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Customs - Case Laws
Showing 501 to 520 of 40550 Records
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2025 (4) TMI 705
Levy of penalty - Liability of appellant for evasion of customs duty - appellant's claim is that he merely lent his Importer Exporter Code (IEC) to Mr. Rajat Arora, and was not involved in the import activities - opportunity for crossexamination of two witnesses was not granted - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- The Court does not find any question of law that would arise in the present appeal. Moreover, the Appellant has, at various stages, tried to evade the true facts and has taken incorrect pleas before various authorities. Such acts on part of the Appellant also shows that the conduct of the Appellant does not deserve any indulgence - the amounts and penalties, which have been imposed upon the Appellant in the Impugned Order are liable to be upheld.
The Appellant, who enjoyed the IEC registration, ought to have acted responsibly and ensured that the same was not misused by any third party. Apart from not being careful about the IEC codes etc., in the present case, this Court is clearly of the opinion that the Appellant and Mr. Rajat Arora were conniving with each other and were fully aware of the transactions and imports that were being undertaken. Their role cannot be delineated and differentiated in the manner that the Appellant seeks to delineate himself. Both were acting in concert with each other, as is clear from the findings of CESTAT.
Appeal dismissed.
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2025 (4) TMI 704
Levy of penalties under Section 114(iii) and 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 - allegedly abetting the submission of false documents leading to the overvaluation and attempted illegal export of goods - HELD THAT:- The department sent a simple letter to the appellant to inquire about receipt of export documents to which he replied as having been received from M/s Mass Shipping Agencies, New Delhi through E-mail. No further investigation seem to have been done at his end to bring out is role in alleged export of goods. The appellant has acted as intermediary in the case who only transmitted the export documents received from M/s Mass Shipping Agency to the CHA for filing the shipping bills with the Customs Authorities. The department has not substantiated charges of abetment or submission of false documents or material to justify penalty upon him under Section 114(iii) and 114AA of the Customs Act respectively.
A similar issue was decided by this Tribunal in the case of Bansal Fine Foods Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Customs, Mundra [2022 (7) TMI 372 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD] wherein it was held that “CHA who filed shipping bills as per documents provided by Indian exporter is not liable to penalty under section 114 and 114AA of Customs Act, 1962 when export consignment was rerouted to another country but ultimately delivered to original consignee.”
Penalty under Customs Act can be imposed on a person only if some positive Act of his involvement in fraudulent import/export is found with credible evidence. If a CHA fails to fulfill the obligation cast upon him under CBLR, 2018, appropriate action needs to be taken under those regulations. In this case, the appellant is not even a CHA. He just acted as an intermediary to forward the export documents/ KYC etc. received from M/s Mass Shipping Agency to the CHA. As discussed, the department has not adduced any evidence against the appellant establishing abetment in alleged fraudulent activity of the exporter. Also, no evidence has been brought forward to show that the appellant used false and incorrect material in the case which led to confiscation of export goods. What has come out, is that the appellant received KYC documents, export invoices, packing lists, etc. of the exporter from some other Agency on his mail which he forwarded to CHA for filing papers with Customs. Therefore, the appelant cannot be penalised under Section 114(iii) and 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962.
Conclusion - The department has not brought out any evidence in this case to sustain allegation against the appellant. Therefore penalty has been imposed on him without credible evidence which is held unsustainable.
Appeal allowed.
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2025 (4) TMI 703
Personal Penalty u/s 112 and 114AA - Proper officer - Judicial discipline - Protection of action taken u/s 155 - Proceedings against the appellants are barred by the statutory limitations outlined in Section 155 of the Customs Act, 1962 - actions of the appellants, as officers of customs, could be considered as being done in good faith and in pursuance of the Customs Act, 1962, thus warranting protection under Section 155 or not - HELD THAT:- From the sparseness of judicial precedent as far as application of section 155 of Customs Act, 1962 in quasi-judicial action is concerned, it would appear that such adjudication proceedings, encompassing customs officers, is a recent phenomenon and the rarity of resort in the several decades past is a telling measure of either increasing complicity of officials or unrestrained resort by investigation and, with both from the same stock, is not a good reflection of either. It is of concern that increasing resort may not always be in public interest and, negation at appellate stage notwithstanding, is as good as continuation of damage commenced against officers, as individuals, and, as common weal, to public interest. Customs Act, 1962 offers deployment of section 136 and well as section 132 – corresponding to the charges here – for prosecuting officers of customs but, as is evident, that would be subject to judicial sieve from the very beginning and neither to be entered into lightly nor retreated from hastily.
