|
Advanced Search Options
Income Tax - Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 123 Records
-
1955 (10) TMI 39 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he questions of law which can be agitated in what we might for convenience describe as the second reference, could only be those questions which do not arise out of the first order passed by the Appellate Tribunal and which have not been considered by the Appellate Tribunal in its first order. If a question has been considered and no reference is sought, then it is not open to the assessee or the Commissioner to seek a reference at a subsequent stage because that reference would be barred. But if in giving effect to the decision of the High Court, the Tribunal passes an order out of which a question of law arises, which question never arose out of the first order, then there is no reason why the assessee or the Commissioner should not have the right of coming to the High Court under section 66(1) or section 66(2). In our opinion, the learned Judge below was right in the view that he took. The result is that the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
-
1955 (10) TMI 37 - TRAVANCORE-COCHIN HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... uilon, purported by Ex. B order dated 30th April, 1955, to rectify an alleged mistake in the computation of the income under business in the assessment as above. This was done by setting off the loss of the previous year which had been allowed to be carried forward against the cashew income alone for the year, the income from tobacco being added on to the income from property and other sources for purpose of assessment. 16. The question arising in this case is similar to that which I have already decided in the connected case. Applying the same principle it has to be held that the respondent, Income-tax Officer, exceeded his jurisdiction in taking proceedings under section 35 of the Income-tax Act. The order of rectification dated 29th April, 1955, and filed in the case as Ex. B and passed under section 35 of the Income-tax Act cannot be sustained and is therefore quashed. The respondent will pay the costs of the petitioner. Advocate's fee ₹ 100. Order accordingly.
-
1955 (10) TMI 36 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... and will be dealing with another category or other categories in future, them undoubtedly this case would fall within the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court on which the Advocate-General has relied. But, as we have pointed out, in this case there are no different categories. The category is one and it is not pointed out, and it cannot be pointed out, that there would be any difficulty in the application of this particular proviso to other tax evaders besides those who have been discovered by the fortuitous circumstance of having the honour of being associated with the particular assessment and the further honour of being mentioned in the judgment of a particular Tribunal. In our opinion, the learned Judge below was right in the view that he took that this proviso offended against article 14 so far as it affects third parties. 93. The result is that the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs. Costs to be taxed on the basis of a long cause. 94. Appeal dismissed.
-
1955 (10) TMI 35 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... isdiction to review or revise their order or reconsider their decision on the facts or circumstances of the case. The effect of the issue of notice in the present case calling upon the petitioner to pay the tax by the 15th September, 1955, amounts to cancellation of the previous order made by the then Commissioner permitting the taxpayer not to pay the tax till the decision of the appeal by the Appellate Tribunal and such an order cannot, in my opinion, be covered by section 35. It really amounts to coming to a different conclusion two years later on the same set of facts. I, therefore, reject this argument also. For the reasons given above, I am of the opinion that the applicant is entitled to relief on this application and I order that the notice dated the 25th July, 1955, being in excess of jurisdiction of the Commissioner be and is set aside. This petition is, therefore, accepted with costs. Counsel's fee is assessed at ₹ 100 (one hundred). Application allowed.
-
1955 (10) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Court could take cognisance of the case without previous sanction and for this purpose the Court has to find out if the act complained against was committed by the accused while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty. Once this is settled, the case proceeds or is thrown out?
Held that:- The assault and use of criminal force etc. alleged against the accused are definitely related to the performance of their official duties. But taken along with them, it seems to us to be an obvious case for sanction. The injuries--a couple of abrasions and a swelling on Nandram Agarwala and two ecchymosis on Matajog--indicate nothing more than a scuffle which is likely to have ensued when there were angry protests against the search and a pushing aside of the protetors so that the search may go on unimpeded.
Mr. Isaacs finally pointed out that the fourth accused Nageswar Tewari was a constable and the case should have been allowed to proceed against him at least. This question arises only in Nandram Agarwala's case. The Magistrate who dismissed the complaint took the view that there was no use in proceeding against him alone, as the main attack was directed against the Income-Tax Officials. No such grievance was urged before the High Court and it is not raised in the grounds for special leave.
We hold that the orders of the High Court are correct and dismiss these two appeals.
