 172 (All.) (Commissioner, Trade Tax v. Rampur Distillery and Chemicals Co. Ltd.
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1997 (4) TMI 494 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of 1994) the Tribunal took the view that since there was a bona fide dispute about the levy of the additional tax no interest under section 8(1) can be charged. 4.. Admittedly the liability for additional tax was not admitted at any stage of the proceedings. Initially even the assessing officer did not think that any additional tax was leviable. It was subsequently that he thought of the same and initiated proceedings under section 22 of the Act for the rectification of the assessment and levied the tax. Under section 8(1) of the Act interest is payable only on the tax that was admittedly payable by the dealer. The amount of additional tax levied through orders under section 22 of the Act was not tax admittedly payable and, therefore, the Tribunal was right in holding that no interest can be charged in respect of these amounts. The Tribunal s orders are thus in accordance with law and these revision petitions have no merit. They are accordingly dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1997 (4) TMI 493 - RAJASTHAN TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... v. Commercial Tax Officer 1994 94 STC 422 AIR 1994 SC 2393. In these cases, interest was levied upon the petitioner on the basis of the said earlier decision (Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer 1981 48 STC 466) of the honourable Supreme Court. 12.. In view of the subsequent decision of the honourable Supreme Court 1994 94 STC 422 (J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer), the levy of interest cannot be sustained. The amounts recovered as interest have to be refunded. 13.. Accordingly, the writ petitions are allowed. The orders imposing interest are set aside. The amounts of interest deposited by/ recovered from the petitioner under section 11B of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 and Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 will be refunded to the petitioner within six months from the receipt of a copy of this judgment with interest at the rate of 12 per cent from the date of deposit/recovery till the date of payment. No order as to costs. Writ petitions allowed.
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1997 (4) TMI 492 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r under consideration are similar and following that order the Tribunal s finding on this point is reversed and it is held that the transfer of goods worth Rs. 7,07,740 was by way of stock transfer and not by way of inter-State sales. 6.. The next point raised is about a turnover of Rs. 71,040 which the dealer claimed to be export sales. The Tribunal has held that the export of goods was not established. This is a finding of fact and no cause for interference in revisional jurisdiction is made out. 7.. The third point raised is about the levy of additional tax on Central sales tax. The learned counsel for the revisionist contended that in view of the circular issued by the State of U.P. the dealer could move to the assessing officer for the remission of the additional sales tax and, therefore, this plea is not pressed in this revision petition. 8.. No other point was raised or pressed before me. In the result, the revision petition is partly allowed. Petition partly allowed.
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1997 (4) TMI 491 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of section 3-G(2) of the Act, the purchase thereof cannot be subjected to full rate of tax and the purchasing dealer was not liable to pay the difference under section 3-G of the Act. In those cases, U.P. State Sugar Corporation had come to this Court against the orders under section 3-D. 7. In the present case, however, the tax was levied on selling dealer who is now respondent. That, however, makes no difference in law. The purchasing dealer, i.e., U.P. State Sugar Corporation having furnished the requisite declaration to the selling dealer, the liability, if any is shifted to the purchasing dealer in terms of section 3-B of the Act if a false declaration of certificate unless it is shown that he colluded with the purchasing dealer and deliberately acted upon a false certificate, the exemption cannot be denied (sic). 8.. For the above reasons, there is no illegality in the order passed by the Tribunal. The revision petitions are accordingly dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1997 (4) TMI 490 - RAJASTHAN TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... to two parts, one of sale between the non-petitioner firm on the one hand and the consumers on the other. Lastly, once a particular transaction has been treated as sale and the tax been paid at the first point it cannot be taxed at another or subsequent point in the series of sales. 7.. Thus we hold that the sale of two consignments of cement made by M/s. Mangal Chand Bhanwar Lal, Sardarshahar, to nonpetitioner firm was the first sale in the series of successive sales of the same commodity in Rajasthan and the tax paid thereon at ten per cent was paid at the first point of sale. No tax was chargeable at any subsequent point of sale. This point is answered in favour of the non-petitioner-firm. Point No. 2 8.. In view of our decision on first point this point stands disposed of accordingly in favour of non-petitioner-firm. 9.. We uphold the judgment of the Revenue Board dated December 5, 1975 and dismiss this revision petition. We make no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1997 (4) TMI 489 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... ion (1) of section 68. Hence, the seizure in the instant case by the respondent No. 1, Inspector of Commercial Taxes, Bureau of Investigation is declared invalid and liable to be quashed. 21.. The application is allowed. The seizure of 3,411 of black softy finished tanned leather and 186 pieces of lining leather by the respondent No. 1 on June 25, 1996 is quashed. The penalty proceedings initiated against the applicant on the basis of this seizure are also quashed. The security amount of Rs. 50,000, if deposited in favour of respondent No. 4, Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, West Bengal, in terms of our order dated July 18, 1996 shall be refunded to the applicant within eight weeks from the date of this order. There shall be no order as to cost. After the judgment is pronounced, Mr. J.K. Goswami, learned State Representative, verbally prays for stay of operation of the judgment and order. The prayer is rejected. 22.. J. GUPTA (Judicial Member).-I agree. Application allowed.
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1997 (4) TMI 488 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r contentions raised by the petitioner regarding the liability to tax were also rejected. We are in full agreement with the findings of the Tribunal. 6.. A revision under section 41 of the Act will lie only on the ground that the Appellate Tribunal has either decided erroneously or failed to decide a question of law. The Tribunal in this case has considered the entire facts and circumstances and have arrived at the finding that the petitioner had deliberately attempted to evade the payment of tax due to the Government and that the enquiry officer has clearly established a case for imposition of penalty under section 29A of the Act. They are pure findings of fact. These findings arrived at by the Tribunal cannot be said to be illegal, unreasonable or erroneous. It cannot also be said that the Tribunal has failed to decide any question of law, for, no question of law was involved at all. We see no merit in the tax revision case. It is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1997 (4) TMI 487 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the Act which deals with rectification of mistakes also specifically provides that no rectification that has the effect of enhanced assessment shall be made unless a reasonable opportunity of being heard has been given to the dealer. Thus, the order passed by the learned Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) is wholly erroneous inasmuch as he did not put the dealer to notice of his intention to enhance the turnover and, therefore, the Tribunal s order upholding the same is also not legally sustainable. 5.. The revision petition is, accordingly, allowed and setting aside the Tribunal s order dated December 9, 1994, it is ordered that the dealer s second appeal No. 778 of 1992 for the assessment year 1986-87 stands allowed by the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) for disposing of the dealer s appeal No. 378 of 1989 for the assessment year 1986-87 afresh in accordance with law. Petition allowed.
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