|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 576 Records
-
2005 (10) TMI 594 - SUPREME COURT
Interpretation of Section 300 of the CrPC - Demand for illegal gratification - cognizance of an offence u/s 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ("the Act") - Validity of sanction obtained - HC allowed the first application, when an accused faces a full-fledged trial, having regard to the provisions of the Code, the Trial Court must either record a judgment of conviction or acquittal and the accused cannot be discharged in terms of Section 227 of the Code after a full-fledged trial - In the second matter, the High Court was of the opinion that no fresh trial is permissible in law - HELD THAT:- It is not possible to agree with the decision of the High Court that the Trial Court was bound to record either a judgment of conviction or acquittal, even after holding that the sanction was not valid. We have noticed hereinbefore that even if a judgment of conviction or acquittal was recorded, the same would not make any distinction for the purpose of invoking the provisions of Section 300 of the Code as even then, it would be held to have been rendered illegally and without jurisdiction.
However, we are of the opinion that the interest of justice shall be sub-served if while allowing these appeals and setting aside the judgments of the High Court, the trial court is requested to dispose of the matters at an early date preferably within six months from the date of communication of this order, subject, of course, to rendition of all cooperation of the Respondents herein. In the event, the trial is not completed within the aforementioned period, it would be open to the Respondents to approach the High Court again. These appeals are disposed of with the aforementioned directions. No costs.
-
2005 (10) TMI 593 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... a to take immediate remedial measures with regard to all the above aspects, as MCGM has completely abdicated all its basic functions. 289. CONCLUSIONS (a) In amended DCR 58(1)(b), "open lands" would include lands after demolition of structures. (b) Clarification dated 28th March, 2003 is clearly violative of Section 37 of MRTP Act and Article 21 of the Constitution of India. (c) The issue whether the amended DCR 58 is contrary to Section 37 of MRTP Act or Article 21 of the Constitution of India, is kept open. (d) All the constructions carried out by various Developers are clearly in violation of EIA Notification as amdnded on 7th July, 2004, as admittedly none of them have obtained clearance from Ministry of Environment and Forests. (e) All sales of Mill lands carried out by NTC are clearly contrary to the Supreme Court orders dated 11th May, 2005 and 27th September, 2002 and contrary to the sanctioned BIFR schemes. 288. Rule is accordingly made absolute with costs.
-
2005 (10) TMI 592 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... judgment of a court, no order of a minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything. The court is careful not to find fraud unless it is distinctly pleaded and proved; but once it is proved it vitiates judgments, contracts and all transactions whatsoever;" See also Ram Preeti Yadav v. U.P. Board of High School and Intermediate Education and Ors. Any action by the authorities or by the people claiming a right/ privilege under the Constitution which subverts the constitutional purpose must be treated as a fraud on the Constitution. The Constitution does not postulate conferment of any special benefit on those who do not belong to the category of people for whom the provision was made. The fraud committed by the Appellant for obtaining unlawful gain has been found as of fact by a statutory committee. The said finding of fact has not been interfered with by the High Court. No case has been made out for us to take a different view.
-
2005 (10) TMI 591 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ered possession of the property. In view of the said fact also, the Trial Court was right in proceeding to decide the case on merits and in passing the decree in favour of the plaintiff. 17. So far as the findings recorded by the Trial Court for passing a decree for possession in favour of the plaintiff are concerned, they have neither been disturbed nor set aside by the lower Appellate Court nor by the High Court. The plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to a decree for possession. 18. For the foregoing reasons, in our opinion, the appeal deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. The decree and order passed by lower Appellate Court and confirmed by the High Court are set aside and the decree for possession passed by the Trial Court is restored. Respondent-Bhagwandas is granted four month's time to vacate the premises subject to his filing usual undertaking within four weeks from today. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
-
2005 (10) TMI 590 - SUPREME COURT
Misappropriation of the gold utilized for making Ornament "Golaka" for Mekkavu Bhagavathy of Chottanikkara Temple - Offence punishable u/s 13(1)(c) and (d) r/w Section 13(2)of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and and 403 IPC and 477-A I.P.C. - HELD THAT:- From the findings arrived at by the High Court that it was A-3 who was entrusted with the gold by the Devaswom Board, and who was looking after the affairs of making the ornament Golaka, simply because accused-appellant had accompanied him to Coimbatore, it cannot be inferred that there was an agreement entered into between them to misappropriate the gold. To constitute a conspiracy, agreement between two or more persons for doing an illegal act, or an act by illegal means, is a sine qua non. Although the agreement among the conspirators can be inferred by necessary implication, the inference can only be drawn on the parameters in the manner of proved facts, in the nature of circumstantial evidence. Whatever be the incriminating circumstance, it must be clearly established by reliable evidence and they must form the full chain whereby a conclusion about the guilt of the accused can be safely drawn.
