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Service Tax - Case Laws

Showing 141 to 160 of 31533 Records

• 2025 (6) TMI 1014
  

  Liability to pay service tax - cable operators service - appellants, as Multi System Operators (MSOs), were liable to pay service tax on the gross amount charged for providing cable operator services to cable operators under the Finance Act, 1994 or not - denial of Cenvat Credit on the ground that appellant had not provided any evidence - entitlement for cum duty benefit - invocation of extended period of limitation.

  Whether the appellants, as Multi System Operators (MSOs), were liable to pay service tax on the gross amount charged for providing cable operator services to cable operators under the Finance Act, 1994? - HELD THAT:- The amounts computed in the show cause notice and confirmed in the impugned order is not the amount charged by the appellant to provide taxable service to the Cable Operators. Value adopted in the show cause notice and the impugned order being not the amount charged for providing the service of MSO to the cable operators and being entirely presumptive or speculative.

  In the case of West Coast Paper Mills Vs CCE & ST, Mangalore, relied upon by the appellant, no any allegation that such consideration has been specified under-stated. Whereas, in the instant case, income shown by the appellant has not been found correct and reliable. So, this finding also not applicable in the instant case.

  Denial of Cenvat Credit on the ground that appellant had not provided any evidence - HELD THAT:- The quantum of service tax paid on the input service received from the TV channels, validity of tax invoice received and use of input service to provide output service to the cable operators was as evident and could not have been denied. The services of channels to SCV Cable Net forms part major input service based on which the service provider provides service to their subscribers. It is also argued that if duty is found payable on the final product the benefit of credit on the invoice cannot be denied.

  Benefit of cum-tax - HELD THAT:- The value of taxable service is required to be treated as cum tax value and the benefit of cum tax is required to be extended. Details of income given by the appellants are not believable in comparison to department inquiry. Therefore, appellants are not entitled for benefit of cum-tax.

  Extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- The facts and issues were in the knowledge of Department from 31.03.2005 onward. When the facts are in the knowledge of the Department, there is no case of wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts or intention to evade payment of tax on the part of the appellant. The appellant has further explained that there were differences with the partner and ownership litigation before the Hon’ble High Court and Hon’ble Supreme Court and the matter was ultimately settled on 07.12.2010. The appellant has suffered financially, the extra-ordinary circumstances in which the MSO service was provided during the period may be taken into consideration there was also confusion in the industry as to whether the MSO was liable to pay service tax from 10.09.2004. There was no deliberate suppression of facts or malafide intention on the part of the appellant. In these circumstances, the period of limitation is not invokable - It is clear from the above mentioned facts that appellants purposefully and intentionally suppressed the facts and evaded payment of service tax. In these circumstances, Learned Commissioner rightly invoked extended period as provided under Section 73 of the Finance Act. Therefore, no any illegality in this regard.

  Conclusion - The appellants have failed to disclose their correct income/gross value. They have failed to pay service tax after registration. They have paid service tax initially and therefore the ground that there was genuine confusion about taxability is also not tenable. No any reasonable cause for such failure to pay. Since appellants tried to suppress the fact to evade payment of service tax, therefore, period of limitation is rightly invoked in the SCN. No cogent or sufficient documentary evidence relating to payment of service tax has been adduced, so, question of credit of CENVAT does not arise.

  There is no merit in the appeals. Therefore, appeals are liable to be dismissed.

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• 2025 (6) TMI 1013
  

  Commercial training or coaching centre services or not - entitlement to take benefit of the Notification dated 20.06.2003 to support the plea that service tax was not leviable under ‘commercial training or coaching centre’ services - benefit of the Notification dated 25.04.2011 - exemption from 01.07.2012 to 10.07.2014 in terms of serial no. 9 of the Exemption Notification dated 20.06.2012 - exemption from 11.07.2014 onwards in terms of the Notification dated 11.07.2014 that amends the earlier Notification dated 20.06.2012 - invocation of extended period of limitation contemplated under the proviso to section 73(1) of the Finance Ac.

  Entitlement to take benefit of the Notification dated 20.06.2003 to support the plea that service tax was not leviable under ‘commercial training or coaching centre’ services - HELD THAT:- It is not in dispute that the students are directly paying charges to the appellant. The Notification dated 20.06.2003 specifically excludes the benefit of the exemption to centres where the charges are directly paid to the “commercial training or coaching centre”. The appellant would, therefore, not be entitled to the exemption granted under the Notification dated 20.06.2003. This is precisely what has been held by the Commissioner in the impugned order dated 21.06.2017. There is, therefore, no error in the finding recorded by the Commissioner.

  Whether the appellant can claim the benefit of the Notification dated 25.04.2011? - HELD THAT:- The appellant is a study centre imparting education for some of the courses of the Universities. It is the Universities that award certificate, diploma or degree and not the appellant. The finding recorded by the Commissioner that in such circumstance the appellant would not be entitled to the benefit of the Notification dated 25.04.2011, therefore, also does not suffer for any illegality.

  Whether the appellant would be entitled to exemption from 01.07.2012 to 10.07.2014 in terms of serial no. 9 of the Exemption Notification dated 20.06.2012? - HELD THAT:- The exemption would be available to a coaching centre only when the consideration in lieu of services provided by the service provider is paid by the University and not by the students. The appellant directly receives the fees from the students and the consideration is not received from the Universities. The benefit of this Notification would, therefore, not be available to the appellant. This is what has been held by the Commissioner in the impugned order for denying the benefit of this Notification. There is, therefore, no error in the finding recorded by the Commissioner.

