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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 568 Records
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2003 (10) TMI 658 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r question which would only mean that the respondents are not in possession of any other property other than Shop No.3 leased out to them in the above-mentioned property belonging to the appellant. That is also why they prayed for restoration of possession. Therefore, raising a dispute in regard to the description or identity of the suit schedule property or a dispute in regard to the boundary of the suit schedule property is only a bogey to delay the eviction by the abuse of the process of court. Courts of law should be careful enough to see through such diabolical plans of the judgment debtors to deny the decree holders the fruits of the decree obtained by them. This type of errors on the part of the judicial forums only encourage frivolous and cantankerous litigations causing laws delay and bringing bad name to the judicial system. For the reasons stated above, this appeal succeeds, the impugned order of the High Court is set aside with exemplary cost of ₹ 25,000/-.
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2003 (10) TMI 657 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ine of ₹ 5,000/- which is applicable only in other cases and not regarding the cases arising out of any Special Act wherein the provisions of the Special Act will only prevail over and above the provisions of either the General Act or any other law for the time being in force and therefore either regarding the jurisdiction of the Magistrate or regarding the limitation, the petitioner cannot point out the general provision and escape from the clutches of law. 9. In short the petitioner is bound by the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act 1959 and the respondent has aptly registered the case under the appropriate provision of law and therefore this Court does not find any tangible reason to cause its interference into the said case registered in C.C. No. 317 of 2002 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate No. I, Dharmapuri and hence the following order 10. In result, There is absolutely no merit in the above criminal original petition and the same fails and dismissed as such.
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2003 (10) TMI 656 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... taxable to income tax is the income and if, to earn that income, an assessee has incurred business expenses with a sense of compassion for fellow human beings and contribution to the sense of brotherhood in society, those expenses do not cease to be deductible. The minimum one can do, to encourage such kind hearted deeds as appears to have been done by this assessee, is not to be little those noble gestures by marking those gestures as ‘benevolence at the cost of exchequer’. The exchequer does not require tax payers to pay taxes on all their receipts, without any deductions, or to claim deductions for only such expenses as Shylock would have incurred if he was in assessee’s place. We leave it at that. 10. For the reasons set out above, we direct the Assessing Officer to delete the disallowance of ₹ 2,92,855 towards assessee’s reimbursing his employee medical expenses incurred on employee’s family member. 11. The appeal thus stands allowed.
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2003 (10) TMI 655 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... alice was committed, the impugned allotment of land could not have been interfered with. What was only necessary to be seen was as to whether there had been a fair play in action. 37. The question as to whether any undue haste has been shown in taking an administrative decision is essentially a question of fact. The state had devolved a policy of Single Window System with a view to get rid of red- tapism generally prevailing in the bureaucracy. A decision which has been taken after due deliberations and upon due application of mind cannot be held to be suffering from malice in law on the ground that there had been undue haste on the part of the State and the Board. (See Bangalore Medical Trust vs. B.S. Muddappa and others 1991 (4) SCC 54 and Pfizer Ltd. vs. Mazdoor Congress and others 1996 (5) SCC 609 ). 38. For the aforementioned reasons, we are of the opinion that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. These appeals are allowed. No costs.
