Advanced Search Options
Income Tax - Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 77 Records
-
1979 (12) TMI 40
Assessment, Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... ase, there will be no order as to costs. Mr. Sengupta, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents, prays for a certificate for appeal before the Supreme Court under art. 134A read with art. 133(1) of the Constitution. It is submitted by him that the question whether the direction that has been given by the learned judge in making the rule nisi absolute was necessary for the disposal of the rule so as to attract the provision of s. 153(2)(ii) of the I.T. Act, 1961, is a substantial question of general importance and needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. We do not, however, think that the question is a substantial question of law of general importance. In deciding the matter, we have followed the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Rajinder Nath s case, referred to above. In the circumstances, the oral prayer for leave is refused. As prayed for, there will be stay of all further proceedings till three weeks after the Christmas vacation. SHARMA J. -I agree.
-
1979 (12) TMI 39
Capital Gains, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... yalal s estate. The question was whether, after the death of Kanhaiyalal, this amount could be brought to tax under s. 41(1) of the I.T. Act, 1961, The Madhya Pradesh High Court held that the amount, which was received by Kanhaiyalal s widow, could not be taxed in her hands as she was not the person who had obtained deduction or allowance for the amount of sales tax paid. This judgment was affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court in 1971 82 ITR 624. The question turned on the construction of s. 41(1) and s. 54 is not couched in the same language. We do not find that the said decision has any scope for the application of the construction of s. 54. Further, she was not being assessed as the legal representative of Kanhaiyalal. Here we are concerned with the assessment of Venkateswaran himself though made on his heir. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
-
1979 (12) TMI 38
Commissioner, Settlement ... ... ... ... ..... b). We would like to add that the competent authority can always consider the fact that no action has been taken against the transferors or transferee for bringing the alleged difference to tax though it will not by itself, as stated above, rebut the presumption which has been raised. The competent authority may, with the above fact of inaction coupled with other sufficient circumstances, reach the conclusion that the presumption about the ulterior motive is or is not rebutted. To that extent the fact of the inaction may be relevant, but, in our opinion, it cannot by itself alone, rebut the presumption which is permitted to be raised under s. 269C(2)(b). In that view of the matter, therefore, these appeals should be allowed and the orders of the Tribunal should be set aside and the matter be sent back to the Tribunal for disposal thereof according to the correct principles as stated in this order. In the result, these appeals are allowed accordingly with no order as to costs.
-
1979 (12) TMI 37
Carry Forward And Set Off, Loss ... ... ... ... ..... t year by virtue of cl. (i) of s. 72(1) of the Act. If that is so, then it necessarily follows that the condition prescribed by the proviso to cl. (i) of s. 72(1) of the Act is required to be satisfied if the carried forward loss in an assessment year under cl. (ii) of s. 72(1) of the Act is sought to be set off against the profits and gains of any business or profession carried on by the assessee and assessable for that assessment year. In the circumstances of the case, therefore, the Tribunal was right in holding that the assessee was not entitled to set off the loss sustained by her as partner in M/s. Alok Paper Industries in the assessment year 1970-71 as she ceased to be partner of that firm from December, 1966. For all these reasons, our answer to the first question is in the negative and against the assessee and to the second question is in the affirmative and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
-
1979 (12) TMI 36
Inaccurate Particulars, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... roach and total misconstruction of s. 271(1)(c) of the Act. The Tribunal was of the view that the inflation under one head is offset by the understatement of income under another set. This is not the criterion for the purpose of applying s. 271(1)(c). The question for consideration is had the assessee concealed the particulars of income or furnished inaccurate particulars thereof ? Whether on ultimate analysis, the concealment under one head or one source of income had been offset by the inflation of another head or source, appears to us to be an irrelevant consideration. The Tribunal, we are afraid, has not approached the question keeping in mind the correct principle on the basis of which the section had to be applied. This being so, we should decline to answer the questions referred and would send back the appeal to the Appellate Tribunal for fresh disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations contained in this judgment. We make no order as to costs.