  Whether the appellant is entitled to exemption from 11.07.2014 onwards in terms of the Notification dated 11.07.2014 that amends the earlier Notification dated 20.06.2012? - HELD THAT:- The amended Notification has been reproduced in paragraph 17 of this order. The benefit of clause 9(b) is not available to the appellant as none of the conditions are satisfied. The conditions do not relate to imparting of education provided by the service provider to the educational institution. The finding recorded by the Commissioner, therefore, that the benefit of this Notification cannot be taken by the appellant does not suffer for any illegality.

  Whether the extended period of limitation contemplated under the proviso to section 73(1) of the Finance Act could be invoked by the department? - HELD THAT:- There is substance in the contention advanced on behalf of the appellant that mere suppression of fact is not enough as it has also to be conclusively established that suppression was wilful with an intent to evade payment of service tax - It is correct that section 73 (1) of the Finance Act does not mention that suppression of facts has to be “wilful’ since “wilful’ precedes only misstatement. It has, therefore, to be seen whether even in the absence of the expression “wilful” before “suppression of facts” under section 73(1) of the Finance Act, suppression of facts has still to be willful and with an intent to evade payment of service tax. The Supreme Court and the Delhi High Court have held that suppression of facts has to be “wilful’ and there should also be an intent to evade payment of service tax.

  In Pushpam Pharmaceuticals Company, the Supreme Court examined whether the Department was justified in initiating proceedings for short levy after the expiry of the normal period of six months by invoking the proviso to section 11A of the Excise Act. The proviso to section 11A of the Excise Act carved out an exception to the provisions that permitted the Department to reopen proceedings if the levy was short within six months of the relevant date and permitted the Authority to exercise this power within five years from the relevant date under the circumstances mentioned in the proviso, one of which was suppression of facts. It is in this context that the Supreme Court observed that since “suppression of facts’ has been used in the company of strong words such as fraud, collusion, or wilful default, suppression of facts must be deliberate and with an intent to escape payment of duty.

  Thus, the extended period of limitation could have been invoked only if there was suppression of facts with intent to evade payment of service tax - the extended period of the limitation contemplated under the proviso to section 73(1) of the Finance Act could not have been invoked in the facts and circumstances of the case.

  Conclusion - The appellant has produced a chart which shows the period covered by the extended period of limitation under the proviso to section 73(1) of the Finance Act and the normal period provided for in section 73(1) of the Finance Act. It transpires from the chart that the period from April 2010 to 12.04.2014 is covered by the extended period of limitation. The demand of service tax for the extended period of limitation with interest and penalty, therefore, cannot be sustained. However, the demand for the normal period is confirmed.

  The matter would, therefore, have to be remitted to the Commissioner to only examine what portion of demand falls within the normal period of limitation contemplated under section 73(1) of the Finance Act for it is such demand that has been confirmed and then consider whether penalty under sections 77 and 78 of the Finance Act should be leviable on the appellant for this period and if so then to determine amount of penalty - appeal allowed in part.

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• 2025 (6) TMI 1012
  

  Quantum of penalty - prayer to reduce penalty to 25% of the amount of demand confirmed - HELD THAT:- A perusal of 2nd proviso to Section 78 of Finance Act makes it abundantly clear that for penalty to be reduced to 25% the requirement is that the proposed/confirmed amount of service tax should have been paid along with the interest within the period of 30 days of the serving of show cause notice or of the date of receipt of the order confirming the demand.

  In the present case apparently and admittedly the amount of Rs. 9,88,319/-, out of the total demand of service tax of Rs. 11,16,723/- was paid by the appellant along with interest even prior the issuance of the show cause notice. Hence the SCN proposing the demand including the amount already paid was actually not sustainable. The proposal confirmed by the original adjudicating authority has accordingly been rightly modified by Commissioner (Appeals) confining the demand to the balance amount of Rs. 1,28,404/-.

  It is also an admitted and apparent fact that the said amount has not been disputed to be the liability of the appellant. The said amount also stands was paid by the appellant along with the interest and even with the amount of penalty of Rs. 32,101/-/A 25% within 30 days of the order confirming the said demand - the amount of penalty was not required to be paid at the time of making the payment of the amount of demand confirmed except that the amount of proportionate interest was to be paid. Since the duty as well as interest and even penalty were paid by the appellant during the period prescribed under Proviso (ii) of Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994. There are no reason that the appellant should be denied the benefit of the said proviso.

  Conclusion - The 25% of the demand confirmed should only be imposed as penalty on the appellant.

  The appeal stands partly allowed.

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• 2025 (6) TMI 1011
  

  Recovery of service tax with interest and penalty - short-payment/non-payment of service tax - service tax demand raised for the financial year 2014-15 based on data received from the Income Tax Department - demand for the period March, 2014 to September, 2014 for which the return was due and filed in the month of October, 2014 has been made beyond the period of 5 years as the show cause notice has been issued on 30.12.2020 - extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- As per proviso to sub section (1) to Section 73 off the Finance Act, 1994, the relevant date for computing the period of limitation starts from the date of filing of return. Once ST-3 return was filed on 23.10.2014 the 5 year period from that date would be on 22.10.2019 and no notice invoking even extended period of limitation could have been issued for making demand for this period. Thus, the submissions made by the Counsel for appellant is agreed upon that demand for this period being beyond 5 years period is barred by limitation.

