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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 365 Records
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1997 (5) TMI 454 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nscious of the settled position that under the common law owner means a person who has not valid title legally conveyed to him after complying with the requirements of law such as Transfer of Property Act, Registration Act etc. But in the context of Section 22 of the Income-tax Act having regard to the ground realities and further having regard to the object of the Income-tax Act, namely, 'to tax the income', we are of the view, owner' is a person who is entitled to receive income from the property in his own right. 65. In the light of the above narration and discussion, we do not think it necessary to discuss any more separately the submissions advanced across the bar. 66. In-time, we answer the question referred to this court in T.R.C. Nos. 9-10/88 in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. The Civil Appeal No. 4165/94 filed by the Revenue stands dismissed and Civil Appeal No. 4549/95 by an assessee stands allowed. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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1997 (5) TMI 453 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... arrant is and can be issued for appearance before the Court only and not before the police and since authorisation for detention in police custody is neither to be given as a matter of course nor on the mere asking of the police, but only after exercise of judicial discretion based on materials placed before him, Mr. Desai was not absolutely right in his submission that warrant of arrest under Section 73 of the Code could be issued by the Courts solely for the production of the accused before the police in aid of investigation. 26. On the conclusions as above we allow these appeals, set aside the impugned order and direct the Designated Court to dispose of the three miscellaneous applications filed by C.B.I. in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made herein before. 27. Before parting with this judgment we place on record our deep appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by Mr. Desai and Mr. Sibal in deciding the issues involved in these appeals.
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1997 (5) TMI 452 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... edings, under Section 14, the time spent for that purpose has to be excluded, the Registrar was wrong in refusing to condone the delay. We find no force in the contention. From September 10, 1975 till the date of disposal of the matter in the High Court on the civil side, by operation of the direction issued by the High Court under Section 14 of the Act, the said period stands excluded. However, the explanation for period of delay from October 26, 1974 till the date when civil suit came to be filed is required to be explained. The limitation prescribed is only two months after notice. Unless proper explanation is given, the valuable right has been created in favour of the respondents under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, it is the duty of the Court to ensure that unless proper explanation is given the valuable right cannot be defeated. Considered from this perspective, the Registrar was right in not condoning the delay. 4. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed.
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1997 (5) TMI 451 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on of Mr. Jain that in any case the appellants did not deserve the sentence of death. From the judgments of the Courts below we notice that in awarding the death sentence the trial Court and in confirming the same the High Court were considerably moved by the facts that the victims were helpless and innocent and that the appellants committed the gruesome murders for some gain. While there cannot be any manner of doubt that the murders were ghastly and in committing them Mukund betrayed his trust we did not think this case to be one of the 'rarest of rare cases' as exemplified in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684 AIR (1980 SC 898 and Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab 1983 (3) SCC 470 AIR 1983 SC 957. We, therefore, commute the sentence of death imposed upon the appellants for their conviction under Sections 302/34. IPC to imprisonment for lire but maintain the sentences imposed for the other convictions. The appeals are thus disposed of. Order accordingly.
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1997 (5) TMI 450 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... iven no instructions to the advocate on record. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed for want of prosecution. No order as to costs.
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1997 (5) TMI 449 - CEGAT CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... misuse of the facility extended. The Department is otherwise satisfied from the accounts maintained by the Department that the facility of Rule 173L has not been misutilised by the appellants and all the substantive provisions have been duly followed. In fact, the accounts were also subsequently rendered to the Department on their asking. In the circumstances, I hold that the decisions relied upon by the learned Consultant are fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. Gujarat High Court’s decision in the case of Alembic Glass Industries Ltd. (supra) was not a decision involving primarily an issue of interpretation of Rules 173L (3) & (4) of Central Excise Rules, 1944 and it was in the nature of observations made by the Honourable High Court in the context of the issue before them. Accordingly, by following the Tribunal’s decisions referred to above, I allow the appeal filed by the appellants herein with consequential reliefs, if any.
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1997 (5) TMI 448 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ifferent form. In substance, their contention is that it is not practicable to write the ACRs at this distance of time. They have also further stated that they have obtained the advice of the counsel and on the faith of that, they have come to that understanding. When put a question, Shri Shanti Bhushan has taken responsibility on himself for the advice and stated that he understood the judgment of this Court in a manner which is not inconsistent with its letter spirit. Therefore, the respondents have acted upon it. 3. In view of the personal responsibility taken by Shri Shanti Bhushan, his standing at the bar and his fairness and candid admission, we accept his statement. We do not think that the officers have willfully or deliberately disobeyed the implementation of the orders of the Court. Accordingly, three months' time is now given to the respondents to do the exercise and implement the judgment in its full spirit. 4. The Contempt Petitions are accordingly dismissed.
