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Showing 61 to 80 of 699 Records
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2004 (3) TMI 773 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... connected papers. We do not find any merit in the same. The review petition is dismissed.
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2004 (3) TMI 772 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... precedent. (see Union of India and others vs. Jaipal Singh 2003(7) Supreme 676). This court cannot and does not reverse or modify the decree or order appealed against while deciding the petition for special leave to appeal and that too when the SLP was being dismissed. What is impugned before this Court can be reversed or modified only after granting leave and then assuming appellate jurisdiction over it. If the order impugned before this Court cannot be reversed or modified at the SLP stage obviously that order cannot also be affirmed at the SLP stage (see Kunhayammed and others vs. State of Kerala and another (2000)6 SCC 359) and Sri Ramnik Vallabhdas Madvane and Ors. vs. Taraben Pravinlal Madhvani 2003 (8) Supreme 208). The inevitable conclusion is that the judgment has no legal sanction. We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court granting bail to the respondent. The respondent-accused is directed to surrender to custody forthwith. Appeal is allowed.
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2004 (3) TMI 771 - ITAT JODHPUR
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... ... ..... accordance with law. The AO considered the security deposit as the value of consideration. However, the deposit in question was refundable. The AO also worked out the value of consideration by taking the present value factor of 18 per cent, i.e., the deemed rate of interest. On the contrary, the rate of interest shown by the assessee at 9 per cent was actual rate of interest. Therefore, the AO was not justified in assuming that the rate of interest was 18 per cent. In our opinion, the differential interest, if any, cannot be considered as value of consideration for transfer of the capital asset. Considering the totality of facts, we are of the considered opinion that the order passed by the CIT(A) is well reasoned and just on the basis of facts. We, therefore, do not see any valid ground to interfere with the finding of the CIT(A) because the working of the AO is based only on assumption and presumption and not on factual position. 6. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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2004 (3) TMI 770 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in submitting the final report to the Court of Special Judge. o p /o p In the written submissions filed after the conclusion of hearing, it is contended that the Inspector of Police had no jurisdiction to investigate the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act without the order of a Magistrate of 1st Class and it was only the Deputy Superintendent of Police who was competent to investigate. Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 has been adverted to in this connection. That is not the ground which was urged before the High Court or even in the SLP or in the arguments advanced at the time of hearing. It is not even the case of the Respondent-accused that the Inspector of Police (Vigilance & Anti-Corruption) has not been authorized under the proviso to Section 17. We are therefore not inclined to deal with that question in this appeal. o p /o p In the result the impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed. No costs. o p /o p
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2004 (3) TMI 769 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ondition for such a long time creates doubt in our mind. The period of non-sealing in the circumstances of this case does give rise to a doubt that there might have been a possibility of tampering which cannot be ruled out, more so because sample sent to the Chemical Examiner is a small quantity. The trial court proceeded on the basis that from the statement of the police it showed that it was kept in a safe place, therefore, no prejudice has been caused to the appellant. The prejudice in our opinion is apparent if the seized articles are different from the articles sent to the Chemical Examiner which in this case we cannot say with certainty that the said manipulation has not happened. Therefore, on this ground alone this appeal succeeds and is allowed and the appellant is acquitted. His bail bonds stand discharged. We place on record our appreciation for the services rendered by Mr. L.K. Pandey, and direct the payment of ₹ 750.00 towards the payment of amicus curiae.
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2004 (3) TMI 768 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... latives only on Saturday afternoons and Sunday and there receiving the loan amount in cash has not been dis-believed. In fact, the assessing officer has accepted the transactions as genuine. The fact that the assessee was an Income Tax Practitioner has nothing to do with the violation. In the circumstances, non-consideration of the reason given by the assessee to find out whether it is a reasonable cause or not brushing aside to explanation by stating that as an Income Tax Practitioner, he ought not to have violated Section 269SS, is not proper or valid. 11. We are of the view that the assessee - appellant has shown reasonable cause for receiving the loan amounts in cash for the purposes of construction as and when amounts were required. As both the conditions stipulated by Section 273B are satisfied, the levy of penalty cannot be sustained. The appeal is therefore allowed and the order of the Tribunal appellate authority and the original order levying penalty are set aside.