  For the period from October, 2014 to March, 2015 the demand could have been made within 5 years from the due date for filing the return in present case. It is observed that appellant had for this period not filed any return. On account of the extraordinary circumstances/situations from 15th March, 2020 Hon’ble Supreme Court has sustained the period of limitations for all the proceedings vide order made in the Suo-moto Writ Petition No.3 of 2020 [2021 (3) TMI 497 - SC ORDER] wherein it has been held that 'In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal, application or proceeding, the period from 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021 shall stand excluded.'

  In terms of para 2(2) of the above order, the period of limitation would have been 90 days from 15.03.2021. Thus, there are no merits in his submissions made in this regard. The reliance placed by the appellant on the circular dated 20.07.2021 wherein it was clarified that Supreme Court decision may not apply. However, there are no merits in the said submission because Government vide Section 6 of Taxation and Law Acts, 2020 read with Notification No.450/61/2020-Cus.IV(Part-I) dated September 30, 2020 had clarified that only on 31.12.2020 in all such cases and show cause notices in the present case has admittedly served upon the appellant on 30.12.2020. So for the period from October, 2014 to March, 2015 the show cause notice has been rightly issued within the period of limitation as prescribed read alongwith the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court and Taxation and other Laws, 2020.

  Thus, it is evident that appellant was provided services on which 50% of the taxes were being paid by the service receiver and appellant was required to pay service tax of only 50%. All these facts should have been taken into account while demanding the tax liability for the period from October, 2014 to March, 2015 Commissioner (Appeals) have taken note of these documents but has not render any findings, nor he has given any relief to the appellant in this regard. For the purpose of examining these documents and re-determining the tax liability in accordance with the above invoices and circular, the matter is remanded back to the Original Authority for rendering suitable findings in this regards.

  The appellant had provided all these documents to his advocate/accountant for filing the return in due time which has due to ignorance of advocate/accountant not filed by the said advocate/accountant in time. This is a fit case where such ignorance would not be made a reason for imposition of penalty on the appellant under Section 78 of the Act and the same is set aside 0 the late fee imposed on the appellant under Section 70 of the Finance Act, 1994 reduced to Rs 10,000/-.

  Conclusion - i) The service tax demand based on Income Tax data is sustainable and valid. ii) The extended period of limitation and penalty under Section 78 are validly invoked and imposed. iii) Interest on the service tax demand is rightly imposed. iv) Late fees and penalty for non-filing are valid but reduced in amount; penalty under Section 78 is set aside due to mitigating circumstances. v) The limitation period extension due to COVID-19 applies, and the show cause notice was timely issued.

  The matter is remanded back to Original Authority for re-determination of the tax liability - Appeal is partly allowed and matter is remanded back to Original Authority.

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• 2025 (6) TMI 1010
  

  Refund of amount deposited in excess - time limitation in terms of Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 as made applicable on service tax matters by Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 - refund claim for the amount deposited in the month of January, 2017 and in May, 2017 was filed on 28.12.2018 - HELD THAT:- The unspent advanced deposit lying in balance of the applicant’s account current are not treated as duty for the purpose of Section 11B. Thus the claim of refund of such unspent deposit in account current cannot be hit by the limitation as provided by this Section.

  In case of Fluid Control Pvt. Ltd. [2018 (3) TMI 1857 - CESTAT MUMBAI] wherein it has been held that 'The limitation prescribed under Section 11B applies to the refund of duty amount. Inasmuch as the lower authorities themselves observed that the amount in question is “duty waiting to be debited”, this clearly shows that the same is not duty, in which case, the provision of Section 11B would not apply. Otherwise also I find that the PLA deposits are mere deposit for the purposes of their utilisation in the future and if the same is not in a position to be utilised, the depositor has to be held as owner of the said amount which is required to be refunded to them, in the absence of any limitation prescribed under the Act for such refund.'

  Thus, once it is admitted that the amount paid under challan no.00041 was an advance payment, the refund claim could not have been hit by the limitation period.

  Conclusion - The refund claim for the amount deposited twice as service tax for January 2017 is not barred by limitation because the amount under Challan was an unspent advance deposit.

  The impugned order is devoid of merits and is set aside - appeal allowed.

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• 2025 (6) TMI 1009
  

  CENVAT credit - input services under the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 - general insurance services - repair and maintenance of vehicles - expenses for staff welfare - nexus with the output service provided by the appellants or not - HELD THAT:- On examination of the Certificate of Insurance submitted by the learned Counsel for appellants, it transpires that the vehicle owned by the appellants and registered with the Regional Motor Vehicles Authority under their name and address giving credibility to the argument that such vehicles are used as capital goods by the appellants and therefore service tax on insurance premium paid should be treated as input service, which is not covered under the exclusion clause (BA) of Rule 2(l) of the CCR of 2004.

  It is found that such insurance certificate(s) were issued by the insurance company in respect of vehicles registered in the name of the appellants. However, it is found that both the authorities below have not discussed about the contents in those certificates, which were now submitted by the appellants before the Tribunal. Therefore, the disputed issue needs to be examined afresh, and the matter should be remanded back to the original authority for the said purpose.