-
1955 (10) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT
Whether section 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act under which the Income-tax Officer issued the recovery certificate to the Additional Collector of Bombay is void under article 13(1) of the Constitution in that the same offends article 22(1) and (2), article 21 and article 14 of the Constitution?
Whether section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876, under which the warrant of arrest was issued by the Additional Collector is void under article 13(1) of the Constitution as the same is repugnant to article 14 of the Constitution?
Held that:- The law impugned before us has only adopted, for its own purpose, the same coercive process which was devised by the States for their own purposes which are closely akin or similar to the purpose of the Union. To deny this power to the Union on constitutional grounds urged before us will lead us to hold that no new offence created by law can be made triable according to the procedure laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure, for that Code sanctions different modes of trial in different areas, namely, by section 30 Magistrate in some areas, by the Sessions Judge with assessors in certain areas, and by the Sessions Judge with jurors in other areas. Adoption of an existing machinery devised for a particular purpose cannot, if there be no vice of unconstitutionality in the machinery, render it unconstitutional if it is made to subserve a purpose closely akin or similar to the purpose for which it had been devised. The first objection formulated by learned counsel for the petitioner must, therefore, be rejected.
It is only after the sale proceeds were found to be insufficient to satisfy the assessed amount and the assessee failed to pay up the balance that the question of the arrest of the defaulter arose. By that time section 13 had been amended and the warrant of arrest was issued on the 7th June, 1955, that is to say, long after the amendment of the section. In our opinion the second ground urged by the learned counsel must also be negatived. Appeal dismissed.
-
1955 (9) TMI 83 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e into operation provided the valuation discloses a surplus and not a deficit. There is no warrant for that contention in the language of rule 3(a). When rule 3(a) refers to "computing the surplus for the purpose of rule 2" it only refers to the mode of computation laid down in rule 2(b). It does not postulate that the result of the computation must be a surplus before rule 3(a) can come into play. If there is a surplus, then the surplus would be reduced by the permissible deduction under rule 3(a). If there is a deficit, the deficit will be increased by the permissible deduction under rule 3(a). But if the deduction is one which falls within the ambit of rule 3(a) it must be allowed as a deduction in computing the surplus or the deficit for the purpose of rule 2(b). The answers to the questions therefore will be (1) in the negative, (2) does not arise, (3) in the negative, and (4) in the affirmative. The Commissioner to pay the cost. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1955 (9) TMI 82 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... er were to be accepted, then the assessee would be in the happy position of not having to pay the penalty at all because there is no provision in law of recovering the penalty. The reason why Section 18A (9) is not mentioned in Section 47 is because, again, the Legislature has looked upon the imposing of penalty on the grounds mentioned in Section 18A(9) as the exercise of power under S. 28 and not under Section 28(1)(c), and as Section 47 provides for recovery of penalties imposed under Section 28 it was unnecessary to refer to Section 18A(9). 3. In our opinion, the Tribunal was in error in holding that the appeal was not competent. Therefore, we must answer the Question as follows "The order of the Income Tax Officer imposing the penalty was passed under Section 28(l)(c) read with Section 18A(9) and an appeal against that order lay, to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and thereafter to the Tribunal". 4. The Commissioner to pay the costs. 5. Reference answered.
-
1955 (9) TMI 78 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s and we cannot predicate that the 300 shares which were sold were shares other than the bonus shares, and you have to determine what the cost to the assessee was with regard to these 350 shares, and that cost can only be arrived at by averaging the cost by taking into consideration the fact that the 50 bonus shares were received free of cost. It is only by that method that the proper profit or loss can be arrived at. In is only by that therefore, by reason of the decision that we gave in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Messrs. Manecklal Chunilal & Sons Ltd. (Income Tax Reference No. 16 of 1948) the method of valuation adopted by the Income-tax Department was right and the loss should be assessed according to the method of the Department and not according to the assessee company or to the Tribunal. The answer therefore must be that the loss by the assessee company computed by the Department is according to law. The assessee to pay the costs. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1955 (9) TMI 76 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... alled for. In my opinion, the correct view to be taken in such cases was taken in the case of 1950 18ITR194(Mad) and I would refer, in particular, to the judgment of Viswanatha Sastri J. 18. For the reasons given above, it appears to me that there were no materials in this case on which the Tribunal could properly hold that any part of the remuneration paid to Mr. Rohatgi as Managing Director was the income of the assessee family for taxing purposes. The Tribunal, it would be remembered, did not hold the whole of the remuneration to be the family's income but only a part. In my view, there are no facts in the present case, from which it could be held that the amount in question was assessable in the hands of the assessee family as a part of its income. 19. The answer to the questions referred must, therefore, be Question (1) "No." Question (2) "On Mr. Rohatgi personally." The assessee will have the costs of this Reference. S.C. Lahiri, J. 20. I agree.
