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2016 (3) TMI 1475
Addition u/s 68 - unsecured loans raised by the assessee - loan which was received prior to the start of the previous year - CIT(A) deleted addition - HELD THAT:- A categorical finding has been given by CIT(A) that there is no cash credit received during the present year and all the loans were received prior to 01/04/2008. This finding of CIT(A) could not be controverted by Learned D. R. of the Revenue. Hence, we find no reason to interfere in the order of CIT(A) because no addition can be made u/s 68 of the Act in respect of any loan which was received prior to the start of the previous year relevant to present assessment year. Accordingly, this ground is rejected.
Addition u/s 41(1) - Addition of amount appearing in the books of accounts of the assessee against sundry creditors since the assessee could not substantiate these credits - CIT(A) deleted addition - HELD THAT:- It cannot be said that there is any liability which has ceased to exist, thus we find no reason to interfere in the order of learned CIT(A) and accordingly reject ground No. 2 of the Revenue.
Disallowance of expenses - expenses not wholly necessarily and exclusively related to own business - CIT(A) deleted addition - HELD THAT:- CIT(A) has examined each and every item of expense in detail and the disallowance was deleted by him on the basis of his categorical finding that all the expenses are fully, necessarily and exclusively related to assessee’s business and the same are allowable expenses except small portion which is already disallowed by him and these findings of CIT(A) could not be controverted by Learned D. R. of the Revenue. Hence, we find no reason to interfere in the order of CIT(A).
Appeal of the Revenue stands dismissed.
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2016 (3) TMI 1474
Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) - disallowance being 10% of miscellaneous expenses, repair & maintenance etc. being unverifiable in nature and disallowance being loss on sale of asset which was debited to profit & loss account - bonafide mistake - HELD THAT:- Assessee as brought to the knowledge of the AO that the loss on sale of fixed asset was reflected in Schedule 18 of the audited accounts. We also note that while computing the depreciation under the Act, the gross sale consideration was reduced and the depreciation has been claimed at the reduced WDV. However, due to clerical mistake, the said amount was omitted in the computation. We find that in the copy of the Income-tax computation, the said disallowance had been mentioned but inadvertently the amount was omitted.
We further note that in the balance sheet at col. No.18 of Other Expenses was shown as Loss on sale of fixed assets however, in the computation in the head ‘Loss on sale / discard of assets, the amount was not reflected. We also find that even during the course of assessment proceedings, all the information relating to the sale of asset had been furnished and the bonafide mistake that was made was accepted and the said amount was offered for taxation. We note that it is also not a case wherein the said amount was reflected under wrong head or concealed but the same was duly reflected in the audited accounts.
We find that there is no deliberate attempt on the part of the assessee either to conceal income or to file inaccurate particulars of income. The assessee at the time of assessment proceedings has given all the details before the completion of the assessment proceedings. His explanation given to the AO has not been found to be false. We also find support from the decision of Price Waterhouse Coopers (P) Ltd.[2012 (9) TMI 775 - SUPREME COURT] held that the claim of the assessee could not be regarded either as “false” or not “bonafide” so as to conclude that assessee has furnished inaccurate particulars of income. Therefore, we set aside the orders of the authorities below and allow the appeal of the assessee. Assessee appeal allowed.
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2016 (3) TMI 1473
Taxability of income in India - receipts taxable as royalty within the meaning of section 9(1) (vi)of the Act as well as Article-12 of the Indo-US DTAA - amount received from the Indian entities - HELD THAT:- As decided by ITAT A.Y.s 2004- 05 to 2006-07 [2014 (11) TMI 432 - ITAT MUMBAI] expressions “Royalty” and “Fees for included services” have been given distinct meaning in the Indo US treaty. We have already noticed that the tax authorities were not able to come to a conclusion as to whether the consideration received by the assessee company would fall within the meaning of “Royalty” or “Fees for included services”, even though there are plethora of case laws explaining both the terms.
Hence, we are of the view that the tax authorities have not examined the impugned issue in proper perspective, i.e., the matter has not been examined in the context of Indo-US treaty by considering the meaning of various terms used therein. As stated earlier, the meaning to be ascribed to various terms used in the treaty has been the bone of contention in various case laws and we notice that the tax authorities have not considered the applicable case laws. Impugned matter requires fresh examination at the end of the assessing officer. We, restore the matter to the file of the AO for fresh adjudication. - Ground Nos. 1 to 3 are allowed in favour of the assessee in part.
