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Showing 1 to 20 of 1898 Records
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2015 (12) TMI 1901 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Exemption u/s 10(23C)(vi) - claim rejected as society was diverting its income to the members of the society and, therefore, the society was not acting as a non-profitable institution - Commissioner rejected the application holding that the purpose/objects of the society as per the memorandum of association does not indicate that the institution is running solely for educational purpose
HELD THAT:- As perusal of the impugned order that based on a survey, a show cause notice was given and, thereafter, a finding has been given that the profits of the institution are being diverted to the members of the society in the garb of payment of interest on the unsecured loans given by them. The genuineness of this transaction has been doubted. A specific finding has been given that at the time when the members gave the loan, no rate of interest was payable by the institution but subsequently, for the subsequent assessment years, the rate of interest of 12% was charged to obviate the profit by way of interest and divert the money to its members in the garb of payment of interest on the loan given.
For the assessment year 2005-06, the rate of interest was increased from 12% to 18% and in 2006-07 the rate of interest was increased to 21%. This increase in rate of interest was to ensure that the income of the society was diverted to its members in the garb of payment of interest. The increase in the rate of interest could be seen on account of the increase in the income of the society. There is also a specific finding that the bye-laws had no provision for taking loan on interest, though, subsequently, the amendment was made in its bye-laws during the financial year 2006-07, which will have no effect in so far as the present application of the petitioner is concerned.
Thus an irresistible inference can be drawn that the petitioner's society, even if it was running an educational institution solely for education purposes, yet it was with the intention of earning a profit and it was not for a non-profit purpose. On this short ground, we are of the opinion that the order of the Commissioner does not require any interference. Decided against petitioner/society registered.
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2015 (12) TMI 1900 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Sanction of Composite Scheme of Arrangement in the nature of Slump Sale - HELD THAT:- This Court is of the view that the present Scheme of Arrangement is in the interest of the shareholders and creditors of all the companies as well as in the public interest, therefore, the same deserves to be sanctioned.
Petition disposed off.
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2015 (12) TMI 1899 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Revision of assessment - maintainability of petition - Availability of statutory remedy of filing an appeal as against the order of assessment - invocation of jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution - HELD THAT:- It is not the case of the petitioner herein that he was not put on notice or that the authority, who passed the order of assessment, is not having the jurisdiction. On the other hand, the competent authority has passed the order of assessment, after giving due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and by considering the objection raised by them. Needless to say that if the consideration of objection was not proper or erroneous, that cannot be a ground to maintain the writ petition, since the alleged erroneous consideration or improper consideration cannot be stated as violation of principles of natural justice. On the other hand, it may be a good ground for filing an appeal.
Therefore, when the present assessment order having been passed by the competent authority, after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, the same cannot be questioned under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as the petitioner has to raise all those grounds only before the appellate authority who is also a fact finding authority.
All these writ petitions are dismissed, however, with liberty to the petitioner to challenge the order impugned in these writ petitions before the appellate authority within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
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2015 (12) TMI 1898 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Levy of Entry Tax - entry of raw material being brought into a local area for consumption in manufacturing of a new commodity - HELD THAT:- The question of law has been decided by this Court in the case of THE COMMISSIONER COMMERCIAL TAX LKO. VERSUS S/S MARINO INDUSTRIES LTD. [2014 (12) TMI 1422 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] wherein this Court has taken into consideration the finding of fact that the dealer was a manufacturer of laminated sheets using craft paper as raw material and not for packaging purposes and, therefore, the contention of the State has not been accepted by the Tribunal as it is only the goods specified in the schedule as notified by the State Government, which is liable to be levied with entry tax.
The goods as specified in the Notification specifically provide for paper for packing purposes and, therefore, that would not include the paper, which is being used as raw material. The question of law is, therefore, decided in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.
Revision dismissed.
