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Showing 81 to 100 of 915 Records
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2010 (7) TMI 1152 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... isions of Article 235 of the Constitution is the High Court) and in an elaborate format depicting performance of the judicial officers in all relevant fields, so as to ensure that every judicial officer in the State will not be denied what is due to him in accordance with law and on the basis of his performance; 2. We direct the Secretary of the Union of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pension as well as all the Chief Secretaries of the States to issue appropriate guidelines, in the light of this judgment, within eight weeks from the date of the pronouncement of this judgment; 3. We further direct that all the High Courts would ensure that 'police verification reports', conducted in accordance with law, are received by the concerned authority before an order of appointment/posting in the State Judicial Service is issued by the said authority. With the above directions, the appeal is dismissed. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
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2010 (7) TMI 1151 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... f the assessee as revenue expenditure, this issue has also not been examined by either of the authorities. We, therefore, set aside the matter to the file of the assessing officer with a direction to examine the claim of the assessee whether expenditure incurred on acquisition of mining rights is revenue expenditure or capital in nature.” Both sides agreed that issue may be restored to Assessing Officer. Since the CIT (A) has decided the issue on the basis of decision of the ITAT in ITA No.1013/Del/2008 for assessment year 2002-03, the ITAT had set aside the issue to the file of Assessing Officer with the direction to examine the claim of the assessee, hence we also set aside this issue to the file of Assessing Officer for re-examination. 16. Ground Nos.8 & 9 are general in nature and do not require any adjudication. 17. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is partly allowed for statistical purposes. Order pronounced in open court on the 23rd day of July 2010.
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2010 (7) TMI 1150 - SUPREME COURT
Contempt petition for non-implementation - misappropriation the amount - Bank's Branch manager - the respondent was working as a Manager of the appellant's Branch. In a vigilance inspection, it was found that some 20 loans to the tune of ₹ 16.48 lacs were disbursed to some persons against FDRs though the FDRs were in the names of altogether different persons. It was also seen that the withdrawals which were allowed, were far in excess over the amounts in the FDRs. All those entries were in the hand-writing of the respondent.The High Court held that the documents produced were neither detailed nor their nature was explained. It further held that there was no discussion and much less any analysis of the evidence presented. The Court held that no specific finding has been recorded on the basis of the evidence to establish the guilt of the respondent. The absence of good reason was held to be in breach of the principles of natural justice. Therefore, the order was set aside. The High Court directed the appellant to reinstate the respondent though for the limited purpose of holding the inquiry afresh.
HELD THAT:- There was a clear documentary evidence on record in the handwriting of the respondent which established his role in the withdrawal of huge amounts for fictitious persons. The ledger entries clearly showed that whereas the FDRs were in one name, the withdrawals were shown in the name of altogether different persons and they were far in excess over the amounts of FDRs. The respondent had no explanation and, therefore, it had to be held that the respondent had misappropriated the amount. Inspite of a well reasoned order by the Inquiry Officer, the High Court has interfered therein by calling the same as sketchy. The High Court has completely overlooked the role of the bank manager as expected by this Court in the aforesaid judgments.
In these facts and circumstances, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court. The petition filed by the respondent in the High Court will stand dismissed. Consequently, contempt proceedings initiated by him will also stand dismissed.
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2010 (7) TMI 1149 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cision but also the decision making process is not in accordance with the law since the Settlement Commission has not followed the provisions of Rule 5(3) of the Valuation Rules which are part of the Act. 29. Under the circumstances, we hold that the orders dated 2nd August, 2001 and 4th December, 2001 passed by the Settlement Commission are ex facie arbitrary and perverse, inasmuch as the settlement of the case in relation to the duty liability is not in accordance with law. The orders passed by the Tribunal dated 2nd August, 2001 and 4th December, 2001 to the extent that the Settlement Commission has settled the case in respect of 7 shipments for the amount of ₹ 23,01,077/ instead of ₹ 3 lacs is set aside. The question whether the Settlement Commission has power to entertain the rectification application is left open as not pressed. Order accordingly. 30. Writ petition is allowed and rule is made absolute in the above terms. No order as to costs.
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2010 (7) TMI 1148 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he exemption from the date of first notification. This is precisely what the learned single judge held, and therefore the impugned order is strictly in accordance with law and hence, we do not find any justification to interfere with the well-considered order of the learned single judge. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that as the duty has already been paid, learned single judge permitted the petitioners to file an application for refund within four weeks. On account of this appeal and the stay order, the petitioners have not availed the benefit yet. Therefore, he requests four weeks’ time to file the application for refund from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 9. The petitioner is permitted to file the requisite application for refund within four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and thereafter the authorities are directed to pass appropriate order expeditiously. No costs.