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2003 (10) TMI 654 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... l today. The Counsel has relied on this Tribunal’s decision in Universal Automobile & Ancillary Ltd. v. CCE & C 1990 (47) E.L.T. 79 (Tribunal) wherein, after considering a set of facts similar to the facts of the instant case, the Tribunal has held that a joint appeal can be filed by a firm and its partners. No better judicial authority has been cited before me. 4. I am of the view that the present appeals have to be allowed by way of remand. The impugned order is set aside and the Commissioner (Appeals) is directed to treat the appeal before him as joint appeal of the firm and its partner, subject to the condition that the cause title of the Memorandum of Appeal is amended to incorporate the partner’s name as co-appellant in view of the cited decision of the Tribunal. Once the amendment is made, the Commissioner (Appeals) shall dispose of the joint appeal on its merits afresh after affording to the appellants a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
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2003 (10) TMI 653 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... where the order contains something which is not mentioned in the decree, it would be a case of unintentional omission or mistake as the mistake or omission is attributable to the Court which may say something or omit to say something which it did not intend to say or omit. No new arguments or re-arguments on merits can be entertained to facilitate such rectification of mistakes. The provision cannot be invoked to modify, alter or add to the terms of the original order or decree so as to, in effect, pass an effective judicial order after the judgment in the case. o p /o p Above being the position, the first Appellate Court was not justified in exercising power under Section 152 of the Code and the High Court was equally in error by putting its seal of approval thereon. o p /o p Therefore, the appeal relatable to the judgment in Second Appeal No.3618/1987 is dismissed while the one relating to Second Appeal No.1472/1988 is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. o p /o p
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2003 (10) TMI 652 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n the date it receives Presidential assent and is construed as coming into operation immediately on the date preceding its commencement. Thus, if a Central Act is assented by the President on 23.8.1995 then it would be construed to have come into operation on the mid-night between 22nd and 23rd August, 1995. Sub-section (3) has to be read as a corollary to sub-section (1). Sub- section (1) provides that the Act would come into operation on the date it receives the assent of the President where a particular day w.e.f. which the Act would come into force is not prescribed whereas sub-section (3) provides the exact time of the day/night when the Act would come into force. It would not apply to cases where the legislature has delegated the power to the executive to bring into force the Act from a date to be notified by publication in the Official Gazette. For the reasons stated above, we do not find any merit in these appeals and the same are dismissed with no order as to costs.
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2003 (10) TMI 651 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... by the Tribunal under s. 254(2) of the Act. Since it is not an order passed in appeal by the Tribunal, we are clearly of the view that the present appeal under s. 260A of the Act is not maintainable. Consequently, the same is dismissed.
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2003 (10) TMI 650 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... culars of income". As rightly observed by the CIT(A), the finding of the AO had been reached on the facts which are available on record. Penalty and assessment are two distinct proceedings. Though additions made in the assessment order constitute material for the purpose of penalty proceedings, for the imposition of penalty, the AO is required to bring cogent material on record on the basis of which it could be established that the assessee had concealed the particulars of income or had furnished inaccurate particulars of income. No such material has been brought on record to justify the imposition of penalty under section 271(1)(c) in the present case. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the considered opinion that no interference is called for in the well reasoned order passed by the CIT(A) cancelling the penalty in dispute. Accordingly, we uphold the impugned order. 6. In the result, the appeal filed by the Revenue is dismissed.
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2003 (10) TMI 649 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... m. and if the authority concerned had said 6.00 p.m., we could understand that it could be a typographical error. However, the detaining authority has mentioned 1800 hours. There cannot be a typographical error in respect of the figures '6.00 a.m.' and '1800 hours'. If this is so, it is clear that there was non application of mind. The other documents, which are supplied to the detenu in respect of the ground case also speak of everything having taken place in the morning including the observation mahazar, seizure mahazar etc., If that is so, then there will be no question of the detaining authority asserting in the grounds that the incident took place in the evening. It only shows utter non application of mind. The order must go on this count alone. The writ petition is allowed and the order of detention dated 16.11.2002 is quashed. The detenu Veera Veeramuthu is directed to be set at liberty forthwith unless he is required in connection with any other case.
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2003 (10) TMI 648 - SUPREME COURT
Whether and, if any, to what extent a Writ Petition will be maintainable at the instance of the respondent- Parishad questioning an award made on a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act ?
