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Income Tax - Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 77 Records
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1979 (12) TMI 81
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... ... ..... rship in the firm, hence no goodwill and accordingly in could not be subjected to any gift-tax. 10. Under s. 2(D) of the said Indian Partnership Act, 1932 a third party has been defined and used in relation to a firm or to a partner therein, meaning any person who is not a partner in the firm. The minor not being partner, but having been admitted to the benefits of the partnership, as such is a third party vis-a-vis the firm and the partners constituting the firm as per the above definition, with the result that the minor was not entitled to any goodwill and the goodwill could not be subjected to any gift-tax in lieu of the goodwill as in the present case since the minor has not acquired any goodwill. 11. In the result, we agree with the findings of the AAC and uphold the impugned order, though on the reasoning mentioned above. In the result, the appeal by the Revenue fails and is dismissed, while the cross objections by the assessee become infructuous and are also dismissed.
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1979 (12) TMI 80
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... ... ..... sessee has not been categorical in his assertions about the claim made, being in toto, in respect of cartons as above, and since we have held that packing expenses in lieu of carton used on goods meant for export qualify for weighted deduction in terms of export market development allowance under s. 35B of the Act being expenses in the nature of advertisement publicity and covered under sub-cl. (i) of cl. (b) of sub-sec. (1) of s. 35B of the Act, we direct the ITO to work out the relief on these expenses and allow it to the assessee for all the three assessment years under appeal. The appeals by the assessee for all the three assessment years succeed and are allowed. 24. In the result, the ITA Nos. 739 and 740 /Ahd/78-79 by the assessee and the cross objections Nos. 223 and 224/Ahd/ 78-79 arising out of ITA Nos. 739 and 740 and ITA No. 976 / Ahd/ 78-79 by the assessee succeed and are allowed, while ITA No. 1026/Ahd 78-79 by the Revenue partly succeeds and is allowed in part.
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1979 (12) TMI 60
Income Tax Act, Income Tax Rules ... ... ... ... ..... tained in the provision in question unless any one payment is above Rs. 2,500. Section 40A appears in Chap. IV of the Act dealing with computation of total income and is classified under the sub-heading in group D Profits and gains of business or profession . Parliament must have intended a working rule and unless by clear meaning of the words a different intention appears, we must give the provision a construction which would make the provision workable. Our answer to the first question, therefore, is The statutory limit of Rs. 2,500 under s. 40A(3) of the Act applies to payments made to a party at a time and not to the aggregate of payments made to a party in the course of the day as recorded in the cash book. In view of such an answer, in the instant case, the provision was not at all attracted. The second question does not arise and need not be answered. Assessee would be entitled to costs of this reference. Hearing fee is assessed at rupees one hundred. DAS J.--I agree.
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1979 (12) TMI 59
Annual Value, House Property, Income Tax Act, Rent Control ... ... ... ... ..... ssment stage is to look to the assessment order itself. When it, of its own, does not reveal that the matters and controversies now sought to be raised by way of reassessment were at all before the ITO or considered by him, it would be entirely surmiseful and, therefore, not permissible to still import their existence and consideration. This can, however, be permissible only where the assessment record of that stage overwhelmingly brings out that the matter did come for due consideration and was in fact considered. Mere silence on a matter or absence of discussion in the original order does not imply that the ITO adjudicated upon the same one way or the other. Having made these observations, I concur with the overall conclusion of my learned brother that question No. 2 should be answered in favour of the revenue in terms of the observations made above. As regards question No. 1, the same is returned unanswered, to be adjudicated afresh by the Tribunal in accordance with law.
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1979 (12) TMI 57
Assessed Tax, Interest On Tax ... ... ... ... ..... der of the High Court or other appellate authority which reduces the assessment only indicates that there is an overpayment where payment of the assessed tax has already been made. It does not mean that the overpayment is only from the date of such order of the appellate authority of the High Court. The proviso also indicates that the Commissioner is given a discretion in the matter of fixing up the rate of interest. He cannot curtail the period for which interest is to be paid and postpone it to a date subsequent to the date of actual payment which as a result of the High Court s order has become an overpayment. The restriction imposed by the Commissioner is thus without authority of law. The petitioner was entitled to interest from the date when the assessed tax for the said years had been paid and up to the date when they were adjusted towards subsequent years. A writ shall issue that the Commissioner shall modify his order accordingly. Parties shall bear their own costs.
