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Showing 61 to 80 of 551 Records
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2006 (4) TMI 526 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ri, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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2006 (4) TMI 525 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... to decide the point of different extracted below "Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the addition of ₹ 10,35,562, credited to the Capital Account during the year, deserves to be sustained." The learned Third Member agreed with the finding of the learned Judicial Member through his order dated 26-4-2006. Accordingly the order proposed by the learned Judicial Member at the first instance has become the order of the Bench and the appeal is disposed of with the following consequential orders. 4. In view of the majority opinion, the addition of ₹ 10,35,562 made on account of alleged unaccounted income from sale of jewellery, which are declared under the VDIS, 1997 is deleted. The first ground is, accordingly, allowed and decided in favour of the assessee. The second ground regarding the addition of ₹ 28,679 taxable as long-term capital gains is dismissed as not pressed. 5. In result, the appeal filed by the assessee is partly allowed.
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2006 (4) TMI 524 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... units under Rule 57-I of CER, 1944. (c) Confiscate land, building, plant and machinery belonging to these units under Rule 57-I of CER, 1944. (d) Impose penalty on all the parties under Rule 173Q(1) and Rule 209A of CER, 1944.” Extended period of limitation was also invoked as allegedly there was suppression of facts by the respondents-assessees. The order-in-original confirmed the demand raised as per show cause notice and held that there being suppression of facts, the department was entitled to invoke the extended period of limitation. In Appeal, the Tribunal after discussing the entire evidence, has come to the conclusion that there was no suppression of facts by the respondents-assessees and, therefore, the department was not entitled to invoke the extended period of limitation. In our view, the finding recorded by the Tribunal is a finding of fact which does not call for interference and accordingly these appeals are dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs.
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2006 (4) TMI 523 - ITAT CHANDIGARH
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... ... ..... vice of notice was not done by the Assessing Officer, so, therefore, assessment proceedings conducted consequent thereon are illegal and are invalid. Therefore, assessment proceedings conducted in consequence of notice are rendered invalid. Therefore, we allow the appeal of the assessee with regard to the improper service of notice. 9. As regards on merit, denying the deduction under section 80-I, learned Departmental Representative pointed out that in assessee’s own case in the assessment year 2001-02, as per judgment of the ITAT Chandigarh Bench in ITA No. 32/Chandi./2004, dated 16-12-2005, issue is covered against the assessee. Learned Authorised Representative did not object to this. On perusal of the ITA No. 32/Chandi./2004, dated 16-12-2005, we find that issue of allowance of deduction under section 80-IA has been decided against the assessee. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal of the assessee on merit. 10. In the result, appeals of the assessee are allowed partly.
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2006 (4) TMI 522 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ys for withdrawal of the writ petition with liberty to the petitioner to challenge the impugned order in appeal. 2. The writ petition is allowed to be withdrawn with liberty as prayed. 3. We clarify that if the remedy of appeal is time-barred, it will be for the petitioner to make out a ground for condonation of delay.
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2006 (4) TMI 521 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he sole purpose of availing production incentives. As such, the shortages detected were not real but pseudo. Criminal proceedings were lodged by the appellants against the said chief chemist. Apart from the shortages, there is no other evidence to show that the sugar bags in question have in fact been removed by the appellants without payment of duty. The appellant has already offered a plausible explanation in respect of the shortages. Irregularities in maintenance of records by its chief chemist cannot be made the basis for arriving at the findings of clandestine removal of goods. As such, I am of the view that confirmation of demand of duty against the appellants is not justified. The same is accordingly set aside and the appeal allowed with consequential relief to the appellants.” 3. We are satisfied that the impugned order does not suffer from any legal infirmity. 4. No substantial question of law arises in this appeal. The appeal is dismissed in limine.
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2006 (4) TMI 520 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ave heard Ms. Bansal, learned counsel for the revenue and perused the order under challenge. As noticed earlier, the Commissioner of the Income-tax and the Tribunal have concurrently come to the conclusion that the assessee-society has been established without any profit motive. It has also been found on appreciation of the available material that the objects of the assessee-society are purely educational and that the society has been granted exemption of that basis for the previous assessment years. Merely because certain surplus has been declared by the assessee would not, therefore, justify denial of the exemption claimed by the society under section 10(22) of the Income-tax Act. The decisions of the Supreme Court in Aditanar Educational Institution’s case (supra) and in Kannada Education Society’s case (supra) clearly support that proposition. No substantial question of law arises for our consideration in this appeal, which fails and is accordingly dismissed.
