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Income Tax - Case Laws
Showing 101 to 120 of 142 Records
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1997 (9) TMI 43 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Civil Suit, Search And Seizure ... ... ... ... ..... Before parting with this order one thing requires to be taken notice of. This fact is that a period of 30 days is specified under section 132(5) for challenging the order of seizure. That period is obviously over. The petitioner/plaintiff is left free to file objections now within a period of 30 days. This period would begin from today. This is because the plaintiff/petitioner under bona fide belief was following a remedy in the civil court. This forum is obviously not available. As such, on the basis of the principle contained in section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, it would be just and proper to allow the petitioner to file objections. As such, if the objections are now filed within a period of 30 days, the respondent authorities would look into the same and would not reject the same on the ground of limitation. The objections if any preferred by the petitioner, the same be disposed of within the period stipulated under the Act. This petition is disposed of accordingly.
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1997 (9) TMI 42 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Reference, Concealment Of Income, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... s found plausible and there could legitimately be two opinions about it, the fact that the Tribunal has accepted one version in preference to the other, does not make out a case for penalty, nor guilt of concealment could be said to have been established. This is what exactly has happened in the instant case. The question whether the assessee was guilty of concealment or furnishing of inaccurate income within the meaning of section 271(1)(c) is essentially one of fact. It could not be shown to us that the Tribunal misdirected itself in any manner in appreciating the material that was before it or it omitted to consider the relevant factors germane to the imposition of penalty for concealment under section 271(1)(c) of the Act. In view of the above discussion, this application is without merit and is, accordingly, rejected, by saying that the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is concluded by the findings of fact and does not give rise to any statable question of law.
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1997 (9) TMI 41 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax, Revision, Merger ... ... ... ... ..... change of opinion would arise in this case because the authority who is exercising jurisdiction under section 34 is not the authority who had passed the original order. Therefore, there is no question of change of opinion arising in this case. In the light of the above, we answer question No. 1 in the affirmative against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue in the light of the finding that the Deputy Commissioner had not issued notice under section 34 in respect of an assessment order which is fully merged with an appellate order. We are inclined to re-draft question No. 2 as follows Whether the Deputy Commissioner in exercise of the power under section 34 has jurisdiction to direct assessment of escaped income ? We answer the question in the affirmative against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar will be sent to the Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax, Thiruvananthapuram.
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1997 (9) TMI 40 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Firm, Reconstitution Or Succession ... ... ... ... ..... n partnership, section 188 is attracted for there is a succession of one by another partnership. In the instant case, there was no clause in the partnership deed to the effect that in the event of death of a partner, the firm will not stand dissolved. In view of the above decision of the Supreme Court and in the absence of any clause in the partnership agreement that the partnership business will continue despite the death of the partner, in our opinion, it was a case of succession of one firm by another. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal on the facts of the case was simply right in directing that the two assessments should be made for the two broken periods and it also rightly directed the grant of continuation of the registration for the period October 5, 1973, to September 11, 1974, as claimed by the declaration filed along with the return for that period. In the result, both the questions are answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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1997 (9) TMI 39 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Mercantile System, Liability To Pay Purchase Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ting the very levy of sales tax during that year, he collected it under the name rusum . The said amount was collected during the accounting period relevant to the assessment year 1968-69 when it was brought to tax in that assessment year. The claim for deduction was not allowed in the computation of the total income on the plea that the amount had not been deposited with the Government. The Supreme Court held that the amount collected by way of sales tax, though not deposited with the Government Treasury, was a permissible deduction as business expenditure on the finding that the assessee in that case maintained its accounts on mercantile basis. The Supreme Court referred to its earlier decision in Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. CIT 1971 82 ITR 363 while stating the above legal position. Following the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court both the questions referred to this court are answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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1997 (9) TMI 38 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax, Instant Tea, Tea ... ... ... ... ..... t tea unit. Even though this court, by annexure-I judgment, had directed the respondent to consider the matter afresh, the respondent has not done any such reconsideration. We, therefore, set aside annexure-K order under challenge. Since this court, while passing the interim order in C.M.P. No. 2848 of 1993, allowed the assessing authority to go on with the assessment proceedings, but to keep in abeyance recovery proceedings, revised assessment order has been already passed by the assessing authority on October 9, 1995, copy of which is produced as annexure-I along with C. M. P. No. 3085 of 1997. As a consequence of our setting aside annexure-K order dated July 1, 1993, passed by the respondent herein, we set aside the revised order dated October 9, 1995, also. We make it clear that it is open to the assessing authority to pass revised assessment order on the basis of the directions given by the Tribunal in its order dated June 20, 1996. The revision stands allowed as above.