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2016 (3) TMI 1472
Enforcing appropriately the constitutional mandate as contained under the provisions of Articles 16(4-A), 16(4-B) and 335 of the Constitution of India or, in the alternative, directing the Respondents to constitute a Committee or appoint a Commission chaired either by a retired Judge of the High Court or Supreme Court in making - survey and collecting necessary qualitative data of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes in the services of the State for granting reservation in promotion.
Whether a court should issue a direction to effectuate an enabling constitutional provision which has to be exercised by the State in its discretion on being satisfied of certain conditions precedent?
HELD THAT:- There can be no doubt that certain constitutional duties are inferred from the various Articles of the Constitution and this Court has issued directions. Certain directions have been issued in S.P. Gupta [1981 (12) TMI 165 - SUPREME COURT] and Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association [1993 (10) TMI 352 - SUPREME COURT] (IInd Judges case) but they are based on principles of secure operation of legal system, access to justice and speedy disposal of cases. In All India Judges' Association and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. [2001 (2) TMI 1023 - SUPREME COURT], the Court issued directions by stating that it is the constitutional obligation to ensure that the backlog of cases is decreased and efforts are made to increase the disposal of cases. Keeping in view the concept of constitutional silence or abeyance, guidelines were issued in Vishaka and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. [1997 (8) TMI 456 - SUPREME COURT] and for the said purpose, reliance was placed on international Treaties, norms of gender equality and right to life and liberty of working women.
The Courts do not formulate any policy, remains away from making anything that would amount to legislation, rules and Regulation or policy relating to reservation. The Courts can test the validity of the same when they are challenged. The court cannot direct for making legislation or for that matter any kind of subordinate legislation. We may hasten to add that in certain decisions directions have been issued for framing of guidelines or the court has itself framed guidelines for sustaining certain rights of women, children or prisoners or under-trial prisoners. The said category of cases falls in a different compartment. They are in different sphere than what is envisaged in Article 16(4-A) and 16(4-B) whose constitutional validity have been upheld by the Constitution Bench with certain qualifiers.
The relief in the present case, when appositely appreciated, tantamounts to a prayer for issue of a mandamus to take a step towards framing of a rule or a Regulation for the purpose of reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in matter of promotions. In our considered opinion a writ of mandamus of such a nature cannot be issued.
The Writ Petitions, being devoid of merit, stand dismissed.
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2016 (3) TMI 1471
Extension of stay on recovery by Tribunal - stay being in excess of 365 days - validity of stay on disputed demand granted earlier in respect of the appeals pending before it in exercise of power u/s 254(2A) - grievance of the Revenue is that it is without jurisdiction as the extension of the stay results in stay being in excess of 365 days, therefore, in clear breach of the third proviso to Section 254(2A) - HELD THAT:- The stay granted by the impugned orders is for a period of six months from its date i.e. 17th July, 2015 and 11th September, 2015. Thus, in the present facts, the impugned orders have exhausted its life and are no longer in force. Thus, the challenge to the impugned order is purely academic. Therefore, we see no reason to entertain the Petitions.
The issue as mentioned herein above, is no longer res integra so far as this Court is concerned in view of the decision of this Court in CIT v/s. Tata Teleservices (Maharashtra) Ltd. [2015 (12) TMI 1507 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT], wherein this Court following the earlier decision of this Court in Narang Overseas (P) Ltd. v/s. ITAT [2007 (7) TMI 5 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] and CIT v/s. Ronak Industries [2010 (11) TMI 461 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] held that even after substitution of the third proviso to Section 254(2A) of the Act, the Tribunal would have power to extend the stay beyond a period of 365 days as provided therein. Petition dismissed.
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2016 (3) TMI 1470
Disallowance of the benefit u/s 80P(2) (d) - CIT(A) allowed deductio2014 (9) TMI 1280 - ITAT JODHPUR]n - HELD THAT:- As it is noticed that the learned CIT (A) has followed judicial discipline by deleting the disallowance by following the decision of the co-ordinate Bench of this Tribunal in assessee’s own case for the immediately preceding year [2014 (9) TMI 1280 - ITAT JODHPUR] and as the Revenue has not been able to show any distinguishable facts, we are of the view that the finding of the learned CIT (A) is on right footing and does not call for any interference. As a result ground No.1 in both the Revenue’s appeal stands dismissed.