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2006 (4) TMI 519 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the assessee without verifying any fact. Since the ground of the department has been that in the assessment year 1990-91 on the same facts the CIT(A) dismissed the claim of the assessee which view of the CIT(A) was ultimately confirmed by the I.T.A.T., Amritsar Bench. Therefore, we are of the view that the CIT(A) was not justified in deleting the addition on the issue involved." (sic) 4. From a perusal of findings recorded above, invocation of proviso to section 145(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, cannot be held to be unjustified. 5. As far as on the question of addition of ₹ 3,06,639 in Rice Bran Oil account and ₹ 2,12,280 De-Oiled Cake account is concerned, the counsel for the appellant, while taking us through various documents on record, prayed for reappraisal of evidence, which is not a substantial question of law if considered as per the guidelines laid down by this Court in CIT v. Ms. Monica Oswal 2004 267 ITR 3081. 6. Hence, the appeal is dismissed.
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2006 (4) TMI 518 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e and in favour of the assessee without going into the merits of the question in each case so as to return a positive finding of fact that the assessee in each case had ?concealed the particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income.? Nor did it examine the quantum of penalty in each case. The ITAT decided the appeals before it on the understanding that where there was a returned loss and a reduced loss was assessed there could be no question of imposition of penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act. This understanding, we have indicated above, does not hold good for the period between the said 1976 and 2003 amendments. This being the position, answering the questions as indicated above and allowing all the appeals, we remand all these cases to the ITAT for disposal of merits. No costs.” In the light of the above, the questions stand answered similarly in the present case also and the matter remanded to the Tribunal for disposal on merits.
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2006 (4) TMI 517 - SUPREME COURT
Challenge to the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority - Government Servant - Disproportionation to his known source of income - disciplinary proceeding - acts of omission and commission contravened provisions of Rule 3 (1)(i)(ii) and (iii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 - HELD THAT:- It was also not a case where the Appellant could be held guilty in the disciplinary proceedings applying the standard of proof as preponderance of the probability as contrasted with the standard of proof in a criminal trial, i.e., proof beyond all reasonable doubt. When a final form was filed in favour of the Appellant, the CBI even did not find a prima facie case against him. The Disciplinary Authority in the aforementioned peculiar situation was obligated to apply his mind on the materials brought on record by the parties in the light of the findings arrived at by the Inquiry Officer. He should not have relied only on the reasons disclosed by him in his show cause notice which, it will bear repetition to state, was only tentative in nature.
As the Appellate Authority in arriving at his finding, laid emphasis on the fact that the Appellant has not filed any objection to the show cause notice; ordinarily, this Court would not have exercised its power of judicial review in such a matter, but the case in hands appears to be an exceptional one as the Appellant was exonerated by the Inquiry Officer. He filed a show cause but, albeit after some time the said cause was available with the Disciplinary Authority before he issued the order of dismissal. Even if he had prepared the order of dismissal, he could have considered the show cause as it did not leave his office by then.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that interest of justice will be sub- served if the Disciplinary Authority is directed to consider the matter afresh in the light of the show cause filed by the Appellant herein before him. It will be desirable that an opportunity of personal hearing is also given to the appellant herein. We make it clear that although we are setting aside the order of Disciplinary Authority and consequently all other orders, we direct that the Appellant shall be deemed to be under suspension till an appropriate order is passed by the Disciplinary Authority. The question of payment of backwages, it is directed, would depend upon the ultimate order that may be passed by the Disciplinary Authority. For the views we have taken, it is not necessary for us to consider the other contentions raised by Mr. Tripathi.
This appeal is allowed to the afore-mentioned extent and the matter is remitted to the Disciplinary Authority for consideration of the matter afresh in the light of the observations made hereinbefore.
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2006 (4) TMI 516 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... iff competition in the market has not been doubted or found incorrect. The attempt of the Assessing Officer to link the trade creditors and the trade debtors is futile. Both are unconnected and the assessee has different reasons for paying interest to its trade creditors and for not charging interest from its trade debtors. Both should not be mixed up which apparently has been done by the Assessing Officer. We uphold the order of the learned CIT(A) and dismiss the appeal filed by the revenue." 2. There is in our view, no legal infirmity or perversity in the view taken by the Tribunal. Just because the respondent/assessee had not charged interest from its trade debtors did not mean that interest paid by it to its trade creditors should not be allowed as a deduction especially when there is no dispute about the genuineness of the payment made by the assessee. 3. No substantial question of law arises for our consideration in this appeal which fails and is hereby dismissed.