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1997 (5) TMI 447 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at each case has to be adjudged on its own facts. The approach of the company court under such circumstances in each case should be in the light of the observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraph 12 of the said judgment. In my considered opinion, Therefore, there is no conflict in between the provisions of the Debt Recovery Act and the provisions of section 446 of the Companies Act and that each case has to be adjudged on its facts and merits and the company court shall have the full power and jurisdiction to consider the best interest of the creditors, both secured and unsecured, as also the workman who has been equated at par with the secured creditors and other attending circumstances, and then pass necessary orders under the provisions of section 446. 29. In view of the decision taken by me herein, it would thus be necessary to examine each one of the cases on its own merits and pass necessary orders therein. 30. List the matters on July 26, 1997, for directions.
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1997 (5) TMI 446 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... an unfair trade practice had caused loss or injury to the consumers of such goods by eliminating or restricting competition or otherwise. As stated earlier, except the complaint of the D.G., there was no other material before the Commission which would justify the finding in this behalf. Such an exercise is necessary since any order passed under Section 36D attracts the penal consequences. 15. For the aforesaid conclusions, we are of the opinion that the impugned order of the Commission passed under Section 36D of the Act holding that the company had committed unfair trade practice under Section 36A(3)(a) of the Act is unsustainable and it is accordingly quashed and set aside. The matter is remitted back to the Commission for disposal afresh in accordance with law after giving an opportunity to both the parties to lead such evidence as they deem fit. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. In the circumstances of the present case, parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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1997 (5) TMI 445 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... her v. State ofU. P. and others, reported in 1995 UPTC 952, wherein this Court has held that the power to cancel/modify the eligibility certificate is exercisable by the Commissioner under Section 4-A (3) and the Court accodingly quashed the order passed by the Divisional Level Committee. 3 Following the aforesaid authority, we quash the impugned order dated' 7-9-1995, Annexure No. 5 to the writ petition, passed by the Divisional Level Committee. 4. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of finally.
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1997 (5) TMI 444 - ITAT JAIPUR
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... ... ..... PL dt. 19th December, 1996 and the same is placed on record. We have perused the said communication, as per which though the Board has not acceded to the request of the LIC to notify 'Incentive Bonus' under sub-cl. (i) of cl. (14) of s. 10, it has, however, directed that a portion of the allowance certified as having been actually incurred in the performance of duties shall be exempt under the above provision. This direction of the Board has to be read with the scheme formulated by the LIC bearing Ref. Mktg./ZD/4/97, dt. 18th February, 1997. 4. Since the above scheme was not available at the time of deciding the first appeal, we are of the view that the assessee should get the benefit of the said scheme. In the interest of justice, therefore, we remand the matter back to the file of the AO with the direction to consider the assessee's claim in the light of the direction of the Board. 5. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes.
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1997 (5) TMI 443 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a is pure and simple a plea in defense. Taking of accounts and finding out what is due and payable by the defendants to the plaintiff bank would be an exercise necessarily to be performed even by the Tribunal to satisfy the demand of the principles of natural justice before finding out the amount of debt for which the Tribunal may issue a certificate under Section 19(7) of the Act. There was no occasion for the defendants to have asked for issuance of a "mandatory injunction for accounts". Indeed it was an ingenious device invented by the defendants in an effort at excluding the summary jurisdiction of the Tribunal and stalling the transfer of the suit from the court to the Tribunal. (45) 46. All the appeals are dismissed. The order of the learned single Judge is maintained. No order as to the costs (46) The records of the suits shall be transmitted to the Tribunal. The parties through their respective counsel are directed to appear before the Tribunal on 14.7.1997.
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1997 (5) TMI 442 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... date of judgment of the Supreme Court. This leads me to believe that Govt. of India, did not act with reasonable speed as was expected from it, in a situation like this. It ought to have been alive of the fact that it was dealing with pre 1-10-1974 retired Judges, who are at dawn of their life. Interest @ 18% per annum is the normal interest payable. Taking into consideration the cumulative effect of all these factors, I do not have the slightest hesitation in holding that the petitioner is entitled for payment of interest @ 18% per annum from the date of retirement. 16. In the result, the writ petition is partly allowed. Respondents are directed to pay interest, at the rate of 18 per cent per annum from the date of retirement of the petitioner, till the date of its payment. Payment be made within 6 weeks from today. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I am inclined to award the cost of litigation to the petitioner also. Counsel's fee assessed at ₹ 2500/-.
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1997 (5) TMI 441 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d, is sufficient guideline for determining the rates at which the demand can be assessed to revenue cess. 16. It is already seen that the machinery provision under sub-section (2) of Section 20 was adopted by the Tehsildar and after demand was made, the appellant approached the appellate authority and the revisional authority who complied with the principles of natural justice. In view of the fair stand taken by learned Solicitor General that the executive cannot make any demand retrospectively, the demand must be construed to operate from the date of the Resolution passed by the Government and from that date, the appellant is liable to pay the land cess for use of the water at the rates specified therein. The respondents are directed to compute the rate on that basis and make a fresh demand; on making such demand, the appellant shall pay the amount of cess within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the demand. 17. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. No costs.