Leave encashment claimed u/s 43B - CIT (A) has deleted the same by applying the proviso to Section 43B of the Act as the said amount had been paid before the due date applicable for filing the return of income under Sub Section (1) of Section 139 of the Act in respect of the previous year in which the liability to pay such sum was incurred. The Revenue has not been able to dislodge this finding of the learned CIT (A) and consequently we are of the view that the findings of the learned CIT (A) on these issues are also on right footing and do not call for any interference.
Both the appeal of the Revenue stands dismissed.
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2016 (3) TMI 1469
Exemption u/s 11 - assessee is not entitled to claim of such exemption which was not made in the return - HELD THAT:- As observed that the assessee society is registered u/s 12A of the Act and enjoys its benefits. In our considered view the ld. CIT(A) being an appellate authority ought to have considered the assessee's claim which was purely legal in nature and the reservation as contemplated in the Goetze India Ltd. [2006 (3) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT] is applicable to AO and not to the appellate authority.
We are of the view that assessee's claim should have been considered and appropriate relief in accordance with law may be provided. We set aside the matter to the file of the AO to consider the assessee's claim afresh by providing adequate opportunity of being heard. If some compliance is further required, the assessee may be allowed to make the same and decide the grounds of appeal in accordance with law. Thus the appeal of the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes.
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2016 (3) TMI 1468
Disallowance of interest - advances granted for acquiring development rights in relation to land situated at Bhandup - interest charged @ 12% on the aggregate loan - as per AO since there is no business during the relevant previous year and the only receipt declared by the assessee is interest on debentures and assessee has advanced interest free loan to Ackruti City Ltd - HELD THAT:- We are of the considered opinion that the disallowance of interest, if any, is to be restricted to the amount of advance actually given by the assessee and should not be in reference to the expenditure incurred for the registration and stamp duty charges for registration of development agreement. We further found that since the advance was granted on 31.12.2009 as per the ‘development agreement’ therefore, the period covered during the year under consideration is only w.e.f 31.12.09 i.e. for 3 months accordingly, the AO is directed to compute the disallowance of interest only on the actual amount of advance and only for the period of three months w.e.f. 31.12.09 to 31.03.10. AO is directed accordingly.
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2016 (3) TMI 1467
Seeking sanction of scheme of amalgamation with Virchow Drugs Limited. - Sections 391 and 394 of the Companies Act, 1956 - HELD THAT:- This Court is of the opinion that the proposed scheme of amalgamation is in conformity with the provisions of the Act. The scheme does not affect the interest of stakeholders and the public or public interest and is intended to further the business interests of transferor and transferee companies for more profit and maximum utilization of available resources. Therefore, the scheme of amalgamation approved in the meeting of Board of Directors of transferor company on 04.01.2016 is sanctioned with effect from the date appointed i.e., 01.04.2015. The transferor company viz., Siri Drugs India Private Limited is ordered to be dissolved without going through the process of winding up.
Petition disposed off.
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2016 (3) TMI 1466
Seeking production of original record relating to the assessment proceedings - proceedings initiated by the Assessing Officer for making a provisional assessment were not correct - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- The petitioner was directed to file reply by 10th February, 2016 which was not possible and, accordingly, the petitioner rightly applied for adjournment, which was granted fixing 15th February, 2016. The order sheet shows that the petitioner did not appear on 15th February, 2016, but at the same time, we find that if on the second date the petitioner did not appear, the Assessing Authority had the option to proceed ex-parte or fix another date, which in the instant case did not happen. If the Assessing Officer proceeded ex-parte, he could have fixed another date for ex-parte hearing or after recording the absence of the petitioner could have proceeded ex-parte and passed an assessment order on that date itself, which in the instant case did not happen. Therefore, any assessment order made on the next date i.e. on 16th February, 2016 becomes erroneous, as no date was fixed for 16th February, 2016 for making an assessment. Such assessment order passed on 16th February, 2016 without due notice is apparently in gross violation of the principles of natural justice.