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2006 (4) TMI 515 - SUPREME COURT
Challenging the judgments of the High Court - Implementation of the development Project Report - Bar of res judicata - cost of land acquisition - Notifications issued from time to time for acquiring lands for the Project - Non-Service of Notice on the landowners u/s 28(1) of the KIAD Act - violation of Article 300A of the Constitution - HELD THAT:- As we have stated, pursuant to the objections raised to the Project by the new Minister for Public Works, an "Expert Committee" was setup in 2004 to review the Project. The Expert Committee was conveniently headed by K.C. Reddy, who was the Advisor to the Public Works Minister. This K.C. Reddy was the same gentleman, who as a member of the previous HLC, had scrutinised the Project threadbare and had given it the green signal. Surprisingly however, at this stage, he appeared to be all willing to find faults and flaws in the Project and the FWA, despite the fact that there was an Empowered Committee that was required to monitor the implementation of the Project. The High Court rightly pointed out that the Expert Committee was constituted virtually in supersession of Clause 4.1.1 of the FWA.
Interestingly, neither the interim report nor the final report of the Expert Committee identified the excess land but in fact, left it for the KIAD Board. The counsel for the KIAD Board handed over a set of documents, which purportedly identified the specific excess lands. It was the grievance of the KIAD Board that they had not been given the opportunity for placing these documents before the High Court. Since the date of documents showed that they were drawn subsequent to the date on which the High Court had delivered its judgment, the learned Senior Counsel for KIAD Board Mr. K.K. Venugopal candidly admitted that this exercise was carried out after the impugned judgment had been delivered. It is a moot point whether the person, who swore this affidavit on behalf of the KIAD Board stating that no opportunity had been given to the KIAD Board to place these documents on the record of the High Court, needs to be considered for prosecution u/s 340 read with Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. We strongly deprecate such misleading or false affidavits on the part of the KIAD Board.
Article 300A of the Constitution - In our view, this is nothing but a repetition of the arguments made by the State of Karnataka. As we have elaborately discussed, that the land was not in excess has been held by the Division Bench of the High Court on two occasions and we agree with it. Thus, there was no question of the land being acquired for a purpose other than a public purpose or there being any contravention of Article 300A. In fact, we are somewhat surprised that this type of argument must come from the KIAD Board, which was intimately involved, from the very beginning, with the process of acquiring land. Further, the State and its instrumentalities (including the KIAD Board) were enjoined by Clause 5.1.1.1 of the FWA, to make "best efforts" to acquire the land required for the Project. Indeed, till the State itself changed its stand with regard to the Project, nothing was heard from the KIAD Board about lands being acquired in excess of the public purpose. Further, as an instrumentality of the State, the KIAD Board cannot have a case to plead different from that of the State of Karnataka. Thus, we are unable to countenance the arguments of Mr. Venugopal on behalf of the KIAD Board.
Considering the facts as a whole, the High Court came to the conclusion that since the Project had been implemented and Nandi had invested a large amount of money and work had been carried out for more than seven years, the State Government could not be permitted to change its stand and to contend that the land allotted for the Project was in excess of what was required. Having perused the impugned judgment of the High Court, we are satisfied that there is no need for us to interfere therewith. Thus, there is no merit in this contention, which must consequently fail.
It is pertinent to note that the State had agreed (vide Clause 5.1.1.1 of the FWA) in respect of the lands required under the FWA, that: "GOK shall use its best efforts and cause its Governmental Instrumentalities to use their best efforts, to exercise its and their legal right of eminent domain (or other right of similar nature) under the Laws of India to acquire the Acquired Land. Prior to acquiring any Acquired Land, GOK will obtain from the company written confirmation of its willingness to purchase such Acquired Land from GOK at the purchase price (whether in the form of cash or comparable land) required under the Laws of India (the "Acquired Land Compensation"). GOK shall offer to the ex-propriated owners of the land the Rehabilitation package specifically worked out for this Infrastructure Corridor Project with mutual consultation of the consortium and the Revenue Authorities in accordance with the applicable rules".