  The original authority should verify the certificate(s) of insurance and other documents submitted/to be submitted by the appellants for proper fact finding, whether the input services are confirming to the definition of the ‘input service’ provided under Rule 2(l) of the CCR of 2004 for determining its eligibility for availing CENVAT credit - appeal allowed by way of remand.

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• 2025 (6) TMI 928
  

  Maintainability of appeal - appropriate forum - High Court or Supreme Court - issues relating to the rate of duty and valuation of goods - entitlement to cash refund in light of the proviso to Section 142(6)(a) of the CGST Act, 2017 - HELD THAT:- The scope of the proviso to Section 142 (6) (a) warrants serious consideration. Under this proviso, once any amount of CENVAT credit as on the appointed date had been carried forward under the CGST Act 2017, at least prima facie, there was an embargo on cash refunds. The Tribunal’s Original Order dated 24 January 2025 had not, at least specifically, ordered any cash refund. Only consequential relief was granted without specifying what this consequential relief would be. The relief of cash refund was granted only by the order dated 06 May 2025, disposing of Misc. Application No. 85710 of 2025 and by purportedly exercising the powers under Rule 41 of the 1982 Rules.

  The prejudice to the Revenue by the refusal of some protection for a limited period would far outweigh the prejudice to the Respondent. If ultimately the Respondent is found eligible for the relief now granted by the CESTAT, there should be no serious difficulty in recovering this amount from the Revenue. However, if any cash refunds are granted to the Respondent and the Revenue succeeds in its Appeal/s, the position may not be as simple, since it is the Respondent’s case that it is not undertaking any active business or has closed down its factories.

  This is a fit case that the CESTAT’s direction for cash refund of Rs.256.45 Crores should be stayed for a period of eight weeks from the date of uploading of this order. Accordingly, we order such stay for a period of eight weeks from the date of uploading of this order.

  This Petition and the Appeal are disposed of as not pressed with liberty to the Petitioner/Appellant to prefer Appeal/s before the Hon’ble Supreme Court by invoking the provisions of Section 35-G and 35-L of the Central Excise Act, 1944, within eight weeks from the date of uploading of this order.

  Conclusion - i) The Appeal and Writ Petition are not maintainable before the High Court and must be filed before the Supreme Court. ii) The direction for cash refund potentially violates the proviso to Section 142(6)(a) of the CGST Act and requires appellate scrutiny. iii) The direction for cash refund is stayed for eight weeks pending appeal before the Supreme Court.

  Petition and appeal disposed off.

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• 2025 (6) TMI 927
  

  Refund of service tax paid - refund disallowed alleging that invoices issued prior to 01.04.2015 or after 29.02.2016 are not eligible to refund - section 103 of the Finance Act, 1994 - applicability of principles of unjust enrichment.

  Whether refund of service tax Rs.1,52,17,889/- is admissible under Section 103 of the Finance Act, 1994? - argument of the appellant is that irrespective of the Point of Taxation Rules, under Section 103 of the Finance Act, no service tax has been levied or collected during the said period irrespective of the date of invoices before 01.4.2015 and after 29.2.2016 - HELD THAT:- On reading various provisions alongwith charging Section 66B and Section 68, it is clear that the invoices raised on completion of services be considered as relevant for determining the point of rendition of service. In the present case, the vendors carry out the work as per the contracts entered prior to 01.04.2015 and invoices are raised continuously as and when the work mentioned in a purchase order for a particular work is completed. Therefore, the invoices raised before 01.04.2015 and after 29.02.2016 cannot fall within the scope of refund of service tax under Section 103 of the Finance Act, 1994 since as per the said Rules the service had not been rendered during the period specified under Section 103 of the Finance Act, 1994. Therefore, the learned Commissioner(Appeals) was right in upholding rejection of the refund of Rs.31,67,199/- for the invoices issued before 01.04.2015 and after 29.02.2016.

  With reference to the contract with M/s. Ess Kay Bee Pvt. Ltd., it relates to construction of new public toilet facility on the western part of the passenger arrival building, which would definitely fall under the scope of ‘new construction’. Similarly, the contract with M/s. Larsen & Toubro Ltd. is for expansion of existing Terminal-1 with a view to accommodate increased capacity of passenger traffic; hence, it would definitely fall under the scope of ‘all new construction’ - the construction services under various contracts would definitely come under the scope of “original works” and accordingly admissible to refund of service tax paid under the Section 103 of the Finance Act, 1994. Therefore, the appellant are entitled to refund of the service tax claimed to have been paid during the period from 01.04.2015 or after 29.02.2016 under Section 103 of the Finance Act, 1994.

  Once the appellant could able to corelate the contract with particular invoices linking through the individual purchase orders, we do not find any reason not to accept the same and deny refund of the service tax paid on such invoices solely on the ground that the invoices do not reflect the contracts indicating the same were entered prior to 01.04.2015, in absence of any contrary evidence is brought on record by the Revenue indicating that the correlation statement is incorrect. Therefore, the finding in this regard cannot be sustained.