The law is not an instrument of convenience; flexibility, appropriated for invoking jurisdiction from one provision to the exclusion of other, is nothing but encroachment unless legitimized by good grace in accepting restrictions implicit in the other. The absence of judicial rulings, except the few and of recent vintage, is not an indication that the present appellants, finding themselves in this predicament, are clutching at mere straws unless it can be shown that such proceedings through adjudication are, statistically, a norm and not deviation. Indeed, Learned Special Counsel, in response to a direct query, was unable to substantiate so - as legislative sanction accorded for instituting appellate remedy, through newly minted Tribunal and through the constitutional courts, in 1980 did not consider it necessary to exclude the safeguard enacted in 1962. Section 155 of Customs Act, 1962 are intended as safeguards and are of no less significance to adjudication proceedings.
The original authority, with determination of absence of ‘good faith’ in acts of omission and commission on the part of the appellants, has skirted the template of section 155(2) of Customs Act, 1962 which lacks that motif. The finding is perverse for not only having invoked a test which is in the preserve of judiciary for acceptance of jurisdiction by evaluation of acts for ‘good faith’ at the threshold in suits, prosecution or other legal proceedings against Central Government, officers of the Government or local authorities but also by implicit acceptance of safeguards as extending to adjudications, by having ventured upon the test of ‘good faith’ even while avoiding the facts of the dispute necessary to decide the ingress of limitation - Adjudicating authority and appellate authority may choose not be persuaded by judgements that are distinguishable on facts and law but no lower authority may sit in judgement upon any decision of higher authority for chastising or discrediting. That Revenue chose not to challenge the said decisions rendered those to be final and binding on all lower authorities.
As the trigger for limitation is ‘from accrual of such cause’ which is not only a finding on facts but also would need sifting of the investigation process for location of the trigger. While the former of the stipulations in the second of the safeguard is only a question of fact, the argument of Learned Counsel on the manner of reading the conjunction, concatenating the two deadlines, as not ‘necessary and sufficient’ has effect of adjudging the latter stipulation.
Conclusion - i) The procedural safeguards in Section 155 of the Customs Act, 1962, are crucial and must be adhered to before initiating proceedings against customs officers. ii) The absence of compliance with procedural requirements can invalidate proceedings, regardless of the merits of the case. iii) The principles of natural justice must be observed throughout adjudication processes.
The appeals are allowed by way of remand to the adjudicating authority.
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2025 (4) TMI 702
Classification of imported goods - wind shield glass set - to be classified under the Customs Tariff Item 70071100 or under the CTH 87089900 - HELD THAT:- As per the reading of descriptions as provided under Import Tariff, Section Notes to Chapter XVII and Explanatory Notes to HSN/CTH 8708, it is found that the goods imported will have the essential characteristic of parts & accessories of motor vehicles only when the same are solely or principally used in the said vehicle.
The goods as imported by the respondent did not fulfil the description as provided in explanatory notes to CTH 8708 . Moreover, the assessing officer in his findings has not adduced any evidence that the goods imported by the respondent are the parts and accessories of motor vehicles. Thus, as per the Chapter Notes cited, the goods imported by the respondent are excluded from the CTH 8708.
It is observed that as per the Explanatory Notes to Chapter Heading 7007, "Toughened (tempered) Glass" are specifically covered under the CTH 7007. In vehicles, such windshield glasses are fixed for protection of the passengers. These glasses are used in heat chambers as well as in cubicles set up in snowy areas. It has multiple uses. The Department sought to classify the goods under CTH 8708 as parts of vehicles by alleging that these are usable in vehicles as well. However, it is not necessary that all cars would have windshields.
It is further observed that 'wind screens' were included in the CTH 87082200 after the amendment brought in finance Bill 2001. The respondent referred the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Indian National Shipowners Association versus Union of India [2009 (3) TMI 29 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT], wherein it has been held that introduction of new entry under the provisions of statute denotes that such tariff was not previously applicable.
Thus, prior to amendment brought in by the Finance bill 2001, the impugned goods ‘wind shield glass set’ were not classifiable under the CTH 8708 as motor vehicle parts. As the CTH 70071100 specifically covered the impugned goods imported by the respondent during the period under dispute, there are no infirmity in the impugned orders passed by the Ld. Commissioner (Appeals).
Conclusion - The goods were appropriately classified under CTI 70071100 during the relevant period.
The impugned orders upheld - appeal of Revenue dismissed.
