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2009 (7) TMI 1375 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rning any decease or illness which may affect his health. 23. Before parting with the case, we may also deal with the submission of learned Counsel for the appellant that the order of the National Commission is flawed because it has declined to interfere on a wrong premise that both the Fora below had arrived at "concurrent findings", which was not so. It is true that there is an apparent error in the order of the National Commission, inasmuch as the State Commission had, in fact, disagreed with the view taken by the District Forum but having regard to the fact that on our independent examination of the material on record, the claim by the appellant has been found to be fraudulent, we are of the opinion that no useful purpose would be served by remitting the matter to the National Commission for fresh adjudication on merits. 24. In view of the foregoing discussion, we do not find any merit in this appeal, which is dismissed accordingly but with no order as to costs.
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2009 (7) TMI 1374 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hich were within the knowledge of the petitioners, the respondent can be compensated by imposing cost on the petitioner. Consequently, the application for amendment is allowed subject to a cost of ₹ 10,000/- payable by the petitioners to the respondent. Cost be paid within four weeks. Amended petition be filed. WP(C) No.7546/2007 Amended writ petition be filed within four weeks. Additional counter affidavit to the amended petition, if any, be filed within four weeks thereafter. Rejoinder, if any, before the next date of hearing. List on 8th September, 2009. CM No.6956/2009 The learned counsel for the petitioners accepts notice and states that the reply to the application has already been filed on 28th July, 2009. The reply is not on record. Counsel to take steps to have it placed on record. The learned counsel for the respondent DDA states that the response to the reply filed to the application of DDA for vacation of stay is not to be filed. List on 8th September, 2009.
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2009 (7) TMI 1373 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pecial Bench by citing cases never cited by either party nor raised nor argued during the course of hearing, and contrary to the principle of natural justice and without the issue being put to the Appellant renders the decision bad in law and liable to be set aside ? d) Whether the Tribunal sitting as a Division Bench ought to have either followed the larger Special Bench decision or in accordance with judicial propriety and practice referred the matter to the President to constitute a larger Bench ? 2. So far as question (2) is concerned, the same is covered in question No.(5) and, therefore, learned counsel for the appellant does not press this question. Put up for final hearing in second week of September, 2009.
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2009 (7) TMI 1372 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sale deed for registration without reference to the purchaser. If such a situation is allowed, it would certainly put the purchaser in trouble. Further, the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No.194 of 2009, by judgment dated 1.4.2009, had in fact set aside such a document of cancellation which was registered. The said judgment of the Division Bench was subsequently followed by another Division Bench in Writ Appeal No.789 of 2009 dated 23.6.2009. We are entirely in agreement with those Division Bench judgments and for all the reasons recorded in this judgment, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order dated 19.2.2009. 21. As regards to the reference of the judgment in Writ Appeal No.1923 of 2005, we may point out that none of the above points were either advanced or argued or discussed in the said judgment and therefore, the said judgment is not useful to the appellant. 22. For all the above reasons, the writ appeal fails and it is dismissed. No costs.
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2009 (7) TMI 1371 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... g (See paras 6 & 7). 18. In Vaddeboyina Tulasamma and Ors. v. Vaddeboyina Sesha Reddi (dead) by L.Rs. AIR 1977 SC 1944, Justice Bhagwati speaking for the Court held that Sub-section (1) of Section 14 is very large in its amplitude and covers every kind of acquisition of property by a female Hindu. Regardless of whether such property was possessed by a female Hindu on the date of commencement of the Act or was subsequently acquired or possessed, she would be the full owner of the property. 19. In view of such consistent views taken by this Court on the interpretation of Section 14, we hold that Section 14(1) of the said Act would apply in respect of the properties which stand in the name of the appellant and the appellant would be the full owner of those properties. 20. Therefore the order of the High Court cannot be upheld and is set aside. The order of the Learned Trial Judge is affirmed. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. There is no order as to costs.
