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Showing 41 to 60 of 699 Records
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2004 (3) TMI 793 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed to the plaint as per the provisions of Order 7, Rule 14 Sub-rule (1) of the Code could still be tendered in evidence with the leave of the Court which the Court may grant in exercise of jurisdiction under Sub-rule (3) of Rule 14 of Order 7 of the Code as amended by Amendment Act 22 of 2002. 10. In all such considerations, the impugned order, rejecting the petition of the plaintiff/petitioner purely on the ground, that since Rule 17-A of Order 18 of the Code has been omitted by Amending Act 46 of 1999, there is no scope for production of documentary evidence, which have not been presented along with the plaint, has been made in exercise of jurisdiction illegally and with material irregularity. The same is therefore set aside. The application as filed by the plaintiff/petitioner shall accordingly stand allowed. This revisional application is thus allowed.. 11. If urgent Xerox certified copy of this order is applied for by the parties, the same should be given expeditiously.
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2004 (3) TMI 792 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... es an attempt to commit rape and not actual rape. Definition of "rape" as contained in Section 375 IPC refers to "sexual intercourse" and the Explanation appended to the Section provides that penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of rape. Intercourse means sexual connection. In the instant case that connection has not been established. Courts below were not correct in their view. When the evidence of the prosecutrix is considered in the proper perspective, it is clear that the commission of actual rape has not been established. However, the evidence is sufficient to prove that attempt to commit rape was made. That being the position, conviction is altered from Section 376 IPC to Section 376/511 IPC. Custodial sentence of 3 and '/2 years would meet the ends of justice. The accused who is on bail shall surrender to custody to serve remainder of his sentence. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated.
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2004 (3) TMI 791 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... her arbitrary or discriminatory or actuated by malice. This apart SSI having a turnover of more than ₹ 20 crores was the lowest bidder. Faced with the situation that the bids given by the respondents were not competitive with the bid given by SSI Limited, learned counsel for the respondents contended that because of the fall in price in the computer hardware and lowering of duty on the imports of the computers or its components the government should invite fresh bids. It is not for us to comment as to what course is to be adopted by the appellants, in the changed circumstances attributable to lapse of time. It is for them to decide whether to continue with the tenders already floated, if necessary be making negotiations so as to bring down the rates quoted or to invite fresh tenders. For the reasons stated above, the appeals are accepted. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and the writ petitions filed by the respondents are dismissed with no order as to costs.
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2004 (3) TMI 790 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... th which we are concerned. But in Saraswat bank also the Division Bench held that the prohibition against transfer or assignment or transfer of tenants right under Section 15 of the Bombay Rent Act was not absolute but was subject to certain well known exceptions. ( 40. ) We , therefore, conclude that the tenants right to remain in occupation of the non-residential premises governed by the maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 is a property; such property is saleable and the tenant has disposing power over the interest of tenancy for his benefit and in view thereof, we hold that the interest of the tenant of non-residential premises to which the maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 applies is attachable and saleable in execution of the decree against the tenant. ( 41. ) Let the papers of chamber summons no. 593 of 2003 in Execution Application no. 736 of 2001 in Summary Suit No. 2255 of 1998 be placed before the learned Chamber Judge for proceeding accordingly. Order accordingly.
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2004 (3) TMI 789 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ashed on the ground of delay, the first question to be looked into is the reason for delay as also the seriousness of the offence. Regarding the reasons for delay, the appellant has to thank himself. He is responsible for delay. Regarding the seriousness of the offence, we may notice that the ill of untouchability was abolished under the Constitution and the Act under which the complaint in question has been filed was enacted nearly half a century ago. The plea that the complaint was filed as a result of vindictiveness of the complainant is not relevant at this stage. The appellant would have adequate opportunity to raise all pleas available to him in law before the trial court at an appropriate stage. No case has been made out to quash the criminal proceedings on the ground of delay. Having regard to the enormous delay, we direct the trial court to expedite the trial and dispose of the case within a period of six months. For the reasons aforestated, the appeal is dismissed.
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2004 (3) TMI 788 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tificate. Once the recovery was initiated, property sold, loan and interest waived off then nothing survived which could form basis for initiating recovery of the same amount after lapse of eighteen years. The law does not permit it. The Constitution prohibits it. The action of the respondents was arbitrary and illegal as Article 21of the Constitution guarantees right of liberty to every citizen. Arrest and detention under Sections 279 and 281 of the U.P. Zamindari and Land Reforms Act, 1950, for recovery as arrears of land revenue is one of the procedure to realise the sum due against a defaulter. But if the recovery becomes barred by time then the arrest of the petitioner was contrary to procedure established by law, thus, violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. 17. In the result this petition succeeds and is allowed. The recovery proceedings initiated against the petitioners are quashed. 18. The petitioners are entitled to costs which is assessed at ₹ 10,000/-.