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2025 (4) TMI 701
Denial of benefit of Notification No.30/2004-CE dated 09.07.2004 - amendment of Bills of Entry under Section 149 of the Customs Act, 1962 - the self-assessment of the Bills of Entry at the time of clearance, not challenged - HELD THAT:- Admittedly, in this case, the appellant has not challenged the Bills of Entry, but they sought amendment under Section 149 of the Customs Act, 1962, which is very much impressed upon the observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of ITC Ltd. [2019 (9) TMI 802 - SUPREME COURT (LB)], wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the assessment order has to be modified under Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962 or any other relied upon provisions of the Act i.e. Section 149 of the Customs Act, 1962. Admittedly, the appellant has claimed for modification of assessment under Section 149 of the Act, the same is available to the appellant. Therefore, the appellant is entitled for amendment in the Bills of Entry.
The benefit of Notification was admitted by the adjudicating authority, but held that the same cannot be given to the appellant only because of the reason that they have not challenged the assessments of Bills of Entry.
The issue has been examined by this Tribunal in the case of Artex Textile Private Limited [2023 (9) TMI 1268 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD], wherein this Tribunal observed that 'the appellant in principle entitle for exemption Notification as the condition of non availment of Cenvat Credit need not to be satisfied by the importer in respect of imported goods. The same has been clarified by the Central Board of Excise and Customs vide Circular No. 1005/12/2015-CX dated 21.07.2015.'
Conclusion - The appellants are entitled for the benefit of Notification No.30/2004-CE dated 09.07.2004 for the imports made prior to 17.07.2015.
Appeal allowed.
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2025 (4) TMI 656
Inclusion of royalty paid by the Appellant to the overseas Licensors/foreign suppliers in the value of imported goods for assessment to duty as per Rule 10(1)(c) of the Customs Valuation Rules, 2007 - difference of opinion - the Member (Technical) dissented, believing the royalty should be included in the assessable value - majority order - HELD THAT:- It is an admitted fact on record that both the authorities below have accepted the transaction value under Rule 3(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007. In other words, there is no dispute with respect to the declared value of the goods imported into India by the appellants from the related persons. However, the issue involved in the present appeal relates to includability of royalty in the value of parts/components imported into India, in terms of Rule 10(1)(c) of the Rules of 2007.
Rule 10(1)(c) ibid can only be invoked, if the conditions viz., (i) royalty is relatable to the imported goods; and (ii) royalty is paid as a condition of the sale of the imported goods, are satisfied cumulatively and simultaneously. In other words, if any one of the above conditions is not fulfilled, then Rule 10(1)(c) ibid cannot be invoked. Consequently, the royalty paid by the importer-buyer cannot be included in the value of the imported goods - In the present case, running royalty @3% of net sales had been paid by the appellants to three numbers of licence holders, as per the Licence and Technical Assistance Agreement. Further, while determining the net sales, value of all components (imported from related as well as unrelated persons) had been deducted.
The royalty paid as indicated in column (5) is only on the value of the finished goods, excluding the value of the imported goods (whether imported from related or un-related persons). For example, if the figures mentioned in the above table for the period October, 2011 to December, 2011 is considered, then it depicts that value of sales of Rs.145,365,008/-, after exclusion of value of imported goods of Rs.27,389,650/- is Rs.117,975,358/- and 3% royalty on such net value comes to Rs. 3,539,260/. Thus, it transpires from the above table that the actual running royalty amount paid at 3% is only on the value of sales, after excluding the value of imported goods.
Since, the royalty paid is not in relation to, or in connection with the sale of imported goods, and it is paid by the appellants for using the know-how in manufacture automotive components in India, the condition laid down under clause (c) of Rule 10(1) ibid, shall not be applicable for addition of royalty in the transaction value of imported goods for the purpose of levy of customs duty. Further, on examination of the License Agreement dated 04.02.2011 available in the case file, no conditions have been prescribed for sale of the imported components. Further, the technical license agreement does not stipulate import of goods from related person only.
The issue arising out of the present dispute has been dealt with by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Tribunal in the case of Kruger Ventilation Indus. (North India) Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Commr. Of Customs (Import), New Delhi, [2022 (5) TMI 496 - CESTAT NEW DELHI]. It has been held that if the importer is free to procure the inputs from any source, then it does not constitute as a condition for sale of the imported goods and does not warrant inclusion of royalty in the assessable value.
Conclusion - The royalty payments should not be included in the assessable value of the imported goods.
In view of the majority opinion, the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed in favour of the appellants.
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2025 (4) TMI 655
Seeking grant of regular bail - Smuggling - petitioner carried gold in the form of crude or in form of paste - personal search of petitioner and drawing of the Mahazar is in accordance with law or not - HELD THAT:- The investigating officer conducting the personal search of suspected under NDPS Act, he has to be conduct before nearest Gazetted Officer of any Department or nearest Magistrate. Under the Customs Act. Gazetted Officer of the Customs Department got power to conduct personal search. In this case, the petitioner herself has given consent for her personal body search to SIO. Accordingly, the respondent officials have conducted personal search of the petitioner. Therefore it is not necessary to respondent officers to called the other Gazetted officer.