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2009 (7) TMI 1370 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ts of Andharpradesh and Kerala as per the decisions mentioned supra, this Court is not in a position to rely upon the decision rendered by the Karnataka High Court reported in (III) 2007 BC 752 Karnataka (S.Parameshwarappa and another Vs. S.Choodappa). Therefore, viewing from any angle, the entire contentions urged on the side of the appellants/complainants cannot be accepted. 25.The first appellate Court, after having threadbare discussion in each appeal has clearly come to the conclusion that the debt mentioned in each complaint is barred by limitation and this Court has not found any valid reason to make interference with the well merited judgments passed by the first appellate Court and altogether the present criminal appeals deserve dismissal. 27.In fine, these criminal appals deserve dismissal and accordingly are dismissed. The judgments rendered in Criminal Appeal Nos.133 to 136 by the Additional District and Sessions cum Fast Track Court No.III, Madurai are confirmed.
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2009 (7) TMI 1369 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in an appeal filed under Section 5 of the High Courts Act, if only it is shown that the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge is arbitrary or perverse. We find it difficult to describe the exercise of discretion by the learned Single Judge in this case as arbitrary or perverse. The learned Single Judge felt that by raising technical contentions, the appellant was wriggling out of its duty to pay the amount deposited with it. In this case, the learned Single Judge decided to invoke the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and granted reliefs. So, the appellate court is not justified in interfering with the same. 7. Obviously, there is a mistake in the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the relevant portion of which we have have quoted above. What the learned Single Judge meant must be that even if other writs cannot be issued to the Co-operative Society, a writ of mandamus can be issued. In the result, the Writ Appeal fails and it is dismissed.
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2009 (7) TMI 1368 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ain the provisions which are said to occur in it you cannot derive these provisions by implication from a proviso." Said Lord Watson in West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Co. 1897 AC 647 (HL). Normally, a proviso does not travel beyond the provision to which it is a proviso. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as a proviso and to no other. (See A.N. Sehgal and Ors. v. Raje Ram Sheoram and Ors. (1991) IIL LJ 50 SC AIR 1991 SC 1406, Tribhovandas Haribhai Tamboli v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and Ors. 1991 2 SCR 802 AIR 1991 SC 1538 and Kerala State Housing Board and Ors. v. Ramapriya Hotels (P) Ltd. and Ors. (1994) 5 SCC 672 1994 (5) SCC 672). 95. For the reasons aforementioned, the appeal preferred by M/s Steel Authority of India Ltd. is allowed with no order as to costs and the appeals filed by the Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Housing Board are dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at ₹ 25,000/- each.
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2009 (7) TMI 1367 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t there was penetration while as in the instant case there is not an iota of averment made by the Petitioner about the said fact much less the evidence. Only some vague and stray averments against the husband that he would not indulge in sexual intercourse or use contraceptive to avoid pregnancy could not be assumed that there was sexual intercourse between the Petitioner and the Respondent. In a serious offence like this, things could not be left for assumptions and presumption of the complainant. The learned Sessions Judge has rightly observed that no prima facie offence under Section 376 of IPC is made out warranting framing of the charge and has rightly remanded the matter back to the learned Magistrate. 14. I do not find any illegality, impropriety or incorrectness in the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge. I accordingly dismiss the present petition. 15. A copy of this order be sent to the learned ACMM so as to bring it to the knowledge of the learned Magistrate.
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2009 (7) TMI 1366 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... lam, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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2009 (7) TMI 1365 - SUPREME COURT
Breach of contract of an agreement for sale - second respondent was unable to pay the balance amount of consideration - appellants executed a deed of sale in favour of other persons - refused to return the earnest money to second respondent - Whether breach of contract of an agreement for sale would constitute an offence u/s 406 or Section 420 of the IPC? - HELD THAT:- Appellants in this Petition, in no uncertain terms, stated that they were ready and willing to pay the amount on due date.
The ingredients of Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code are - Deception of any persons, Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person to deliver any property; or To consent that any person shall retain any property and finally intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit.
The High Court, should have posed a question as to whether any act of inducement on the part of the appellant has been raised by the second respondent and whether the appellant had an intention to cheat him from the very inception.
If the dispute between the parties was essentially a civil dispute resulting from a breach of contract on the part of the appellants by non-refunding the amount of advance the same would not constitute an offence of cheating. Similar is the legal position in respect of an offence of criminal breach of trust having regard to its definition contained in Section 405 of the IPC.