-
1955 (9) TMI 75 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e years immediately preceding the previous year. The reasons for introducing this fiction was that certain profits in the past years bore less tax because the company did not pay any excess dividend and it conformed to the ceiling laid down by the Legislature, but when in subsequent years the company departed from the ceiling the Legislature asked the taxing authorities to assume that what was being paid as dividend was out of those profits which had been kept back or kept in reserve. But, as we have just pointed out, this fiction has no scope. It cannot have any play in a case where there are no past profits which were kept back or kept in reserve. Therefore, in our opinion, the Tribunal was right when it came to the conclusion that the assessee company was not liable to pay any additional tax in the circumstances of this case. The answer to question No. 1 will be in the affirmative and the answer to question No. 2 will be in the negative. The Commissioner to pay the costs.
-
1955 (9) TMI 74 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... . In our opinion the two cases are not in pari materia. In the case of a Court sale the sale is effected by the Court and the Court issues a sale certificate when the sale becomes complete and the title vests in the auction purchaser. In the case of a sale by a receiver, although it may be a result of an order of the Court, it is not the order of the Court that vests the title in the purchaser. In order to vest the title in the purchaser the receiver has to execute a conveyance in favour of the purchaser and it would be that conveyance which would ultimately vest the title in the purchaser. Therefore the sale effected by the receivers was a sale as contemplated by the Transfer of Property Act. It was not a compulsory transfer of title as a result of any provision of the law. In our opinion, therefore, the Tribunal was in error when it took the view that this case fell within the third proviso to section 12B. We, therefore, answer the question submitted to us in the negative.
-
1955 (9) TMI 73 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... in circumstances gets exemption from payment of tax which has been assessed and which has been charged. The only ground that the Tribunal has in its judgment given for accepting the contention of the department is that the assessee was not assessable to tax by reason of section 25 (4). That, with respect, is a clearly erroneous view of the matter. The assessee was not bound to make an application under section 25 (4). He might not have made an application in which case the position would have remained the same except that the department would have proceeded to the next stage, that of levying the tax, but because he did apply under section 25 (4) and the application was granted the department stopped at the second stage of charging and did not proceed to levy the tax or compel the assessee to pay the tax. In our opinion the case of the assessee falls within the ambit of the notification. The result is that the answer to the question submitted to us must be in the affirmative.
-
1955 (9) TMI 72 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... it as his dividend income. Whether rights the assessee may be entitled to by reason of the fact that subsequently he became liable to refund the dividend, those rights are outside the ambit of the particular assessment with which we are concerned. He may have relief under the Income-tax Act or he may not, but we are not concerned with the position that arose on the 4th December, 1947, which would correspond with the assessment year 1948-49. We are only concerned with the assessment year 1946-46, and as far as that assessment is concerned the assessee had no answer to the contention of the Department that the sum of ₹ 30,000 represented his dividend income. Our answers to the questions submitted to us will therefore be Question (1) is unnecessary. Question (2) in the affirmative as to the first part. The latter part of question (2) does not arise. The assessee to pay the costs. Notice of motion dismissed. No orders as to costs of the notice of motion. Appeal dismissed.