In this case, the respondent officer have themselves satisfied and reasonable believed regarding concealment of the smuggling gold. Thereafter, they conducted personal search and found that, the petitioner has concealed the 17 gold bar in her cloth and seized the same by conducting seizer mahazar in the presence of panchas out of them one is female. On considering Sec 102 and 104 of Customs Act and circular issued by Customs Department in the year 2013, itself is one code for search, seizer and arrest. Therefore, it is procedure followed by the respondent officer while personal search of petitioner and seizer of Gold bars by drawing mahazar is in accordance with law and circular.
The learned standing Counsel for the respondent relied on another important document i.e., business of the petitioner and accused No.2 is based on Hawala Channel. It is serious offence. A people of Bharath are looking forward to put their Nation/Bharath in the 3rd Economic place in entire world. In such circumstances, if bail is granted to the petitioner, it gives wrong message to public at large and it will have an bad impact and convey wrong message to the society, as well as it gives wrong signal to the nation.
Conclusion - The regular bail petition filed by the petitioner/accused under Section 483 of BNS Sanhita-2023 is hereby rejected.
Petition dismissed.
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2025 (4) TMI 579
Condonation of gross delay of 544 days in filing and 44 days in refiling the appeals - delay not satisfactorily explained - Classification of imported goods - it was held by SC order that 'There is a gross delay of 544 days in filing and 44 days in refiling the appeals which have not been satisfactorily explained.'
HELD THAT:- There are no merit in the review petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.
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2025 (4) TMI 578
Imposition of interest, penalty, and redemption fine on IGST under Section 3(7) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 in lieu of payment of IGST leviable under Section 3 (7) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 - pre-import condition was not met - HELD THAT:- Section 3 (12) of the Tariff Act, prior to its amendment, did not make applicable the provisions of the Customs Act relating to interest, offences and penalties to integrated tax chargeable under Section 3 (7) of the Tariff Act.
This issue is no longer res integra. In Mahindra & Mahindra Limited [2023 (8) TMI 135 - SC ORDER], this Court was interpreting Sections 3 (6) and 3A (4) of the Tariff Act, which are pari materia to the unamended Section 3 (12) of the Tariff Act, held that no specific reference was made to interest and penalties in Sections 3 (6) and 3A (4) of the Tariff Act, which are substantive provisions and, therefore, imposing interest and penalty would be without the authority of law. In the present case, the levy of IGST is under Section 3 (7) of the Tariff Act, and Section 3 (12) of the Tariff Act which is applicable to the said levy is pari materia to Sections 3 (6) and 3A (4) of the Tariff Act as referred to in the case of Mahindra & Mahindra Limited. In these circumstances, the said decision is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case.
The impugned Order, to the extent that it levies interest and penalty, is without the authority of law and is liable to quashed and set aside.
Redemption fine - HELD THAT:- Section 3 (12) of the Tariff Act, after its amendment by Finance (No. 2) Act, 2024, dated 16th August, 2024, makes applicable the provisions relating to interest, offences and penalties of the Customs Act to the Tariff Act. As already, Section 3 (12) of the Tariff Act, as amended, is applicable only after 16th August,2024 and is not applicable to the present case. Accordingly, in the present case, no confiscation could have been imposed.
Further, the Joint Director General of Foreign Trade, by Trade Notice No. 7 of 2023-24 dated 8th July, 2023 clarified that all imports made under the Advance Authorization Scheme on or after 13th October, 2017 and upto and including 9th January, 2019, which could not meet the pre-import condition, may be regularized by making payments as prescribed in the Customs Circular No. 16/2023 – Customs dated 7th June, 2023. For this reason also, no confiscation can be done nor any redemption fine can be imposed.
Conclusion - i) It is declared that Circular No. 16 of 2023-Customs dated 7th June, 2023, to the extent that it purports to levy interest upon the IGST payment, is beyond the provisions of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 and is bad in law. ii) The impugned Order dated 1st August, 2024, to the extent that it seeks to recover interest, confiscate goods, impose redemption fine and impose penalty, is quashed and set aside. iii) It is declared that the amendment to the provisions of Section 3 (12) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 by Finance (No. 2) Act, 2024 dated 16th August, 2024 is prospective in nature and is applicable only from 16th August, 2024 onwards.
Petition allowed.