-
1979 (12) TMI 35
... ... ... ... ..... to receive commission did not accrue to them and the entire income accrued at the end of the year and was assessable in the hands of the assignee. The contention of the assignee that part of the income accrued to the original agents and it was liable to be assessed in their hands was negatived. Similarly, in the present case, though the occasion for the award of interest was taking over possession of the land acquired, the right to receive the same arose only when the court in its discretion awarded interest on the enhanced compensation under s. 28 of the L. A. Act and was assessable only in the year of assessment and could not be spread over in the previous years because the right to receive interest did not arise prior to the passing of the decree by the court. As a result of the discussion aforesaid our answer to the question referred to us is in the negative and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs of this reference.
-
1979 (12) TMI 34
Contract Business, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... that part of the income. The only material, if at all that can be called a material, is a mere presumption that the assessee must be aware of the total volume of work done by him and of the payments that he was entitled to receive on that account. Presumption of fact cannot be equated to a finding of fact and more so when against the concrete assertion by the assessee the department has not been able to find any fact to contradict such assertion. Having regard to the discussions made above, it must be held that the finding of the Tribunal, that there was intention to conceal and/or there was gross negligence on the part of the assessee, is not based on any material and consequently the Tribunal was not right in law in holding that the penalty under s. 271 (1)(c) of the I.T. Act was leviable. In the result, both the questions are answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to costs. Hearing fee Rs. 250. NAGENDRA PRASAD SINGH .-I agree.
-
1979 (12) TMI 32
Civil Court, Reference Pending, Right To Receive Compensation ... ... ... ... ..... is actually now awarded on reference by the civil court, has to be taken into account and that has been ignored. There is no dispute that the land being in the possession of protected tenants they are entitled to 60 of the compensation that is awarded or that may be found awardable in future and only 40 thereof is payable to the accountable persons. That would undoubtedly have to be taken into account along with other factors referred to above. The determination of the right to receive compensation for the land put at Rs. 22,204, in the circumstances of the case, has to be revised having regard to the several factors referred to above. These factors have to be taken into consideration while determining the enhanced compensation payable to the accountable persons and on that basis the principal value of the property that has passed to the accountable persons determined. This question is answered accordingly in favour of the revenue and against the assessee as indicated above.
-
1979 (12) TMI 31
Balancing Allowance, Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... rows some doubt on the correctness of the decision of the Bombay High Court in CIT v. London Hotel 1968 68 ITR 62. We may point out that the learned author refers to two decisions, namely, Muthukaruppan Chettiar v. CIT 1939 7 ITR 76 (Mad) FB and Rao Bahadur S. Ramanatha Reddiar v. CIT 1928 3 ITC 10 (Rang) as if both of them were rendered by the Madras High Court and as if they were inconsistent with the decision of the Bombay High Court. In fact, there Was only one decision by the Madras High Court, the one reported in 7 ITR page 76 FB , the other one being of the Rangoon High Court. The decisions are not in point. The result is, we answer the first question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The second question does not appear to call for any answer in the present case, as the assessee has complied with the provisions, and, therefore, the question in that form does not arise for consideration. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
-
1979 (12) TMI 30
Exemptions, Gift Tax ... ... ... ... ..... wife. It may be that Manickam Gupta is the karta of the HUF, but the fact remains that the shares of the HUF to the extent of the value of Rs. 40,000 was gifted by Manickam Gupta to his wife. There is nothing to show that the gift was not made by Manickam Gupta as Manickam Gupta, but as karta of HUF. In these circumstances, we agree that the assessee is entitled to the relief under s. 5(1)(viii). In view of the above finding that the gift has been made by Manickam Gupta in his capacity as husband to his wife, the conclusion of the Tribunal on the facts of the case cannot be taken exception to. We, therefore, do not think it necessary to go into the question whether karta or a member of an undivided or joint family can make a gift to the wife of any joint family property, and claim exemption under s. 5(1)(viii) of the G.T. Act. The question referred is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
-
1979 (12) TMI 29
... ... ... ... ..... bifurcation made in the books has no correlation with the clauses of the dissolution deed. The sum of Rs. 51,923 has not also been calculated in the accounts as payment for the use of the quota and licence rights or the car, telephone or other assets used by the firm. It has been paid to acquire the rights of the retiring partners in these and other assets and is a payment of a capital nature. We may also refer to the fact that even the retiring partners appear to have treated the entire sum as one integral receipt and claimed it as capital receipt in their hands as a payment received for their right, title and interest in the firm. Though that is not conclusive, that also shows that no separate payments were contemplated as contended for by Mr. Sharma. For the reasons mentioned above, we agree with the view taken by the Tribunal and answer the question referred to us in the negative and against the assessee. The Commissioner will be entitled to his costs in this reference.