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2015 (12) TMI 1897 - ITAT MUMBAI
Levy of penalty u/s 271(1)(c) - changing the heads of income due to difference of opinion - as per AO assessee has treated the Guest house as his business asset and accordingly, he was claiming depreciation thereon - assessee explained that the mistake has occurred due to wrong understanding of the accountant - CIT(A), deleted the penalty by holding that there was difference of opinion about the nature of Capital gain, i.e., whether it was long term capital gain or short term capital gain and it appears that the assessee was under bona fide belief that it was a long term asset as he was owning the property over a period of three year
HELD THAT:- The admitted facts are that the “Guest house” sold by the assessee is a business asset on which depreciation has been allowed. Hence, there is no dispute that the gain arising on sale of the same would be assessable as “Short term capital gain” as per the provisions of sec. 50 of the Act. However, the assessee has treated the same as non-business asset at the time of filing return of income and accordingly computed the long term capital gain.
The total income of an assessee for a particular assessment year is computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act by having regard to the accounts of the assessee. Hence, it is imperative on the part of the assessee to compute the total income in accordance with the provisions of the Act. In case of assessee, on which depreciation has been allowed, the provisions of sec. 50 mandate that the gain should be computed as “Short term capital gain” only.
The assessee has tried to defend his action by drawing support from the decisions rendered in the case of ACE Builders Pvt Ltd [2005 (3) TMI 36 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] and Smita Conductors Ltd.[2013 (9) TMI 1056 - ITAT MUMBAI] In our view both the decisions cannot come to the support of the assessee, since they have been rendered in a different context.
It is not a case where the assessee has made a claim on some plausible basis, but the same became unacceptable in the eyes of law. It is also not simple case of changing the heads of income due to difference of opinion. On the contrary, the assessee himself has accepted that the gains arising on sale of guest house is assessable as Short term Capital gain. Hence, in our view, the facts of the case show that the assessee furnished inaccurate particulars of income and the explanations furnished by the assessee in that regard were not substantiated.
We are not able to agree with the view taken by the CIT(A). We notice that the assessing officer has levied penalty @ 200% of the tax sought to be evaded. In our view, the same appears to be on the higher side. Accordingly, we set aside the order of CIT(A) and direct the AO to sustain the penalty to the extent of 100% of the tax sought to be evaded. Decided in favour of revenue.
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2015 (12) TMI 1896 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Levy of interest u/s 234(A) - Tribunal decided the issues in favour of the assessee which relates to levy of interest under Section 234(A) as the same has also been considered in earlier assessment years - Being aggrieved thereof, the instant appeal has been preferred.
HELD THAT:- We have gone through the orders passed by the authorities below as well as the ITAT and we are of the opinion that no substantial question of law arises out of the judgment rendered by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
Thus, the appeal is hereby failed and dismissed accordingly.
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2015 (12) TMI 1895 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Dishonour of Cheque - acquittal of accused - discharge of existing liability or not - case is barred under the West Bengal Money Lenders Act, 1940 or not.
Whether cheque was issued in discharge of existing liability? - HELD THAT:- It is a settled law that the holder of a cheque carries with him a presumption that the cheque was rightly issued. It is true that as per the decision of the Apex Court in Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hedge [2008 (1) TMI 827 - SUPREME COURT] it was held that even though the holder of such cheque carries such presumptive value but it is the liability of the complainant to prove that the said cheque was issued in respect of one legally enforceable debt. If the evidence of P.W.1 is scrutinized vis-à-vis the documentary evidence mainly Ext. 1 that is 'Chukti Patra' this Court can very well say that the said cheque was issued in favour of the present appellant in respect of one legally enforceable debt.
Whether this case is barred under the provisions of the West Bengal Money Lenders Act, 1940? - HELD THAT:- The money lending without licence is not totally barred or prohibited by the said Act. It is one regulatory Act and it regulates the business of money lending. Section 8 of the said Act says that after certain notification in the official gazette no money lender shall carry on the business of money lending unless he holds an effective licence. But the provision is not mandatory if one reads Section 13 of the said Act then he must say in the same tone with me that even if a money lender fail to file a money lending licence before the court while instituting the suit for recovery of a loan then filing of such suit is not barred.
