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VAT and Sales Tax - Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 1179 Records
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2016 (12) TMI 1897
Re-assessment/deemed assessment - power of re-assessment - change of opinion or not - reasons to believe - Classification of goods - composite pack of mobile phone along with mobile charger and other accessories - taxable at the rate specified for Entry 68 of Part 1 of Schedule-III read with Entry 14 of Part-II of the said Schedule or not - HELD THAT:- It is evident from the provisions of Section 31 of the Bihar VAT Act that sub-section (1) of Section 31 although not very happily worded, but is on the same lines as the earlier provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961 prior to its amendment in 1987. Taking into account the said Section as a whole including sub-section (2), it is evident that two types of cases are envisaged therein; in both type of cases the prescribed authority must be satisfied that reasonable grounds exist to believe that there has been under assessment or escaped assessment or assessment to tax at a lower rate or any deduction has been wrongly made therein or an input tax credit has been wrongly claimed, in which cases within the statutory period of four years it can make an assessment or reassessment of the tax payable by such dealer - In the first category, such reassessment can be made irrespective of whether the dealer has concealed, omitted or failed to disclose full and correct particulars of such sale or purchase or input tax credit, whereas in the second category there has been such a failure to disclose on the part of the dealer. The same would flow from the harmonious reading of the provisions of sub-section (1) with sub-section (2) of Section 31 of the Act, which obliges the prescribed authority in the second category of cases to impose by way of penalty the sum equal to three times of the amount of tax which is or may be assessed on the turnover of sale or purchase which escaped assessment, whereas in the first category there would be a mere reassessment of the under-assessed or escaped tax, etc.
In the present matter, it is not in dispute at all that there has been no concealment, omission or failure to disclose full and correct particulars by the petitioners. Thus, the only issue is as to whether the assessing officer was justified in making reassessment under Section 31 of the Act with regard to the periods in issue - the provisions of the Act are on similar lines as the unamended provisions of Section 147 of the Income Tax Act and that they provide for two categories of cases; but even the provisions of Section 147 of the Income-tax Act amended in the year 1989 make it clear that there must be reason to believe that there has been under-assessment or escaped assessment, etc. and as has been held in the case of COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, DELHI VERSUS M/S. KELVINATOR OF INDIA LIMITED [2010 (1) TMI 11 - SUPREME COURT] by the Apex Court, it should not be a mere change of opinion, otherwise it would amount to arbitrary exercise of power by the assessing officer to reopen the assessment - The said law emphatically laid down by the Supreme Court in Kelvinator's case is squarely applicable in the present matter also and it has to be held that reassessment cannot be made on a mere change of opinion.
Whether the decision of the Supreme Court subsequent to the assessments can be considered a mere change of opinion? - HELD THAT:- The law on this point is also very much clear, as held in the several decisions cited including that of DY. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX & ORS. VERSUS M/S. SIMPLEX CONCRETE PILES (INDIA) LIMITED [2012 (9) TMI 516 - SC ORDER], a subsequent reversal of legal position by the judgment of the Supreme Court does not authorize the Department to reopen the assessment which stood closed on the basis of law at the relevant time.
It is evident that in the first category of 8 writ petitions assessment/reassessment had been made earlier under the provisions of Section 31 and/or Section 33 of the Act. It is also evident from the notice issued under Section 31 of the Act that the sole reason for initiation of proceedings under Section 31 of the Act is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of STATE OF PUNJAB & OTHERS VERSUS NOKIA INDIA PVT. LTD. [2014 (12) TMI 836 - SUPREME COURT] - There was no other material which has come into the possession of the Department which was already not known to it. The fact that there had been earlier assessment/reassessment under Section 31 or Section 33 of the Act goes to show that any further issuance of notice under Section 31 of the Act in such matters without anything more, except the decision of the Supreme Court in Nokia's case would, on the same materials, amount to a mere change of opinion by the prescribed authority in the matter. Thus, any action on the said basis would clearly be without jurisdiction and therefore without authority of law.