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2004 (3) TMI 767 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ersy is involved, we feel interference on the facts of the case is called for. One more plea which was pressed by learned counsel for the appellants is that continuance of the proceedings before the appropriate Court in the manner prescribed in law would serve no useful purpose in view of the long passage of time. We do not find any substance in this plea. It is for the Competent Court to decide regarding the action to be taken next, after hearing both sides as provided in Section 227 of the Code. No direction can be given to the said Court at this premature stage as to what course the Court should adopt in dealing with the complaint. It is open to the appellants to raise all their contentions at that stage if they want to make a plea for discharge. We make it clear that as and when such plea is made to the Judge of the Competent Court, he shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. With the aforesaid directions and observations the appeals are finally disposed of.
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2004 (3) TMI 766 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ber of the Fund. Such employees have received their retiral benefits earlier. The pension scheme, as stated above, only provides for a second retiral benefit. Hence there is no question of penalty being imposed on such employees as alleged. The pension scheme only provides for an avenue for investment to retirees. They are provided avenue to put in their savings and as a term or condition which is more in the nature of an eligibility criteria the scheme disentitles such category of employees out of it. For the aforestated reasons, these appeals are allowed and the impugned judgments and orders are set aside. There shall be no order as to costs. So far as Civil Appeal No.607 of 2003 is concerned, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant - bank states that whatever credit balance to the provident fund account of the employee which was transferred to the pension fund shall be refunded to the respondent employee with accrued interest, if any, if not already refunded.
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2004 (3) TMI 765 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ts at the place from where the bags of poppy husk was recovered itself was taken as possession of these bags by the police. In fairness, the police should have conducted further investigation to prove that these accused were really in possession of these articles. The failure to give any satisfactory explanation by the accused for being present on that place itself does not prove that they were in possession of these articles. Though the respondents raised a plea before the Session Court, the same was not considered by the Sessions Judge in the manner in which it should have been considered. We do not think that the High Court erred in holding that there was no evidence to prove that the respondents were in conscious possession of the poppy husk recovered by the police. The prosecution failed to discharge its obligation to prove the possession of the poppy husk by the respondents. We do not find any infirmity in the judgment passed by the High Court. The appeal is dismissed.
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2004 (3) TMI 764 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the production started before 1996 could not be ruled out. Even the documents produced by the appellant do not show any continuous 'commercial production' during the period December 1996 to February 1999. We agree with the conclusion of the High court that it was not sufficient for showing 'commercial production' that some small items were sold by the appellant in December 1996 and 'nil' assessment of sales tax was made and a small excise duty payment was also made. We agree with the High Court's view that these were all self-serving documents created as evidence for commercial production prior to the cut off date of 31.12.1996. Upon an overall assessment of the facts on record, we are not satisfied that the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court on facts is so perverse that it requires interference by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2004 (3) TMI 763 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... took note of the grounds which persuaded this Court to cancel the bail. Such approach of the High Court, in our opinion, is violative of the principle of binding nature of judgments of superior court rendered in a lis between the same parties, and in effect tends to ignore and thereby render ineffective the principles enunciated therein which have a binding character. For the reasons stated above, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court was not justified in granting bail to the first respondent on the ground that he has been in custody for a period of 3 years or that there is no likelihood of the trial being concluded in the near future, without taking into consideration the other factors referred to hereinabove in this judgment of ours. This appeal, therefore, succeeds. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The bail-bonds of the first respondent are cancelled and the second respondent is directed to take the first respondent into custody forthwith.