There cannot furthermore be any doubt that the High Court would exercise its inherent jurisdiction only when one or the other propositions of law, as laid down in R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta and Ors.[2008 (10) TMI 713 - SUPREME COURT] is attracted, which are as under:
(1) The High Court ordinarily would not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash a criminal proceeding and, in particular, a First Information Report unless the allegations contained therein, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, disclosed no cognizable offence.
(2) For the said purpose, the Court, save and except in very exceptional circumstances, would not look to any document relied upon by the defence.
(3) Such a power should be exercised very sparingly. If the allegations made in the FIR disclose commission of an offence, the court shall not go beyond the same and pass an order in favour of the accused to hold absence of any mens rea or actus reus.
(4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the same by itself may not be a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings should not be allowed to continue.
As the High Court has not applied its mind with regard to the aforementioned aspects of the matter, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed.
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2009 (7) TMI 1364 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Court. 23. As discussed earlier, the "public interest" argument of the Petitioner is premised on the plea that his wife is a public servant; he is in litigation with her, and requires information, - in the course of a private dispute - to establish the truth of his allegations. The CIC has held that there is no public interest element in the disclosure of such personal information, in the possession of the information provider, i.e. the Indian Air Force. This Court concurs with the view, on an application of the principles discussed. The petitioner has, not been able to justify how such disclosure would be in "public interest" the litigation is, pure and simple, a private one. The basic protection afforded by virtue of the exemption (from disclosure) enacted under Section 8(1)(j) cannot be lifted or disturbed. 24. In view of the above discussion, the writ petition fails, and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order on costs.
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2009 (7) TMI 1363 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the prayer of the plaintiff in these appeals cannot be granted in exercise of inherent power of a Court because it will have overriding effect over the substantive right of the defendant over its property. We, thus, find that the decision in the case of Manohar Lal (supra) does not help the plaintiff in anyway in view of the nature of relief claimed in this suit. 35. On consideration of the entire materials on record, we are of the opinion that the two applications filed by the plaintiff one under Order 39 and the other under Order 38 should have been dismissed on the ground that in the facts of the present case, the ingredients of those provisions have not been attracted and at the same time, there is no scope of grant of the relief under Section 151 of the Code. 36. The appeal filed by the defendants is allowed and the one filed by the plaintiffs is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances, there will be however, no order as to costs. Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. 37. I agree.
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2009 (7) TMI 1362 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y the defendant as alternative does not matter much as this court has already held the sale transactions to be sham and fictitious, therefore, the claim set up by the defendant No.1 for adverse possession against Rajinder Krishan and Kewal Krishan is valid and has been recognized by a decree. In any case, in civil law, the defendant No.1 could raise as many pleas as were permissible to him and the alternative plea of tenancy as set up by him could not damage the plea of adverse possession, as the specific case of the defendant No.1 is that he neither paid any lease money to Rajinder Krishan and Kewal Krishan nor to the plaintiffs. Consequently, all the substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the plaintiffs and against the respondents. For the foregoing reasons, I hereby accept the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment and decree and dismiss the suit of the plaintiffs. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly.
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2009 (7) TMI 1361 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... show that any steps had been taken or were in the process of being taken in the Court of Law. No doubt in case of a dispute between assignor and assignee the Registrar may refuse to register the assignment until rights of the parties have been determined by the Competent Court. Although no time limit has been fixed, yet the Registrar can await for the decision only if some dispute is pending adjudication in a competent Court. Thus, it cannot be said that mere revocation of an assignment Deed is a dispute with regard to the validity of an assignment. Taking into consideration that there is no legal infirmity in the Deed of assignment, the Petitioner has not approached the Civil Court for cancellation of the assignment Deed and in the absence of any material on record to show that any dispute is pending between assignor or assignee with respect to assignment deed, I find no infirmity in the impugned Order. The petition is without any merit and the same is accordingly dismissed.