So far as the remaining eight matters are concerned, admittedly they are cases of deemed assessments on the basis of the provisions of Section 26 of the Act or assessment under Section 27. No doubt under Section 25 of the Act, the prescribed authority is required to look into and scrutinize the return filed under Section 24 (1) and (3) of the Act but that is not the same thing as making a proper assessment. If the assessing authority had no occasion to form an opinion during the course of such deemed assessment of the returns filed by the petitioner, and subsequently a notice was issued under Section 31 (1) of the Act, or assessment made under Section 27, albeit on the ground of decision rendered by the Supreme Court, it could not be said that there has been any change of opinion - so far as the remaining eight cases are concerned, the plea of the petitioners regarding change of opinion is not applicable.
That being the position, considering the fact that various issues of facts, etc. will have to be dealt with before the question of liability can be decided, the writ jurisdiction does not appear to be a proper one to deal with such issues of fact which must be thrashed before the statutory authorities up to the Tribunal - no interference is called for in such cases where that has been no previous assessment/reassessment under Section 31 or Section 33 of the Act - Application allowed.
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2016 (12) TMI 1869
Input tax credit - Respondent Assessee has not proved the transaction between it and M/s Mahesh Steel Centre & M/s Rajahans Metals - whether the finding recorded by the Tribunal for the discharge of the burden by the assessee could be said as perverse to the record or not? - Section 70 of the KVAT Act - HELD THAT:- Once the purchaser dealer-assessee satisfactorily demonstrates that while purchasing goods, he has paid the amount of VAT to the selling dealer, the matter should end so far as his entitlement to the claim input tax credit. If the selling dealer has not deposited the amount in full or a part thereof, it would be for the Revenue to proceed against the selling dealer. But thereby the benefit of input tax credit cannot be deprived to the purchaser dealer.
Petition dismissed.
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2016 (12) TMI 1861
Rate of Tax - Manufacture and sale of Lizol (floor cleaner), Harpic (toilet cleaner) and Mortein mosquito repellents – Classification - Entry 88 or Entry 20 to Schedule IV – Interpretation of Statute - Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 - HELD THAT:- The impugned judgment and order of the High Court need not not be interfered.
Petition dismissed - The question of law that has been raised in these special leave petitions, in case arises in future from a different judgment, it shall be addressed to on merits.
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2016 (12) TMI 1782
Conditions for granting stay pending statutory appeal - stay on condition of remittance of 30% of the demand - HELD THAT:- This is an eminently fit case, where the appeal filed by the appellant before the statutory authority needs an expeditious consideration and out of turn disposal, keeping in abeyance recovery proceedings on the basis of the order impugned in the statutory appeal.
This writ appeal directing that the appeal of the appellant pending before the third respondent shall be considered and disposed off.
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2016 (12) TMI 1780
Maintainability of appeal - delay in compliance with the pre-deposit - HELD THAT:- It is the accepted position at the Bar that the controversy is covered by the decision dated 23 rd February, 2015, rendered in M/s. Innovatives Systems, representative by its Managing Partner vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, representative by Principal Secretary to Government, Revenue(CT-II) Department [2015 (2) TMI 1314 - SUPREME COURT] where it was held that It is an admitted fact that after the disposal of the appeal by the Appellate Deputy Commissioner, the appellant had deposited the pre-deposit as directed by the Appellate Deputy Commissioner (CT), Vishakhapatnam. The High Court ought to have condone the delay in complying with the order passed by the Appellate Deputy Commissioner (CT), Vishakhapatnam and should have directed him to decide the appeal on merits.
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2016 (12) TMI 1770
Grant of subsidy for promotion of industrial sick units - Rajasthan Investment Promotional Scheme - principle of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation - HELD THAT:- In the scheme RIPS 2003 introduced by the State of Rajasthan vide notification dated 28.7.2003 the said scheme was amended vide notification dated 2.12.2005 whereby sub-clauses (vi) and (vii) were inserted in clause 7 of the RIPS, 2003, but subsequently, the said provision was deleted just after five months vide notification dated 28.4.2006, but SLSC granted entitlement certificate to the petitioner-respondent Shree Cement Company Ltd. granting subsidy upto 75% for both the units situated in Pali and Bhiwadi. In the SLSC all the higher authorities of the government were present and after due application of mind issued eligibility certificate in favour of the petitioner-respondent Shree Cement Company Ltd. even after deletion of amendment vide orders dated 29.7.2006 and 27.6.2007. It is worthwhile to observe that in the writ petition although notification dated 28.4.2006 was challenged, but the said prayer was not pressed by the respondent company.