Even if we hold that at some point of time, the accused-appellant had some knowledge or suspicion about A-3 indulging in fraudulent misappropriation of gold, entrusted to A-3, in the absence of some positive evidence indicating agreement to that effect, conspiracy could not be inferred. On the findings itself arrived at by the High Court, we cannot hold that the accused-appellant was the conspirator to misappropriate the gold, with A-3.
On scrutiny of the entire facts led by the prosecution, the charge of conspiracy cannot stand as there is no link to show that the conspirators agreed to misappropriate the gold while the gold ornament was being prepared.
The accused-appellant was convicted under Sections 13(1)(c) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. To constitute an offence under clause (c) of Section 13(1) of the Act, it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that the accused has dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriated any property entrusted to him or under his control as a public servant or allows any other person to do so or converts that property for his own use. The entrustment of the property or the control of the property is a necessary ingredient of Section 13(1)(c). On the findings arrived at by the High Court, it is obvious that the property was neither entrusted nor was under the control of the accused-appellant and thus the accused-appellant could not have been convicted under the Section.
To attract the provisions of Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, public servant should obtain for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage by corrupt or illegal means or by abusing his position as a public servant. Therefore, for convicting a person under the provisions of Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988, there must be evidence on record that the accused has obtained for himself or for any other person, any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage by corrupt or illegal means or by abusing his position as a public servant obtained for himself, or for any person, or obtain for any person, any valuable thing, or pecuniary advantage without any public interest.
What we find in the present case is that there is no evidence on record to prove these facts that the accused-appellant had obtained for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. We may clarify that the charge of conspiracy being not proved u/s 120B I.P.C., the accused appellant could not be held responsible for the act done by A-3. The prosecution has failed to prove that he has obtained for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. Similarly, we do not find any evidence on record to convict accused-appellant under Sections 403, 477-A I.P.C.
Thus, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside.
-
2005 (10) TMI 589 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... allegations made in the prosecution are only for evasion of customs duty and violation of any notification. In what way issuance of FIRC will have connection of customs duty is made not known. Production of supporting documents, which were found false on the side of prosecution, in order to wrongly obtain FIRC has a direct bearing upon the wrong import instead of bearing with the evasion of customs duty. It is in this view of the matter, the facts of the case are different from that in Hiralal's case. It is the paramount duty of the petitioner to demonstrate how he is entitled for application of section 91 of the Act. One easy endeavour is to make it available of all the annexures and statements in Form I-B under section 88 and showing that they are alone the rock bottom for prosecution and nothing else. That has not been done. Thus it becomes a triable point. 48. For the aforesaid reasons, both the criminal revision petition and criminal original petition are dismissed.
-
2005 (10) TMI 588 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ointment of an arbitrator by the respondents. We, therefore, direct that pending the appointment of an arbitrator and for three weeks thereafter, the appellants will not be dispossessed from the premises in their possession. The appellants to then apply to the arbitrator for interim orders. 4. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly. 5. No order as to costs.
-
2005 (10) TMI 587 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... t in Adalat Prasad vs. Rooplal Jindal and Others (2004) 7 SCC 338 , wherein it has been held "15. It is true that if a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence, issues process without there being any allegation against the accused or any material implicating the accused or in contravention of provisions of Sections 200 and 202, the order of the Magistrate may be vitiated, but then the relief an aggrieved accused can obtain at that stage is not by invoking Section 203 of the Code because the Criminal Procedure Code does not contemplate a review of an order. Hence in the absence of any review power or inherent power with the subordinate criminal courts, the remedy lies in invoking Section 482 of the Code." See also Poonam Chand Jain vs. Fazru - (2005) SCC (Cri) 190 For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any merit in this appeal, which is dismissed accordingly. However, the Appellant shall be at liberty to raise other contentions in an appropriate proceeding.
-
2005 (10) TMI 586 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
... ...
