|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 978 Records
-
2009 (7) TMI 1355 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... thing applies to the pleadings qua the plea of the plaintiffs that the property in question is a trust property. As pointed out above, the learned Single Judge has referred to various judgments dealing with exception (b) to Section 4(3) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 relating to the plea of existence of the trust by the plaintiffs, including provisions of Sections 81 and 82 of the Indian Trust Act. Since we are agreeing with the said reasoning, which is based on many judgments referred to by the learned Single Judge, it is not necessary to burden this judgment by repeating the same. 27. Only after the evidence is led and keeping in view that evidence various pleas put forth by the learned counsel for the appellants can be examined and appreciated. 28. In these circumstances, we do not find any merit in these appeals as we are of the opinion that the order of the learned Single Judge does not call for any interference. The appeals are accordingly dismissed.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1354 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, PRINCIAL, NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... bay at Goa's order on the amalgamation of the companies by misleading the court cannot revalidate the acts done in a fraudulent manner, the respondents cannot hide behind the Hon'ble High Court's order to lend validity to all acts which stand vitiated by fraud. 75. In view of the foregoing, in the facts and circumstances of this case, as per the respondents' own case that the petitioner was allotted 13 per cent, shares, there being an unrebutted case of entitlement to shares, the respondents having failed to rebut the petitioner's allegation regarding the transfer of shares, if any, behind his back, I hold that the petitioner has the requisite qualification under Section 399 of the Act to maintain this company petition under Section 397/398 of the Act. 76. Company Applications Nos. 325 of 2006 and 201 of 2009 are hereby dismissed in the above terms. No order as to cost. Interim orders to continue. Company petition to be heard on August 19, 2009 at 2.30 pm.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1353 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Though not relevant, we are constrained to observe that there is nothing that stops the assessees from utilising the cash in hand which may be business asset on the valuation date for any non-productive purpose on the next day. Therefore the argument of the assessees that cash in hand of businessmen should be treated as productive asset also is meaningless. Except narrating the recommendations of the Chelliah Committee, neither the Finance Minister in the Budget Speech, nor the Central Board of Direct Taxes in it's circular, said anything for exclusion of cash in hand in excess of ₹ 50,000/- held by individuals and HUF from the "assets" for the purpose of Wealth Tax Act. In the result, we allow all the departmental appeals, reversing the orders of the Tribunal and by upholding the orders of the lower authorities holding that cash in hand in excess of ₹ 50000/- held by the individual assessees formed part of assets under Section 2(ea)(vi) of the Act.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1352 - SUPREME COURT
Abducting minor girl and commiting rape on her - Offence punishable u/s 376 of IPC - Statement of the prosecutrix recorded u/s 164 Cr.P.C. - whether a case of no consent? - trial court found appellant guilty of the offence punishable u/s 376 IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of ₹ 2,000/- in default to undergo imprisonment for another six months - On appeal, The High Court upheld the conviction u/s 376 IPC but reduced the sentence to a period of four years and to pay a fine of ₹ 1000/- in default to further imprisonment for one month. Hence this appeal.
HELD THAT:- The Trial Court and the High Court proceeded with altogether different set of facts. Before the trial Court the prosecution case had been that the prosecutrix went to zoo along with Suleman and on her return from zoo the appellant had seen both of them together and slapped Suleman who ran away and thereafter the appellant took the prosecutrix on the pretext of taking her to movie and roamed; took her on a rickshaw to the hotel where she was kept and raped.
However, before the High Court the case has been entirely different as in paragraph 5 of the High Court judgment it has been stated that when the prosecutrix came out from the house of informant PW.2 Abdul Hai Laskar the appellant met her and proposed to take her to witness a movie and she went along with him. The High Court has mentioned the facts that as per the FIR lodged by PW.2 Abdul Hai Laskar, to the effect that "on the previous evening, the accused appellant Musauddin Ahmed @ Musa entered into the house and forcibly abducted his maid servant."