The learned Single Judge has committed an error while holding that petitioner-respondent Shree Cement Company Ltd. has vested right by virtue of principle of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation to get subsidy upto 75% on the basis of entitlement certificate issued by the SLSC because the State Government is framing scheme from time to time to grant certain benefits and concession in the form of subsidy to the industrial development, but here in this case, upon perusal of entire record, it is obvious that till deletion of provision vide notification dated 28.4.2006, none of the eligibility conditions were fulfilled by the respondent Company but ignoring those facts, the SLSC issued entitlement certificate on 29.6.2006 and 28.7.2007 much after the deletion of the provision by way of notification dated 28.4.2006.
Specific provision has been incorporated under clause 13 of the RIPS, 2003 to check the action and orders of SLSC while exercising revisional power, therefore, it cannot be said that any error was committed by the Principal Secretary, Finance of State Government to quash the orders passed by the SLSC, therefore, the judgment impugned in this appeal is not sustainable in law.
Appeal allowed.
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2016 (12) TMI 1754
Penalty u/s 27(3) of TNVAT Act - suppression of facts or not - Held that:- In terms of the said provision to levy penalty the Assessing Officer should record his satisfaction that escapement of tax was due to willful non-disclosure. Mere non-disclosure does not automatically lead to levy of penalty. The statute contemplates levy of penalty in cases of willful non-disclosure. Therefore, the petitioner's conduct in paying the tax at the time of inspection prior to issuance of show cause notice can be taken into consideration.
The matter is remanded to the respondent for fresh consideration who shall take note of the conduct of the petitioner in remitting tax even prior to the issuance of show cause notice dated 18.08.2016 and 31.05.2016 respectively - petition allowed by way of remand.
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2016 (12) TMI 1740
Classification of goods - potato chips, kurkure and cheetos masala balls and other flavours known as namkins - claim of assessee is that it falls within a specific heading “Deshi sweetmeats, kulfi, ice-cream and namkins” irrespective of use of preservative, and was liable for a rate of 6%, whereas the claim of Revenue has been that it falls under a generic entry “preserved food articles”, and was liable to be taxed @ 12%.
Whether product of the appellant-company viz. 'kurkure', 'potato chips' and 'cheetos' fall in the category of Entry 78 of Notification dated 25.10.2000 and does not come within the ambit of Entry 150 of the said Notification?
Held that:- I do concur with the arguments of the learned counsel for the Revenue that the product in which the assessee is dealing, though technically can be said to be namkin but taking into consideration the specific entry under the Act, it can only be placed in the category of “preserved food article” because the assessee for whatever reasons adds number of preservatives and nitrogen gas may be for purposes that it lasts longer, but adding preservatives and nitrogen is sufficient to hold that it may fall within category of entry 150 of “preserved food article”.
Common parlance understanding - Held that:- The Apex court time and again has observed that in cases like this, test of “common parlance” is to be applied and taking into consideration, if we apply the common parlance test, if a consumer goes to market and asks for namkin, normally the shopkeeper who may be selling both locally made namkin bikaneri bhujia, chana dal, chewra etc. as also the product of assessee, will immediately provide “bikaneri bhujia, chana dal, chewra” etc. and only if one specifically asks for “potato chips, kurkure and cheetos” etc., then the shopkeeper may give such items otherwise the product of namkin like sev, bikaneri bhujia, mogar etc. would immediately be given by the shopkeeper. Even normal ordinary meaning of namkin in my view is bikaneri bhujia, chana dal, chewra or a similar product.
Thus, potato chips, kurkure and cheetos can clearly be said to be “food articles” and though may be that it may taste like a namkin, but cannot really be said to be pure and simple namkin, it can only be classified to be falling in the category of “food articles” - the question of law is required to be answered against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue - petition dismissed - decided against petitioner.
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2016 (12) TMI 1737
Time Limitation - Validity of assessment order and assessment notice - Rule 6(5) of the CST Rules - issuance of bogus C forms - Whether there is any limitation for issuing a notice under Rule 6(5) of the Central Sales Tax Rules (Kerala), 1957 and completing the assessment under the CST Act?
Held that:- There is no dispute about the fact that there is no separate return to be filed under the CST Act. Return filed under the KVAT Act itself is a valid return for CST Act also.