... ... ..... three years and 90 days from the date of the application for reference made by the claimant within the time prescribed by Section 18(2) of the Act. We uphold the view of the High Court in Paramraj's case (supra) that the remedy having become barred the right could not thereafter be enforced. In that context, we hold that the claimant while approaching the court under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act would not be entitled to invoke Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In the light of these, we allow these appeals and set aside the orders of the High Court. We dismiss the applications for reference made by the claimants. We also uphold the view of the Land Acquisition Court that a reference made beyond the expiry of three years and 90 days from the date of application for reference by the Deputy Commissioner is incompetent. We hold that the respondents are not entitled to claim any enhancement by recourse to Section 18 of the Act. In the circumstances we make no order as to costs.
-
2005 (10) TMI 585 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e findings is manifestly unreasonable and unjust one in the context of evidence on record. This judgment squarely applies to the case on hand. In the instant case, the High Court has rightly exercised its right and discharged its duty to reverse the error and removed the injustice done by the courts below. The High Court is right in exercising its duty, rightly so in interfering with an unreasonable and unjust findings by both the Courts below. 14. On a careful perusal of the materials on record, it will be clear that both the courts below did not appreciate the evidence on record both oral and documentary and, therefore, the findings arrived at by the High Court, in our opinion, does not call for any interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India and the civil appeal deserves to be dismissed. 15. In the result, the appeal stands dismissed and the judgment and decree of the High Court is affirmed and of the lower courts are set aside. However, we order no costs.
-
2005 (10) TMI 584 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... igh court which are to be disposed of on the basis of affidavits, therefore, it cannot be held that only those affidavits which are sworn before the Oath Commissioners appointed by the Chief Justice of High Court can be presented and accepted in proceeding before High Court. Thus taking pedantic and technical view in the matter would virtually cause great hardship to the public at large and defeat the very purpose of Notaries Act 1952 and resulting which the provisions of aforesaid Act and Section 139 of C.P.C. would be rendered meaningless. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that affidavits sworn before Notaries appointed under Notaries Act, 1952 can be presented before the proceedings in question and cannot be excluded for consideration for the reasons aforestated. In the result the objection raised by the learned counsel of the opposite party is not sustainable and liable to be rejected. Sri Gaur is allowed two weeks and no more time to file supplementary affidavit.
-
2005 (10) TMI 583 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in retaining the addition on account of alleged bogus purchases at 25% i.e. ₹ 73,23,322/- of the total purchases amounting to ₹ 2,92,93,288/- ?” The remaining questions proposed in both the appeals are based on findings of fact recorded after appreciation of evidence and cannot be termed to be substantial question of law.
-
2005 (10) TMI 582 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 21-9-2005 clearly reflects that it is not a case of escaped income or rectification which may fall within the expression ''mistake apparent from the record'. Reading of the impugned notice shows that the Assessing Officer wants to change the opinion which is not permissible in law. Consequently, the impugned notice/order dated 14-9-2005 and 21-9-2005/ Annexures-4 and 5 respectively to the writ petition are hereby quashed. It is, however, made clear that the appeal pending before the concerned authority, with respect to the aforesaid assessment years, under Income Tax Act, if any, may be heard and decided expeditiously. Writ Petition stands allowed. No order as to costs.
-
2005 (10) TMI 581 - CESTAT CHENNAI
... ...
... ... ..... ses stand on a different footing. In those cases, the appellants were, admittedly, physically dealing with excisable goods. They used to receive such goods from their principal, store them in their godown, clear them to buyers, collect payments for the sale and transmit the same to the principal after taking their commission. This activity would attract the definition of “Clearing and Forwarding Agent”, which includes Consignment Agent. Apparently, therefore, the appellants in the other two appeals seem to have rendered service of a Consignment Agent to their customers during the respective periods. Such service was taxable during the periods of dispute. Hence there seems to be no prima facie case for these two appellants against the demands of Service tax. Accordingly, we direct M/s. Sri Vasavi Jeans and M/s. Sabarey Enterprises to pre-deposit the respective tax amounts within six weeks and report compliance on 21-12-2005. (Dictated and pronounced in open Court)
-
2005 (10) TMI 580 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... turer. The manufacturer issues credit notes to the assessee in respect of parts supplied to the customers. In fact situation like this, the Apex Court in Mohd. Ekram Khan's case (2004) 136 STC 515, has held the supply of parts to the customers against the credit note of the manufacturer is liable to tax under the Act. Therefore in our opinion, the finding and the conclusions reached by the Appellate Tribunal as rightly argued by the learned Counsel for revenue is contary to the law declared by the Apex Court. 9. In view of the above findings, the Revision Petition filed by the revenue requires to be allowed and accordingly, it is allowed. The impugned orders passed by the Appellate Tribunal in Appeal No. 279/2003 dated 23.1.2003 is set aside. The order passed by the assessing authority in the assessee's case for the assessment year 1998-1999 is restored. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. Ordered accordingly.