-
1979 (12) TMI 28
Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... ed that this compensation money was paid by the insurance company in connection with the transfer. Mr. Roy, in making the submission, is ignoring para. 15 read as a whole. It is true that the Tribunal has used the expression in connection with with the above extinguishment or transfer. But in the subsequent sentences, the Tribunal has said The profit which has arisen to the assessee in the present case as already stated above is from the extinguishment of its rights in the capital asset and, therefore, has arisen from the transfer of such asset. Looked at from either of the reasonings we agree with the lower authorities that the sum of Rs. 4,95,044 has been properly brought to tax as capital gains. We are of opinion that this contention of the learned counsel for the assessee cannot be accepted. For all the reasons stated above, our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative and in favour of the department. There will be no order as to costs. DEB J.-I agree.
-
1979 (12) TMI 27
Depreciation And Development Rebat ... ... ... ... ..... een asserted that the store room too was an integral part of the cold storage room. We are afraid it is not possible to give any final adjudication on then matters unless the nature and details of these different items are available. We find that the Tribunal made no attempt to go into this aspect. We are, therefore, constrained to restore the matter back to the Tribunal. Let expenses incurred on cold storage room, platform for machines, observation tower and cooling tower be treated as allowable for the purpose of allowance of development rebate and also higher rate of depreciation as applicable to plant and machinery. The Tribunal should also next look into the other items and consider as to what extent they can be treated as an integral part of the plant, and the other items, therefore, are entitled to the benefit of development rebate and depreciation as aforesaid. The question referred shall stand answered accordingly. Looking at the circumstances, no order as to costs.
-
1979 (12) TMI 26
HUF, Partition ... ... ... ... ..... d on two grounds. The first one is that the income from the asset which has ceased to belong to the HUF cannot be added to the income of the HUF. This aspect we have already decided in favour of the assessee. As regards the claim of partial partition, the Tribunal has held that there was such a claim and it was unnecessary to remand the matter. Sri Rama Rao, the learned standing counsel for the revenue, however, relying on the above two decisions, contends that the Appellate Tribunal should have remitted the matter to the ITO to give a finding with regard to the partial partition. This question has become purely academic now in view of our finding on the first point. However, the relinquishment deed is a registered one and the ITO has assessed Venkataratnam as an individual. Therefore, it is wholly unnecessary to remand the case to the ITO on the second aspect. In the result, the reference is answered in favour of the assessee and against the department. No order as to costs.
-
1979 (12) TMI 25
Cross Transfer, HUF ... ... ... ... ..... gifts had been established from which it could be inferred that these formed part of the same transaction. From the dates and the amounts of gifts we find that the above observations cannot be assailed. The learned counsel for the department has argued that these gifts had been made on account of certain arrangement. According to him, therefore, these should be considered as cross-gifts. We are not convinced with this contention. In addition to the aforesaid facts, it is also worth mentioning that the gifts in favour of the wife of the assessee karta have not been made by the donees of the karta but by the other persons. The wife of the karta had also full control over the gifts made to her. In the circumstances, it cannot be held that these are cross-gifts. For the aforesaid reasons, we answer questions Nos. 1 and 3 in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and question No. 2 in the negative, i e., against the department. No order as to costs. DHILLON J.-I agree.