The statute does not provide for a period of limitation. Though such a question is pending before the Division Bench, when a contention is raised, it has to be decided. As matters stand now, there cannot be any dispute regarding the right of assessee to treat the assessments as completed within a reasonable time - If we look at the statutory provision under Rule 6(5), once a return is filed, the officer is bound to complete the assessment, after the close of the year. If no action is taken for completing the assessment within a reasonable period, the assessee can treat the assessment as completed. Thereafter the only procedure that is available to reopen the assessment on ground of escaped turnover is under Rule 6(7). A procedure under Rule 6(5) cannot be adopted at any point of time. It has to be done within a reasonable time or atleast before the time stipulated in Rule 6(7) - Even going by the statutory provision under Rule 6(5), the assessment has to be completed within a reasonable time, which shall not be later than the period prescribed under Rule 6(7).
Rule 6(5) clearly provides that for taking action in respect of incorrect or incomplete returns, enquiry has to be conducted by the assessing authority after giving the dealer an opportunity to prove the correctness and completeness of the return submitted by him. It is after issuing such a notice that the assessing authority shall proceed to determine the turnover to the best of his judgment. This process has to be initiated within the specified time. If after issuing notice, there is delay in completing the assessment, the proviso in terms of Finance Act, 2010 and subsequent Finance Acts may render assistance to the State.
Petition allowed - decided in favor of petitioner.
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2016 (12) TMI 1719
Demand notices during pendency of appeal - Held that: - the present petition stands disposed of by observing that let the first appellate authority finally decide and dispose of the Appeal within a period of four weeks from today in accordance with law and on its own merits after giving an opportunity to the petitioners.
As appeal itself is being ordered to be finally decided and disposed of within a period of four weeks from today, and therefore, respondent no.2 may not insist upon implementation the impugned notices - present Special Civil Application stands disposed of.
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2016 (12) TMI 1706
Transit passes - the goods were being transported with the intention of evasion of tax and there was violation of section 78(3) of the Rajasthan Value Added Tax Act - Held that: - section 78 (1) & (3) of the RVAT Act mandates for obtaining Transit Pass as also producing the same as and when required - It is surprising that though the owner/ driver/person incharge stopped the vehicle at the Check-post and obtained Transit Pass for one set of goods namely; Leather but no Transit Pass was obtained for such other goods, which were also lying in the same truck and was being transmitted of “Pump and Accessories”.
It is mandatory for a person to obtain Transit Pass for the goods being transported and available with the vehicle when in transit. These provisions in my view are to be strictly complied with mandatory and is required to be taken into consideration in letter and spirit - petition dismissed.
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2016 (12) TMI 1704
Evasion of tax - Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, has not the appellate tribunal erred in sustaining the alleged suppression against the revision petitioner? - Held that: - since it is virtually admitted by the assessee that they had committed suppression and had also compounded the offence, it was then completely within the jurisdictional domain of the Assessing Authority to complete the assessment applying the principles of best judgment based on verification of the documents available and quantification of the same in a manner that is available to them under law.
The Assessing Authority or the Tribunal was not required under law to grant the petitioner any opportunity to verify the alleged variations in the presence of the Assessing Authority nor was it bounden upon the Tribunal to make such verification its own as has now been required by the assessee - revision dismissed.
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2016 (12) TMI 1703
Jurisdiction - whether the Sales Tax Tribunal, Punjab, Chandigarh could have validly exercise its jurisdiction while deciding the rectification application, filed under Section 21A(2) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948? - Held that: - the Tribunal may, at any time within two years from the date of any order passed by it, rectify any mistake apparent from the record. This may be done either on its own motion or on the matter being brought to its notice by any person.
Power to rectify a mistake should be exercised when the mistake is a patent one and is quite obvious. The mistake cannot be such which can be ascertained by a long-drawn process of reasoning. It was held that while rectifying a mistake, an erroneous view of law or a debatable point cannot be decided. It was specifically held that incorrect application of law can also not be corrected.
Whether the amendment to Rule 29(xii) vide notification dated 15.4.2002 was merely clarificatory and hence retrospective in nature, being a decision on a debatable question of law, could not have been construed to be a mistake apparent on the record and was not liable to be rectified in exercise of power under Section 21-A of the Act. Even if the earlier view was an erroneous view in law, it was, as per the aforementioned decisions, not amenable to be corrected in exercise of the power under Section 21-A.