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2003 (10) TMI 647 - CESTAT CHENNAI
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... ... ..... cise formalities on theirbehalf i.e. M/s. TCL. He had also observed that M/s. CMC for thepurposes of payment of duty always adopted the sale price of M/s. TCL for theplasticisers and it was in this background that he had dropped theproceedings initiated in the matter. In view of the above facts andcircumstances, we find that the Ld. Commissioner (Appeals) hasmisdirected himself by applying the judgement rendered by the ApexCourt in the case of Ujagar Prints v. UOI & others (supra). Wealso do not agree with the conclusion arrived by the Ld. Commissioneron the Supreme Court decision in the case of Gurunanak RefrigerationCorporation (supra) wherein he opined that the judgment is notrelavant to the present cases. We therefore, respectfully followingthe judgement rendered by the Apex Court in the case of CCE, NewDelhi v. Gurunank Refrigeration Corporation (surpa), allow the appealby setting aside the impugned order. Ordered accordingly. (Dictated and pronounced in open Court)
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2003 (10) TMI 646 - SUPREME COURT
Interpretation of Section 32(1B) which was inserted by amending Act 49/ 69 in Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948
Whether the voluntary surrender which is not in terms of Sections 15 and 29 is a valid one?
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2003 (10) TMI 645 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... view of the aforesaid, the Assessee was entitled to avail the tax benefit under Notification dated 13.6.94 in respect of all purchased raw material required for use of manufacturing of the goods meant for export outside India, in all its units, to utilise its full capacity. It cannot be restricted or denied only on the ground that Units manufacturing 14 MT per day has been installed on Plot B/87 prior to application of 100 EOU. 26. So far as Manufacturing Unit installed on Plot No. B/86 with 28 MT production per day capacity is concerned, it has been installed after registration of undertaking as 100 E.O.U. and has rightly been treated even otherwise as New Industrial Unit. 27. Accordingly, the writ petition filed by revenue is dismissed and one filed by the Assessee is allowed. To that extent order passed by the Tribunal is modified. The assessee is entitled to benefit of Notification dated 13.06.1994 on purchase of raw material for all the Units. 28. No orders as to costs.
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2003 (10) TMI 644 - SUPREME COURT
Whether declaration that the respondents are not 'land grabbers' within the meaning of definition clause contained in Section 2(d) of the Act of 1982?
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2003 (10) TMI 643 - SUPREME COURT
Validity of Section 2 of the Orissa Administrative Service, Class - II (Appointment of Officers Validation) Amendment Act, 1992
Whether the Resolution of 1973 serves to render the very provision contained in Rule 4 of the 1959 Rules, cited above, as redundant and a nullity such that appointment to the O.A.S. II could only be by direct recruitment to the exclusion of all other sources?
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2003 (10) TMI 642 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... acture, apply as much to levy of dutyas to granting modvat credit. The learned counsel has also pointedout that a contrary order has been passed for a subsequent period bythe Commissioner (Appeals being order-in-appeal no.YPP/944/SRT/2002/4636 issued on 10.10.2002. 2. We have perused the records and have considered the submissionsmade by both sides. The present order is clearly unjust and cannot beallowed to stand. The appellants are right in their contention thatthe finding regarding manufacture applies equally to levy of duty aswell as eligibility to modvat credit. If there was no manufacture,there could be no payment of duty also. There is no dispute that theappellants had paid a higher amount of duty on the goods than thecredit taken. If the credit taken was not eligible, what was requiredwas only to adjust the duty paid against that credit. 3. In view of the observations made above, the impugned order isset aside and the appeal is allowed. (Pronounced in the open court)
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2003 (10) TMI 641 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the post of Part-Time Lecturer is not contemplated as a cadre post under the Rules?
Whether the appellants being not in the regular employment, the principles of service jurisprudence cannot be extended to an advocate who is acting as a Part-Time Lecturer?
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2003 (10) TMI 640 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the acquittal as directed by the High Court, so far as they are concerned, stands confirmed?
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2003 (10) TMI 639 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a person who has been in possession of the temple as an hereditary trustee can claim title to one of the items of the property belonging to the temple as his own?
Whether the certificate issued by the Assistant Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments is conclusive as the question of title to the immovable properties belonging to the temple?
Whether the right of a temple can be negatived on the mere strength of the assessment register standing in the name of the plaintiff/Respondent or any other person?
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