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2010 (7) TMI 1147 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... an amounts were retained as such with those companies i.e. until the amount is converted into equity, so far no interest was received or agreed to be paid by the loanee companies. Since there is no accrual or receipt of interest, Tribunal cancelled the assessment of interest income. We are in complete agreement with the finding of the Tribunal because the loans were later treated as advance made for investments in equity i.e. for purchase of shares and so long as department has no case that interest accrued to the assessee, there is no scope for assessment. In view of the finding of facts rendered by the Tribunal based on which they rejected the department's case, we see no reason to interfere with the Tribunal's order. In fact, the other questions raised by the department in their appeals are not seen considered by the Tribunal. Therefore, those questions do not arise from orders of the Tribunal. Consequently we dismiss all the three appeals filed by the department.
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2010 (7) TMI 1146 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the respondent would confuse one for the other. We, therefore, do not agree with the conclusion arrived at by the learned single Judge that, prima facie, a case of infringement has been made out. We would also like to point out that the conclusion arrived at by us has been on the assumption that the appellants' trademarks are not registered or if registered, such registrations were invalid. We have not gone into that question of registration and its validity for the simple reason that the rectification proceedings are pending and the suit has been adjourned in view of Section 124(1) of the said Act and the Counsel agreed that the issue of Section 124 need not be gone into for deciding this appeal. Consequently, we allow this appeal and set aside the order of the learned single Judge to the extent that he allowed IA No. 15425/2008 and dismissed IA No. 217/2009. The injunction granted by the learned single Judge stands vacated. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
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2010 (7) TMI 1145 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... petitioner would be pari passu with such unsecured creditor. Learned counsel, however, submits that till date no such claim has been received despite an earlier advertisement and in case any such claim is received in pursuance to a subsequent advertisement, the same can be dealt with as aforesaid especially keeping in mind the undertaking already given by the WPC 5014/2010 Page 1 of 2 petitioner pursuant to the order of the Recovery Officer dated 22.02.2010.Learned senior counsel also states that the expenses for any future advertisement can be met by the petitioner out of the amount lying on account with the petitioner. Let notice issue to show cause as to why rule nisi be not issued returnable on 17.08.2010. Dasti. It is directed that till the next date of hearing, directions contained in the impugned orders for the petitioner to deposit the realization from the sale of immoveable property with the Official Liquidator is stayed. A copy of the order to accompany the notice.
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2010 (7) TMI 1144 - SUPREME COURT
Jurisdiction u/s 156(3) CrPC - the facts of the case, that suit for recovery of money filed by SEPCO is pending in the civil court and counter claim of the appellants is also pending in the same suit, proper course would be to appoint an arbitrator to resolve the dispute. However, according to him, instead of pursuing the said legal and contractual remedy, the respondent- SEPCO rushed to the Magistrate and the Magistrate committed an error in invoking jurisdiction u/s 156(3) of the Code by directing the Investigation Officer concerned to submit a charge sheet in the Court. He also submitted that inasmuch as the appellants, as on date, have repaid ₹ 10 crores as against the claim of ₹ 21 crores and made a counter claim for ₹ 10 crores, the criminal proceedings could be deferred till appropriate decision being taken in the civil proceedings. On the other hand, after taking us through the salient features in the complaint, specific allegations with reference to the criminality of the respondents, various terms of the contract and the conduct of the appellant in diverting the entire amount received for a different purpose and in view of the Sections 156(3) and 190 of the Code, the Magistrate is well within his powers to pass the impugned order and the same has been rightly considered and approved by the learned single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court contended that there is no merit in the appeal filed by the appellants. Hence this appeal.
HELD THAT:- In the instant case the Magistrate did not apply his mind to the complaint for deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding; but only for ordering an investigation u/s 156(3). He did not bring into motion the machinery of Chapter XV. He did not examine the complainant or his witnesses u/s 200 CrPC, which is the first step in the procedure prescribed under that chapter. The question of taking the next step of that procedure envisaged in Section 202 did not arise. Instead of taking cognizance of the offence, he has, in the exercise of his discretion, sent the complaint for investigation by police u/s 156.
In the facts and circumstances, it cannot be said that while directing the police to register FIR, the Magistrate has committed any illegality. As a matter of fact, even after receipt of such report, the Magistrate u/s 190(1)(b) may or may not take cognizance of offence. In other words, he is not bound to take cognizance upon submission of the police report by the Investigating Officer, hence, by directing the police to file chargesheet or final report and to hold investigation with a particular result cannot be construed that the Magistrate has exceeded his power as provided in Sub-section 3 of Section 156. Neither the chargesheet nor the final report has been defined in the Code. The chargesheet or final report whatever may be the nomenclature, it only means a report u/s 173 of the Code which has to be filed by the police officer on completion of his investigation. In view of our discussion, in the case on hand, we are satisfied that the Magistrate in passing the impugned order has not committed any illegality leading to manifest injustice warranting interference by the High Court in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are also satisfied that learned single Judge as well as the Division Bench rightly refused to interfere with the limited order passed by the Magistrate. We also hold that challenge at this stage by the appellants is pre-mature and the High Court rightly rejected their request.
we are in agreement with the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court of Chhattisgarh as well as the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Chhattisgarh. As on date there is no impediment for the police to investigate and submit report as directed in the order dated 04.07.2009 by Chief Judicial Magistrate. Interim orders in respect of all the proceedings including the order passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh are vacated and both parties are at liberty to pursue their remedy in the pending proceedings in accordance with law.