The procedure relating to granting adequate opportunity as provided under Article 25 (1) of the U.P. VAT Act was not followed. Reasonable opportunity of being heard was not given. Proper inquiry was not made and therefore, the ex-parte assessment order cannot be sustained - In exceptional and in extraordinary circumstances as has happened in the instant case, the Court is of the opinion that a writ of certiorari should be issued in order to dispense justice to the assessee. There has been a gross violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Adequate opportunity of hearing has not been provided nor the sufficient time was given to file objections.
In M/S. AROMA CHEMICALS VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS [2014 (4) TMI 949 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] a Division Bench of this Court held that a period of 7 days' time given for filing reply to the show cause notice was found to be insufficient and in violation of the principles of natural justice and, accordingly, the order was quashed.
In the instant case, provisional notice was issued on 9th February, 2016 and an assessment order was passed on 16th February, 2016 within a period of one week - undue haste and speed was exercised by the Assessing Officer. The Court fails to fathom as to what was the urgency in proceeding in such a cavalier fashion. There could have been some urgency if the period of limitation was expiring for making an assessment order which in the instant case was not existing.
Tthe assessment orders cannot be sustained and are quashed - The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed at the admission stage.
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2016 (3) TMI 1465
Addition of prior period expenses - In the absence of any supporting evidence/documents, the expenses AO made the addition - CIT(A) deleted the addition - HELD THAT:- The assessee is a public sector undertaking and it has got a vast organization. In its system of account when expenditures are not reported or identified upto the close of the year are subsequently accounted for under prior period expenses. This system of accounting has been regularly followed and the Department has not disputed about this in the past. We also agree with the contention that the AO has clearly erred in drawing adverse inference that these expenditures were not covered by actuarial valuation.
AO's plea that supporting evidences have not been produced is also not cogent as rightly contended by the ld. counsel for the assessee, the particulars supporting against expenditures are duly attached with the concerned vouchers. It is not the case of the Assessing Officer that any voucher of the assessee company has been found to be lacking credibility. We also note that ITAT, Ranchi Bench, in assessee’s own case [2013 (5) TMI 858 - ITAT RANCHI] had upheld the assessee’s claim of prior period expenditure for assessment year 2007-08. Decided in favour of assessee.
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2016 (3) TMI 1464
Jurisdiction of Delhi Special Police Establishment to inquire or investigate into any offence alleged to have been committed under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Section 6A(1) of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 - HELD THAT:- The provisions of Section 6A(1) of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 has been held to be unconstitutional being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India by a Constitution Bench of this Court in DR. SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY VERSUS DIRECTOR, CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION & ANR. AND CENTRE FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION VERSUS UNION OF INDIA [2014 (5) TMI 783 - SUPREME COURT]. The judgment of the Constitution Bench is however silent as to whether its decision would operate prospectively or would have retrospective effect. Though a large number of precedents have been cited at the Bar to persuade us to take either of the above views, as would support the case of the rival parties, we are of the considered view that this question should receive the consideration of a Constitution Bench in view of the provisions of Article 145(3) of the Constitution of India.
The provisions of Section 6A(1) do indicate that for officers of the level of Joint Secretary and above a kind of immunity has been provided for. Whether there can be a deprivation of such immunity by a retrospective operation of a judgment of the Court, in the context of Article 20 of the Constitution of India, is the moot question that arises for determination in the present case - having regard to the provisions of Article 145(3) of the Constitution of India, the aforesaid question referred to a larger bench for which purpose the papers may now be laid before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India on the administrative side.
Matter referred to Larger Bench.
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2016 (3) TMI 1463
Winding up of company - inability to pay debts under Section 434(1)(a) of Companies Act - HELD THAT:- The learned Single Judge held that this was not an appropriate case for winding-up of the company on the ground of its inability to pay debts under Section 434(1)(a).
In the present case, whilst there is no doubt that the respondent company had made an OTS offer, there is no material to suggest that this offer was accepted by the IDBI and so communicated. On the other hand, the IDBI in fact assigned the debt to Kotak Mahindra Bank, which later assigned it to the present appellant. On the other hand, the company’s counter claim is still pending. The record also shows that the appellant got its “foot into the door” metaphorically speaking, by offering to the Court which was reluctant to entertain the winding up proceeding- that it would be content accepting the said sum of Rs. 250 lakhs. However, the appellant was not agreeable for that amount and demanded a high rate of interest.