In the present case before this court P.W.1 claimed that he had money lending licence but could not produce the same. This is not a civil litigation and as such the rigors of Section 13 of the Money Lenders Act cannot be made applicable in this case. Thus, lending of money even without licence has not been specifically barred by the West Bengal Money Lenders Act and as such the payment made by the complainant to the respondent was perfectly valid by the said Act of 1940. If that be so the argument of the respondent that the complainant appellant had no legally enforceable debt as against the respondent cannot have any leg to stand on. The decision of the learned trial court on this point that there was no legally enforceable debt is not tenable and this Court respectfully differs with that view.
Thus, this Court is of the view that the learned trial court erred in acquitting the present accused in respect of the charge punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. The impugned order of acquittal passed in C. Case No. 435 of 2006 by the Judicial Magistrate, Baruipur, 24 Parganas (South) is hereby set aside.
Appeal disposed off.
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2015 (12) TMI 1894 - ITAT MUMBAI
PE in India - Scope of Article 5(2)(k) of DTAA between India and the UK - HELD THAT:- As in latest order passed by the Tribunal in [2015 (9) TMI 1532 - ITAT MUMBAI] in which identical issue has been decided while we agree with the learned counsel that art. 15 will not be applicable on the facts of the present case, this finding does not really come to the rescue of the assessee since, as we have already held, the assessee did have a PE in India under art. 5(2)(k) of the India-UK tax treaty, and, accordingly, profits attributable to the PE are taxable under art. 7 of the India-UK tax treaty. Decided against assessee.
Reimbursement of the expenses as part of the income of the assessee - As decided in assessee own case [2015 (9) TMI 1532 - ITAT MUMBAI] as held reimbursements received by the assessee are in respect of specific and actual expenses incurred by the assessee and do not involve any markup, there is reasonable control mechanism in place to ensure that these claims are not inflated, and the assessee has furnished sufficient evidence to demonstrate the incurring of expenses. There is thus no good reason to make any addition to income in respect of these reimbursements of expenses - Decided in favour of assessee.
Interest charged u/s 234B is to be deleted.
Income relatable to work performed in India in liable for taxation in India - HELD THAT:- We find that in assessee’s own case for A.Y.1998-99 to 2001-02 [2015 (9) TMI 1532 - ITAT MUMBAI], the Tribunal has held that the profit which is attributable to the PE, can only be assessed in India.
Respectfully following the aforesaid order and order of the Hon’ble Special Bench in the case of Clifford Chance [2013 (6) TMI 544 - ITAT MUMBAI] It is held that the only income in respect of services rendered in India, which are attributable to PE only, would be taxable in India. Thus, ground no. raised by the Revenue stands dismissed.
Allow 85% of disbursement claim proportionate to the fee related to the services rendered in India as compared to total fees - We direct the AO to follow the aforesaid order of the Tribunal [2015 (9) TMI 1532 - ITAT MUMBAI] and hold that no amount should be disallowed.
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2015 (12) TMI 1893 - COMPETITION APPELLATE TRIBUNAL NEW DELHI
Cartelization by the manufacturers of cement and manipulation of prices - Section 19(1)(a) of Competition Commission Act, 2002 - constitutional validity of Rule 3 of the Competition Commission of India (Selection of Chairperson and other Members of the Commission) Rules, 2003 - violation of principles of natural justice.
HELD THAT:- In a number of decisions, the High Courts and Supreme Court have repeatedly ruled that the Commissions, Tribunals and other administrative bodies clothed with the power to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties or pass orders adversely affecting a person or a body of persons or imposing penalty for contravention of any statutory provision or otherwise are bound to act justly, fairly and in consonance with the principles of natural justice.