-
2005 (10) TMI 579 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... not cared to examine the details of the intrinsic merits of the evidence of the eye-witnesses and has rejected their evidence on the general grounds, the order of acquittal passed by the High Court resulted in a gross and substantial mis-carriage of justice so as to invoke extra- ordinary jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution." 9. Since the judgment of the High Court is not in accordance with law, we have no option but to set aside the same and to remit the matter back to the High Court for a fresh consideration of the appeal. The appeal preferred by the State of M.P. is accordingly allowed, the judgment and order of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is remanded back to the High Court for a fresh hearing after issuing notice to the accused respondent. It is made clear that we have not gone into the merits of the case and the High Court shall reappraise and examine the evidence on record and decide the appeal in accordance with law.
-
2005 (10) TMI 578 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... al interest which needs to be cared for and strengthened by string of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing system." 17. It is true that reformation as a theory of punishment is in fashion but under the guise of applying such theory, courts cannot forget their duty to society and to the victim. The Court has to consider the plight of the victim in a case involving rape and the social stigma that may follow the victim to the grave and which in most cases, practically ruins all prospects of a normal life for the victim. Could a Court afford to forget these aspects while imposing a punishment on the aggressor? I think not. The Court has to do justice to the society and to the victim on the one hand and to the offender on the other. The proper balance must be taken to have been stuck by the legislature. Hence, the legislative wisdom reflected by the statute has to be respected by the Court and the permitted departure therefrom made only for compelling and convincing reasons.
-
2005 (10) TMI 577 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ntiff running into thousands of crores. Thus finding in para 24 of the judgment in M/s Commerical Aviation and Travel v. Vimla Pannalal case (Supra) would of little assistance to the plaintiff. I am of the considered view that the valuation for purposes of court fee made by the plaintiff is clearly arbitrary and the court has reasonable material to come to the conclusion, especially in view of the averment of the plaintiff himself based on his own sales figures amount in excess of ₹ 50,00,000/- would be due and payable the plaintiff on rendition of accounts, if the plaintiff succeeds in the suit. Plaintiff is thus required to pay court fee on the amount of ₹ 50,00,000/- In view of the aforesaid, plaint is liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 of Code. However keeping in mind the provisions of sub rule (b) of Rule 11 of Order 7 of the Code., the plaintiff is granted fifteen days time to make up the deficiency of court fees. List for directions on 07.11.2005.
-
2005 (10) TMI 576 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... fence, there is no specific averment as to how any of the accused 1 and 2 (respondents 2 and 3 herein) were actually involved in the conduct of the business of the company relating to the transaction in question or how and on what basis it can be said that it was with the active connivance of these two accused that the offence was committed by the company. In my opinion, the petitioners could not have been summoned on the basis of the allegations made by the complainant. The Metropolitan Magistrate has not committed any mistake in declining to summon the two accused. The petitioners have no merit and, Therefore, dismissed. 14. I, however, hasten to add that this order will in no way mean any restriction to the power of the CMM or any Magistrate dealing with the case at any subsequent stage to summon any of the two accused in exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C., if the complainant is able to produce evidence which can fasten criminal liability for the offence on them.
-
2005 (10) TMI 575 - COMPANY LAW BOARD CHENNAI
... ...
... ... ..... ted by the Bench. The petitioner has not established any criminal contempt on the part of the respondents, while disobeying the orders of the Bench and, therefore, there is no scope for invoking Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act. In view of these conclusions, the petitioner is at liberty to move the High Court for invoking its jurisdiction under Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act so as to prosecute the respondents for having wilfully disobeyed the orders dated July 18, 2005 and July 20, 2005, of the Bench. Ordered accordingly. With these directions, both the applications stand disposed of. 12. This Bench by an order dated August 16, 2004, and the subsequent orders directed the respondents to file their counter-statement to the main petition, but the respondents have not so far filed any counter-statement, which must be filed by October 21, 2005, and rejoinder to be filed by November 7, 2005. The company petition will be heard on November 8, 2005, at 2.30 p.m.
........
|