Thus, we find no reason to interfere with the said directions of the High Court. In the future also, we make it clear that while the State Government and its instrumentalities are entitled to exercise their contractual rights under the FWA, they must do so fairly, reasonably and without mala fides; in the event that they do not do so, the Court will be entitled to interfere with the same.
Taking an overall view of the matter, it appears that there could hardly be a dispute that the Project is a mega project which is in the larger public interest of the State of Karnataka and merely because there was a change in the Government, there was no necessity for reviewing all decisions taken by the previous Government, which is what appears to have happened.
Non-Service of Notice - When these appeals were argued, no attempt was made by any of the learned counsel to satisfy us that the appellants had not actually been served notice of the acquisition. Neither was the finding of the learned Single Judge or the Division Bench impugned on this point. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention that notices were not served on the appellants as required u/s 28(1) of the KIAD Act.
We do not see any prejudice caused to them as a result of the wordings of the notification of acquisition. The concerned authority also heard them on the objections filed after affording them an opportunity to file such objections under Section 28(2) of the KIAD Act. Thus, there is no substance in the contention of the appellants that the notification was vague and hence that the State did not comply with the principles of natural justice.
The learned Single Judge erred in assuming that the lands acquired from places away from the main alignment of the road were not a part of the Project and that is the reason he was persuaded to hold that only 60% of the land acquisition was justified because it pertained to the land acquired for the main alignment of the highway. This, in the view of the Division Bench, and in our view, was entirely erroneous. The Division Bench was right in taking the view that the Project was an integrated project intended for public purpose and, irrespective of where the land was situated, so long as it arose from the terms of the FWA, there was no question of characterising it as unconnected with a public purpose. We are, therefore, in agreement with the finding of the High Court on this issue.
The High Court accordingly found that the writ petitions were not maintainable. Since the writ petition proceeded on this footing, we cannot permit the appellants to take a different stand before us, contrary to what had been stated before the High Court. Since we have not been convinced otherwise, the writ petitions were not maintainable and the High Court was justified in the view that it took.
In summary, having perused the well considered judgment of the Division Bench which is under appeal in the light of the contentions advanced at the Bar, we are not satisfied that the acquisitions were, in any way, liable to be interfered with by the High Court, even to the extent as held by the learned Single Judge. We agree with the decision of the Division Bench that the acquisition of the entire land for the Project was carried out in consonance with the provisions of the KIAD Act for a public project of great importance for the development of the State of Karnataka. We do not think that a Project of this magnitude and urgency can be held up by individuals raising frivolous and untenable objections thereto. The powers under the KIAD Act represent the powers of eminent domain vested in the State, which may need to be exercised even to the detriment of individuals' property rights so long as it achieves a larger public purpose. Looking at the case as a whole, we are satisfied that the Project is intended to represent the larger public interest of the State and that is why it was entered into and implemented all along.
The Final Orders In the result, we find that the judgment of the High Court (dated 3.5.2005) impugned before us in the Main Matter, is not liable to be interfered with. There is no merit in the appeals and they are hereby dismissed. Considering the frivolous arguments and the mala fides with which the State of Karnataka and its instrumentalities have conducted this litigation before the High Court and us, it shall pay Nandi costs quantified at Rupees Five Lakhs, within four weeks of this order.
In the Land Acquisition Matters, the appeals challenging the judgments of the High Court dated 28.2.2005, 29.6.2005 and 18.11.2005 are dismissed as without substance. However, in the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2006 (4) TMI 514 - ITAT DELHI
Validity Of assessment proceedings - Notice against non existent/ceased company - scheme of amalgamation being sanctioned - Applicability of sec 170 - whether after dissolution of a company and after the intimation of such dissolution with the ROC an assessment can be made on dissolved company or not - HELD THAT:- In the case of Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. vs. CIT [1979 (12) TMI 50 - DELHI HIGH COURT] was dealing with a case where proceedings were initiated and orders of assessments made on Amalgamating Companies, which cease to exist. An order of assessment was made on companies which ceased to exist after the date of dissolution of Amalgamating Company without the process of winding up.
Thus, it is clear that the assessment made in the present case in the name of HP India after the date of its dissolution is not valid. The fact that this company filed a return of income is not of any consequence. The order of assessment was made on 25.2.2005. As on this date HP India as an entity did not exist. The assessment is therefore held to be invalid and is cancelled.