Petition allowed - decided in favor of petitioner.
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2016 (12) TMI 1702
Works contract - whether the transaction referred in the contract to make a serial and transferring the right over the serial would attract the definition of the term “goods” occurring in the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963?
Held that: - The question whether making a serial for valid consideration amounts to sale of goods or not, is more or less settled by a large number of decisions of the Apex Court and of this court. It is settled now that “goods” would include all kinds of movable and immovable property whether it be tangible or intangible.
The vesting of copyright is different from divesting the ownership right in the property in which copyright subsists. The divesting of the ownership right essentially depends upon the nature of contract in relation to the transaction. The deemed transfer of copyright as contemplated in law itself will not result in transfer of ownership of the property. To understand transfer of ownership in a particular transaction for the purpose of sale, the court has to differentiate the terms and conditions of the contract. In this case as seen from the contract (clause 11), it was agreed that TV films and materials will become the absolute property of the Government with perpetual copyrights, distribution rights etc., only upon delivery of the film. If that be so, the contract can be easily comprehended as having the characteristics of a sale as contemplated under the Sale of Goods Act, 1930.
The tribunal erred in construing the contract as a contract of service - the order of tribunal set aside and the order of the assessing authority restored.
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2016 (12) TMI 1695
Payment of tax at compounded rate - works contracts - The singular contention of the petitioner is that they had already been granted an order to pay tax at compounded rates under the provisions of Section 8(a)(ii) of the Act and that, therefore, they are eligible to pay tax at such rates for all the works that they had obtained for execution.
Held that: - It is ineluctable that the provisions to pay tax at compounded rates is only in lieu of the obligation to pay tax under Section 6 of the Act. Therefore, the primary charging Section is always Section 6 of the Act and Section 8, which provides for payment of tax at compounded rates, is only an optional method offered to the assessee for ease and convenience in payment of tax. The main charging Section, namely, Section 6 of the Act, proposes levy of tax on sale or purchase of goods.
It is admitted by the petitioner and is evident from the permission granted under Section 8 of the Act, which orders are produced as Annexure-A in the revisions, that they had applied for compounding of certain works contracts covered by a particular work order but not for other works that were being undertaken by them. They had, however, claimed that going by the third proviso to Section 8(ii), they are entitled to pay tax even for those works at the compounded rates. This is totally unacceptable and against the express intendment of the provisions of the section.
The petitioner, having accepted the orders of the Assessing Authority under Section 8(a)(ii) of the Act to pay tax at compounded rates for certain works, cannot renege from the obligation cast upon them under the statute and then try to interpret the provisions to suit its convenience and its cause to claim benefits which they were never entitled to and which was never intended by the statute to be granted. The petitioner would be entitled to pay tax at the compounded rates only for the works for which permission was granted and not for the others.
Revision dismissed.
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2016 (12) TMI 1497
Detention of seized truck and goods - non payment of tax dues - Held that: - The Truck is detained since 15th October 2016, therefore, if the truck is kept idle for a longer period, the condition of Truck shall be deteriorating and it shall not be in the interest of either of the parties. Under the circumstances, the truck can be released on the terms stated hereinabove, which the petitioner has agreed to comply with. The petitioner has agreed to pay/deposit a sum of ₹ 20,00,000/= on or before 24th December 2016 and has also agreed to pay balance amount of ₹ 84,08,325/= with interest; if any on the outstanding amount on or before 20th February 2017 - An undertaking affirmed by the Regional Manager and the authorized signatory of the petitioner-Company to the aforesaid extent is also filed - petition disposed off - decided in favor of petitioner.
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2016 (12) TMI 1429
Classification of goods sold - Rigid Frame Columns (RFC) - classifiable under section 14(iv)(v) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 read with Entry C-55(v) of the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 or are classifiable under the Residuary Entry of the Maharashtra Value Added Tax, 2002 - whether the RFCs manufactured by the Appellant would fall within section 14(iv)(v) of the CST Act and Schedule Entry C-55(v) of MVAT Act? - interprtation of statute - Held that: - Merely because “steel structurals” or “angles” or “joists” etc are manufactured by the process of welding, would not take it outside the scope of section 14(iv)(v) of the CST Act or Schedule Entry C- 55(v) of the MVAT Act respectively. It is merely a new process by which “steel structurals” are now manufactured considering the advancement in technology. This by itself, with nothing more, would not disentitle “steel structurals” from being classified under section 14(iv)(v) of the CST Act or Schedule Entry C-55(v) of the MVAT Act.