In Mahipal Singh Tomar v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2013 (5) TMI 1064 - SUPREME COURT], the Supreme Court examined the issue relating to violation of natural justice in a case where copy of the enquiry report was not furnished to the affected person and he was not given opportunity to represent his cause against the allegation of large scale irregularities in the placement of selected candidates in different colleges.
The Chairperson did not have the opportunity of hearing the arguments of the advocates for the parties, which lasted for three days i.e. 21st, 22nd and 23rd February, 2012 and yet he became party to the decision. Obviously, he did not know what are the nature and contents of the arguments of the seven Senior Advocates and other advocates, who appeared for the parties. The minutes of the meetings recorded on those dates do not show that the remaining six Members had recorded the arguments advanced by the learned advocates, as was done by the officer who heard the arguments in Ossein and Gelatine Manufacturers' Association of India v. Modi Alkalies and Chemicals Limited and Another [1989 (8) TMI 347 - SUPREME COURT]. The Chairperson's participation in the decision making process had salutary effect on the final verdict.
The arguments of Respondents that no prejudice has been caused to the appellants due the participation of the Chairperson in the decision-making process cannot be accepted. It is not possible to make a guesswork of what would have been the fate of the case if the Chairperson had not taken part in the decision-making process. One does not know whether the remaining six Members would have reached a positive conclusion that the appellants are not guilty of violating Sections 3(3)(a) and 3(3)(b) read with Section 3(1) of the Act and/or they would not have imposed the particular penalty under Section 27 of the Act.
The impugned order is vitiated due to the violation of one of the facets of the principles of natural justice, we do not consider it necessary to deal with and decide other points argued by the learned counsel for the appellants for assailing the order under challenge - The impugned order is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Commission for fresh adjudication of the issues relating to alleged violation of Sections 3(3)(a) and 3(3)(b) read with Section 3(1) of the Act by the appellants. The appellant shall be entitled to withdraw the amount deposited by them in compliance of the interim order passed by the Tribunal.
Appeal allowed.
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2015 (12) TMI 1892 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Cancellation of bail granted - accused is facing trial under Section 302 IPC for which punishment is life imprisonment or death - bar on grant of bail under Section 437 of Cr.P.C. - HELD THAT:- It is true that once bail granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering any supervening circumstances which is not conducive to fair trial. It is also settled law that once bail is granted, it cannot be considered barely on a request from the side of the complainant unless and until the complainant shows that the same is being misused and it is not no longer conducive in the interest of justice to allow the accused any further to remain on bail. The bail can be cancelled only in those discerning few cases where it is shown that a person to whom the concession of bail has been granted is misusing the same.
The respondent is facing trial for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and Section 25/27/30 Arms Act. The respondent sustained bullet injuries in his hand which clearly shows his presence at the spot at the time of incident in question. This fact has been further established by the opinion dated 20.03.2014 given by Dr. Bhim Singh with regard to bullet injuries sustained by respondent. He opined that the said injuries could be possible due to low velocity project-tile (bullet), which lost velocity after piercing the body of the deceased Rajbeer Rana.
It is not in dispute that the accused is facing trial under Section 302 IPC for which punishment is life imprisonment or death. Thus, granting bail is barred under Section 437 of Cr.P.C. If in such a case, bail is granted in a mechanical manner then wrong message goes to society that after committing a heinous crime one can move freely out of the jail. This type of concession encourages the offender and discourages the victim in particular and the society as a whole. Thus, in such cases bail should be granted rarely in a case where the involvement of the accused is prima facie doubtful - In the case in hand the respondent actively participated in committing murder. His presence is very much established by the injuries received on his hand. Accordingly, the order dated 02.03.2015 whereby the learned trial Court granted bail to the respondent is set aside.
The respondent is directed to surrender before the trial Court within one week from today - Petition allowed.