In a case of amalgamation where one entity takes over the business of two other entities, the same would be a case of succession to business, otherwise on death and therefore the provisions of Sec. 170 of the Act would apply.
We therefore hold that the assessment in the name of H.P.India is null and void and the assessment is therefore held to be invalid and is cancelled. In view of the decision on this preliminary issue the other issues raised by the assessee are not taken up for consideration.
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2006 (4) TMI 513 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ms detected at the time of survey under section 133A. Therefore, we do not find any force in the arguments of the assessee in respect of the surrender of ₹ 2 lakhs. Accordingly, we do not find any infirmity in the order of the CIT(A) and uphold the same. Ground raised by the assessee stands rejected and the appeal dismissed.” 5. We do not find any infirmity in the findings recorded by all the authorities below while rejecting the books of account of the assessee. 6. As is found from the facts on record, the estimation done by the Assessing Officer after rejection of books of account was upheld up to the Tribunal. The contention of the assessee that this Court should make its own assessment of the percentage of gross profit of the appellant, is not acceptable to us as the same does not fall within the domain of guiding principles to determine as to what amounts to a substantial question of law. 7. In view of our above observations, the present appeal is dismissed.
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2006 (4) TMI 512 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... stion of fact it is found that there was a nexus between the expenditure incurred by the assessee and his business and once it was held that the genuineness of the expenditure was not in dispute or had been established, the assessing authority could not sit in the arm chair of the businessman to determine as to what commission he ought to pay to its agents for doing his business. Mr. Jolly, however, argued that the CIT (Appeals) and the Tribunal had failed to take into account the fact that there was a search at the premises of the assessee in which it was discovered that the assessee was doing some business outside the books of account. We do not think that the said circumstances, even if established, could be conclusive evidence of the fact that the commission was either not paid or that the same was excessive within the meaning of section 40(A)(2) of the Income-tax Act. No substantial question of law arises for our consideration. This appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
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2006 (4) TMI 511 - ITAT MUMBAI
Revision u/s 263 by CIT - erroneous and prejudicial Order - Include the DEPB and duty drawback income for computation deduction u/s 80HHC - HELD THAT:- The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. [2000 (2) TMI 10 - SUPREME COURT], has clearly held that if the Assessing Officer has adopted one of the courses permissible under law or where two views are possible and the Assessing Officer has taken one view with which the ld. CIT does not agree, the Assessing Officer’s order cannot be treated as erroneous unless the view taken by the Assessing Officer is not sustainable under law. We have already observed that in the present case, at the time when assessment was completed, the legal position was in assessee’s favour and, therefore, the deduction allowed by the Assessing Officer cannot be said to be unsustainable under law. The ld. CIT-DR has also vehemently argued that there is non-application of mind on the part of the Assessing Officer. In our view, this argument is not acceptable.
As mentioned, all the relevant details were already available before the Assessing Officer when the assessment was made. It has been held in the case of Gabriel India Ltd.[1993 (4) TMI 55 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] that if all the relevant details have been filed by the assessee and the Assessing Officer allows the claim, the decision of the Assessing Officer cannot be held to be erroneous simply because in his order he does not make any elaborate discussion in that regard. Thus, we hold that the ld. CIT has wrongly invoked his jurisdiction u/s 263 of the IT Act. We, therefore, quash his impugned order passed u/s 263 of the Act.
In the result, the assessee’s appeal stands allowed.
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2006 (4) TMI 510 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
Imposition of Anti-dumping duty - Acyclic alcohols - exported to India from the subject countries below their normal value and that the domestic industry suffered material injury - initiation of investigation for imposition of anti-dumping duty on dumped imports - whether anti-dumping duty may be imposed on ‘article under consideration’ by giving an extended meaning to ‘article’ liable to pay anti-dumping duty u/s 9A(1), so as to include in the description of ‘article under consideration’ even other articles which are like articles - HELD THAT:- Rule 2(d) defines the expression “like article” for the purpose of the said rules unless the context otherwise requires, to mean an article which is identical or alike in all respects to the article under investigation for being dumped in India or in the absence of such article another article, which although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the articles under investigation. It is evident even from this definition of “like article” that the expression “article” in 9A(1) which may be liable to anti-dumping duty and in respect of which investigation is to be made as per the rules, will not by itself include any other article which has characteristics closely resembling those of the article under investigation unless even such “another article” is specifically identified as the article under consideration for the purpose of investigation and imposition of anti-dumping duty.