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1997 (9) TMI 37 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Non-resident, Agent, Delay In Filing Return ... ... ... ... ..... order passed under section 144 of the Act. In that view of the matter, I hold that section 217(1) and section 139(8) have no application whatsoever in the instant case as such no interest can be levied. Since the order was passed under section 147. of the Act pursuant to a notice under section 148 of the Act, the notice of demand dated March 28, 1980, for payment of interest under section 217(1) and section 139(8) of the Act is bad, illegal and without jurisdiction, and the same is hereby quashed and set aside. In any event I hold that the tax authorities should have exercised their discretion under rules 40 and 117A of the Income-tax rules and should have completely waived the interest in the instant case but the authorities failed to exercise their discretion in a judicial manner as such on that score also the demand notice is bound to be cancelled or set aside which is accordingly done. With these observations, the petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1997 (9) TMI 36 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Capital Or Revenue Expenditure, Powers Of High Court, Replanting ... ... ... ... ..... the High Court can interfere under section 256(1) if the findings or conclusion of the Tribunal are perverse. This is what the Supreme Court said in Kilasho Devi Burman (Smt.) v. CIT 1996 219 ITR 214 The High Court in a reference under the taxation statutes exercises advisory jurisdiction in regard to questions of law. It is only when it has before it a question that asks whether the Tribunal has, upon the evidence on record before it, come to a conclusion which is perverse, that it may go into facts, for this is a question of law. A conclusion is perverse only if it is such that no person, duly instructed, could, upon the record before him, have reasonably come to it. For the foregoing reasons on the statements of case and the findings of facts as recorded by the Tribunal which can by no stretch of imagination be said to be unreasonable much less perverse, the question as referred does not arise, therefore, no question of our opinion thereon. Reference answered accordingly.
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1997 (9) TMI 35 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... ade in the name of the firm, the registration continued in the name of the three partners who initially owned the vehicles. 5. In Addl. CIT vs. U.P. State Agro Industrial Corpn. Ltd. 1981 20 CTR (All) 141 1981 127 ITR 97 (All) TC 27R.228, this Court held that the expression building owned by the assessee in s. 32 of the IT Act, 1961, has not been used in the sense of the property, complete title in which vests in the assessee. The assessee will be considered to be an owner of the building under s. 32 if he is in a position to exercise the right of the owner not on behalf of the person in whom the title vests, but in his own rights. 6. Applying the ratio of the aforesaid decisions, we are of the considered view that the Tribunal rightly reached the conclusion that the assessee owned and used the three vehicles within the meaning of s. 32 of the Act. We, therefore, answer the aforementioned question in the affirmative, that is in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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1997 (9) TMI 34 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Question Of Law, Loans Or Deposits ... ... ... ... ..... rshan Singh were in the nature of Amanats and, therefore, these deposits also did not fall within the purview of section 269SS of the Act. Keeping in view the nature of controversy and also the fact that the application filed by the Department has been allowed by the Tribunal, it appears appropriate to examine the question of law raised by the assessee. Out of the three questions raised by the assessee, question No. 2, as modified hereunder, is required to be referred to this court by the Tribunal Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, no penalty was leviable under section 271D of the Income-tax Act, 1961, on the amount of Rs. 20,000 received by the assessee from Raj Kumar and Rs. 20,000 received from Darshan Singh on the ground that those amounts were in the nature of Amanat and not loan or deposit within the meaning of section 269SS of the said Act? The Tribunal is directed to send a statement of the case and refer the aforesaid question to this court.