  Whether the refund amount is hit by principles of unjust enrichment? - HELD THAT:- The explanation furnished in their written submissions that the amount has been shown in the P&L Account since at the time of payment of service tax, they were not eligible to cenvat credit, hence expensed in the P&L account, could not by itself be considered as discharge of their burden. Also, it is not impressed with the argument of the Learned AR for the Revenue that, the amount claimed as refund spent by the appellant in the construction/expansion of airport, since reflected in their books of accounts as an expenditure may have been affected in the UDF and other fees charged by the appellant during the specific period mentioned under section 103 of Finance Act, 1994, when the said fees are fixed by the statutory authorities. Thus, the matter needs to be remanded to the adjudicating authority and the appellant is directed to submit further documents to establish the fact that the refund amount has not been passed on to others.

  Conclusion - The amount claimed as refund is admissible only relating to the invoices raised between 01.04.2015 and 29.02.2016. Invoices raised prior to 01.04.2015 and after 29.02.2016 involving a total amount of Rs.31,67,199/- is not admissible. For the purpose of verification of applicability of unjust enrichment, the matter is remanded to the adjudicating to examine the issue afresh taking note of the documents that would be submitted by the appellant.

  Appeal disposed off.

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• 2025 (6) TMI 926
  

  Direction to carry out and comply with the order passed by this Tribunal - reference to Rule 41 of the CESTAT (Procedure) Rules, 1982 to invoke jurisdiction of this Tribunal so as to give effect to its order.

  Whether consequential relief granted by the Tribunal would include the entire amount, the appropriation of which was held by us to be contrary in law? - HELD THAT:- The appropriation of Rs. 299.81 crore and Rs. 122.052 crore was held to be not inconformity to law since reversal of those two amounts happened much prior to issue of show-cause notice and Section 73 sub Section 3 of the Finance Act, 1994, as existing them, was not permitting issue of show-cause notice when duty or the amount was already paid before issue of show-cause notice except when extended period was invoked - the entire demand of CENVAT Credit of Rs. 683,31,98,658/- that was confirmed by the Commissioner in the impugned order was set aside while holding that appropriation of the amount referred in para 8.4 and 8.5 of the order was held to be not valid only for the reason that it was contrary to Section 73 (3) of the Finance Act, 1994.

  Whether the disputed amount of Rs. 122,05,41,156/-, which is stated to be taken as credit towards trading of goods is also eligible for refund since appropriation of the same was held by the Tribunal as improper? - HELD THAT:- Neither the show-cause notice nor the Order-in- Original impugned have given any detail of any sales undertaken by the Appellant during the period of show-cause notice and from the record it is noted that Appellant was contractually obligated to provide various telecom services like co-location, hosting, marketing and sale promotion, business and technology consulting and other business support service - there is a a strong believe that concerning eligibility of Appellant to get refund of Rs. 122.05 crores, there is a requirement of scrutinisation of documents to find out if, in fact, the said reversed amount was done in respect of trading of goods or as pointed out in the show-cause notice at para 8.1 that those credits availed by the Appellant were on input services received from different companies which, was reversed by the Appellant on persuasion (apparently by the Respondent). Therefore, there is a requirement that Respondent-Department may delve into the matter in detail and prepare a Report regarding the credit to the tune of Rs. 122.05 crores taken by the Appellant were taken from input services received and were utilised for the trading of goods and to extend the benefit of consequential relief accordingly in respect of this amount of Rs. 122,05,41,156/-.

  The understanding of learned Joint Commissioner appreciated, who submitted para wise reply to this miscellaneous application and in making a note as to why this Tribunal had concluded that ‘order by the Original Authority appropriating the said amount of Rs. 122,05,41,156/- was not sustainable’ and also taking note of the fact that no findings of this Tribunal was made in respect of self assessed and suo-moto payments of tax of the amount of Rs. 122,05,41,156/- was not payable. This aspect has to be looked into in determining consequential relief while granting refund so as to avoid multiplicity of litigation but not in the way department intended to do by issuing show-cause notice to deny consequential relief which was also expressly granted by this Tribunal in respect of amount of Rs. 256,45,51,029/- mentioned in the miscellaneous application.

  Whether the specific relief sought through amendment of the appeal memo in granting refund of Rs. 256,45,51,029/- in cash to the Appellant is permissible under the law? - HELD THAT:- When the command of the law is “shall be refunded to him in cash”,irrespective of anything contained in the existing act and whether Appellant had closed its business or not, it is entitled to cash refund, and since the amount was never utilised when the matter was sub-judiced and nothing from record would reveal receipt of the said amount from any other person to apply the doctrine of unjust enrichment, to which effect affidavit of the Director of Appellant has also been filed, consequential relief to grant refund of Rs. 256,45,51,029/-, that was specifically incorporated in the prayer portion vide this Bench order dated 19.11.2024, has to be paid in cash alone and since more than three months have passed in the mean time, Respondent-Department is directed to pay the same with applicable interest forthwith and not later than four weeks of receipt of copy of this order.

  Whether the issue of show-cause notice dated 13.03.2025 by the Respondent to the Appellant proposing to refuse the relief granted by the Tribunal in its final order was proper? - HELD THAT:- First of all such a notice, which Respondent-Commissioner states to have been issued in conformity to the principle of natural justice, prima facie establishes a defiance attitude to the Tribunal’s order since Respondent-Department had recourse to file appeal challenging legality of the said order and also can take administrative decision in the presence of the Assessee- Appellant as to what would be the exact nature of the consequential relief. As noted in the final order of this Tribunal. Secondly, without reference to the provision of law, how such notice is to be adjudicated by the concerned official unless law and legal procedure are to be applied to deal with such show-cause notice. Thirdly, if at all it is to be considered as a notice under Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 then no refund was made to hold the said as erroneous refund for the purpose of issuing a show-cause notice for its recovery apart from the fact, as pointed out by the learned Counsel for the Appellant, that Respondent-Department can’t disregard an order unless a competent authority or Court grant a stay on the said order - the said show-cause notice dated 13.03.2025 as nullity in the eye of law.