In the result, the appeal arising out of SLP of Srinivas Gundluri and Ors. (SSVG) is dismissed and the appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) filed by SEPCO is allowed to the extent indicated.
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2010 (7) TMI 1143 - SECURITIES APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, MUMBAI
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... ... ..... to produce us the records and the related file which has ben produced today. On the basis of some inspection carried out by the respondent Board, the appellant was served with a show cause notice and after obtaining its reply the designated authority after conducting an enquiry submitted its report recommending the penalty of warning to the appellant. It appears that the designated member has not agreed with the findings of the designed authority and is proceeding further in the matter. Without expressing any opinion on the procedure that is being followed, we are clearly of the view that in the circumstances, this is not a fit case where the interim order against the appellant should be allowed to continue any further. We, therefore, direct the operation of the order dated July 20,2010 shall remain stayed during the pendency of the appeal. The original file which was produced today has been returned to the respondent Board. The same be produced at the time of final hearing.
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2010 (7) TMI 1142 - SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA
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... ... ..... said connected clients and know as to whether they were indulging in any sort of manipulation in the scrip of KCL at the time of trading through it. I, therefore, also find merit in the submission of the Notice that it had not violated the provisions of clause A(2) of Code of Conduct specified for stock brokers in regulation 7 of Broker Regulati ons while dealing with its connected clients, as alleged in the SCN. In view of the above facts, I am constrained to take a view that the charges leveled against the Notice as alleged in the SCN do not stand established. 14. In view of the above, after considering all the facts and circumstances of the case and exercising the powers conferred upon me U/S 15-I(2) of the SEBI Act, 1992, I hereby conclude that the charges leveled against the Notice in the said SCN do not stand established. 15. In terms of the Rule 6 of the Adjudicating Rules, copy of this order is sent to the Notice and also to Securities & Exchange Board of India.
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2010 (7) TMI 1141 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sion but also the decision making process is not in accordance with the law since the Settlement Commission has not followed the provisions of Rule 5(3) of the Valuation Rules which are part of the Act. 29. Under the circumstances, we hold that the orders dated 2nd August, 2001 and 4th December, 2001 passed by the Settlement Commission are ex facie arbitrary and perverse, inasmuch as the settlement of the case in relation to the duty liability is not in accordance with law. The orders passed by the Tribunal dated 2nd August, 2001 and 4th December, 2001 to the extent that the Settlement Commission has settled the case in respect of 11 shipments for the amount of ₹ 21,35,879/ instead of ₹ 6 lacs are set aside. The question whether the Settlement Commission has power to entertain the rectification application is left open as not pressed. Order accordingly. 30. Writ Petition is allowed and rule is made absolute in the above terms. No order as to costs.
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2010 (7) TMI 1140 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Application u/s 482 of the CrPC - quashing the issuance of process by the Magistrate - Section 138 of the NI Act - HELD THAT:- I am of the view that the said provision may not apply to the provisions of Negotiable Instruments Act and merely because the accused reside outside the jurisdiction of the court, in each and every case it is not necessary for the Magistrate to postpone the issuance of process. The Magistrate, in my view, can exercise his discretion and decide whether to issue process, dismiss the complaint after recording the verification of the complainant and his witnesses, if any, or postpone the issuance of process and in a given case hold a further inquiry, depending on facts and circumstances of each case and non-compliance of the said provision would not vitiate the issuance of process if there is material to indicate that there has been an application of mind on the part of the Magistrate after going through the verification and other material brought on record by the complainant.
In the present case, large number of applications have been filed u/s 482 of the CrPC, alleging non-compliance of the provisions of section 202 and a relief is claimed that the process issued by the Magistrate may be quashed. If there are conflicting judgments of the same High Court, it would create uncertainty in the mind of the learned Magistrate regarding course of action which has to be followed by him and, therefore, in my view, this is an important issue which needs to be finally resolved by the Division Bench or larger Bench of this Court.
Office is directed to place the judgment and order of this Court before Hon’ble the Chief Justice.