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2015 (12) TMI 1891 - ITAT AMRITSAR
TDS u/s 194A - interest on deposits held by the Branch - assessee in default for not deducting tax at source on alleged deposits which were funds of the Central Government - CIT(A) has held that societies which are being wholly funded by Government would qualify for non deduction of tax u/s 194A in accordance with notification No. 3489 dated 22.10.1970 - HELD THAT:- As per the PMGSY [a scheme of the Ministry of Rural Development], any interest income accrued on surplus funds of the project parked in the bank would be of Ministry of Road Developments and State Rural Road Development Agency would not have any right over the interest income. Chapter X of the Accounting Manual of PMGSY Scheme is explicit in this regard and the AO erred in relying on Chapter XIII of the said Manual.
Chapter X of the Accounting Manual is specific with regard to the nature and state of interest income, stating the interest income as belonging to the Ministry of Rural Development. The State Rural Road Agency does not have any control whatsoever on the interest income. That being so, the contents of Chapter XIII of the Accounting Manual, as rightly held by the ld. CIT(A), cannot over ride those of Chapter X of the Manual.
J&K State Rural Road Agency is a body established by the Government of J & K, registered under the Societies Registration Act and is fully funded by the Government and it is not required to make TDS.
Then, in BRANCH MANAGER, STATE BANK OF BIKANER & JAIPUR [2012 (4) TMI 210 - ITAT JAIPUR] as held that for interest on such like deposits, TDS provisions of section 194A of the Act are not attracted. This decision was also taken note of by the ld. CIT(A) while deleting the demand raised. Also, no contrary decision has been pressed into service before us on behalf of the department. Decided in favour of assessee.
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2015 (12) TMI 1890 - ITAT MUMBAI
Additional disallowance of depreciation enhanced by CIT(A) - “assets” have already entered into the ‘block of assets’ - HELD THAT:- As “assets” in question were forming part of ‘block of assets’ which were used earlier for the purpose of business. The said asset were destroyed / lost in theft in the assessment year 2006-07 and no insurance claim has been received to the assessee. To the extent of the amount of claim made to the insurance company was reduced from the block of assets in the earlier years and accordingly, assessee has claimed depreciation on the reduced written down value.
Since the assessee could not receive the insurance claim, the amount of insurance claim was added back and accordingly, depreciation was claimed on this amount.
CIT(A) has enhanced the disallowance of depreciation on the ground that the said asset has not been put to use for the business purpose. Such a reasoning given by the CIT(A) for the enhancement cannot be sustained, because now it is quite a settled proposition that if the “assets” have already entered into the ‘block of assets’ and is forming part of the gross block of assets, then deprecation has to be allowed even if the said assets has not been used in the relevant year.
This proposition now stands settled by the catena of decisions including that of case of CIT vs G.R. Shipping Ltd [2009 (7) TMI 1169 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] Otherwise also, if the assessee’s claim for insurance has not been settled and amount has been added back, then the depreciation has to be allowed on such an amount. Accordingly, we direct the AO to grant deprecation in the previous year relevant to AY 2006-07, that is, when it was added back to the block of assets and secondly, rework the deprecation for the assessment year under appeal accordingly. Appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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2015 (12) TMI 1889 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
Nature of expenses - Corporate debt restructuring - replacement of remembraning cells - AO treated both these claims capital expenditure - HELD THAT:- Revenue’s argument seeking to treat assessee’s CDR claim as capital expenditure is rejected. We rely on co-ordinate bench decision in assessment year 2004-05 [2013 (11) TMI 773 - ITAT AHMEDABAD] and leave it for the AO to calculate this corporate restructuring expenditure as adopted in assessment year 2004-05.
Expenditure on replacement of remembraning cells - As assessee has already succeeded before the hon’ble jurisdictional high court in its own case [2015 (2) TMI 118 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] rejecting the very substantial question framed in assessment year 1999-2000. There is no exception pointed out before us. We respectfully follow the same and uphold the lower appellate findings under challenge. Revenue’s appeal partly accepted for statistical purposes.