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2025 (4) TMI 577
Classification of imported goods - Copper Rod Nominal Dia 8mm with ATSM B49 - to be classified under CTH 74071020 or under CTH 74081190? - rejection of the Certificate of Origin (COO) without verification - suppression of facts or not - extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- The goods which were in the coil form contrary to the definition of “bars and rods” contained in Customs Tariff Act, 1985, which are supposed to be not in coils as culled out above in para 3.1 and 3.2, were still declared as bars and rods and not as a wire by the appellant.
The statutory provisions being clear, no doubt, even from the literal interpretation, in the minds of anyone could be left that the same were not to be treated ‘as bars and rods’. We, therefore, find that the certificate of origin as submitted was incorrect as the HSN is allied in most countries and could not have been different in South Korea. Therefore, with such apparent mistake, benefit has been correctly denied by the department. This is supplemented by the assertion of the party too, when they state that CL in COO refers to coil.Tariff Heading 74081190 is appropriate heading as indicated by the department. Therefore, exemption under CEPA notification was correctly denied and BCD @ 5% was correctly demanded, in Show Cause Notice dated 19.06.2019.
Extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- In the certificate of origin-CL is mentioned in the description portion which refers to coil. The department terms the same as cryptic reference to the coil trying to use the same as an alibi, if there were caught. The intention is to be construed with overall facts and circumstances, while the description is not available in the Bills of Entry which is a most reliable document in the International imports, the same however, is available in the packing list and in an cryptic manner in the certificate of origin. It is not coming out from records, as to whether, these documents specially the packing list were submitted by the importer as part of the documents attached with Bills of Entry while seeking assessment by the party or not - the adjudicating authority/assessing authority is directed to verify this aspect and construe the limitation, accordingly. If, the description of the goods being in coils was sufficiently reflected in the documents like packing list and the same was provided in the system, then benefit on limitation which is beyond normal period can be permitted to the appellant. However, if the benefit on limitation is decided as not being available to the party, then extended period as well as penalty will sustain, accordingly.
Conclusion - i) The classification of goods under CTH 74081190 is correct, the CEPA exemption denied. ii) The rejection of the COO without verification is upheld as the issue is misclassification, not origin. iii) The imposition of penalties under Sections 114A and 114AA is justified due to intentional mis-declaration. iv) The extended period for issuing the SCN is applicable due to suppression of facts.
The appeal Is partly allowed by way of remand for verification of whether the packing list was submitted with the Bills of Entry to determine the applicability of the extended period.
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2025 (4) TMI 576
Revocation of Customs Broker License - forefeiture of security deposit - levy of penalty - mis-declaratin of quantity and value of the goods, in order to avail higher amount of drawback and other incidental export benefits - violation of provisions of Regulation 10(a), 10(d), and 10(n) of the CBLR, 2018.
Violation of of Regulation 10(a) - HELD THAT:- The adjudicating authority has held that even though the appellant had procured the authorisation letters of the exporters, they were not obtained from the exporters directly by the appellant. It has been accepted by the Ld Counsel that the appellant did not meet the exporter but the documents were received through Sh. Ram Pratap, who was the appellant’s friend, and acquainted with one of the exporters. Rule 10(a) does not cast any responsibility on the appellant CB to obtain the authorisation from the exporter directly. It only requires the appellant to have the authorisation from the firm/company etc, which was available with the appellant. Therefore, the violation of 10(a) cannot be upheld.
Violation of of Regulation 10(d) - HELD THAT:- The appellant CB cannot be held responsible for the actions of the exporters. It is an admitted fact that the goods were found to be less in quantity as well as they were valued much higher than its cost. This was clearly an attempt by the exporters to defraud the Government by claiming higher drawback, but the actions were purely of the exporters. The department has not been able to lead any evidence of any active collusion by the appellant or any evidence of the appellant CB having advised the exporters or assisted them in then activity. Consequently, the conclusions reached by the adjudicating authority cannot be agreed upon.
Violation of of Regulation 10(n) - HELD THAT:- There is no evidence that the appellant CB did not undertake verification of the KYC documents. It is noted that IEC and Aadhar/PAN card are issued by the Government departments. Therefore, any verification would be based on the copies of these documents submitted by the client/exporter, which can be verified independently online in the respective portals. The Department cannot expect the appellant/CB to be responsible to ensure the correctness of the actions of the Government Department which have issued these certificates. Consequently, verification of certificates as part of the obligation under Regulation 10(n) on the Customs Broker stands satisfied as long as it satisfies itself that the IEC and the Aadhar were issued by the concerned officers.
Levy of penalty - HELD THAT:- Once the goods were seized by the Department, the said exporters did not come forward to claim the goods. It is a matter of concern is that when the goods were seized, no one came forward to claim the said goods, clearly evidencing the attempt of the exporters to defraud the government. This should have been a warning to the appellant CB that the export goods obviously did not belong to the exporters on paper. Though there is no collusion of the appellant CB in the attempt of the exporters to defraud the Government, the appellant CB plays a crucial role in international trade. The CB has an obligation as the appointed agent to transact Customs formalities and is responsible for their clients. Therefore, the appellant is liable for penalty.