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1997 (9) TMI 33 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Payments Exceeding Rs. 2500, Unavoidable Circumstances ... ... ... ... ..... ly stated that the copy of the account of the commission agent in the books of the assessee-firm was true and correct. Shri Kedar Nath who had sworn the affidavit was not cross-examined by the Assessing Officer or by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Appellate Tribunal, therefore, accepted the uncontroverted affidavit of Shri Kedar Nath, filed on behalf of the commission agent. It is in these circumstances that the Tribunal accepted the contention of the assessee-firm that payments in cash exceeding the stipulated limit had been made in unavoidable circumstances. We do not see any illegality in the inference drawn by the Appellate Tribunal on the facts and circumstances of the case. The finding of fact as recorded by the Appellate Tribunal cannot be disturbed, especially when that is fully supported by the evidence available on the record. We, therefore, answer the aforementioned question in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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1997 (9) TMI 32 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Deemed Dividend, Scope Of Section 2(22)(E) ... ... ... ... ..... t case are closer to the facts of the case in G. R. Govindarajulu Naidu v. CIT 1973 90 ITR 13(Mad) and we are, therefore, inclined to follow the observation of, the Division Bench mentioned above. That apart, the provision of law, namely, section 2(22)(e), which we have already extracted above, says that by a fiction dividend is made to include any payment by a company, etc. Therefore, it is difficult for us to introduce another fiction in respect of the words payment by the company by construing even a transfer entry as amounting to payment. In other words, when section 2(22)(e) itself introduces a fiction, it is improper for us to introduce another fiction and construe a payment as equivalent to a constructive payment. In this view of the matter, we are not inclined to accept the arguments advanced on behalf of the Revenue and following the decision in G. R. Govindarajulu Naidu v. CIT 1973 90 ITR 13 (Mad), we answer the reference in the affirmative and against the Revenue.
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1997 (9) TMI 31 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Know-How, Question Of Law, Reference, Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... could not be allowed in respect of payments made prior to April 1, 1986, and thereby denying deduction of Rs. 1,26,944 being 1/6th of Rs. 7,61,666 ? These are relatable to the assessment year 1986-87 and arising out of Income-tax Appeal No. 3326/Delhi of 1990 and R. A. No. 1028/Delhi of 1994. Mr. Sharma did not press for question No. 1. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that question No. 2 does arise from the order of the Tribunal and accordingly direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi Bench D , Delhi, to refer question No. 2 reproduced above along with the statement of the case to this court for its opinion.
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1997 (9) TMI 30 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Search And Seizure, Jewellery ... ... ... ... ..... f hearing to the petitioner. The prayer now made in this petition filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution is that since the order of reassessment as framed by the AO was set aside in appeal, there is no liability existing as on date against the assessee and, therefore, the AO be directed to return the jewellery seized during the course of the search. In the written statement filed on behalf of the Department it is stated that the appeal is pending before the Tribunal and in case it succeeds it will be difficult to recover the said amount from the petitioner-assessee. Having heard counsel for the parties and after going through their pleadings, we direct the AO to return the jewellery to the petitioner on his furnishing adequate security for its return to his satisfaction. The petitioner will furnish security within a period of one month and the AO after accepting the same will return the jewellery within two weeks thereafter. The writ petition stands disposed of accordingly.
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1997 (9) TMI 29 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Recovery Of Tax, Interest, Waiver Of Interest ... ... ... ... ..... with the Department in the matter of assessment. In fact, it is a matter of record that the original assessment was reduced considerably in the appeal filed by the petitioner. Pursuit of remedies available to the assessee cannot be construed as non-co-operation with the Department unless the pursuit had been of a cantankerous nature, obstructive or evasive. For all the reasons stated above, I am of the view that the impugned order cannot stand. The order of the first respondent dated July 27, 1988, is quashed and the first respondent is directed to take on file both the petitions dated December 15, 1987, and the revised petition dated June 27, 1988, and pass a considered order after affording an opportunity to the writ petitioner to state his case and substantiate his claim for waiver of interest. The writ petition is allowed. The matter is remitted to the first respondent. No costs. In view of the disposal of the main writ petition, W. M. P. No. 15933 of 1988 is dismissed.