There had been material contradictions regarding the factual aspects of the incident itself. There is nothing on record to show or furnishing any explanation as to why the IO did not seize any material objects like, clothes, blood samples etc. from the prosecutrix and the place of occurrence.
PW.4 Mira Begum, prosecutrix has stated in her examination in chief as under: "He took me to a room at Paltan Bazar. There the accused forcibly tears open my clothes." The torn clothes were not recovered by the IO.
The I.O. did not make any effort to take the semen, blood samples etc. from the appellant which could have given the prosecution an opportunity to obtain medical reports of the appellant as it was necessary to establish the guilt of the appellant.
No person has been examined from the hotel to identify the appellant or the prosecutrix as the I.O. has only seized the register of the hotel to establish that room No.102 was booked in the name of appellant Mussauddin Ahmed and Marzina Begum as husband and wife. Admittedly, the name of the prosecutrix was not Marzina Begum. Therefore, some person from the hotel should have been examined to identify her as well as the appellant.
The prosecutrix appears to be a lady used to sexual intercourse and a dissolute lady. She had no objection in mixing up and having free movement with any of her known person, for enjoyment. Thus, she appeared to be a woman of easy virtues.
We are of the considered opinion that the prosecution failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court and the trial court are set aside. Appellant is acquitted of the charge u/s 376 IPC. The appellant is on bail. His bail bonds are discharged.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1351 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... come-tax Act, 1961 and imposed penalty of ₹ 24,14,690. the CIT(A) reversed this order of the Assessing Officer. In further appeal filed by the revenue, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal maintained the order of CIT(A). It is inter alia observed by the ITAT that even the perusal of the order of the Assessing Officer reveals that there was a divergence of opinion as to whether the expenditure is capital or revenue in nature. Issue involved was thus definitely debatable legal issue and simply non filing of appeal against the addition so made does not necessarily establish the act of concealment/furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income. The ITAT thus returned the finding of fact that it was the bona fide claim, which is debatable/contentious legal issue, could not invite penalty for concealment. In view of the aforesaid backdrop, we are of the opinion that no substantial question of law arises in this case for our consideration. 2. This appeal is accordingly dismissed.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1350 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ed opinion of the Court, is either adequate or suffice. The detenu has appeared in person before the Advisory Board and nothing prevented him from asking for legal assistance. It is true that the Advisory Board has to consider the representation made by the detenu for legal assistance but such a request has to be made before the Advisory Board. When he appeared before the Board and no request was made for legal assistance, the contention that it was actually made in the representation originally sent to the Government, cannot be accepted. When the petitioner was actually produced before the Advisory Board he could very well represent before the Board to have legal assistance. Hence, this contention putforth forth by the learned Counsel, cannot be countenanced. 13. In the light of what is stated above, the grounds putforth by the learned senior Counsel do not carry any merit and the same are liable to be rejected, accordingly, rejected. The Habeas Corpus Petition is dismissed.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1349 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... of disclosing any professional communication. It was only for the purpose of proving a fact which was observed by him as an individual, which has nothing to do with her profession he was summoned. It was only in such context, the court observed that the evidence tendered by the Advocate does not fall under Section 126 of the Evidence Act and it was admissible. The said judgment has absolutely no relevance to the issue involved in the present matter. 13. The learned trial Judge failed to consider the true spirit behind the mandatory provision as contained in Section 126 of the Indian Evidence Act and allowed the application. 14. Therefore I am of the view that the learned trial Judge erred in permitting the respondent to summon the Counsel for the petitioners as a witness and as such the impugned order is liable to be set aside and accordingly the same is set aside. 15. In the result, the civil revision petition is allowed. Consequently, the connected MP is closed. No costs.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1348 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT (AURANGABAD BENCH)
... ...