Conclusion - i) The revocation of CB license is set aside. ii) The forfeiture of security deposit is set aside. iii) The penalty of Rs 50,000/- imposed on the appellant is reduced to Rs 25, 000/-.
Appeal allowed in part.
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2025 (4) TMI 575
Importer under the Customs Act, 1962 or not - levy of penalty on the basis of evidence available of construed knowledge - difference of opinion - majority order - Two containers loaded with the medicine had been discharged at the port of Pipavav and were lying unclaimed by the importer. It was also revealed through intelligence that the subject consignments were earlier exported by the Appellant from some other port by availing the benefit of DEPB. - Pipavav is not the notified port to import.
HELD THAT:- When all these facts are taken up together, it is found that the appellant has not been able to conclusively prove that they were not aware of the sending back of the expired drugs by M/s Private Party Oderig. The mere fact that they have not returned the export proceeds to M/s Biologica (UK) Ltd., cannot come to the rescue of the appellants. Since admittedly they were carrying on multiple transactions both with M/s Biologica (UK) Ltd. as well as with M/s Private Party Oderig, they may be maintaining a running account for their transactions which has not been properly investigated by the Revenue.
So far as the appellant’s argument that the value of the consignment should be treated as nil, since it pertains expired drugs, this can come to their rescue only if the Pipavav Port is designated as a proper port for import of medicines. Since this could not have been imported at Pipavav Port, even in the case of normal pharma products, the import could not have been cleared on payment of customs duty.
In respect of the argument of the appellant about re-importation required to be made within one year, the office of Authorised Representative provides the copy of the Notification 135/99-cus dated 27.12.1999 wherein the period for re-importation has been increased from one year to three years. Therefore, even this argument of the appellant cannot be legally sustained.
Matter to be posted before the regular bench - Appeal allowed in part.
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2025 (4) TMI 574
Violation of the FTP 2009-2014 - simultaneous availing of benefits under the 'Status Holder Incentive Scheme (SHIS)' and the 'Zero Duty Export Promotion Capital Goods (EPCG)' scheme - HELD THAT:- Few aspect of the impugned public notice of the Director General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) had not been taken into account by the original authority as also the circumstances in which the utilization was effected by the appellant.
In order that the sequence of events and the relevant policy prescription be appreciated in context, the matter requires to be re-adjudicated afresh to enable which the impugned order is set aside leaving all issues open.
The impugned order is set aside and the dispute restored to the original authority for a fresh decision.
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2025 (4) TMI 529
Time limitation for issuance of SCN - Failure to follow 90 days time limit prescribed under Regulation 17 (5) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018 - HELD THAT:- The respondents have not disputed that there was a delay on their part in complying with the timelines fixed in the CBLR, 2018 under regulation 17. However, the only contention before this Court is that those timelines are only directory in nature and therefore, for non compliance of timelines, the petitioner cannot seek for quashing of the impugned show cause notice dated 28.03.2022 as well as the impugned Inquiry Report dated 17.06.2022.
This Court is bound by the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Santon Shipping Services Vs. The Commissioner of Customs [2017 (10) TMI 621 - MADRAS HIGH COURT], wherein the Division Bench has categorically held that similar regulations applicable to Customs House Agents, viz., CHALR, 2004 are mandatory and strict timelines will have to be necessarily followed as per the said regulations.
Conclusion - This Court is of the considered view that the impugned show cause notice as well as the impugned inquiry report have to be quashed on the ground of non adherence to the timelines fixed under regulation 17 (5) and (7) of CBLR, 2018, which are mandatory in nature.
The impugned show cause notice dated 28.03.2022 and the impugned Inquiry Report dated 17.06.2022 are hereby quashed and these writ petitions are allowed.
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2025 (4) TMI 528
Determination of customs duty - rejection of declared FOB value - delaration of high value in the shipping bill so as to claim excess benefit of MEIS and IGST refund - redetermination of value under Rule 6 and Rule 8 of the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Export Goods) Rules, 2007 read with Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962 - HELD THAT:- Section 14 of the Customs Act provides that for the purpose of Customs Tariff Act, 1975 or any other law for the time being in force, the value of the imported goods and export goods shall be the transaction value of such goods, but it provides for some exceptions. These exceptions include the conditions under which the transaction value can be rejected and the value can be re-determined as per rules. It needs to be noted that the Customs Tariff Act and the schedules thereunder determine the amount of duty payable. As per Section 12 of the Customs Act, duties of customs shall be levied at such rates as may be specified under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 or any other law for the time being in force, on goods imported into or exported from India. Duties on most goods are charged on ad-valorem basis and, therefore, the value of the goods is important. Section 14 provides for determining the value and also provides for the Government to make Rules for the purpose.
The Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Export Goods) Rules 2007 have been framed under Section 14 of the Act to determine the export value of the goods. Rule 3 provides that the value shall be the transaction value subject to Rule 8. Rule 8 provides for rejection of the declared value under certain conditions. Rules 4 to 6 provide for re-determination of value if the transaction value is rejected under Rule 8. In this case, the Additional Commissioner rejected the value under Rule 8 and re-determined the value under Rule 6. However, no export duty is chargeable on the goods. Therefore, re-determination of value under Section 14 and the Valuation Rules is irrelevant.
The confiscation of the goods under Section 113 (i) and consequential imposition of redemption fine cannot be sustained and need to be set aside - Penalty under Section 114 is attracted if the export goods are confiscated. Since in this case, confiscation under Section 113 itself cannot be sustained, penalty under Section 114 also cannot be sustained.
The case of the department is that the appellant had knowingly declared wrong value and hence penalty is imposable. As discussed above, since the appellant has to only declare the transaction value and has neither any obligation nor power under the law to re-determine the Value under some other method, and further since he has no obligation whatsoever under the law to predict what value the proper officer may determine, the appellant had not mis-declared the value in the Shipping Bill. Therefore, penalty under Section 1114AA is not imposable on the appellant.
Conclusion - i) The re-determination of the FOB value by the Additional Commissioner is without any authority of law and it has been wrongly upheld by the Commissioner (Appeals) in the impugned order. ii) The finding that the goods were liable to confiscation under Section 113(i) and the redemption fine imposed are liable to be set aside. iii) The penalties under Section 114 and 114AA are also liable to be set aside.
The impugned order is set aside - appeal allowed.
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2025 (4) TMI 527
Classification of goods imported by the appellant - Carbon and Sulphur Analyzer CS-800 - to be classified under CTH 90271000 by treating it as ‘Gas or Smoke analysis apparatus’ or not - HELD THAT:- Clearly, CTH 9027 is the heading which covers ‘Instruments and apparatus for physical or chemical analysis (for example, polarimeters, refractometers, spectrometers, gas or smoke analysis apparatus); Instruments and apparatus for measuring or checking viscosity, porosity, expansion, surface tension or the like; instruments and apparatus for measuring or checking quantities of heat, sound or light (including exposure meters); microtomes’.
A plain reading of the coverage, as per HSN, would indicate that the kind of gas or smoke analysis apparatus, which is specifically covered under CTH 90271000, are the one where the apparatus is used to analyze combustible gases or combustion by-products (burnt gases) and especially in coke ovens, gas producers, blast furnaces, etc., for determining their content of carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen or hydrocarbons - The technology it is using requires creation of fume or gas only with intent to ultimately test the presence of carbon or sulphur element in the metal and not the presence of carbon dioxide or sulphur dioxide gas in the metal. Therefore, this particular equipment is not classifiable under CTH 90271000. It is also noted that different types of analysers have been imported through different ports and they have been classified under many headings including CTH 90279090 & 90278090. From perusal of the same, it is also noticed that those equipments, which are specifically meant for analysing gases like SOX/NOX i.e., sulphur dioxide and nitrous oxide, etc., are getting classified under CTH 90271000, whereas, other kinds of analysers are getting classified under CTH 90278090.
As far as the argument that appellants themselves have started classifying the product under CTH 90271000 and therefore, now they cannot go back and claim that it is not classifiable is concerned, it is found that there is no estoppel on the appellant to challenge the classification even if they have started paying the duty under different heading during subsequent period. As far as the issue of payment under protest is concerned, it has got no relevance for the present appeal as during the material period, they had contested the classification and the said classification is being examined and not for the future classification practice adopted by them.
Conclusion - The apparatus's primary function was to measure element content in solid samples, not to analyze gases. The appellant was not estopped from challenging the classification, even if they had previously classified the apparatus under CTH 90271000.
The order of the Commissioner (Appeals) is not tenable and therefore, liable to be set aside - Appeal allowed.
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2025 (4) TMI 526
Revocation of Customs Broker License - forefeiture of security deposit - levy of penalty - alleged breach of timelines, obligations enumerated in regulation 10 of Customs Broker Licensing Regulations, 2018 - HELD THAT:- In the instant case, notice was issued on 22nd May 2023 well beyond the 90 days from receipt of offence report stipulated for initiating action. Furthermore, the report dated 28th November 2023 was also submitted beyond the 90 days from the date of show cause notice prescribed for completion of inquiry. It is also seen that the revocation order dated 12th June 2024 exceeded the 90 days from the date of enquiry report mandated for completion of the process. There was, thus, patent breach of timelines at every stage of the proceedings.