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1997 (5) TMI 440 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... onfined to the question whether the infringement is such which is likely to deceive or cause confusion. In cases where it is prima facie shown that the court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit, this principle will have no application as question of jurisdiction goes to the root of the matter. 14. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, I am clearly of the opinion that the balance of convenience lies in favour of the defendant and not in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore the impugned injunction order passed in favour of the plaintiff cannot he sustained and has to be set aside. 15. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order dt. 17-1-1992 passed by the 1st Addl. District Judge, Ghaziabad is set aside. 16. It is made clear that the trial court will decide the suit on the basis of evidence adduced before it, without being influenced in any manner with any observations made in this order and in accordance with law.
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1997 (5) TMI 439 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mstances, the defendant/respondent having altered its position, it would not be appropriate at this stage to allow the amendment as sought for by the plaintiff/applicant, since in my opinion, in any case, the date of expiry of the agreements would be dependent on the interpretation of the clauses of the agreement and, Therefore, no prejudice would be caused to the plaintiff/ petitioner even if the amendment sought for is not allowed. I have, by a separate order passed today in AA 82/94 held that even apart from the aforesaid admission, the said two agreements entered in the year 1986 have have expired by efflux of time in the month of May, 1995. (9) In view of the aforesaid, I do not see any reason why the said amendment as sought for should be allowed. The parties have altered their positions and Therefore if the present amendment is allowed, the respondents would be prejudiced. Accordingly, I find no merit in this application and the same is rejected. Application rejected.
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1997 (5) TMI 438 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... eived. She was present in Court. She was briefly questioned. It appeared that the act of conversion was only to ensure admission. She did not appear to have been nodding familiarity with what happens in a Church. 57. In the circumstances of the case, we are unable to hold that the petitioner was eligible to be considered for admission against a seat reserved for "candidates who are Christians, Indian Nationals and officially sponsored by a Church or a Mission." Consequently, the petitioner has no cause for grievance which may be remediable through the present proceedings. Thus, while rejecting the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents regarding the maintainability of the writ petition, we find that on merits, the petitioner is not entitled to the issue of a mandamus directing the respondents to admit her to the MBBS Course. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. However in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1997 (5) TMI 437 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s or completeness of the return by invoking the provisions s. 143(2)(b) the AO has no option but to make a fresh assessment on the total income or loss of the assessee by making an order under s. 143(3) and while doing so the AO was not precluded from making an addition or disallowance as may be warranted on the facts and circumstances of the case and such an assessment was an assessment under s. 143(3) which is appealable under s. 246(1) or s. 246(2) as the case may be meaning thereby in such cases neither the AO is precluded from making any addition nor the assessee is precluded from agitating such an assessment either wholly or partly by way of appeal and the nature of objections raised in Form No. 6A filed as provided under s. 143(2)(a) were not any hindrance in this respect. We, therefore, hold that the assessee had right to challenge the assessment framed under s. 143(3) fully or partly. This ground of appeal is rejected. 12. In the result the appeal is partly allowed.
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1997 (5) TMI 436 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... statement that the Special Squad met these persons in Kerala of Ponnani and learnt and the warrantee was in Gulf Country, but that again was of no effect, because neither any effort was made by them to obtain the address of the detenu from those persons whom they met not any enquiry whatsoever was made to apprehend the alleged detenu at Abu Dhabi. There was absolutely no effort by these authorities on which we can place reliance. Even the respondents' counsel could not point out any averment to the effect that any such effort was made by the Investigating Authorities to apprehend the detenu at Abu Dhabi. 17. Thus, ongoing through the records and affidavit, we are satisfied that the authorities have not been able to explain the reason for the delay in executing the order of detention. Mere saying that the detenu was absconding is not enough. Hence we quash the impugned order of detention and direct release of the detenu forthwith, if he is not required in any other case.
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1997 (5) TMI 435 - COMPANY LAW BOARD
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... ... ..... the court, concurrent jurisdiction to compound offences which are punishable with fine or imprisonment or both and that while the Company Law Board/Regional Director would follow the procedure laid down in the Companies Act, the court will follow the procedure laid down in the Criminal Procedure Code. 20. Accordingly, we hold that the exercise of powers by the Company Law Board under 621A(1) is independent of exercise of powers by the court under Sub-section (7), and all offences other than those which are punishable with imprisonment only or with imprisonment and also fine, can, be compounded by the Company Law Bard without any reference to Sub-section (7), even in cases where the prosecution is pending in a criminal court. 21. We refer the case back to the learned Member dealing with this application for compounding to decide the case of compounding on the merits, since the jurisdiction to consider this instant petition for compounding lies with the Northern Region Bench.
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