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2009 (7) TMI 1360 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, PRINCIPAL BENCH, KOLKATA
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... ... ..... petitioners have suggested that, with the view to put an end to the long standing disputes among the parties, direction be given to the respondents to sell their shares to the petitioners on a fair value. Such a direction cannot be given in the instant case, as there is nothing on record to identify the shareholders belonging to the respondents group and there is no averment that all the members of that group have been made parties to the proceeding. However, if the respondents group wishes to sell its shares to the petitioners, they are at liberty to express their intention to the petitioners in writing. Once they do so, the same will be binding on the petitioners on a price to be determined by an independent valuer, if need be, appointed by this Board. 15. The petition is disposed of in the above terms, reserving the right to appoint a valuer, if an application is so made after the respondents' group exercises the option, if any, to sell their shares to the petitioners.
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2009 (7) TMI 1359 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... before ITAT. By the impugned order, the Tribunal upheld the order of CIT (Appeals) and accordingly dismissed the appeal filed by Revenue. It is this order against which the Revenue has filed this appeal. 7. As observed supra, we do not find any substantial question of law arising in this appeal. In our view both the authorities, namely CIT and ITAT rightly held that for want of any material, there was no justification for issuance of notice under section 148 ibid. In our view it was rightly held that the report of Inspector was not sufficient to warrant issuance of notice on the facts of this case and something more was required. That apart, even the alleged report did not contain any material evidence to enable the Assessing Officer to issue impugned notice under section 148 ibid for re-opening of assessment. This, in our opinion, is a pure question of fact. 8. Accordingly and in view of the aforesaid discussions, we find no merit in this appeal. It is dismissed in limine.
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2009 (7) TMI 1358 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of these vices. The High Court went into the competence and suitability of Respondent No. 5 for such posting. It is here that the High Court fell into a grave error. As a matter of fact, the impugned order of the High Court casts stigma in the service of Respondent No. 5 which may also act prejudicial to his interest in the pending appeal against the adverse remarks. 11. We may also observe that transfer of the Writ Petitioner from Ghaziabad-IV to Hapur-II cannot be said to be stigmatic and any observation made in the impugned order about the work and conduct of the Writ Petitioner shall not be read adversely by the authorities against the Writ Petitioner. 12. Consequently, the order dated August 22, 2007 passed by the High Court quashing the transfer of Respondent No. 5 from Hapur-II to Ghaziabad-IV is set aside. Appeal of Rajendra Singh is allowed while appeal of Karvendra Singh stands dismissed with clarification as indicated above. The parties shall bear their own costs.
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2009 (7) TMI 1357 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s scale of pay gets reduced. 12. The State Government has not challenged the applicability of Rule 74(b) of the Code in the matter. That being the position, the appellant's pay has to be fixed in accordance with Rule 74(b) of the Code and not otherwise. The view of the Tribunal, therefore, that the appellant's pay be fixed on his promotion to the rank of Assistant Engineer (Electrical) taking his last pay drawn in the rank of Sub-Assistant Engineer and following the provisions of Rule 74(b) of the Code being eminently just, proper and in accordance with law warranted no interference at the hands of the High Court. 13. Appeal, accordingly, has to be allowed and is allowed. The order dated March 2, 2006 passed by the High Court impugned in the present appeal is set aside and the order dated December 23, 1999 passed by Orissa Administrative Tribunal is restored. The differential salary shall be paid to the appellant now within two months from today. No order as to costs.
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2009 (7) TMI 1356 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Court may be directed to dispose of the suit by continuing the interim order of status quo granted by this Court on 23-7-2007 till the disposal of the suit. 5. The. learned Counsel for the plaintiff appellant requested to waive the cost imposed by the trial Court. The learned Counsel appearing for the defendants respondents fairly submits, the request made by the plaintiff for waiving off the cost imposed by the trial Court may be granted. 6. Accordingly, the appeal is disposed of with the following observations The impugned order passed on I.A.No. 1 is modified and the parties are directed to maintain status quo relating to the possession of the suit site bearing No. 77 as granted by this Court vide its order dt. 23-7--07, till the disposal of the suit and the trial Court is directed to dispose of the suit on merits and in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible. 7. The cost of ₹ 7,000/- imposed by the trial Court while passing the impugned order is set aside.
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