On perusal of the impugned order, there is no finding that the acts, omission or commission on the part of the customs broker was cause of one or more of the delays. The Hon'ble High Court of Bombay in Principal Commissioner of Customs (General), Mumbai v. Unison Clearing P Ltd [2018 (4) TMI 1053 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] held that 'the timelimit contained in Regulation 20 cannot be construed to be mandatory and is held to be directory. As it is already observed above that though the time line framed in the Regulation need to be rigidly applied, fairness would demand that when such time limit is crossed, the period subsequently consumed for completing the inquiry should be justified by giving reasons and the causes on account of which the timelimit was not adhered to.'
In addition to the circumstances failing to portray any delay occasioned by dereliction on the part of the customs broker, there is no explanation whatsoever in the impugned order justifying the delay as unavoidable and beyond human control.
Conclusion - The timelines specified in the Customs Broker Licensing Regulations, 2018, are directory and not mandatory. The licensing authority failed to justify the delays and that the customs broker was not responsible for any procedural delays.
The impugned order is set aside - appeal allowed.
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2025 (4) TMI 525
Applicatiion for cancellation of bail granted to the respondent - smuggling of gold into India and selling it in the Grey market - HELD THAT:- This application is filed on 03.05.2024. Thereafter on 16.05.2024, the respondent came to be detained under COFEPOSA Act and he was under detention till 06.03.3025 for a period of almost 10 months. Record shows that this application is not pursued, though reply by the respondent is filed on 07.05.2024. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Joyi Kitty Joseph V/s. Union of India and Ors. also noted submission of both the sides that this application for cancellation of bail was not pursued by both the sides. The respondent having undergone preventive detention for almost 10 months during pendency of this application is a circumstance weighing in favour of the respondent.
It is submitted during the course of oral submissions that complaint in the Court is still not filed by the DRI. The period of more than one year from the date of first remand is elapsed. As per the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, accused becomes entitled to statutory bail if investigation is not completed within the stipulated period, depending on the punishment provided for the offence - The respondent was already in custody from 06.03.2024 to 16.04.2024 and even otherwise he would have been entitled to statutory bail after the period of 60 days was over. In this view of the matter, the prayer for cancellation of bail coupled with continuation of investigation without filing complaint is not permissible under the law.
The Ld. trial Court while deciding the plea of respondent's bail, has considered all the relevant material in detail and released the respondent on bail by imposing certain conditions, which even the Hon'ble Apex Court, while dealing with the petition challenging preventive detention of the respondent, was pleased to consider. No supervening circumstances are brought on record which warrant interference under Section 439(2) of Cr.P.C. in the bail order passed in favour of the respondent. Therefore, after going through the principles laid down in the judgments relied upon by both the parties and the facts and circumstances of the case, no case is made out by the applicant for cancellation of the bail granted to the respondent and the application is liable to be rejected.
Conclusion - The application for bail cancellation rejected, as no supervening circumstances or breaches of bail conditions were established.
Application dismissed.
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2025 (4) TMI 466
Seeking issuance of appropriate directions to the Respondent-Department to either return the gold to the Petitioner or refund the value of the said gold - HELD THAT:- The entire journey of 10 years has still not culminated in either redemption or refund being issued to the Petitioner. Clearly, the Customs Authorities ought to have initially given effect to the order of Commissioner (Appeals) and accordingly should have determined the duty and allowed the Petitioner to avail release of the gold, which did not happen.
Gold prices have also increased considerably during this period. Considering this position, the Court is inclined to direct the Adjudicating Authority, Assistant/Deputy Commissioner (Refunds) to pass the refund order within a period of one month from today.
List for reporting compliance on 15th July, 2025.
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2025 (4) TMI 465
Seeking release of the gold items being one gold chain weighing 51 grams and two gold pieces weighing 65 grams each seized - HELD THAT:- The Petitioner is willing to pay the customs duty as payable on the said gold pieces. Further, in the opinion of this Court the gold chain could be considered as a personal effect of the Petitioner. Insofar as the gold chain, is concerned the same shall be considered as a personal effect of the Petitioner, and shall be released to the Petitioner without payment of the customs duty.
Insofar as the gold pieces are concerned, let the Petitioner appear before the Customs Department and an order be passed bearing in mind the above fact that the Petitioner wanted to declare the said gold pieces and had chosen to go through the red channel.
Petition disposed off.
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