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SEBI - Case Laws
Showing 501 to 510 of 510 Records
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2001 (8) TMI 1446
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... ... ..... er dated 8th November, 2000 of the noticees, that around that period the shares were traded in BSE, at below par value, and there was no trading on Hyderabad and Chennai exchange. That means there was no loss to investors and gain to the Acquirers. This aspect was taken into account, therefore maximum penalty is not levied. 41. The fact that the acquisition price was more than the then prevailing market price, would have induced the investors to avail of the public offer and exit from the company gainfully may not be ignored. However, this benefit was in any case not available to the shareholders as the acquirers were exempted from making public offer under regulation 11(2) as the acquisition was in a preferential allotment. Since the Adjudicating Officer has taken into consideration the relevant factors while deciding the quantum of penalty, I do not consider it necessary to interfere with his decision in this regard. 42. For the reasons stated above the appeal is dismissed.
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2001 (7) TMI 1318
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... ... ..... ’s finding that the appellant is a promoter of MRL is tenable it cannot be held that the appellant is an acquirer or a person acting or deemed to be acting in concert with the acquirers and thereby ineligible to participate in the public offer. I am of the view that there is no legal backing flowing from the Act, or the Regulations to uphold the SEBI’s decision holding the appellant ineligible to participate in the public offer made vide letter dated 30-5-2001. 43. For the reasons stated above the appeal is allowed and the SEBI’s direction in the impugned order that the appellant shall not be eligible to participate in the public offer made by the acquirers vide letter dated 30-5-2001 is set aside. 44. I cannot part with this case without expressing my gratitude to the learned counsel on all sides who have co-operated with me extremely well for the disposal of the appeal within the time limit as specified in the order of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court.
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2001 (4) TMI 956
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... ... ..... ing the Appellants not to take 7.7.2000 as the relevant date. 47. Shri Setalvad had stated that the Respondent had treated the Appellant's case discriminately vis-a-vis the acquisition of Bestfoods by Unilever Plc. The Respondent has explained in its written reply in detail how the facts relating to acquisition of Bestfoods is distinguishable from the facts of acquisition of Burmah Castrol by the Appellants. In the light of the information available before me, as provided by the parties, I am inclined to hold that the acquisition of Bestfoods is not exactly identical with the acquisition of Castrol (India) Ltd, to be treated identically. 48. In the light of the above discussion I am of the view that the impugned order is to be sustained and the relevant date for the purpose of deciding the offer price to the share holders of Castrol (India) Ltd should be 14.3.2000 and not 7.7.2000. 49. For the reasons stated above, the impugned order is upheld and the appeal is dismissed.
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2001 (3) TMI 1073
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... ... ..... ons. In this case, I find that the AMC failed to comply with that Regulation, which provided for restriction on the activities of the AMC. Thus I find that the AMC violated restrictory provisions contained in Regulation 29 and consequently that of Regulation 19 which read with Regulation 10 of SEBI (Mutual Fund) Regulations, 1996 provides to the effect that the AMC should comply with the Regulations." Emphasis Supplied 24. The Adjudicating Officer has thus come to the categorical conclusion that the appellant had failed to make certain material disclosures in the AOD, inspite of SEBI's direction and decided to impose a sum of ₹ 3 lakhs as monetary penalty. In the light of the facts and circumstances of the case I do not consider that the decision of the Adjudicating Officer imposing ₹ 3 lakhs as penalty is unjustified. For the reasons stated above, imposition of penalty made by the respondent vide order dated 10-11-2000 is upheld. The appeal is dismissed.
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2001 (1) TMI 1019
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... ... ..... cannot stand. The observation made by the Adjudicating Officer based on his satisfaction cannot be limited to applicability to regulation 11/section 15 (ii) alone as the facts are common. Further the Adjudicating Officer has also clearly stated in the order that the delay in filing of the report has not resulted in any gain to the Appellant. There is not even a whisper in the impugned order of any loss to any body. There is nothing on record to show that the Appellant had a past record of default. None of the factors of section 15 J is attracted in this case. In the light of the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the Supreme Court's guidelines in the Hindustan Steel's case imposition of monetary penalty on the Appellant in my view is unwarranted. 30. For the reasons stated above I am of the view that the order-imposing penalty on the Appellant cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be set aside. I do so. 31. The appeal is allowed.