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1979 (12) TMI 56
Foreign Technician ... ... ... ... ..... the words for the period of three hundred and sixty-five days in all , the Legislature is referring to remuneration for the services rendered for a specified number of days and this expression has nothing to do either with accrual or receipt. In this context, when we try to construe s. 10(6)(vii)(b), we are led to the conclusion that a technician is entitled to exemption of remuneration for the period of 365 days in all commencing from the date of his arrival in India-whether the said period of 365 days falls within one financial year or more than one financial year. The moment he has received this advantage of exemption any remuneration earned for a period exceeding 365 days would be subject to taxation. On our understanding of s. 10(6)(vii)(b) the Tribunal, it appears, has reached the correct conclusion in the instant case. Our answer to the question referred to us, therefore, is in the affirmative and against the department. We make no order as to costs. DEB J.--I agree.
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1979 (12) TMI 55
Provident Fund, Termination Of Service ... ... ... ... ..... ue and becoming payable to an employee participating in a recognised provident fund is excluded from the computation of his total income, inter alia, if though he has not rendered continuous service for a period of five years or more, his service has been terminated by any cause beyond his control. In the instant case, the Tribunal has found on the facts that the assessee tendered his resignation for reasons recorded in the employer s letter of the 23rd August, 1967. These were reasons beyond the control of the assessee. The Tribunal has also found that the employer wrote this letter bona fide and not for any ulterior purposes. On the basis of these factual findings by the Tribunal, we have to hold that the Tribunal has correctly applied to the instant case the provisions of r. 8(ii) of Part A of Sch. IV to the I.T. Act, 1961. Our answer to the question referred to us, therefore, is in the affirmative and against the department. We make no order as to costs. DEB J.--I agree.
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1979 (12) TMI 54
Carry Forward, Registered Firm, Set Off, Unabsorbed Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... that it is the only possible construction of the provisions contained in s. 32(2) of the Act the contention of the revenue does not hold good. We respectfully differ from the opinion expressed in 1973 92 ITR 459 (All) (K. T. Wires Products v. Union of India) and 1975 101 ITR 658 (Guj) (CIT v. Go Silk Wvg. Factory). Suffice it to say that the problem was not looked at and solution sought for in the manner dealt with by us. We express the same view regarding Raj Narain Agarwala v. CIT 1970 75 ITR 1 (Delhi). but would like to add that the observation touching the, question relevant for our determination was an obiter dictum of the High Court. The views expressed in the decisions do not appeal to us. In the result, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. Let a copy of the judgment be sent to the Appellate Tribunal who shall render such orders as are necessary to dispose of the case conformably to the judgment.
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1979 (12) TMI 53
Amendment In 1968, Annual Charge, Income From House Property, Income From Other Sources, Rule Against Double Taxation
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1979 (12) TMI 52
Profits In Lieu ... ... ... ... ..... ere is some force in the contention raised by the assessee. However, we find that no such plea was at all raised at any stage before the I.T. authorities or even before the Appellate Tribunal. The question referred to us by the Tribunal is also confined to the interpretation of the provisions contained in s. 17 of the 1961 Act. We are required to give our opinion on that question. As already noted above, if those provisions are taken into account, the amount of Rs. 1 5,200 given to the assessee in the present case, had to be treated and assessed as salary income in this year. We, therefore, answer the question referred in the affirmative. We are unable to allow the new case to be set up at this reference stage by the assessee. In case, however, the law permits the assessee to put forth his claim under s. 28 before any authority, he can do so in accordance with law and let the authority consider the same, accordingly. No order as to cost. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1979 (12) TMI 51
Private Company ... ... ... ... ..... he context of the articles of association of the company which permitted such salary, the resolution dated August 25, 1960, which also recognised that the matter relating to remuneration would be taken up later, the consistent conduct of the company in paying every month the salary amounts to the managing director and the tacit approval of the other directors of this course did lend it the cloak of regularity. No manifest illegality on this score, therefore, could be in the circumstances imputed. As regards the observation of the learned Tribunal that the withdrawals could be treated as mere borrowings, was never the case of the assessee or the company at any stage. In the totality of these circumstances, we are of opinion that the amounts of salary in these years actually accrued to the assessee and he did receive them as well. The questions referred are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. Looking at the circumstances of the cases, no order as to costs.