TDS u/s 192 - Default u/s 201(1) and (1A) - medical reimbursement - non deduction of tds - HELD THAT:- The assessee has acted fairly and honestly in computing its TDS liability qua salary and other allowances paid to its employees u/s. 192 - Nor it is the Revenue’s case that it has not acted in the above stated bonafide manner or that quantum of medical allowance question appears to be payment of salary in garb thereof. The case file does not reveal that these very sums stand assessed in individual employees’ hands.
Revenue fails in controverting all of the above stated findings. We accordingly reverse lower authorities’ action and accept assessee’s first substantive ground challenging section 201(1) and (1A) demand in question. This first substantive ground relating to medical reimbursement issue succeeds.
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2015 (12) TMI 1888 - ITAT PUNE
Penalty proceedings u/s 271(1)(c) - revised return showing higher income was filed on the basis of which notice for reopening was issued - undisclosed agricultural income - assessee in his statement recorded u/s 131 on oath by the ADIT (Investigation), Nashik had confessed that the agricultural income shown by him during the assessment year 2005-06 from sale of agricultural produce did not match with the agricultural crops shown in the 7/12 extracts - HELD THAT:- Assessee had no plausible explanation towards the source of Rs.3,00,000/- which he had introduced in his business as agricultural income. Although the assessee has filed the revised return by disclosing the additional income of Rs.3,00,000/- the same cannot be said to be voluntary because the return was filed only after the enquiries were conducted by the Department and the assessee was unable to substantiate the source of the same for which he declared the additional income.
As per the provisions of section 271(1)(c) of the Act, penalty is leviable if the assessee has concealed the particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income. In the instant case, the assessee by declaring business income as agricultural income in the return of income has concealed the particulars of his income and furnished inaccurate particulars of such income.
Provisions of section 271(1)(c) are clearly attracted. Various decisions relied upon by the assessee before the CIT(A) are distinguishable and are not applicable to the facts of the present case. Grounds raised by the assessee are dismissed.
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2015 (12) TMI 1887 - SC ORDER
Captive Consumption of Molasses - Manufacturing of Rectified Spirit and ENA - benefit of exemption Notification No. 67/95-CE on Molasses captively used in the manufacture of Rectified Spirit and ENA.
HELD THAT:- The appeal is admitted.
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2015 (12) TMI 1886 - ITAT COCHIN
Maintainability of appeal before Tribunal - low tax effect - HELD THAT:- In view of the latest CBDT Circular No.21/2015 dated 10th December, 2015, the appeals of the Department are not maintainable inview of the tax effect being less than the monetary limit prescribed by the said Circular. The tax effect in filing the appeal before the Tribunal should be above Rs.10 lakhs in view of the above said Circular. The above Circular has clearly mentioned to have retrospective effect and is to have application to the pending appeals. Accordingly, in view of the said Circular, all the appeals of the Revenue are dismissed as not maintainable.
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2015 (12) TMI 1885 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Identification of handwriting in the cheque - Whether a Civil Court may not send a disputed handwriting/signature to a handwriting expert (under Section 45 of the Evidence Act) if the time gap between the admitted signature and the disputed signature is very large? - HELD THAT:- Nature and extent of variation differs from person to person and, in its way, forms an important element in identification process. Writing variation is due to various factors external factors like writing position, writing instrument, care of execution, etc; physical and mental conditions like fatigue, intoxication, drug use, illness, nervousness, etc. These factors produce a varying degree of variation. The variation is commensurable in its degree with the intensity of the cause - Variation does not preclude identification of the writing. In fact, it forms an additional factor that serves to personalize the writing.