-
1979 (12) TMI 24
Priority Industry ... ... ... ... ..... must apply the Mysore decision. We consider that to do so would run in the teeth of the construction placed by the Supreme Court on s. 80E. The first of the three steps referred to at p. 91 of 1978 113 ITR 84-the passage has already been extracted clearly shows that the computation of the total income has to be in accordance with the other provisions of the Act, i.e., in accordance with all the provisions, except s. 80E. This computation would take in adjustment of losses from other than priority industry also. Thus, there is no escape from adjustment of these losses. The assessee would be eligible for deduction of a percentage, of the profits and gains attributable to the priority industry, which remain after adjustment of the losses of the non-priority activity. Therefore, in our opinion, the contention of the assessee cannot be accepted and we, accordingly, answer the question referred to us in the negative and in favour of the revenue. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1979 (12) TMI 23
Jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... point on a misconception of law, the matter may not be open for consideration by this court. He could not dispute the fact that where there was any error in the contention of one of the parties then the matter could be gone into on reference. This court cannot look on helplessly with reference to an error which is manifested in the contention of both sides before the Tribunal. This court has jurisdiction to correct an error in the order of the Tribunal, so long as the point arose out of its order, whoever be the author of the mistake or error in taking up in a particular contention. Having regard to the nature of the issue that was before the Tribunal and having regard to what we have stated above, we think it proper to set aside the order of the Tribunal and direct the Tribunal to consider the case on all the points that require consideration of the question whether additional surcharge was attracted. The reference is returned unanswered. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1979 (12) TMI 22
... ... ... ... ..... he assessee. The Tribunal points out in its order that the departmental representative stated that there was no evidence to make any such plea, namely, that the firm was actually suffering losses. On the other hand, the argument that was addressed before the Tribunal would appear to be that because there was a potentiality for the incurring of losses, the shares in the partnership could not be impressed with the character of joint family property. The learned counsel for the petitioner was not able to draw our attention to any proposition of law in Hindu law or general law to the effect that simply because there was a possibility of incurring losses, a coparcener has no right to impress a property with the character of joint family property. In such a state of affairs, we do not consider that any question of law arises on the facts and circumstances of the case to be referred to this court for its opinion. Hence, the petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1979 (12) TMI 20
Business Expenditure, Interest On Borrowed Capital ... ... ... ... ..... e-firm, the credit was not given for the purposes of the business of the assessee-firm, was repelled. We fail to understand as to how the assessee can derive any advantage from this decision. That case proceeded on an entirely different set of facts. In the present case, the capital had not been borrowed by the assessee and was not utilised by it in its own business. The capital was borrowed by the sister concern and was utilised by it in its business. The assessee merely took over the liability to pay that loan by making transfer entries. That would not make these loans capital borrowed by the assessee for its own business and, therefore, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the claim for deduction of interest was not allowable under s. 36(1)(iii) of the Act. We, therefore, answer the question in the negative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The department is entitled to its costs, which we assess at Rs. 200 and counsel s fee in like figure.
-
1979 (12) TMI 19
HUF, Income ... ... ... ... ..... 3. This, in my view, can never be in the nature of the payment of an interest. The provisions of this section are very similar to s. 50(2) of the Madras Act, referred to above. As was pointed out by the Supreme there was no difficulty on their part in saying so in clear words. In my view, it is compensation for recurring loss caused to the owner because of the taking away of the income producing assets without payment of compensation, which is to cease after the payment of the final compensation. Reliance was also placed on behalf of the department on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Chandroji Rao v. CIT 1970 77 ITR 743. It was a clear case of payment of interest over the compensation payable by the Government to the jagirdar. That case has no bearing on the point in issue. In my opinion, therefore, the answers to all the questions are in the affirmative and against the department. In the circumstances, the parties will bear their own costs. SINHA J.-I agree.
|