This Court is unpersuaded by the submission that the Company Court overlooked the admissions, by way of the balance sheet issued by the respondent; it was shown during the hearing that the explanation for the so called credit liabilities were found in the notes to accounts, which disputed the liability and stated that the matter was pending before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the requirements for entertaining a winding up proceeding, so as to compel the Court to admit the petition, had been made out.
This Court finds no merit in the appeal. Any amounts deposited in Court by the respondent shall be refunded to it, with accrued interest. The appeal is dismissed.
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2016 (3) TMI 1462
Jurisdiction - power of Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to remit the matter to the arbitral tribunal after setting aside an arbitral award - HELD THAT:- A plain reading of Section 34 of the Act will show that parliament has not conferred any power of remand to the Court to remit the matter to the arbitral tribunal except to adjourn the proceedings as provided under sub-section (4) of Section 34 of the Act. The object of sub-section(4) of Section 34 is to give an opportunity to the arbitral tribunal to resume the arbitral proceedings or to enable it to take such other action which will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award. This provision (sub-section(4)) cannot be invoked, once the arbitral Award is set aside.
The Court below has erred in law in setting aside the arbitral award without examining the matter as laid down in Section 34 of the Act - The matter is remitted to the Court of the Principal District Judge, Dharwad, for reconsideration in accordance with law - appeal disposed off.
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2016 (3) TMI 1461
Seeking revocation of suspension order based on the Government Circular issued in Letter No.13519/N/2015-1, dated 23.07.2015 - HELD THAT:- In the present case, the petitioner was placed under suspension on 26.08.2011 and the respondent had enhanced his subsistence allowance on 23.07.2012. Thereafter, only on 29.07.2013, he was issued with the charge memo to which it is made clear that he has to face an enquiry. Even after lapse of three years, the respondent has not passed a reasoned order of extension of suspension.
However, with regard to the order of suspension, it has been kept pending for a long time. Therefore, as per the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of AJAY KUMAR CHOUDHARY VERSUS UNION OF INDIA THROUGH ITS SECRETARY & ANR. [2015 (6) TMI 592 - SUPREME COURT] and following the letter mentioned supra issued by the Government in this regard, this Court is of the view that the prolonged suspension is no longer permissible. Hence, this Court finds merit in the contention of the petitioner.
The respondent is directed to consider and pass appropriate orders on the petitioner's representation dated 24.02.2016 on merits and in accordance with law - Petition disposed off.
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2016 (3) TMI 1460
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - addition u/s 68 - unexplained cash deposits - HELD THAT:- As modus operandi of the transaction is that the moment the cash is deposited immediately the cheques are issued in favour of the somebody. Mostly the name appears of Milap Automotive Pvt. Ltd. - we reject the contention of the assessee that there is no live link between the reasons and the information received.
The assertion of Assessee that on receipt of the information from another AO, AO has simply jumped to the conclusion that the deposit is unaccounted income of the assessee. For this our view is that the moment any person of little bit of common sense looks at this account with the income earning employment of the assessee he will jump to same conclusion. Therefore we upheld that reopening of assessment is validly initiated. Therefore ground no 1 of the appeal is dismissed.
Addition u/s 68 - As it is evident that u/s 133(6) letters have been issued by the AO to them and out of them few responded. This might have happened because of short time available during the remand proceedings and death of Shri Dinesh Prasad who was the main person collecting money from other parties. As the AO himself has stated that the assessee may not be the real owner of the sum so deposited, therefore in the interest of justice we set aside all three appeals back to the file of AO for verification of the details filed and also to enquire from the beneficiaries of the sum received from the bank account of the assessee. Verification from the bank also may be conducted for the companies in which the assessee has made investment. In view of this all the three appeals are set aside to the file of AO to make assessment de novo. Appeal filed by the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes.
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2016 (3) TMI 1459
TP Adjustment - DRP directing the TPO/AO to provide freight subsidy where the figure of freight subsidy is not separately available in the annual report of the assessee company - HELD THAT:- We are not in agreement with the findings of the TPO, in view of the fact that in para-20 schedule to the notes of account of the annual report of global green, it is clearly mentioned that transportation outward expenses are net of freight subsidy. As further observed that by the DRP in such circumstances, in the absence of any contradictory evidence, it cannot be presumed that the freight subsidy has not been reduced from the operating cost and therefore, in the absence of information even though adjustment is not possible, but in such circumstances, for uniform comparability, the freight subsidy in the case of the assessee company has to be considered as operating in nature. The AO is accordingly, directed to consider the said subsidy as part of operating revenue.