The description of the goods in the invoice is not something which would determine classification of their goods in a particular Entry. What has to be seen is whether the goods sold by the Appellant fit the description of a specific Entry in the tariff schedule and only when it does not fall within a specific Entry, the residuary Entry should be resorted to.
RFCs manufactured and sold by the Appellant would be squarely covered by Schedule Entry C-55(v) of the MVAT Act and section 14(iv)(v) of the CST Act - appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.
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2016 (12) TMI 1428
Legality of the imposition of tax of entry on goods as inserted by way of an amendment in the Uttar Pradesh Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 2007 and Uttar Pradesh Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas (Amendment) Act, 2016 (UP Act No.18 of 2016) notified on 16th September, 2016
Held that: - amendment inserted by way of U.P. Act No.18 of 2016 is completely beyond the authority and competence of the State Legislature as it ex facie introduces the levy of tax which was not existing under the old Act and therefore, could not be introduced by way of the amendment as has been done now. Consequently, Clause 19 of Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act, 2016 does not in any way prima facie saves the imposition of the tax through Online Purchase or E-Commerce particularly for personal use. Thus there is a complete lack of legislative competence as such the impugned provisions are rendered unconstitutional.
Interim relief granted during the pendency of writ petition - as an interim measure, the petitioner shall be entitled to trade through E-Commerce and on Online Purchase system but for the said purpose, the petitioner in order to secure the interest of the State shall furnish Bank Guarantee to the satisfaction of the authorities concerned by mentioning in the form prescribed for the said purpose in respect of such transactions - matter on remand.
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2016 (12) TMI 1363
Whether sale of energy to BSEB is regarded as sale? - Concealed sale of energy - Penalty - Held that: - the charging Section 3(1) of the Act when it speaks of levy of duty on either units or on the value of energy consumed or sold, has to be similarly read as the Constitutional Entry 53 providing the power to the State Legislature, to levy electricity duty either on the unit or on the value of energy consumed or sold for consumption - It is evident from the definition of value of energy in Section 2(ee) which is the computation provision brought in by amendment, after the earlier provisions and notifications had been struck down by the Court as providing no guidelines, that it provides for only two type of cases under sub-clause (i) that is, firstly, energy sold to a consumer by a licensee and, secondly, energy sold to a consumer by a person who generates energy - The petitioners are evidently not a licensee in the matters in hand, they are certainly not selling energy to the consumer; rather they are selling it to the BSEB, which is a licensee under Section 2(d) and which in turn sells the energy for ultimate consumption.
Where the generator of energy does not directly receive payment of charges from the consumer, it can be covered within the purview of Section 2(ee) (i) of the Act. In this regard one should also bear in mind that the provision of a taxing statute should be strictly construed, and the benefit of any ambiguity must go to the assessee - Therefore, even on the ground of the applicability of the charging provision it has to be held that the charging provision under Section 3(1) read with the definition of ‘consumer’, ‘licensee’ and ‘value of energy’ as provided in the Act cannot be used to levy any tax on a generating company supplying energy to a licensee like the Electricity Board as in the present matter, as no tax can be computed in their cases - Decided in favor of the assessee.
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2016 (12) TMI 1362
Released of attached property - release of seized books - Sections 45 & 67 [4] of the Act - principles of natural justice - Held that: - the impugned orders passed under Section 45 and 67 [4] of the Act stand withdrawn on the statement made by the learned AGP. The relevant materials/documents/books of account seized in purported exercise of power under Section 67 [4] of the Act be returned to the petitioners within seven days from today, after copying the same and/or retaining copy of the same. In view of the above, no further order is required to be passed in terms of prayers made in para 8 [B] of the petition.
Maintainability of petition at the SCN stage - Held that: - the present petition is preferred at the stage of show cause notice and ample opportunity shall be available to the petitioners to make submissions before appropriate authority and the appropriate authority is bound to consider the same in accordance with law and on merits - The petitioners are relegated to make appropriate submissions before the appropriate authority who had issued the show cause notice which shall be considered by the concerned authority in accordance with law and on merits.
Petition disposed off - decided partly in favor of petitioner.
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