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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 699 Records
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2004 (3) TMI 753 - SUPREME COURT
Whether grant of interest at the rate of 18% per annum by the Consumer Forums in all cases is justifiable?
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2004 (3) TMI 752 - SUPREME COURT
Whether any formal agreement has been concluded between BICICO and the respondent No. 6 or whether any conveyance has been executed or any other formality completed by BICICO to transfer the title in the hotel in favour of the respondent no. 6?
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2004 (3) TMI 751 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... lay condoned. The appeal is admitted.
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2004 (3) TMI 750 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s to deposit a sum of ₹ 1 crore in application E/Stay-1793/2003 and a sum of ₹ 40 lakhs in E/Stay-1794/2003 was exercised and how the interest of revenue has been safeguarded. 11. The impugned order with regard to the two applications E/Stay-1793/2003 in appeal No. E/2691/2003 and E/Stay-1794/2003 in appeal No. E.2692/2003, thus, cannot be sustained and matter needs to be reconsidered by the Tribunal. 12. We, accordingly, quash and set aside the order dated 15-12-2003 in respect of applications E/Stay-1793/2003 and E/Stay-1794/2003. Both the applications viz. E/Stay-1793/2003 in appeal No. E/2691/2003 and E/Stay-1794/2003 in appeal No. E/2692/2003 are restored to the file of the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal for fresh consideration and disposal in accordance with law. 13. Rule is disposed of accordingly. No costs. The parties may be provided ordinary copy of this order duly authenticated by Court Associate on payment of usual copying charges.
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2004 (3) TMI 749 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Managing Director of a Corporation can be appointed by the State Government as the authority contemplated under Section 32G of the State Financial Corporations Act?
Whether the Judgment of the Delhi High Court is to be set aside to the extent that it holds that the Managing Director could not have been appointed and to the extent it quashes the Certificates of Recovery?
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2004 (3) TMI 748 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution also, it has been held in Surya Dev Rai (Supra) that the jurisdiction was not available to be exercised for indulging into re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correcting the errors in drawing inferences like a court of appeal. The High Court has itself recorded in its judgment that "considering the evidence on the record carefully" it was inclined not to sustain the judgment of the Appellate Court. On its own showing, the High Court has acted like an Appellate Court which was not permissible for it to do under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution. The approach of the High Court cannot be countenanced. The appeal is allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of the Appellate Court is restored. The respondent is allowed four months time from today for vacating the suit premises subject to filing the usual undertaking within a period of 4 weeks from today. No order as to costs.
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2004 (3) TMI 747 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the claim of the appellants made under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 be treated to be one under Section 140 of the Act and upon adjusting the amounts provided for thereunder, the appellants may refund the rest thereof to the insurer?
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2004 (3) TMI 746 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tedly knocking at its doors, is on the verge of destitution the High Court itself has jurisdiction to direct suitable amount of maintenance being awarded and to secure compliance with its directions, if the same relief the subordinate Court has failed to grant or to enforce. May be that the High Court could have passed such order on the next date of hearing. But the petitioner has approached this Court probably impelled by impatience. It is not necessary to grant leave to appeal against the order dated 29.10.2003 of the High Court. There is nothing in the impugned order by which the petitioner may feel aggrieved. Let the petitioner appear before the High Court on the next date of hearing and seek appropriate interim and urgent relief from the High Court which if deserving, we have no reason to assume why the High Court shall not grant to the petitioner. The special leave petition be treated as disposed of. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the High Court forthwith.
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2004 (3) TMI 745 - SUPREME COURT
Whether High Court has only demonstrated as to how the material evidence has been overlooked leading to manifest illegality resulting in gross miscarriage of justice?
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2004 (3) TMI 744 - COMPANY LAW BOARD
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... ... ..... , compelling the petitioner to look for a new unit for himself. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be saddled with gross negligence or deliberated inaction or lack of bonafides. The causes put-forth by the petitioner are found to be justifiable to condone the consequential delay in filing the Company Petition and accordingly I do so. In these circumstances, the respondents are directed to file counter in the Company Petition by 21.04.2004 and rejoinder to be filed by 05.05.2004. The Company Petition will be heard on 17.05.2004 at 10.30 A.M. With these directions the applications in CA No. 125 & 127 of 2003 stand disposed of, however, without any order as to costs. -- While disposing these applications, I have not placed any reliance on the statement of objections on record, not being supported by an affidavit verifying the same in terms of the Company Law Board Regulations, 1991, but took cognizance of the affidavit filed in support of the Company Application No. 125/2003.
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2004 (3) TMI 743 - SUPREME COURT
Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to an application made under Section 8 of the Act having regard to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act?
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2004 (3) TMI 742 - SUPREME COURT
Whether an agreement despite expiry would prevail over a regulation made under Section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (for short 'the Act') as regard the age of superannuation of an employee of the Respondent-Board?
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2004 (3) TMI 740 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the recommended person is fit for appointment, by making wide allegations which has become common these days and have resulted in delaying appointment of Judges, though large number of vacancies exist in different High Courts?
