Whether under the circumstances of the case the confiscation ordered by the Collector, Central Excise is illegal?
Whether under any circumstances he could not have confiscated the entire quantity of tobacco used in the mixture?
Held that:- At the same time no person can be permitted to benefit by his wrongful act. No rule of law should be so interpreted as to permit or encourage its circumvention. If by the wrongful act of a party he renders it impossible for the authorities to confiscate under Rule 40 the non-duty paid goods, it is in our opinion open to those authorities to confiscate from out of the goods seized, goods of the value reasonably representing the value of the non-duty paid goods mixed in the goods seized. Applying that rule to the facts of this case, it follows that the Collector Central Excise could have confiscated out of the tobacco seized so much of it as can be held to reasonably represented the value of the tobacco on which the duty had not been paid.
As noticed earlier the tobacco confiscated had been returned to the appellants after realising from them a sum of ₹ 1 lac. as fine. The Counsel for the parties agreed at the hearing that the value of the Biri Patti tobacco used in the mixture for which no duty had been paid could be fixed at ₹ 35,000/-. In view of this agreement it is not necessary for us to remit the case back to the Collector of Central Excise for assessing the value of the tobacco on which duty had not been paid. In view of our earlier findings the fine to be levied on the appellants in lieu of the confiscation that could have been ordered has to be fixed at ₹ 35,000/-. From this it follows that the Collector has to refund to the appellants a sum of ₹ 65,000/- which he has collected from them in excess of the aforementioned ₹ 35,000/-. The appeal is allowed to that extent. In the circumstances of the case we direct the parties to bear their own costs both in this Court as well as before the High Court.
Whether case fell within the language of the two notifications, dated July 31, 1959 and April 30, 1960 and the appellant was entitled to ,exemption from payment of excise duty on the cotton fabrics?
Held that:- The case of the appellant is covered by the language of the two notifications, dated July 31, 1959 and April 30, 1960 and the appellant is entitled to exemption from excise duty for the cotton fabrics produced for the period between October 1, 1959 to April 30, 1960 and from May 1, 1960 to January 3, 1961. It follows therefore that the appellant is entitled to the grant of a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the order of the Assistant Collector of Central Excise of Baroda, dated November 26, 1962 and the appellate order of the Collector of Central Excise, dated November 12, 1963. For the reasons expressed we hold that the judgment of the High Court of Gujarat, dated July 31, 1964 should be set aside, that Special Civil Application No. 1054 of 1963 should be allowed and that a writ in the nature of certiorari should be granted to quash the order of the Assistant Collector of Excise and Customs dated November 26, 1962 and the order of the Collector of Excise dated November 12, 1963. This appeal is accordingly allowed
... ... ... ... ..... ds belonging to such person. That has not however been put as a condition precedent. The certificate can, in my opinion be issued even without first trying to deduct or attach and sell the excisable goods. In this case, there are no sums in the hands of the officer concerned which could have been deducted. It is not clear whether there are any excisable goods belonging to the petitioner which would have been attached and sold. Assuming that they are there, even then, as stated by me earlier, it was not incumbent upon the officer to follow that procedure as a condition precedent before he could have issued the certificate. The section is plain and does not warrant any such interpretation. 5.Since no other contention was raised, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. MEMO OF COSTS Respondents Costs Rs. Ps Stamp for vakalatnama. . . . Nil Advocate s fee as fixed by the Court . . . 100.00 to be paid by the petitioner to the respondent 100.00
... ... ... ... ..... e did not accept this suggested interpretation. We agree with him. The expression without spinning plants being an attribute should relate to the nearest noun factories and not to the remote noun manufacturer The interpretation suggested by counsel for the appellant necessitates the transference of the expression without spinning plants to the beginning part of the rule or the addition of certain words in order to give the rule more grammatical form. But that is not the proper method of interpretation. Nor does it appear to us to be necessary to overstration the language of the rule in that way. The natural construction should be accepted. According to the natural constructions the expression without spinning plants should qualify the nearest noun factories Accordingly the company rightly applied to the Collector for availaing of the Artificial Silk Fabrices in the factory which has got no spinning plants. There is no force in this appeal. Accordingly is dismissed with costs.
... ... ... ... ..... etitioner has not furnished any evidence of his allegation that his father was the licensee. At the hearing, the learned counsel relied upon the order dated 17-5-1962 itself, in which the name of Latoori Mal was mentioned. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be held that the petitioner has established his allegation that his father was the licensee. Article 226 of the Constitution confers an equitable jurisdiction. A litigant cannot claim relief under it as of right. The petitioner has come to this Court with incorrect allegations and wants to take advantage of a typing error in an order, which was passed in 1962. The petitioner had filed an appeal. It has not been stated whether this point was taken by him there. In that event, the mistake would have been corrected then and there. After such a long lapse of time he cannot be given relief on the basis of such a technical defect in the order. The petition fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.
Whether what he actually produces by combusting limestone with coke is carbon dioxide?
Whether it is compressed carbon dioxide as contemplated by Item 14-H?
Held that:- The mere fact that at one stage or the other kiln gas is pressed at 40 to 45 lbs. per sq. inch by a pump or otherwise cannot mean that it is compressed carbon dioxide. At the same time the duty being on manufacture and not on sale the mere fact that kiln gas generated by these concerns is not actually sold would not make any difference if what they generate and use in their manufacturing processes is carbon dioxide. The fact that the gas so generated has carbon dioxide below 99 per cent and does not conform to the specifications of the Indian Standard Institution also would not matter for the gas may be sub-standard, provided what is produced is carbon dioxide.
Thus the gas generated by these concerns is kiln gas and no carbon dioxide as known to the trade i.e. to those who deal in it or who use it. The kiln gas in question therefore is neither carbon dioxide nor compressed carbon dioxide known as such to the commercial community and therefore cannot attract Item 14-H in the First Schedule. Appeal allowed.
