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2005 (7) TMI 733
... ... ... ... ..... s of the case, the Tribunal was justified in law in confirming the order of C.I.T.(A) and directing the A.O. to allow interest under Sec. 214/244(1A) upto the date of adjustment as against upto the date of order giving effect to the C.I.T. (A) s order allowed by the A.O.? 2. We find no substantial question of law in the above as the provisions of law are explicitly clear, the Appeal stands dismissed.
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2005 (7) TMI 732
... ... ... ... ..... by the Department. In this case, according to the appellant, since the issue was not raised at any stage the Department was not given any opportunity to prove that the product in question was in fact being manufactured within the definition of the word in the Central Excise Act. Delay condoned. Issue notice limited to the question as to why the matter should not be remanded back to the Tribunal for disposal.
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2005 (7) TMI 731
... ... ... ... ..... ert itself into a monitoring agency and supervise the investigation in pursuance of the First Information Report. 3. Bearing this proposition in mind we have examined whether this habeas corpus petition can be held maintainable, but In absence of any material against the respondents at this stage that the petitioner's brother is in illegal detention of the respondents who are included herein, we do not deem it appropriate to entertain this habeas corpus petition. The petitioner, therefore, will be at liberty to keep a watch on the case which he has registered regarding disappearance of his brother. In addition, we leave It open In the Interest of Justice, to the petitioner to file a fresh habeas corpus petition, if at any point of time or at any stage of the investigation of the FIR, it comes to his knowledge that his brother is in Illegal detention of any person, including the respondents who have been enlarged on ball. We dispose of this writ petition with this liberty.
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2005 (7) TMI 730
... ... ... ... ..... directed to decide the case on merits instead of dismissing the complaint being premature. 4. Looking to the entire facts and circumstances of the case and hearing the counsel for respective parties, I feel that in view of the decisions of the Apex Court, the trial court should have waited and allowed the complainant to establish its case or cognizance should have been taken after expiry of the stipulated period, instead of dismissing the complaint out right as premature. The court should have taken cognizance only after necessary period had lapsed in accordance with law and cognizance should be taken subsequently. Since the complaint has been dismissed summarily, the applicant has no other alternative but to approach this Court for redressal of its grievance. 5. For the reasons discussed above, the application is allowed and the impugned orders dated 27.3.1995 and 16.8.1997 are set aside. The trial court is directed to proceed afresh and decide the question afresh on merits.
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2005 (7) TMI 729
... ... ... ... ..... ion 138 of the Act. It can be interpreted that any debt or liability arising out of a contract or promise, which is unlawful or not legally enforceable, would not constitute an offence under Section 138 of the Act. 7. In Words and Phrases Vol. 14A, the term "enforceable" is defined as "not invalid as contrary to public policy because bargaining contrary to the law as to venue, word "enforceable" not necessarily implying actual force or coercion but meaning to be executed and to cause to take effect." Explanation to Section 138 clearly says that for the purpose of the section "debt or other liability" means a legally enforceable debt or other liability. Hence, only a claim arising out of an enforceable debt or other liability will constitute an offence under Section 138 of the Act. 8. From the discussions made above, this Court is of the view that the judgment under appeal requires no interference by this Court. Hence, leave is rejected.
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2005 (7) TMI 728
... ... ... ... ..... case because of the challenge to such order of summoning before higher courts. An appropriate check at the very initial point can reduce delay in the disposal of the cases. Therefore, before parting with this judgment, I feel impelled to advice the Metropolitan Magistrates to exercise extra caution before summoning any accused by virtue of Section 141 of the Act. In all cases in which persons other than a company are prosecuted for the offence of a company, the Magistrate shall examine the complainant personally in order to elicit from him information in detail about such person's status in the company and his/her responsibilities in the conduct of the business of the company and whether there was any specific evidence which justifies prosecution of that person either by virtue of provisions of Section 141(1) or by virtue of provisions of Section 141(2) of the Act. The registry is directed to circulate a copy of the judgment to the Metropolitan Magistrates for compliance.
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2005 (7) TMI 727
... ... ... ... ..... premises in the absence of there being a specific statutory provision in that regard. Though we find some merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant calling for reconsideration of the wide propositions of law laid down in Isha Marbles case, we think the present one is not a case for such exercise. We leave the plea open for consideration in an appropriate case. The apex Court held that auction purchaser cannot be held liable in the absence of any specific statutory provision. So far as this case is concerned, there is a statutory provision like Regulation 15(e). Above being the legal position, we find no reason to reconsider the earlier three Bench decisions of this court. We therefore hold that the Board is entitled to insist payment of arrears of electricity charges as pre-condition for supply of electricity to the same premises to a prospective consumer. Reference is answered accordingly. Appeal therefore lacks merits and it is accordingly dismissed.