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2004 (3) TMI 739 - SUPREME COURT
Application seeking eviction of the tenant dismissed by High Court - Held that:- In the present case, the landlord has, through his pleadings and by adducing evidence, made out a case of the tenant's ceasing to occupy the tenancy premises and the onus, therefore, had shifted on the tenant either to rebut the case made out by the landlord or to allege and prove any reasonable cause for ceasing to occupy the premises. In our opinion, in the case at hand the landlord has fully discharged his obligation of making out the case of his entitlement to evict the tenant under Section 13 (2)(v) of the Act. The tenant has failed in discharging his onus. The Controller and the Appellate Authority rightly arrived at the finding of the fact which they did. There was no case for interference at the hands of the High Court. The appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of the Controller, as affirmed by the Appellate Authority, is restored.
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2004 (3) TMI 738 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , as if the tax or interest or penalty payable by such dealer under the CST Act is a tax or interest or penalty payable under the general sales tax law of the State. Firstly, the authority constituted under section 4 of the KST Act is not empowered to assess, reassess, collect and enforce payment of any tax under the KST Act. Secondly, giving advance rulings and clarifications is not one of the functions mentioned in section 9(2) of the CST Act. Therefore, section 9(2) of the CST Act does not empower the respondent-authority constituted under section 4 of the KST Act to give advance rulings/clarifications under the CST Act. As we find that the order passed by the respondent-authority is one without jurisdiction, it cannot be sustained. Hence, the appeal is allowed in part and the order dated July 7, 2003 passed by the authority is set aside. Let a copy of this order be sent to the respondent-authority to ensure that it does not entertain applications relating to the CST Act.
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2004 (3) TMI 737 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n the decisions/orders relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, interpreting any provision of law. On the other hand, on an examination of some of the more relevant provisions of law, I find that there is no impediment in law for enforcing the demand. May be for the sake of convenience or having regard to the particular facts and circumstances, this court in its discretion had granted certain relief to a particular petitioner in a case. That does not necessarily mean that this is a law laid down by this court involving any principle of law or interpreting any provision of the Act. In the present case, it is open to the petitioner to pursue its remedies as provided under the statute and also seek for passing of orders if he has already filed regular return and not to enforce the demand. Exercise of discretion in favour of the petitioner or interference at this stage on a complaint made by the petitioner does not arise. Accordingly this writ petition is rejected.
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2004 (3) TMI 736 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... gets benefit of the exemption. The court must read the exemption notification as it stands and it is not open for the court to read the same in a manner to determine whether the assessee gets the benefit or not. The mere act that the respondent may not get benefit, is not sufficient to introduce additional word in the notification to make exemption available for purchase turnover. These two judgments supports the view of the Revenue. In both these judgments this court has categorically ruled that the court must read the exemption notification as it stands and it is not open for this court to read the same in a manner so as to determine as to whether the assessee gets the benefit or not. In the given circumstances, and on the facts of this case, and in the light of the two decisions, it is not possible for this court to accept the claim of the petitioner and provide relief. In these circumstances both these petitions stand rejected. Parties are to bear their respective costs.
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2004 (3) TMI 735 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the provision of Order XVI, C.P.C. Order XVI, rules 10, 11 and 12 of C.P.C., provide procedure where the witness fail to comply with the summons, the court can attach the property of such witness and fine not exceeding Rs. 500 may be imposed under Order XII, Rule 16, C.P.C. The Sales Tax Officer should have invoked the provisions for compelling the attendance of M/s. Chakko Atta Chakki. In view of the fact that these powers were not exercised by the assessing authority there is no option for me except to remand the case to afford proper opportunity of hearing to the applicant and for compelling attendance of the third party, namely, M/s. Chakko Atta Chakki. In view of the above the revision is allowed in part. The order of the Tribunal is set aside and the matter is remanded to the Tribunal for re-consideration of the matter. The Tribunal itself may exercise the power under Order XVI of the Code of Civil Procedure or may remand the matter to the Sales Tax Officer concerned.
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2004 (3) TMI 734 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... unsel, I am unable to accept his plea with regard to manufacturing in the light of homogenisation process. This conclusion is inevitable. I must notice at this stage annexure R 1 and in annexure R 1 it is stated that what is transferred from Gujarat-Mangalore is only on stock transfer basis. This also evidences that there is no manufacturing as such at Mangalore. Petitioner in the amended petition only challenges annexure Q. Petitioner has suffered assessment orders and appeals have been filed by the petitioner. Appeals stood rejected. The main ground raised both before the assessing authority as well as before the appellate authority is one of eligibility in terms of the notification. Since I have accepted eligibility in terms of the endorsement, these orders also do not require any interference. Annexure Q is only pursuant to the impugned appeal orders. Annexure Q is therefore upheld. In the result, this petition stands rejected. Parties are to bear their respective costs.
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2004 (3) TMI 733 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ned earlier. As already observed this is not a case for interference with the SIR (exhibit P6) prepared by the second respondent at this stage. As observed in the various decisions discussed above it is for the party aggrieved by the SIR prepared by the second respondent to object to the reliance of the materials gathered in the inspection conducted on May 13, 2003 evidenced by the SIR when proceedings by way of assessment or penalty are initiated by the authorities under the Act relying on such SIR. When such objections are raised it is for the concerned authority to consider the same in the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court and of this court including the decision relied on by the petitioner and to take a decision. Without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to raise all objections in regard to the reliance of the exhibit P6 on all grounds including the grounds taken in this writ petition in appropriate proceedings this writ petition is dismissed.
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