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1979 (12) TMI 50
Additional Super Tax, High Court, Undistributed Profits ... ... ... ... ..... ted, especially when the larger company which embodied within itself all the three companies had undertaken to meet all the liabilities and obligation of the transferor-companies. Perhaps orders under s. 23A could as well be treated as rectifications of original assessments. The plea of the company that with the passage of time, the reference should not be returned unanswered, does not much call for indulgence when the company had itself been indulging belatedly in hypertechnicalities. No approval to the dubious silence adopted by virtue of certain decisions of the High Court may deserve to be extended. The courts of law do expect straightforward and above-board conducts. They need not look with favour on any strategical devices enacted under which ITOs are tempted to fall in trap by making wrong orders. With these observations I concur with the ultimate decision arrived at by my learned brother that the references be returned unanswered as incompetent. No order as to costs.
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1979 (12) TMI 48
State Electricity Board ... ... ... ... ..... the aforesaid finding, the Tribunal relied upon Alimohamad s case 1974 97 ITR 133. Even if reliance on the ratio in Alimohamad s case is not available, the finding of fact is clear and we do not think that merely because the ratio in Alimohamad s case 1974 97 ITR 133 has been overruled so far as this aspect is concerned, the revenue can succeed. This matter seems to have been concluded by a clear finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal that there was sufficient cause for the delay. Our answer to the question, therefore, is On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in upholding the order of the AAC in the matter of deletion of penalty under s. 271(1) of the Act, though it went wrong in relying upon the ratio in Alimohamad s case 1974 97 ITR 133, in view of the fact that the same had been overruled by a larger Bench of this court. As the assessee has not appeared at the hearing, there would be no direction for costs. N. K. DAS J.--I agree.
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1979 (12) TMI 47
Business Expenditure, Mercantile System, Previous Year, Sales Tax Liability ... ... ... ... ..... needs of the assessee. In case, on the material, the ITO is satisfied that the remuneration or the salary paid is excessive and not commensurate with the genuine business needs, he has jurisdiction to disallow such claims. The Tribunal, in the present case, has found that the assessee had enhanced the salaries of three employees during the relevant previous year by two hundred per cent. and keeping in view the business requirements of the assessee it was not reasonable on the part of the assessee to have granted further remuneration by way of giving a percentage of the profits earned. The Tribunal could justifiably, on these considerations, disallow the expenditure as not being commensurate with the reasonable business activities of the assessee. We accordingly answer both the questions in the affirmative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The department is entitled to its costs which are assessed at Rs. 200. Counsel s fee is assessed at the same figure.
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1979 (12) TMI 46
State Electricity Board ... ... ... ... ..... significant. These words show that the legislature did not want to give a hide-bound meaning to the definition appearing in the section. Therefore, the definitions are to be read subject to the context in the sections of the Act. If the definition clause is not applicable in a particular context, it may be modified accordingly. It further shows that, if the context requires, the Board can be treated as licensee. In view of the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion that the Board is a licensee within the meaning of the Act. Consequently, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the Punjab State Electricity Board was a licensee within the meaning of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, and it was entitled to the allowance of the development rebate as contemplated by prov. (b) to Expln. 2 to s. 10(2)(vib) of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922. For the reasons recorded above, we answer the question in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee. B. S. DHILLON J.--I agree.