  Conclusion - Miscellaneous application filed under Rule 41 of the CESTAT (Procedure) Rules, 1982 for implementation of Bench’s order by way of grant of refund of Rs. 256,45,51,029/- in cash with applicable interest is allowed. Respondent-Commissioner is directed to pay the same forthwith and in no event, later than four weeks of receipt of this order. A decision on the eligibility of getting refund of the other amount of Rs. 122,05,41,156/- is to be taken at the Commissioner’s end within three months of receipt of this order upon examination of documents record of the Appellant/Applicant. Compliance report be submitted to this Bench on 10.06.2025 through a mention memo.

  Application disposed off.

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• 2025 (6) TMI 856
  

  Classification of service - short-term accommodation service or tour operator service - entitlement of abatement under notification dated 20.06.2012 (from 01.07.2012) in respect of service of tour operator and claim abatement of 90% on gross amount charged - it was held by CESTAT that the appellant, M/s. Make My Trip (India) Private Limited, was not providing short-term accommodation service but acted as a facilitator between the customer and the hotel, receiving commission for the same. The appellant did not qualify as a hotel and could not render the service of renting of rooms in a hotel.

  HELD THAT:- There are no reason and ground to interfere with the impugned judgment passed by the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal - appeal dismissed.

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• 2025 (6) TMI 855
  

  Condonation of gross delay of 265 days in filing the Appeals which has not been satisfactorily explained by the appellant - Invocation of Extended period of Limitation - willful mis-statement or suppression of facts or not - levy of penalty under section 78 of FA - renting of immovable property service - contract for supply, erection, commissioning and installation of retail visual identity signages elements - CESTAT dismissed the Revenue's appeal and partially upheld the assessee's appeal on the question of invoking the extended period of limitation.

  HELD THAT:- The Civil Appeals are, accordingly, dismissed on the ground of delay.

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• 2025 (6) TMI 854
  

  Condonation of gross delay of 187 days in filing the Appeal which has not been satisfactorily explained by the appellant -Classification of services - Business Auxiliary Service (BAS) or not - GDS Commission, incentive, cancellation charges etc., received by the appellants - levy of service tax on various services - it was held by CESTAT that 'the demands for service tax under BAS, on Visa/Passport processing charges, ORC/RAF, and the margin earned from selling air tickets at a higher price, were not sustainable.'

  HELD THAT:- There is a gross delay of 187 days in filing the Appeal which has not been satisfactorily explained by the appellant.

  Even otherwise, there is no good reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the Custom Excise Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, West Zonal Bench at Mumbai - appeal dismissed on the ground of delay as well as merits.

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• 2025 (6) TMI 853
  

  Levy of service tax - tour operator service - providing short-term accommodation service or not - entitlement to abatement of 90% on the gross amount charged under the Abatement Notifications in respect of service of a tour operator - invocation of Section 73A of the Finance Act - penalties - it was held by CESTAT that the demand under section 73 and 73A of the Finance Act set aside, finding that the appellant provided tour operator services and was entitled to abatement.

  HELD THAT:- No case for interference is made out. The view taken by the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal is concurred with.

  Appeal dismissed.

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• 2025 (6) TMI 852
  

  Condonation of delay of 306 days in the filing of this Civil Appeal - Liability of service tax on directors remuneration under the Reverse Charge Mechanism falling under Sl.No.5A of the N/N. 30/2012-ST dt.20.06.2012 - it was held by CESTAT that 'reliance placed in the case of M/S ALLIED BLENDERS AND DISTILLERS PVT. LTD. VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE & SERVICE TAX, AURANGABAD [2019 (1) TMI 433 - CESTAT MUMBAI] where it was held that the remuneration paid to the directors was salary and not subject to service tax under the reverse charge mechanism.'

  HELD THAT:- There is a delay of 306 days in the filing of this Civil Appeal. Even on merits, there are no good ground and reason to interfere with the impugned judgment, which follows an earlier order passed by the Appellate Tribunal.

  The application for condonation of delay as well as the Civil Appeal shall stand dismissed.

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• 2025 (6) TMI 851
  

  Liability to pay service tax - demand raised on the basis of Form 26AS obtained from the Income Tax Department - HELD THAT:- On going through the work orders, appellant is engaged in providing the services of work for construction of side drain, catch water drain and painting work. These facts are not in dispute.

  As the activity undertaken by the appellant with regard to construction do not clearly showing that it is in regard to railways which can be evident from the work order assigned to the main contractor, therefore, the work order assigned to the main contractor is essential to ascertain the fact that the activity undertaken by the appellant is in regard to railways. Therefore, the appellant is directed to produce the work orders issued to the main contractor to ascertain the true facts.

  Matter remanded back to the Ld.Commissioner (Appeal) to ascertain the said fact on production of work orders issued to the main contractor by the appellant - appeal disposed off by way of remand.