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2010 (7) TMI 1139 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tution cannot possibly sift through the evidence and come to the conclusion whether such evidence produced by the Petitioner was sufficient to discharge the initial burden or not. The documents now sought to be produced by the Petitioner hardly constitute an explanation of sources of income for the purpose of purchase of the flat in question. Be that as it may, the detailed orders passed by the Competent Authority and the Appellate Tribunal on facts, have not been shown by the Petitioner to be either perverse or not based on relevant material. Given the limited scope of the powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, it is not possible to accept the submission of learned counsel for the Petitioner that the impugned orders of the Competent Authority and the Appellate Tribunal are perverse or contrary to law. 27. This Court finds no ground to interfere in the matter. The writ petition and the pending applications are dismissed. The interim order stands vacated.
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2010 (7) TMI 1138 - ITAT CHENNAI
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... ... ..... the new flat. If that is so, This was well within the period of one year before the date of sale or two years after such sale. As mentioned by CBDT in Circular No.667referred supra, cost of the plot cannot be excluded from the purchase price of the house property. It is also not disputed that the cost of the undivided share purchased by the assessee itself was not sufficient to justify claim under sections 54 and 54F of the Act. As held by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of CIT vs. H.K.Kapoor (supra) exemption of capital gains could be allowed notwithstanding the fact that the construction of the new house had begun before the sale of the old house. Viewed from any angle, we are of the opinion that the assessee was eligible for claiming exemption under sec. 54 and 54F of the Act. The CIT(Appeals) has rightly allowed such claim and no interference is called for. 9. Appeal of the Revenue is dismissed. The order is pronounced in the open Court on 09-07-2010.
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2010 (7) TMI 1137 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... d,Adv., Ms. Arti Gupta,Adv., Mr. Kunal Bahri,Adv., Mr. B.V. Balaram Das,Adv. O R D E R Delay condoned. Leave granted. Heard learned counsel on both sides. We have examined the position. We find that the shareholders are genuine parties. They are not bogus and fictitious. Therefore, the impugned order is set aside. The appeal is allowed accordingly. No order as to costs.
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2010 (7) TMI 1136 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... lied upon but the same was not discussed or distinguished. Since this Coordinate Bench decision has a bearing on the issue the Tribunal ought to have considered the same and not considering the same would be considered as a mistake apparent from record on various principles on this issue. 5. As seen from the record the above said decision was placed before the Bench but inadvertently the same was not discussed or distinguished. In view of this, we are of the opinion that the assessee should be given an opportunity to place the arguments in this regard and the Miscellaneous Application is to be allowed by recalling the order dated 10.08.2010. It is also necessary to examine whether the above Coordinate Bench decision is applicable on the facts of the case. For these reasons the order is recalled and the Registry is directed to post the cases afresh for fresh consideration in the due course. 6. In the result, MA is allowed. Order pronounced in the open court on 30th July 2010.
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2010 (7) TMI 1135 - CESTAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... t, 1944. 3. Heard. 4. I have gone through the impugned order and find that the lower authorities have not given any option to the appellant to pay 25 of the duty confirmed as penalty as per the proviso of Section 11AC as held by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of K.P. Pouches (P) Ltd. v. UOI - 2008 (228) E.L.T. 31 (Del.). Hence, I give the option to the appellant to pay 25 of the duty within 30 days of the communication of this order, failing which the appellant shall be liable to pay 100 of the duty confirmed as penalty. With these observations, the appeal is partly allowed with consequential relief, if any. (Pronounced in Court)
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2010 (7) TMI 1134 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... senior person, in our view, would violate fundamental rights of persons like petitioners. However, since petitioners have not challenged validity of the said Rules, we are not inclined to answer the issue regarding validity or otherwise of said Rules. 15. We are, therefore, of the considered view that, in the facts of the present case, it is necessary that the State Government makes necessary amendment to the Rules so as to remove this anomalous situation. 16. Writ Petition is, therefore, disposed of by directing the State Government to make necessary amendment to the Rules in the light of what has been observed by us herein above, within a period of six months from today. It is needless to say that on the State Government carrying out necessary amendment, case of the petitioners would be reconsidered by the Zilla Parishad for giving them benefits, if they are entitled under the amended Rules. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2010 (7) TMI 1133 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ise. Whatever the form in which the allegations under Section 406, IPC are made, the fact of the matter is that there is an FIR and the Court concerned has taken cognizance thereof. Under these circumstances, we would only protect the interest of the appellant by directing that she would not be required to attend the proceedings unless specifically directed by the Court to do so and that too in the case of extreme necessity. Similarly, no coercive step shall be taken against her. She shall be granted bail by the Court trying the case if it decides to try the offence by framing the charge. We expect the Court to be careful while considering the framing of charge. 11. We, therefore, hold that the appellant shall not be tried for offence under Section 498A, IPC. However, we desist from quashing the FIR altogether in view of the allegations made under Section 406, IPC with the protection that we have granted to the appellant. With these observations, the appeals are disposed of.
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