Writing of an adult will show an obvious steady change with passage of time. In these circumstances provision of a whole set of signatures written over a period of years will prove of inestimable value to the document examiner - When serious illness occurs, a signature often undergoes a remarkable change in a very short period and if a suspect will is dated near the day of death, standard (admittedly genuine) signatures covering this period are essential if reliable evidence of the authenticity or otherwise of the signature is to be established.
The gist of the experts opinion, emerging from the above Report, is to the effect that it is not always necessary to have contemporaneous handwritings/signatures for comparison. However, as a general rule, it would be desirable to undertake comparison of admitted handwritings/signatures with disputed handwritings/signatures which fall within the range of 2 or 3 years from each other. Therefore, there can be no hard and fast norm as to when comparison can or cannot be undertaken owing to the time lag between the two sets of handwritings/signatures. Various other factors would have to be taken into consideration, as opined by the experts - It is therefore not open to the Court to refuse to entertain an application seeking comparison of disputed handwritings/signatures with admitted handwritings/ signatures on the ground of a long lapse of time between the two sets of handwritings/signatures.
It is only too well-known that the appearance of a signature depends on many factors. The type of pen used, the ink, the quickness of the flow of the pen, the paper on which it was written, the place where the signature is put e.g., a signature on a rough paper would not be exactly the same as that on a smooth paper. In the same way, a signature written with a rough pen would not be the same as a signature with a good smooth-writing pen. Similarly if some smooth pad or some such object is used for resting the paper at the time of the signature, then that signature would be different from the signature put on a paper resting on a rough surface.
No time could be fixed for filing applications under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act for sending the disputed signature or writings to the handwriting expert for comparison and opinion and same shall be left open to the discretion of the court; for exercising such discretion when exigencies so demand, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the each case - merely because an application seeking expert opinion is filed belatedly, it would not automatically mean that the signatures sent for comparison are not contemporaneous.
The matters may be posted before the Court concerned for adjudication on merits.
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2015 (12) TMI 1884 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Seeking payment of the rebate in cash, on exports made in terms of the erstwhile Rule 57 F (13) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 - HELD THAT:- Though various issues are raised in this Writ Petition, and defending the same, a counter affidavit is also filed, now, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that, it would be suffice, if a direction is issued to the respondent to adjudicate the issue, which culminated in the issuance of show cause notice, dated 09.02.2000 alone, after affording due opportunity to the petitioner to fortify its case. Insofar as the claim made by the petitioner, vide Application, dated 30.11.1998, regarding payment of statutory interest on the refund amount is concerned, the learned counsel submitted that the petitioner would not press upon the interest on the refund amount, and to that effect, the petitioner has also filed an undertaking affidavit today, specifically stating that they will not claim the statutory interest payable on the refund, subject to the sanction of refund to the petitioner by the respondent.
The writ petition is disposed off.
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2015 (12) TMI 1883 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Exemption u/s 11 - benefit of certificate u/s 12(A) - conditions stipulated under the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 12AA which empowers the authority to cancel the registration - HELD THAT:- As appellants has fairly stated that the questions of law raised in this appeal are covered by the decision of this Court in the case of ‘The Director of Income Tax Exemption Vs. M/s. Karnataka Badminton Assn. [2015 (1) TMI 1202 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] wherein the questions have been answered in favour of the Assessee and against the Revenue.
Accordingly, for the reasons given in the aforesaid Judgment in Karnataka Badminton Assn.’s case [supra], this appeal is dismissed and the questions of law raised are answered in favour of the Assessee and against the Revenue.
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2015 (12) TMI 1882 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Validity of proceedings u/s 153A - as argued the premises which were searched u/s 132 were not of the Assessee - HELD THAT:- ITAT has noted as a matter of fact that the premises that was searched i.e. 3rd Floor, Global Arcade, M. G. Road, Gurgaon was not of the Assessee. There was nothing on record to connect the Assessee with the premises searched. Therefore, qua the Assessee, the proceedings u/s 153A was invalid. This being a factual aspect, no question of law arises.
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