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2005 (7) TMI 726
... ... ... ... ..... its, but we may only note that the subject matter of the two complaints are four cheques in all amounting to ₹ 76,55,917.47 ps. According to the Respondents, they made payment of ₹ 40 laces by six bank drafts after the issue of some of the cheques. Whether the said payment has been made or it is towards some of the amounts covered by the cheques are all the questions which can be decided only at the trial of the complaint cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and could not have been made the basis of allowing the revision petition. The approach of the High Court is clearly erroneous. 4. For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore the Complaint Cases No. 111 and 211, dated 2nd January, 1997, to be tried on merits in accordance with law. The parties are directed to appear before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on 29th August, 2005 for appropriate directions. 5. The appeals are allowed accordingly.
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2005 (7) TMI 725
... ... ... ... ..... of the above Writ Petition. The above order, is without prejudice to the rights and contentions of both the parties. The learned counsel Dr. Daniel for the Respondents waives service. 2. The above Writ Petition be heard expeditiously alongwith Wealth Tax Reference Nos. 2 of 1992, WTR No. 4 of 1993, WTR No. 8 of 1994, WTR No. 8 of 1991, WTR No. 3 of 1994, WTR No. 102 of 1998, WTR No. 11 of 2000 and Wealth Tax Appeal Nos. 608 of 2003 and WTA No. 362 of 2003. Liberty to both the parties to move for a fixed date of hearing.
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2005 (7) TMI 724
... ... ... ... ..... . Application for condonation of delay is dismissed. Even otherwise on merits, we see no reason to interfere. The Civil Appeal is dismissed.
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2005 (7) TMI 723
... ... ... ... ..... fidavits of the accused as well as the complainant. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are of the view that the parties should be permitted to compound the offence since the parties state that nothing is outstanding from the appellant since the amount due has been paid in full. 3. We, therefore, permit the parties to compound the offence, and set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant. The appeal is allowed.
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2005 (7) TMI 722
... ... ... ... ..... at the stage of granting bail and to direct repayment of any amount is both onerous and unwarranted. In the instant case the liability of the appellant has yet to be determined in appropriate proceeding. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are satisfied that the High Court was justified in granting bail to the appellant but we do not uphold the condition imposed in the order granting bail that he should continue to deposit a sum of Rs.one lakh per month. That condition is deleted. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.
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2005 (7) TMI 721
... ... ... ... ..... Finance Act, 1994. Therefore the Commissioner (Appeals) held that the activity of the assessee cannot be considered as ‘Consulting Engineer’. This has been challenged by the Revenue. Heard both the sides in the matter. 2. We find that the Board (C.B.E. & C.) has issued a Circular No. 79/9/2004-S.T., dated 13-5-2004 clarifying the issue that the charges for erection, installation and commissioning are not covered under the category of Consulting Engineer Services, prior to 2003. In view of this clarification, the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) is just and proper. There is no merit in the Revenue’s appeal and the same is rejected.
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2005 (7) TMI 720
... ... ... ... ..... sider the case in accordance with law. 64. Subject to aforesaid observations and aforesaid circumstances and having regard to the averments made in this petition and the materials placed on record and the affidavits filed by the Regional Director, Department of Company Affairs, Kanpur, and the Official Liquidator, I am satisfied that the prayers made in the petition deserve to be allowed. I also do not find any legal impediment to the grant of sanction to the Scheme of compromise. Hence, sanction is hereby granted to the abovementioned Scheme of compromise under Section 391(2) read with Section 394 of the Companies Act, 1956. 65. CA No. 797/2000 and CP No. 385/2003 are disposed of in the aforesaid terms. CA No. 1852/2002 also stands disposed of. CCP (CO) No. 2/2002 66. In view of what is discussed above, it is not necessary to go into the allegations made in this petition or to take any action. This petition is disposed of. Application also stands disposed of. CA disposed of.
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2005 (7) TMI 719
... ... ... ... ..... is only required to ascertain as to whether the Tribunal while passing the impugned order has jurisdiction, if it has jurisdiction; whether the same is exercised in proper manner or the Tribunal has exceeded the jurisdiction vested in it, and lastly, whether the Tribunal has exercised jurisdiction which was not vested in it. On going through the impugned order of Tribunal, it is not possible to state that any of the conditions are satisfied enabling this Court to intervene. 8.The position in law is well settled. Even if on same set of facts and material on record, it might be possible for the High Court to arrive at a different conclusion , that by itself is not sufficient to enable the High Court to interfere with findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal. In the present case, it is not possible to state that the view adopted by the Tribunal cannot be arrived at. Therefore, even on this count, this Court cannot entertain the petition. 9.The petition is accordingly rejected.