... ... ..... on Proposal consisting of 13 pages and the letter containing proposal reference is made to various public projects and security of the public at large which need continued supervision of the private Respondent. Thus, grant of extension of six months to the private Respondent is the discretion exercised by the authorities with specific reasons. The reasons stated in the Note on Proposal are not unconnected with the service and affairs of the State and the wisdom of the State is based upon these detailed. documents. The Court can hardly sit as an appellate body to examine the soundness of use of this statutory discretion. The record before us show the full justification and public interest which is sought to be achieved. The extension granted to the private Respondent cannot be termed as arbitrary, without any reasonable cause and is not opposed to statutory or basic rule of law. 39. Rule in both the Writ Petitions is discharged. Writ Petitions dismissed. No order as to costs.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1347 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Central Government, rather the second respondent as a delegate of the Central Government had already seized of the matter and evidently dropped the proceedings after its consideration on merits. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the first respondent has pointed out that the petitioners have got an effective alternate remedy available under section 15D of the SEBI Act to approach the appellate authority, the Securities Appellate Tribunal against exhibit P8 and hence this writ petition is not maintainable. But since the jurisdiction vested on the first respondent itself is under challenge, I am not persuaded to relegate the petitioners to resort to statutory remedy, because I find total lack of jurisdiction in issuing the impugned order. On the basis of the conclusions as aforementioned I am inclined to hold that exhibit P8 is an order issued by the first respondent without jurisdiction. Consequently exhibit P8 is hereby quashed and the writ petition is allowed to that extent.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1346 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... b Alam, JJ. ORDER Dismissed
-
2009 (7) TMI 1345 - ITAT DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... e in hand though technically the assessee has not revised the return of income accordance with the provisions of section 139(5) of the Act but has filed a letter making the claims which are perfectly legal and supported by the method of accounting which the Assessing Officer himself has accepted from year to year. It is in these circumstances that the learned CIT(A) has accepted the claim of the assessee. 4.4. In CBDT Circular no. 14 dated 11-4-1955 the Board has emphasized that the department should not take advantage of assessee’s ignorance to collect more tax out of him than the liability due from him. This circular of the Board is very much binding upon the department. In the light of the said Circular the order of the CIT(A) cannot be found fault with. Accordingly, we uphold the orders of the CIT(A) for both the years on the issue in question 5. In the result, both the appeals, filed by the revenue stand dismissed. Order pronounced in open court on 30th July 2009.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1344 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... court against the Revenue in the case reported in 298 ITR 141. 2. In view of said decision, there is no need for us to answer the substantial questions of law framed in this appeal. The appeal is devoid of merit. 3. Appeal is dismissed accordingly.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1343 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nal in its order. Learned counsel for the revenue could not distinguish the said judgment. 2. In this view of the matter, no substantial question of law is involved in this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1341 - ITAT DELHI
Income accrued or assessed in India - Business Connection in India u/s 9(1)(i) - HELD THAT:- There is no disparity on facts or in the activity carried out by the assessee in the years under consideration then in assessment year 1997-98. The ITAT has considered all these issues in assessment years 1997-98 & 1998-99 wherein it was held that income was chargeable to tax u/s 5(2) of the Act as assessee had business connection in India as per section 9(1)(i) of the Act. However, with regard to the quantification of income accrued to the assessee with the business connection in India it has been held by the ITAT that 15% of the revenue accrued to the assessee in respect of the booking made in India that should be treated as income accrued or assessed in India.
Respectfully following the order of the ITAT in earlier two assessment years, we allow the appeals of the assessee and held that no income would be chargeable to tax in India and consequently the appeals of the revenue are dismissed.
In the result, all the appeals of the assessee are allowed and the appeals of the revenue are dismissed.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1340 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... d under water shows that what is excluded is riverbeds or ravines filled with water. The use of the words 'even land perennially submerged under water' in the definition of 'land' would thus indicate that a tank also is land. What is excluded from the definition of land is the riverbed, or a tank which is a dammed ravine. Section 4(f) of the Act which prescribes the ceiling area in regard to Class VI lands also reiterates that even land perennially submerged under water, is land. 14. Having regard to the clear and specific words used in the definition of 'land', it is not possible to exclude land perennially covered with water, which includes tanks, from the definition of land. We therefore agree that tanks meant to provide water for agricultural/horticultural purposes is 'land' for purposes of the Act. We therefore find no error in the orders of the learned Single Judge affirmed by the Division Bench and consequently, the appeal is dismissed.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1339 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Territorial Jurisdiction of police officer - Validity of notices issued u/s 160/91 CrPC - Seeking personal attendance of witnesses to produce document or other thing - Petitioners, who are residing in New Delhi, to appear before C.I.D. Headquarters, at Shillong - HELD THAT:- So read Section 160 CrPC, it becomes clear that such police officer making the investigation can enforce the attendance of a person acquainted with the facts arid circumstances only if the latter resides within the limits of his own police station or adjoining station. If the person being summoned does not reside within the limits of the police station of the police officer making the investigation or, at any rate, within the limits of the adjoining police station, it appears that such police officer cannot enforce his attendance even though he may be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case being investigated by him.