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2004 (3) TMI 787 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... by putting the same in the category of 'colourable devices', even though we do appreciate that this transaction is prima facie with a motive to reduce the assessee's tax liability. It appears to us, in view of the discussions above, that 'motives' of a transaction are not really important but divergence of the true intentions vis-a-vis professed intentions of a transaction are really the determinative factor to examine a case on the touchstone of principles laid down in McDowell's case, In our considered view, revenue's case fails this test. 10. For the detailed reasons set out above, we approve the conclusions arrived at by the Commissioner (Appeals) and decline to interfere in the matter. We also place on record our appreciation for the learned representatives not only for their rendering the useful assistance but also for their patiently handling queries made by us during the course of hearing. 11. The appeal filed by the revenue is dismissed.
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2004 (3) TMI 786 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e opinion which it has done. The power to grant permission has been specifically conferred on the Government by the proviso inserted to Rule 14 by GO No. 1326 dated 6-9-1995. It is noteworthy that in an earlier round of litigation initiated by Respondent 1 the constitutional validity of GO No. 1326 dated 6-9-1995 was upheld. Merely because Section 11 of the Act was not specifically referred to in the order dated 30-10-1995 that could not have been a ground for setting aside the permission dated 30-10-1995. It is well settled that if an authority has a power under the law merely because while exercising that power the source of power is not specifically referred to or a reference is made to a wrong provision of law, that by itself does not vitiate the exercise of power so long as the power does exist and can be traced to a source available in law. The appeal is allowed. The impugned Judgement of the Division Bench is set aside and that of the learned Single Judge is restored.
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2004 (3) TMI 785 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 14 on the ground that it singles out newspaper industry by excluding income test only in regard to the said industry. Apart from the fact that it may not be always possible to grant to everyone all benefits in one go at the same time, it seems that the impugned provision and the enacting of the Working Journalists Act was part of a package deal and that probably is the reason for other newspaper establishments not challenging it and petitioners also challenging it only after lapse of so many years. Further Section 2(i), 4 and Schedule I of Provident Fund Act shows how gradually the scope of the Act has been expanded by the Central Government and the Act and Scheme made applicable to various branches of industries. From whatever angle we may examine, the attack on the constitutional validity based on Article 14 cannot be accepted. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find no merit in the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners. The petition is accordingly dismissed.
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2004 (3) TMI 784 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f this order. It any such appeal is filed in terms of this order. If any such appeal is filed in terms of this order, the Tribunal is directed to consider the appeal without insisting on limitations. 3) The Tribunal is further directed to consider the legality/validity of the impugned order passed by the Commissioner in the light of a specific finding and specific director in terms of para 6 of the Tribunal’s earlier order dated 31.8.1999 as culled out in para 8 of the order in W.P. No.22391-392/2002 dated 18.2.2003. In addition, the Tribunal is also directed to consider the legality of the impugned order strictly in terms of the directions made in para 10 of the order dated 18.2.2003 in W.P. No. 22391-392/2002. Time for completing the proceedings is four months from the dated of filing of the appel. 9. The interim order granted by this Court shall enure to the benefit of the petitioner till the disposal of the matter by the tribunal. 10. Ordered accordingly. No costs.
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2004 (3) TMI 783 - CESTAT CHENNAI
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... ... ..... both units were registered with the Central Excise authorities and were filing separate returns, which were also being assessed. In the facts and circumstances of the case and that in view of the matter the demands are also time barred. On the both the counts I agree with the ld. Member (Judicial) in allowing the appeal. The citations cited by ld. Counsel apply to the facts of the case while the citations relied by ld. SDR is distinguishable as in that case the Bench held that there was no separate independent existence of a dummy unit. The appeal is required to be allowed by setting aside the demands and penalties as held by the Member (Judicial). The Registry shall place the appeal papers before the Members of the original Bench for passing the majority order. Sd/- (S.L. Peeran) Member (J) FINAL ORDER In the light of the majority view, both the appeals of the appellants are allowed with consequential relief. Sd/- (Jeet Ram Kait) Member (T) Sd/- (Archana Wadhwa) Member (J)
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2004 (3) TMI 782 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... ase. Respectfully following the views of the Hon'ble Supreme Court ,therefore, we hold that where the figures of returned income as also the finally assessed income are negative figures i.e. of losses, penalty under section 271(1)(c) is not leviable This is, in our humble understanding, the legal proposition approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court - fact which was neither brought to the notice of Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court in Chemiequip's case (supra), not the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court meant, and would probably ever mean, to disregard such an approval by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, or for that purpose, to disregard the law settled by a Full Bench, in the case of Rare Earth Limited (supra). The objections raised by the revenue are, therefore, unsustainable in law. 10. For the detailed reasons set out above, we approve the conclusions arrived at by the CIT(A) and decline to interfere in the matter. 11. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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2004 (3) TMI 781 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... order of transfer or appointment or promotion or any order passed in disciplinary proceedings on certain well-settled and recognized grounds or reasons, when properly approached and sought to be vindicated in the manner known to and in accordance with law. No such generalised directions as have been given by the High Court could ever be given leaving room for an inevitable impression that the Courts are attempting to take over the reigns of executive administration. Attempting to undertake an exercise of the nature could even be assailed as an onslaught and encroachment on the respective fields or areas of jurisdiction earmarked for the various other limbs of the State. Giving room for such an impression should be avoided with utmost care and seriously and zealously courts endeavour to safeguard the rights of parties. For all the reasons stated above, we set aside the judgments of the High Court under challenge. The appeals are allowed accordingly, with no order as to costs.