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• 2025 (6) TMI 850
  

  Failure to pay service tax on the value of services received - Royalty paid to foreign service providers - Appellant had failed to obtain registration for the "intellectual property service" category and had not furnished any returns to the jurisdictional Service tax authority - reverse charge mechanism - suppression of facts or not - extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- The appellant have deposited the service tax in the account of Delhi Commissionerate instead of Haldia Commissionerate. This remittance of service tax in a difference service tax registration of the same assessee is a matter of internal adjustment and the appellant cannot be saddled with the demand of service tax again. Similarly, the issue relating to accounting code cannot be a reason to demand Service tax again. The service tax paid by the Hqrs can be adjusted by the authorities against the service tax liability, if any, of the appellant company at Haldia - the payment made by head office under different registration number cannot be demanded from the Appellant’s Haldia Unit and if at all there is discrepancy of different registration of head office the department could have adjusted service tax paid by the head office against the service tax due of appellant’s Haldia unit. Similarly, the issue relating to payment under accounting code ‘Scientific and Technical Consultancy Service’ can be adjusted against the accounting code ‘Intellectual Property Service’.

  As per Section 66A of the Finance Act, 1994, read with Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994, the service recipient is liable to pay service tax under reverse charge mechanism. However, when the service tax has already been paid by one unit of the same legal entity, demanding it again from another unit amounts to double taxation on the same transaction, which is impermissible in law.

  It is settled that merely because the service tax paid under different registration but by the same company, cannot tantamount to non- payment of service tax. The law does not permit the taxation authority to recover the tax again where the tax on the same taxable event has already been paid, albeit under a different head or accounting code. Hence, the demand of service tax which was already paid cannot be made twice. Accordingly, the demand of service tax confirmed in the impugned order is not sustainable and hence, the same is set aside.

  Time limitation - HELD THAT:- There is no suppression of facts or intention to evade payment of service tax in the present case, as the service tax has already been paid by RHQ, New Delhi. Therefore, the extended period of limitation under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 is not invocable in this case. Accordingly, the demand confirmed in the impugned order is not sustainable on the ground of limitation also.

  Penalties - HELD THAT:- Since the demand of service tax is not sustainable, the question of demanding interest under Section 75 and imposing penalties under Section 76, 77, and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 does not arise and accordingly, the same imposed in the impugned order are set aside.

  Conclusion - i) The demand of service tax which was already paid cannot be made twice. Accordingly, the demand of service tax confirmed in the impugned order is not sustainable and hence, the same is set aside. ii) The extended period of limitation under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 is not invocable in this case. iii) Since the demand of service tax is not sustainable, the question of demanding interest under Section 75 and imposing penalties under Section 76, 77, and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 does not arise and accordingly, the same imposed in the impugned order are set aside.

  The impugned order is set aside - Appeal allowed.

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• 2025 (6) TMI 849
  

  Non-payment of service tax for the period from 16.06.2005 to 31.12.2005 - Construction of Complex Services - HELD THAT:- The issue is squarely covered by the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme court in the matter of CCE & C, Kerala vs. Larsen & Toubro Ltd. [2015 (8) TMI 749 - SUPREME COURT] and Circular issued by the Board No.108/2/2009-ST dated 29.01.2009 where it was held that 'Works contract were not chargeable to service tax prior to 1.6.2007.'

  Since the issue is squarely covered by the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme court in the matter of CCE & C, Kerala vs. Larsen & Toubro Ltd decision of the Tribunal as well as Circular dated 29.01.2009 issued by the Board, demand confirmed in the impugned order is unsustainable - appeal allowed.

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• 2025 (6) TMI 768
  

  Rejection of Application under the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019 - non-consideration of CBIC Circular dated 27 August 2019, and the answers to the Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), prepared by the Department on 24 December 2019 - HELD THAT:- Firstly, this Petition was not initiated after any unreasonable delay, which might have given rise to parallel rights in favour of the Respondents. Moreover, it is indisputable that the period between 26 December 2019 and 19 April 2021 was at least partially impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. The details in Kundan Industries Limited [2022 (5) TMI 571 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] provide no valid comparison. Despite the leniency demonstrated by the authorities, the Petitioner, Kundan Industries Limited, failed to take action or approach the Court within a reasonable timeframe. For all these reasons, the objection based on delay or laches cannot be upheld.

  If the Circular dated 27 August 2019 and the answers to the FAQs prepared by the Department on 24 December 2019 were considered, it was clear that the tax dues were duly quantified as of 30 June 2019. On this basis, therefore, there was no reason to deem the Petitioner ineligible.

  The record shows that the summons was issued to the Petitioner on 24 December 2018, pursuant to which a statement of the Petitioner’s Director was recorded on 04 January 2019. In his statement, the Petitioner’s Director clearly stated that the Petitioner had quantified the total short-paid liability of service tax as Rs. 120.16 lakhs. The Petitioner’s Director reiterated this position in his statement recorded on 17 March 2020. This material, if considered in the context of the CBIC Circular dated 27 August 2019 and the answers to FAQs prepared by the Department on 24 December 2019, makes it clear that there was a necessary quantification of the tax dues before the cut-off date of 30 June 2019, as contemplated by the scheme. The ground for declaring the Petitioner ineligible, therefore, cannot be sustained.