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2005 (7) TMI 718
... ... ... ... ..... members of the fund in excess of rule 8 of Part A of the Fourth Schedule does not enjoy exemption under section 10(12). Secondly, we also notice that there is no evidence led by the assessee in support of the above. Thus, the aforesaid plea is also not maintainable. The plea that the impugned default was merely of a technical nature and that the department has accepted such position in the past are arguments which would not distract from the factum of the assessee having defaulted in deducting tax at source as required under Chapter XVII-B. 17. In the result, we affirm the conclusion of the CIT(A) that the assessee fund was liable for deduction of tax at source under section 194A of the Act in respect of the credits made to the account of the Members of the fund who ceased to be the employees of ONGC and thus, the assessee is in default under section 201/201(1A) for all the financial years under consideration. 18. In the result, all the appeals of the assessee are dismissed.
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2005 (7) TMI 717
... ... ... ... ..... . In view of the fact that we have today allowed the appeal of M/s. Birla Corporation Ltd. in Civil Appeal No.5118/2003, this appeal is also allowed and it is held that the appellant is entitled to the Modvat credit claimed before the tribunal. CIVIL APPEAL NO.4527/2005 Arising out of SLP(C)No.3196/2004 Special leave granted. Heard counsel for the parties. Respondents waive notice. This case is squarely covered by our judgment and order in Birla Corporation Ltd. in Civil Appeal No. 5118 of 2003 pronounced today. Following the judgment impugned in the aforesaid appeal, the CEGAT had dismissed the appeal of the Appellant herein. This Court having allowed the appeal preferred by M/s. Birla Corporation Ltd., this appeal must also be allowed. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed. The judgment and order of the CEGAT is set aside and it is held that the appellant herein is entitled to Modvat credit claimed before the CEGAT in respect of the ropeways and spare parts thereof. No costs.
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2005 (7) TMI 716
... ... ... ... ..... istrate to summon petitioner. There was no other ground to proceed against the petitioner. Needless to say, a criminal Court will not get any jurisdiction to proceed against a person at the mere sight of the details on the docket-sheet or the cause title. No Court shall act upon the sole tag, label or the badge veiled on the cause-title. No Court shall be carried away by the prints and dots on the veil of cause-title. The Court is bound to unveil the complaint, feel the texure of its contents and test, the criminality. Criminality lies not on how a person is christened at the cause-title, but how he acts, as per the contents of the complaint. 21. But, trial Court acted in haste by the prints on the cause-title. It cannot be justified. I shall therefore hurry to undo the illegality. All proceedings initiated against petitioner on the basis of the complaint in the present case are hereby quashed. Learned Magistrate is directed to drop all further proceedings against petitioner.
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2005 (7) TMI 715
... ... ... ... ..... t can be varied or recalled. The fact that the process has already been issued is no bar to drop the proceedings if the complaint on the very face of it does not disclose any offence against the accused. 28. In the light of the above judgment of the Supreme Court it can be concluded that if the material on record discloses that the complaint is not maintainable, the Court is perfectly justified in discharging the accused and the petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of mentioning of wrong provision of law. But, in the present case, the trial Court held that there is sufficient material to proceed with the trial. 29. In view of the above discussion, the order of the Sessions Court is liable to be set aside. 30. In the result, the revision petition is allowed. The order of the Sessions Court in Criminal Revision Petition No. 222 of 2003 is set aside by confirming the order of the IV Metropolitan Magistrate dated 8-9-2003 in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 3598 of 2003.
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2005 (7) TMI 713
... ... ... ... ..... ness of the direction for holding an inquiry. That direction has not been challenged by the State. The limited challenge is to the blanket order of not arresting the first Respondent for a period of three years in the manner above noted. 7. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties and also having perused the record, including the order dated 26.8.2002, it is clear that such a blanket protection of not arresting the first Respondent in any crime, except after written notice to him, could not be passed. Accordingly, the direction given in the penultimate paragraph of the impugned order giving blanket protection to the first Respondent is set aside and, to that extent, the impugned order stands modified. 8. We may, however, clarify that if out of vindictiveness, any false case is registered against the first Respondent, it goes without saying that he is not without remedy to challenge it in an appropriate forum. 9. The criminal appeal stands allowed to the above extent.
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