It is evident from the provisions of Section 9A(1) that not only the article should be identified for the purpose of the impost, it should be an article that is exported from any country or territory to India. Therefore, export of the article identified from the country is the basis for the levy when it is exported at less than its normal value and becomes liable to imposition of anti-dumping duty not exceeding the margin of dumping upon the importation. An article which has not been exported to India cannot, therefore, be subjected to imposition of anti-dumping duty under Section 9A(1) of the Act which lays down the basis for the impost. There is, therefore, no error in the final findings in so far as duty on articles not imported to India, has not been imposed. Thus, imposition of anti-dumping duty on the articles which were not imported, was not justified.
We do not understand as to how the opening words “operational constraints” escaped notice of the designated authority who confined its findings only in the context of “uneconomic market pricing”. Here also it failed to notice that as per the above annual report, profit margin had come down “mainly due to propylene price remaining continuously high throughout the year”. It is also significant to note that the company had ended with a cash profit of ₹ 432.14 lakhs as against loss of ₹ 698.93 lakhs in the previous year.
It would appear from the 17th annual report 2000-01 of the domestic industry that as against the item “sales” of oxo alcohols the quantity sold in the year and its value are mentioned which indicate, as calculated by the learned Counsel without any dispute, that the average price was ₹ 35.64 per Kg. which showed that the landed value of ₹ 36.35 per Kg. was lower than the net sales realisation by the domestic industry. The net sales realisation, as reflected from the annual report, does not appear to have been considered by the designated authority, while observing : “As regards price undercutting the authority had compared the landed value of imports of subject goods from the subject countries during the POI with the net sales realisation and found that there was a significant price undercutting by the dumped imports”.
Furthermore, while the designated authority observes in the final findings that contraction of demand was not apparent, it failed to apprehend the significance of the fact that the total demand had decreased by 20% but in a scenario of contracted demand, the domestic industry had increased its market share by 11%. It further appears from the record that the domestic industry was continuously incurring losses for five years prior to the period of investigation. There was, therefore, no proper analysis made by the designated authority for evaluating the causal link as to how the position of the domestic industry was worse of because of the dumped imports. As noted, the losses had gradually decreased from ₹ 25.02 crores in 1998-99 to ₹ 18.58 crores in 1999-2000 and to ₹ 7.32 crores in 2000-01. It is, therefore, clear that the findings of the designated authority in relation to injury and causal link aspects are erroneous and are not borne out from the material on record thereby vitiating the recommendations made by it for imposition of anti-dumping duty.
It thus transpires from the material on record that the final findings as regards the domestic industry having suffered material injury on account of the dumped imports of the articles under consideration, is clearly erroneous and the imposition of anti-dumping duty cannot, therefore, be sustained. The impugned final findings and the impugned notification imposing anti-dumping duty, therefore, deserve to be set aside.
Thus, the impugned final findings and the impugned notification imposing anti-dumping duty are hereby set aside and the Appeal Nos. C/609/03-AD, C/610/03-AD and C/606/03-AD are allowed and Appeal No. C/599/03-AD is dismissed.
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2006 (4) TMI 509 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Section 10(24) of the Act of 1961. 3. The order of the AO rejecting the claim under Section 10(24) of the Act of 1961 was affirmed by the CIT(A) and the learned Tribunal. 4. During the course of assessment proceedings, the AO has also initiated proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) for levying penalty for concealment of income and levied penalty thereon. The order of penalty was challenged by the assessee. The CIT(A) upheld the levy of penalty. The Tribunal, however, was of the opinion that the assessee having laid the claim for exemption which was not found tenable ultimately, does not make a case of deliberate concealment of income, but is a case of bona fide contesting claim of exemption and, therefore, the penalty was not leviable. 5. We are of the opinion that no exception can be taken to the view taken by the Tribunal as merely because claim to exemption is found to be not tenable, the penalty cannot be levied. The appeal is accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs.
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2006 (4) TMI 508 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... J. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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2006 (4) TMI 507 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... dverse to the Appellant. Permission granted. The Civil Appeal is allowed to be withdrawn and is dismissed as such with liberty to move this Court again if the Committee of Disputes takes a view adverse to the Appellant.
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