  This is a case where the Petitioner had quantified the tax liability at Rs. 1.21 Crores, and the department, upon finalisation and adjustment, found that the liability would come to Rs. 1.16 Crores or thereabouts, i.e less than the liability quantified by the Petitioner. This could hardly have been a valid ground to declare the petitioner ineligible to avail the benefits of the SVLDRS scheme.

  The aspect of interest can be considered. Though the rejection of the Petitioner’s application under the scheme may not be proper, the Petitioner retained and used the amount for all these years. Since the Petitioner seeks equitable relief, the Petitioner should also be prepared to do equity and pay interest at some reasonable rate.

  Conclusion - The rejection of the Petitioner’s Application under the SVLDRS Scheme set aside on the ground of the Petitioner’s alleged ineligibility - it is declared that the Petitioner was eligible for the benefits under the Scheme - matter remanded to the concerned authority for reconsideration of the Petitioner’s SVLDRS Application and computation of the amount payable afresh within eight weeks from the date of uploading this order.

  Petition allowed by way of remand.

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• 2025 (6) TMI 767
  

  Maintainability of petition - availability of alternative remedy - liability of petitioner to pay tax under the provisions of Finance Act, 1994 as it stood amended w.e.f. 01.07.2012 particularly in light of the exemption under Clause 2(i) of Service Tax Mega Notification No.25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012 for health care services by clinical establishments.

  HELD THAT:- The Ten Schedules attached to the Franchise Agreement dated 17.12.2015 have not prescribed the amount that the Petitioner would be charging the Franchisee/M/s.Pranav Labs for the equipment. The said Franchiser Fee payable to the Petitioner thus remains hidden in the percentage of amount collected and adjusted inter se from the Government referrals and Walk-in tests conducted by the Franchisee/M/s.Pranav Labs under the Franchise Agreement.

  Lending of equipment is a separate service which was provided by way of supply of standard equipments, for which, the Petitioner was entitled to charge fee. Prior to 01.07.2012, the aforesaid activity would have invited levy under Section 66 r/w. Section 65(105)(zzzzj) of the Finance Act, 1994 viz., supply of tangible goods service.

  However, after 01.07.2012 till 13.06.2017 which includes the period in dispute between January, 2016 – June, 2017, such supply of tangible goods is taxable under Section 66B r/w. 66D(a) of the Finance Act, 1994 as inserted by the Finance Act, 2012 w.e.f. 01.07.2012 and in view of Section 66BA of the Finance Act, 1994 as inserted by the Finance Act, 2013 - there is no dispute that two distinctive services have been provided by the Franchiser/Petitioner to the Franchisee/M/s.Pranav Labs. Out of the said two services, namely, the Franchise Service provided by the Petitioner for which, the Franchisee fee was charged under the Franchise Agreement has suffered tax.

  The Impugned Order has merely referred to the Education Guide that was circulated on the eve of the change brought to provisions of Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1944 w.e.f. 01.07.2012. That apart, the Impugned Order has merely referred to certain decisions than actually referring to the core issue relating to valuation that was to be adopted - The huge amount of Rs. 11,66,786/- has been confirmed by invoking extended period of limitation under Section 73(2) of the Finance Act, 1994 with a consequential interest under Section 75 of the Finance Act, 1994 and penalty for a equal amount under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994.

  Conclusion - The Impugned Order dated 24.11.2021 is quashed and the case is remitted back to the 1st Respondent for passing fresh orders on merits for determining the value of the service provided by way of supply of standard equipments in the Franchisee premises by the Franchiser/Petitioner to the Franchisee/M/s.Pranav Labs with reference to Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994 and Rule 3 of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006, within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

  Petition disposed off by way of remand.

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• 2025 (6) TMI 766
  

  Service tax demand raised on the Appellant under Construction of Residential Complex Service for the period from October 2005 to March 2010 under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 - invocation of extended period of limitation - imposition of penalties.

  HELD THAT:- The issue as to whether a composite contract involving provision of service as well as transfer of property in goods could be covered under CICS and CCS from the date of introduction of service tax levy on such services was, being litigated upon which was finally settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CCE Vs. Larsen & Toubro Ltd. [2015 (8) TMI 749 - SUPREME COURT]. The Apex Court has observed that in as much as section 67 of the Act, dealing with valuation of taxable services, refers to the gross amount charged for service, the services of CICS and CCS would cover only pure service activities, as any contrary view would imply that the Union Government can levy service tax on the gross amount, including the value of transfer of property in goods also, which is constitutionally impermissible.

  Though the definition of WCS incorporates the definitions of CICS / CCS into it, the scope of coverage of these services is distinct. While the definition of CICS / CCS would cover such construction activities without involving any transfer of property in goods, such a construction is service simplicitor and whereas a composite construction activity would fall only under WCS.

  Conclusion - i) Composite contracts involving both service and transfer of property in goods fall exclusively under Works Contract Service and not under Construction of Complex Service or Commercial or Industrial Construction Service. ii) Construction of Complex Service and Commercial or Industrial Construction Service cover only pure service contracts without transfer of property in goods.

  The demand raised in the impugned Order-in-Appeal passed by the Commissioner of Service Tax is not sustainable. No need to discuss about justifiability for invoking larger period as the Appellant succeeds on merits. As such, penalties imposed are also set aside - Appeal allowed.

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