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2004 (3) TMI 762 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ad been obtained by suppression of facts. The Hon'ble Supreme Court did not think it a fit case for interference in view thereof. In my considered view the aspect of non-disclosure is not only material for determination of an interim application but also has a bearing on the final determination of the writ petition. The petitioner has approached this Court to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and while seeking to invoke this extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court, a party must come with clean hands and must disclose all facts. If this principle has been consistently applied for private citizen I see no reason why the same should not equally be applied to the department of Govt. of India. For this reason also I am not inclined to interfere with the impugned order. In view of the aforesaid the writ petition is dismissed. In view of the dismissal of the writ petition, the bank guarantee be released within a period of six weeks from today.
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2004 (3) TMI 761 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... over so that the same percentage can be applied to the export profits, it becomes clear that both should have same components. Therefore, if sales-tax does not form part of one, it has to be excluded from the other. Any attempt by the assessee to increase the export profit, or any attempt by the Revenue to decrease the export profit, should be resisted, having regard to the clear words of Sub-section (3) and the Explanations to Section 80HHC. While logic need not always be the basis for a taxing provision, it does not follow that a taxing provision logically made, should be interpreted illogically or asymmetrically, merely because it is a taxing statute. We therefore respectfully agree with the consistent and logical interpretation adopted by the Bombay and Calcutta High Courts and reject the interpretation put forth by the Revenue. 11. As a consequence, we find that the order of the Tribunal is in order and does not call for interference. The appeal is, therefore, rejected.
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2004 (3) TMI 760 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... g with the stay application before the Tribunal by 26.3.2004. 3. In the facts and circumstances of the case, without going into the merits of the controversy between the parties, we are of the view that since the petitioner is going to file appeal within the period of limitation, the authorities are expected not to take any coercive action till the stay application comes up for hearing before the Tribunal for which the petitioner shall make an endeavour before the Tribunal for early hearing of the application. 4. With these observations, this petition is disposed of. Notice is discharged with no order as to costs. The ad-interim relief granted earlier shall continue till the stay application is heard, subject to the aforesaid observations.
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2004 (3) TMI 759 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the accused had the common intention to commit an offence of which they could be convicted?
Whether the two courts below are justified in coming to the conclusion that the appellants are guilty of an offence punishable under section 302 read with section 34 IPC?
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2004 (3) TMI 758 - SUPREME COURT
Whether Natural Gas in whatever physical form including Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) is a Union subject covered by Entry 53 of the List I and the Union has exclusive legislative competence to enact?
Whether States have legislative competence to make laws on the subject of natural gas and liquefied natural gas under Entry 25 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution?
Whether the State of Gujarat had legislative competence to enact the Gujarat Gas (Regulation of Transmission, Supply & Distribution) Act, 2001?
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2004 (3) TMI 757 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the High Court was justified in going into excruciating details on facts in a second appeal?
Has not the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the C.P.C. by reversing a well-considered Judgment of the First Appellate Court on facts especially when no question of law much less any substantial question of law arose for consideration?
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2004 (3) TMI 756 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... mean that the matter is closed and the petitioner was not entitled to approach the High Court, later even though the representation was rejected and no relief was granted to him. The High Court never considered the case on merits. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court and remand the matter for consideration on merits.
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2004 (3) TMI 755 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ORDER The special leave petition is dismissed.
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2004 (3) TMI 754 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hri Anant Kasliwal, learned counsel for the assessee submits that in view of amendment in the provisions of section 80AB of the Act, question No. 2 can be answered against the assessee and in view of answer to question No. 2, question Nos. 1 and 3 are of academic nature. Therefore, when question No. 2 is answered against the assessee, he cannot get any result of answer to question Nos. 1 and 3. 4. Per contra, Shri Singhi learned counsel for the Revenue Submits that in view of sections 80A(3) and 80B(5) of the Act if the gross total income is nil, the assessee is not entitled to deduction under section 80HH of the Act. 5. Considering the submissions made at the bar, in the result, we answer question No. 2 in negative i.e. in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. In view of answer to question No. 2, the answer to question Nos. 1 and 3 is of academic nature and, therefore, need not be answered, as prayed by Shri Kasliwal. Accordingly this Reference stands disposed of.
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