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2000 (8) TMI 1135
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... ... ..... e respondent vide letter dated 4-5-2000 to consider "revoking the indefinite suspension in the trading of this scrip" - effected from 16-5-1996. In this context it is made clear that a company and its promoters are separate legal entities. A company cannot be substituted for promoters for the purpose of imposing penalties. It is also seen that the respondent had asked ASE to consider revoking the 4 year old ban on trading in the appellant’s scrips, but at the same time by the impugned order the appellant has been debarred from accessing the market for the next five years 9. In view of the above, I do not consider it necessary to examine the other points raised in the appeal as it is evident that the impugned order has been directed to the appellant without any justification. 10. For the reasons stated above, I am of the view that the impugned order against the appellant cannot be sustained. Accordingly the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside.
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2000 (7) TMI 1004
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... ... ..... circumstances placed before me do not suggest that the appellants had acted diligently. 76. From the legal and factual position discussed above, it is clear that the appellants as Bankers to an Issue were duty bound to wait for the decision on the company’s application from both the stock exchanges mentioned in the prospectus and only after ensuring compliance of the statutory requirements, they should have decided to release the collection money to the company. Since they were holding the application money in trust they were accountable for its safe up keep and return. They cannot escape the liability for misapplication of money. The liability to refund the money is now on them. The appellants are not out of the reach of section 11B and the respondent is not short of power to reach them. 77. For the reasons discussed above, I have no hesitation to hold that the impugned order is legally valid and there is no merit in the appeals. The appeals are accordingly dismissed.
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2000 (6) TMI 805
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... ... ..... act in good faith and it must act reasonably." 51. In my considered opinion, the legal situation as projected by the Delhi High Court and the apex court would fully apply to the present case also. 52. In the light of the above principles, if we look at the facts of the present case, I take the view that the respondent has acted in good faith and reasonably within the limits of the authority through the mandates given to the respondents and the regulations framed thereof. 53. Therefore, I do not find merit in any of the contentions urged by the counsel for the applicant and, consequently, the application in O.A. No. 75 of 2000 is dismissed and A. No. 851 of 2000 is allowed. 54. However, it shall be stated that the observation of mine made above would confine to the disposal of this application alone; and it may not have any bearing on the decision to be taken by the court at the time of trial on the basis of the issues to be framed in the suit. 55. O.A. 75/2000 dismissed.
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1998 (11) TMI 696
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... ... ..... ard, by way of interim measures, pending inquiry. The same is intended for the protection of the interests of the investors and the securities markets. 29. The impugned orders, in our prima facie view, are fully justified. The petitioners, in the circumstances, are not entitled to interim reliefs claimed in the petition. Ad interim orders passed on November 1, 1998, and continued by an order passed on November 3, 1998, are vacated. 30. At this stage, counsel for the petitioners apply for stay of the present orders, as also for continuation of the aforesaid ad interim orders. Counsel for the respondents strongly opposes the same. 31. Having regard to the attendant facts and circumstances of the case, we permit the petitioners, for a period of four weeks from today, to trade in shares and securities other than BPL, Videocon, Sterlite and Nedungadi Bank Ltd. The petitioners' during the aforesaid period of four weeks will not trade in the aforementioned shares and securities.
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1998 (4) TMI 577
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... ... ..... nsequences provided in the Act, it is difficult to accept the appellant s version that non-compliance of regulations is a mere technical lapse to be viewed leniently. The contention that the penalty of one lakh rupees imposed by the Adjudicating officer is high and that the quantum has been decided arbitrarily, disregarding the factors required to be taken into account as provided under section 15J of the Act , in my view, is not correct. The Adjudicating Officer in his order has clearly stated that while levying the penalty he had taken into consideration the nature of the offence, various other factors and circumstances as also the provisions of Section 15J of the Act. Against the maximum penalty of five lakh rupees provided in the Act, sum of one lakh rupees imposed, in my view is not unreasonable. I do not find any justification to interfere with the impugned order. For the reasons stated above, I do not find any merit in this appeal and accordingly the same is dismissed.
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