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1997 (9) TMI 28 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Non-resident, Shipping Business, Change Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... scope for reading its amendment together. There is a clear dichotomy between these two sections and it should be kept in mind. We do not also agree with the Tribunal that sub-section (7) of section 172 will become otiose, by introduction of section 44B of the Act with effect from April 1, 1976. We have already mentioned that section 172 of the Act is applicable only in respect of occasional shipping business and where the non-resident is anxious to move his ship away from the port by paying the amounts as demanded under section 172(4) of the Act. It may be that to some extent, the introduction of section 44B dilutes the necessity for making an option under sub-section (7) of section 172 of the Act. In our opinion that will not go to the extent of saying that section 44B cannot be applied for the assessment year 1976-77 relatable to the accounting year 1975. In this view of the matter, we answer the question of law referred to us in the negative and in favour of the Revenue.
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1997 (9) TMI 27 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Company, Disallowance Of Expenditure, Interest On Deposit ... ... ... ... ..... nterest paid by the firm to the partner, that is, the amount by which the payment of interest by the firm to the partner exceeds the payment of interest by the partner to the firm. The word used in the Notes on Clauses itself suggests that the net amount of interest paid by the firm to the partner had to be taken note of. This judgment not only supports the view that the Explanation in the Notes on Clauses can be referred to for the purpose of clarification, but also indicates that in that particular case, net interest was taken only because of the specific clarification in the Notes on Clauses. In this view of the matter, we are unable to take a decision different from the views expressed by the Tribunal and the lower authorities and hold that the assessee is not entitled to refer to the net expenditure after setting off the interest income. In this view of the matter, the question referred to us in T. C. No. 939 of 1983 is answered in the negative and against the assessee.
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1997 (9) TMI 26 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Rectification ... ... ... ... ..... Factory v. CIT 1991 opinions expressed by various High Courts and holds as follows (i) Excessive depreciation should be adjusted in the assessment of the assessee against other business income and against other heads of income (ii) Depreciation which remains unabsorbed under (i) will be apportioned to the partners and the share of each will be adjusted against the business and other income of each of the partners pro tanto (iii) If full effect cannot be given to the depreciation allowance of the assessee by the above processes and some depreciation remains unadjusted, the assessee-firm will carry it forward to the succeeding assessment years. Therefore, even on merits the assessee cannot succeed in seeking to set off unabsorbed depreciation of the earlier years. This is because it is admitted by the assessee that the entire amount of unabsorbed depreciation was fully allocated to all the three partners as seen from the order of the Income-tax Officer dated February 28, 1976.
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1997 (9) TMI 25 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Draft Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... ed period of limitation was not available for completing the assessment. It was held by the Tribunal that sub-section 97) of section 144B did not require the Income-tax Officer to follow the procedure laid down in that section if the Income-tax Officer had concurrent jurisdiction together with the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner concerned. A similar question has been examined by this court in Income-tax Reference No. 63 of 1985-CIT v. Gheru Lal Bal Chand 1998 233 ITR 82, decided on September 25, 1997, and it has been held that sub-section 97) of section 144B was not attracted and the procedure laid down in that section, was rightly followed as the Income-tax Officer, having concurrent jurisdiction with the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner under section 125A of the Act, proposed to make variation in the income of the assessee exceeding Rs. 1,00,000. Following the said view, the question is answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Department and against the assessee.
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1997 (9) TMI 24 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax, Deduction, Interest On Borrowed Capital ... ... ... ... ..... id on borrowals of the previous year only, and does not cover interest paid on amounts borrowed in earlier years. This argument has been rejected and in our opinion rightly by the Tribunal. Section 5(k) does not stipulate that the borrowing in respect of which interest has been paid should have been effected in the previous year, nor does it require that the expenditure from that borrowing should also have been effected in the previous year in order to entitle the assessee to claim deduction for interest paid on such borrowings. Interest paid on borrowings made in earlier years for the purposes covered by section 5(k) has necessarily to be considered under section 5(k) and not under section 5(e). What is to be allowed in one year under section 5(k) cannot get enlarged to a larger sum in subsequent years even when the deductions claimed relate to the same borrowing. We do not, therefore, find any error in the order of the Tribunal. The revision petition is dismissed. No costs.
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