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1979 (12) TMI 45
Individual Income ... ... ... ... ..... investments but for the individual services he rendered. They have mainly placed reliance upon the decision in Raj Kumar Singh Hukam Chandji 1970 78 ITR 33 (SC). My learned brother too has agreed with those conclusions and has also referred to the Supreme Court decision in the case of Jugal Kishore Baldeo Sahai v. CIT 1967 63 ITR 238 (SC), wherein a karta or a coparcener attending to the family business, it was held, could be paid remuneration. From the side of the assessee, it was also sought to be urged in the present case that new businesses set up do take time before they start yielding profits. In the circumstances, it was urged that the non-enjoyment of dividend incomes by the family in the present years should not be given undue significance. In view of all these circumstances, I am not inclined to take a different view from what has been arrived at by my learned brother and, therefore, concur, though not without some reservations, with the final conclusion arrived at.
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1979 (12) TMI 44
Transfer Of Property ... ... ... ... ..... im to point out that he came to know about the proposed acquisition much later than the date of the official publication or publication at the site and, therefore, the delay in filing objections before the competent authority should be condoned. The right of the interested or affected person would be time-barred only if he filed objections beyond the prescribed period of limitation from the date of actual or constructive knowledge of acquisition and hence the order which we propose to pass will not work hardship in the actual working out so far as the rights of the individual members are concerned. We, therefore, allow these six appeals and set aside the orders passed by the income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The matter will now go back before the Tribunal from the stage where it was when it passed the orders and the appeals before the Tribunal will now be disposed of on merits so so far as the six appeals are concerned. There will be no order as to costs in any of these appeals.
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1979 (12) TMI 43
Annuity Deposit, Registered Firm, Unregistered Firm ... ... ... ... ..... amount can be given the meaning contemplated by section 271(2) only when the tax is assessed in the hands of the registered firm as if it were an unregistered firm, and, on that, the penalty is calculated as provided in section 271(1). Further, section 271(2) would be rendered nugatory if this contention were to be accepted. The very object of section 271(2) is to treat a registered firm on a par with any other assessee, with reference to the penalty, once it commits default, notwithstanding the privilege it enjoys with regard to the quantum of tax payable by it. The legal position set out above would squarely apply to the facts of this case, so that the registered firm would have to be treated as an unregistered firm to the extent necessary in regard to the calculation of tax. The result is, the questions referred to us for the two years are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee would be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500. One set.
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1979 (12) TMI 42
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... ... ..... rs 1964-65 to 1967-68. In the orders relating to the assessment of wealth-tax, the Tribunal has simply followed its order relating to income-tax which has been the subject-matter of reference in T.C. Nos. 600 to 603 of 1975. As we have answered the question referred to this court relating to income-tax in the affirmative and against the assessee, the question involved in these references, T.C. Nos. 605 to 608 of 1975, namely Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the transaction evidenced by document dated September 21, 1963, is a transfer without consideration in favour of the applicant s minor daughter and the properties so transferred can be included in the computation of the total wealth of the applicant under section 4(1)(a)(ii) of the Wealth-tax Act for the assessment years 1964-65 to 1967-68 ? is also answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs in these references.
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1979 (12) TMI 41
Exclusion, House Rent Allowance, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... to. The Rules and the section are not in conflict with each other. Rather, the Rules are supplementary to the section. Even if the assessee s case is covered by the Rules, the assessee will be entitled to exemption. The Rules impose the maximum limit to the extent of Rs. 400 per month. Admittedly, the house rent allowance paid to Mr. Justice S. C. Mittal during all the four relevant assessment years was below the maximum prescribed limit. It is equally well settled that even if two interpretations of a particular provision are possible, in that case, the I.T. Act, being a taxing statute, one favourable to the assessee would be preferred. The view taken by the Tribunal in this regard is unexceptional. In view of the Bench decision in Justice S. C. Mittal s case 1980 121 ITR 503 (P and H), we answer the question referred to us in the negative, i.e., against the revenue and in favour of the assessee. However, there will be no order as to costs. RAJENDRA NATH MITTAL J.-I agree.
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