Working capital adjustment - As reliance has been placed by the assessee are of the view that the working capital adjustment needs to be allowed. AO is accordingly, directed to allow the working capital adjustment.
Decided against revenue.
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2016 (3) TMI 1458
Deduction u/s 80IA - AO disallowed deduction as Department has filed SLP before the Hon’ble Supreme Court challenging the decision of Velayudhaswamy Spinning Mills P. Ltd. [2012 (10) TMI 1125 - SC ORDER] - HELD THAT:- As decided in Velayudhaswamy Spinning Mills & Others [2010 (3) TMI 860 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] eligible business were the only source of income during the previous year relevant to initial assessment year and every subsequent assessment years. When the assessee exercises the option, the only losses of the years beginning from initial assessment year alone are to be brought forward and no losses of earlier years which were already set off against the income of the assessee.
Looking forward to a period of ten years from the initial assessment is contemplated. It does not allow the Revenue to look backward and find out if there is any loss of earlier years and bring forward notionally even though the same were set off against other income of the assessee and the set off against the current income of the eligible business, once the set off is taken place in earlier year against the other income of the assessee, the Revenue cannot rework the set off amount and bring it notionally. Fiction created in sub-section does not contemplate to bring set off amount notionally. Fiction is created only for the limited purpose and the same cannot be extended beyond the purpose for which it is created - no infirmity in the order passed by the ld. CIT(A) and accordingly, the appeal filed by the Revenue is dismissed.
Nature of receipt - carbon credit - revenue or capital receipt - HELD THAT:- We find that the issue of carbon credits receipts has been considered by the Coordinate Bench of the Tribunal in the case of My Home Power Ltd. [2012 (11) TMI 288 - ITAT HYDERABAD] and held that these receipts are capital receipts. We hold that the carbon credits receipts are capital in nature. So far as case law relied on by the DR in the case of Apollo Tyres Ltd. [2014 (1) TMI 33 - ITAT COCHIN] is concerned, once there is a judgment of is bounden duty of the Tribunal to follow the judgment of the High Court. We find no infirmity in the order passed by ld. CIT(A). Thus, the ground raised by the Revenue for both the assessment years are dismissed.
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2016 (3) TMI 1457
Attribution of income - receipt of arbitration award and interest thereon - allowability of expenses related to award - whether expenses incurred should have been allowed & only net income ought to have been taxed? - HELD THAT:- On verification of computation, it is found that payment of (vi) running bills, principal amount and thereon interest from 01/6/1993 to 31/5/1999 and balance payment (unmeasured work), principal amount and interest thereon from November, 1993 to 31/5/1999 , the Arbitrator has allowed principal amount of Rs. 1,36,983/- and thereafter interest at Rs. 1,80,818/-, thus, total amount has been worked by the Arbitrator at Rs. 3,17,801/-, remaining amount pertained to refund of security deposit of Rs. 76,210/- and interest thereon from November, 1993 to 31/5/1999 Rs. 95,025/- and litigation expenses of Rs. 30,000/-.
Since the identical issue decided by the Coordinate Bench for A.Y. 2006-07 has already been challenged before the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court and the Hon'ble High Court has also framed question of law in the case of assessee which is pending for disposal. Assessee’s appeal is allowed for statistical purposes only.
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2016 (3) TMI 1456
Seeking forbearing the respondents from enforcing the provisions of the amended Paragraph 26(2) of the Employees Provident Fund Scheme in so far as temporary and casual and site workers engaged by the members of the petitioner - HELD THAT:- Since the Hon'ble Supreme Court in J.P.Tobacco Products, etc., etc. v. Union of India & Others [1995 (4) TMI 320 - SUPREME COURT] has already dealt with amended paragraph 26(2) of the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, 1952, the same cannot be challenged in the present Writ Petition and further as per Section 2(f) of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, the same is applicable even to casual workers. Therefore the first contention putforth on the side of the appellant/petitioner is sans merit.
It is an admitted fact that under Section 7-A of the Act, the appellant/petitioner is having unfettered right of raising its objection if any and the same right has also been given by the learned Single Judge and this Court need not make any observation with regard to that aspect.
Appeal dismissed.
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