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2004 (3) TMI 780 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he adjudicating authorities have exonerated the petitioner and the said orders have not been challenged and have thus assumed finality, it is improper on the part of the respondents to prosecute the petitioner on the same facts. If the authorities were serious, they would have challenged the order passed by the Additional Director, Enforcement Directorate, dated 27/9/1992. They would have also challenged the order dated 11/9/1998 passed by the CEGAT. They seem to have accepted the conclusions of the adjudicating authority that the petitioner is innocent. In such circumstances, the pending prosecution will have to be quashed. Hence the following order. ORDER "The complaint being C.C. No. 208/CW/91 pending on the court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Esplanade, Mumbai, is quashed. Needless to say that the order dated 29/1/1999 passed by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in the same case also stands quashed." 22. Petition is disposed of in the aforestated terms.
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2004 (3) TMI 779 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... (8) SCC page 203); and Devender Pal Singh v. State of N.C.T. of Delhi and Anr. (2002 (5) SCC 234) Even in the light of the principles highlighted above when the evidence is tested, the inevitable conclusion is that the trial Court was justified in holding that accusations under Section 120B were not made out so far as the offences under IPC are concerned. So far as the motive for the killing is concerned, the evidence is clear to the extent that A-1 wanted removal of the deceased from the bodies of various trusts and educational institutions and not his removal from this world. In the absence of adequate material to establish commission of offences punishable under Section 302 or 302 read with Section 120B and Section 3(3), 5 and 6 of TADA and Section 27 of the Arms Act, as rightly held to have been not established by the trial Court, the appeals filed by the State and Balbir Singh are without merit. In the ultimate, all the three appeals are without merit and are dismissed.
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2004 (3) TMI 778 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... . ORDER The special leave petition is dismissed.
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2004 (3) TMI 777 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e High Court as it cannot be said that the view taken by the first appellate court was based on no material. To say the least the approach of the High Court was not proper. It is the obligation of the Courts of law to further the clear intentment of the legislature and not frustrate it by excluding the same. This Court in a catena of decisions held that where findings of fact by the lower appellate Court are based on evidence, the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on reappreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible. We, therefore, hold that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the findings of the final court of fact. We, therefore, hold that the judgment of the High Court under the circumstances cannot be sustained and judgment of the lower appellate Court in A.S. No. 21 of 1983 of the Subordinate Judge, Tiruvallur is restored. The appeal stands allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
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2004 (3) TMI 776 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ioners and in terms of which he sought to examine the question of necessity of filing of the present appeal. It appears that despite the above circular, the Revenue has chosen to file the present appeal knowing fully well that the corridors of the Courts are flooded with pending litigations, the presentation of this appeal is quite contrary to the instruction issued in the circular which is binding on the Revenue. In the above view of the matter, considering the instructions issued by the CBDT, we are satisfied that the Board has taken a policy decision not to file appeal in a type of case in hand and the same is binding on the Revenue (appellant herein). In the result, we dismiss this appeal on this count in limine with no order as to costs. 15. In so far as the present controversy is concerned, it is squarely covered by the Division Bench of this Court in Camco Colour Co. and therefore, this appeal has to be dismissed in limine as not maintainable and we order accordingly.
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2004 (3) TMI 775 - ITAT BANGALORE
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... ... ..... CIT (1987) 59 CTR (Kar.) 108 (1986) 162 ITR 468 (Kar.) which was delivered on 1st July, 1986. However, the decision relied on by the counsel for the assessee in the case of Sri Balaji Enterprises (supra), the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court delivered the decision on 14th Feb., 1997, wherein the earlier decision of the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court was considered. Under these circumstances, the latest ruling of the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court will certainly have the binding force on the Tribunal. Therefore, we do not find much force in the stand taken by the assessee (sic). The income earned by the assessee from lease rentals and maintenance charges received by the assessee are nothing but business income under the facts and circumstances of the case. Accordingly, the application of the other provisions of IT Act would follow. It is ordered accordingly. 14. In the result, the appeals filed by the Revenue are dismissed and the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.
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2004 (3) TMI 774 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tance of the Prosecuting Agency as well as the defending parties and their respective counsel. If it is possible to have the records reconstructed to enable the High Court itself to hear and dispose of the appeals in the manner envisaged under Section 386 of the Code, rehear the appeals and dispose of the same, on its own merits and in accordance with law. If it finds that re- construction is not practicable but by order retrial interest of justice could be better served - adopt that course and direct retrial - and from that stage law shall take its normal course. If only reconstruction is not possible to facilitate High Court to hear and dispose of the appeals and the further course of retrial and fresh adjudication by Sessions Court is also rendered impossible due to loss of vitally important basic records - in that case and situation only, the direction given in the impugned judgment shall operate and the matter shall stand closed. The appeals are accordingly disposed of.
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