Consequently, this writ petition succeeds. The impugned notices issued by the respondent No. 6 to the petitioners u/s 160, Cr.P.C. are hereby quashed. No further notice u/s 160, Cr.P.C. shall be issued by him upon the petitioners hereafter to enforce their attendance from Delhi as witnesses in connection with Laban P.S. Case No. 63(11)04. Insofar as the notice u/s 91, Cr.P.C. is concerned, it is hereby declared that the personal attendance of the petitioners before the respondent No. 6 is not necessary merely for production of the documents required by him in connection with that case. However, there shall be no costs.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1338 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... brought out the distinguishing feature. In view of our reasons given above, we respectfully disagree with the view taken by Andhra Pradesh High Court. 51. In National Highways Authority of India and Anr. v. Bumihiway DDB Ltd. (JV) and Ors. (2006) 10 SCC 763, it was opined 44...The parties have entered into a contract after fully understanding the import of the terms so agreed to from which there cannot be any deviation. The Courts have held that the parties are required to comply with the procedure of appointment as agreed to and the defaulting party cannot be allowed to take advantage of its own wrong. Equally the parties are required to adhere to the forum they have chosen for redressal of their grievances. 52. In view of our aforesaid discussion, we are of the opinion that the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge is justified and does not call for any interference. We, therefore, do not find any merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed with costs.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1337 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... xemptions) Delhi, in respect of the petitioner's society for the assessment year 2008-09 as per which exemption under Section 10(23-C)(vi) has been granted subject to certain conditions. 3. A perusal of the said order would show that the petitioner society had filed an affidavit dated 25th April, 2009 inter alia stating that the society is doing solely the educational activity till date and will not undertake any other activity in future as well. Undertaking is also given to the fact that Clauses B, D and E of the memorandum of association would be deleted/amended within a period of six months. 4. In view of the aforesaid, we dispose of this writ petition with a direction to the Director General of Income Tax (Exemptions) Delhi to pass appropriate orders by granting exemption to the petitioner under the aforesaid provision of section 10(23C)(vi) in respect of assessment year 2007-08 as well on the same terms and conditions as is granted for the assessment year 2008-2009.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1336 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... ing in the Supreme Court and it would be open to M/s Malanpur Steel Limited to make its submissions before the Supreme Court. Today when the Special Leave Petition came before this Court the above order was shown to us. We are of the opinion that the High Court should decide the said question in accordance with law. In the meantime, status quo as regards the transfer of shares shall continue till the High Court decides the matter expeditiously. Accordingly, the Special Leave Petition stands disposed of.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1335 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... lf. It was merely held that the High Court should not have interfered with as the said provision conferred an extraordinary power. Each case must be decided on its own facts. If a judicious discretion exercised by the Court had led it to pass an order under Section 319 of the Code, the High Court exercising a revisional jurisdiction would interfere therewith, inter alia, in a case where legal principles laid down by this Court had not been satisfied. The decision of this Court in the case of Mohd. Shafi (supra), therefore, in our opinion, is not an authority for the proposition that in each and every case the Court must wait till the cross-examination is over. 15. Keeping in view the materials available on record as also the nature of the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge we are of the opinion that no interference with the impugned judgment is called for in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. 16. For the reasons aforementioned, the appeal is dismissed.
........
|