-
1955 (9) TMI 67 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the assessment year 1944-45 and the assessment year 1945-46, and the petition, as we have already pointed out in our judgment, with regard to the assessment year 1945-46 is the same as the year 1944-45. Therefore, we amend the question No. (1) by adding "Whether the Tribunal erred in law regarding the sums of ₹ 2,18,669 paid to C.H. Ghanekar and ₹ 1,09,375 paid to Keshardeo Hanumanbux." We will answer the question that the Tribunal erred in law regarding the sum of ₹ 6,77,875 paid to C.H. Ghanekar, and the sum of ₹ 34,875 paid to L.V. Iyer, as also the sum of ₹ 2,18,669 paid to C.H. Ghanekar and the sum of ₹ 1,09,375 paid to Keshardeo Hanumanbux; and the answer to question No. (2) will be that there was evidence before the Tribunal with regard to the sums of ₹ 54,100 paid to Narayandas Joharmal, ₹ 4,600 paid to Miss Grant and ₹ 4,707 paid to Dharsey Chapsey. No order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1955 (9) TMI 66 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... was understood then, he was resident of an Indian State, the provision with regard to section 22 has no application to a non-resident. The contention is obviously untenable. It is now well settled law that the Indian Legislature has the competence to tax nonresidents and the legislation cannot be challenged on the ground of extraterritoriality. If the Legislature has the power to tax a non-resident, surely it has the power which is not of such a wide nature of making a provision for the issue of a notice which would bind a non-resident. In our opinion, therefore, the case falls under section 34(1)(a), the period of limitation is eight years, and if this is the period of limitation there is no dispute that the notices were issued in time and the assessments were completed in time and the assessments were valid and binding. Our answer to the questions submitted to us will be (1) In the negative. (2) Does not arise. The assessee to pay the costs. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1955 (9) TMI 65 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 00. This is nothing more than a mere book entry, to use the language of the Privy Council. The value put upon the shares of the new company in no way increases or decreases the real value of what Sir Homi Mehta got, and what he got was the very shares which he purported to transfer to the limited company but held through a limited company and not through himself as an individual. Ultimately the result must depend upon the view that we take as to whether Sir Homi Mehta made any profit or gain in a commercial sense by transferring these shares to the newly formed limited company. In our opinion he did not make any profit or gain and therefore the mere fact that the shares which he transferred had a market value at the date of the transfer higher than the cost price of the shares did not make Sir Homi Mehta liable to pay tax on the difference. We therefore answer the question submitted to us in the negative. The Commissioner to pay the costs. Reference answered in the negative.
-
1955 (9) TMI 64 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... judicate is not applicable to income-tax cases. Each year is a separate unit that falls for scrutiny. The finding that the debt in question did not become a bad debt relates to the accounting period under consideration only. 21. As already observed by us, there is no evidence in the case that the debt had become barred during the year in question. In our opinion, therefore, no question of law arises on this point also. 22. In the view we have taken of the case it is not necessary for us to decide whether in dealing with an application under section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act it is open to this Court to ask the Tribunal to state the case in respect of grounds other than those canvassed by the assessee before the Tribunal. Opinion on this question is divided. In the facts and circumstances of his case it is not necessary to go into this question. 23. For reasons stated above, this application is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 75. Application dismissed.
-
1955 (9) TMI 63 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nities at all because he could not carry on any trade. Lord Black burn in his judgment at page 76 makes it clear that on the facts of the case he could reach no other conclusion than that the money was paid to reimburse the assessees for the trading profits which they would have earned had the vessel been timeously delivered. One can understand if the assessee had given the licence to someone else. The licence would have been in existence and for some reason he was prevented from earning the profits on that licence. But when the licence itself is not in existence the money could not paid to reimburse the assessee for trading profits which he could have earned. Having heard the Advocate-General we do not think that the case he relies on in any way militates against the principle laid down in Commissioner of Income-tax vs Shamsher Printing Press, (1953) 23 ITR 363. The result is that we must answer the question referred to us in the negative. The Commissioner to pay the costs.
-
1955 (9) TMI 62 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... alisation may depend on the contingency that the making up of the accounts would show income, profits or gains." Therefore, the Advocate-General would be right that the mere fact that computation could not be made on 22-8-1950 and it could be made only later will not necessarily militate against the position that Arvind had acquired the right to receive the amount on 22-8-1950. But if he had no right to receive the amount at all the mere computation will not create a right which did not exist. 10. Therefore, in our opinion, the Tribunal was in error when it took the view that the sum of ₹ 2,49,459 represented profits of the partnership to which Arvind as a minor was entitled. If the Tribunal was in error in taking that view, then clearly this amount could not be included in the assessee's total income of Samvat Year 2006. 11. We must therefore answer the question submitted to us in the negative. Commissioner to pay the costs. 12. Question answered in negative.
........
|
