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Indian Laws - Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 207 Records
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1962 (12) TMI 99 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... inciples of natural justice have been applied. In the circumstances of this case, particularly when we find that the appellant had not raised any objection, we cannot say that the resolution passed by the Lodge Victoria is bad for violating any principles of natural justice. 25. Lastly an attempt was made to persuade us to resurvey the entire material to ascertain the correctness or otherwise of the decision of the Lodge. As we have pointed out earlier, civil courts have no jurisdiction to decide on the merits of a decision given by a private association like a Lodge. Both the courts below have held that the Daughter Lodge has acted in good faith in the matter of the complaint against the appellant. That is a concurrent finding of fact; and it is the practice of this Court not to interfere ordinarily with concurrent findings of fact. There are no exceptional circumstances for our departing from the said practice. 26. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs.
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1962 (12) TMI 98 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... and not even desirable that this Court should try to lay down general principles on such matters that require careful consideration of the peculiar circumstances of each case for the exercise of discretion. It is sufficient to say that we find no reason to interfere with the Tribunal's direction in this case that the reliefs given by it would become effective from the date of the reference. 31. We therefore allow both the appeals in part by modifying the Tribunal's award as regards dearness allowance, leave rules and retirement age and also as regards the adjustment of the interim relief as mentioned above. In all other matters in appeal before us the award is confirmed. The modifications made as regards dearness allowance will, as already stated, take effect from April 1, 1959. The modifications as regards leave rules and as regards retirement age will take effect from this date. In both the appeals the parties will bear their own costs. 32. Appeals allowed in part.
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1962 (12) TMI 96 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d judge on the question of the valuation of the trees on the plot assigned to the appellant's brother-in-law.We therefore set aside this finding and request the High Court to submit a revised finding on the said question within two months from the receipt of the record. The respondent may file a further statement if I e so chooses to explain or even to correct the valuation list already filed by it. Thereafter an opportunity will be given to the appellant to file his objections. The objections filed by the appellant in this Court may be also considered by the High Court. The High Court will submit the finding on the evidence already on record including the said objections and statements. The parties may file objections to the finding within two weeks from the date the said And is received. The appeal will be posted as early as possible after objections are filed or after the expiry of the time given for filing the objections. Case remitted for submission of fresh finding.
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1962 (12) TMI 95 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... alf of the appellants that the several provisions of the Act contravene Article 14 is devoid of any merit." It is well known that there are fundamental differences between the religion and customs of the Mahomedans and those of others, and, therefore the rules of Mahomedan law regarding gift are based on reasonable classification and the provision of Section 129 of the Transfer of Property Act exempting Mahomedans from certain provisions of that Act is not hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. 13. In conclusion, it must be held that the oral gift made by Ismail to his wife, Maniran, was made in accordance with the Mahomedan law and it was a valid gift, inasmuch as no document for the gift was required and the possession of the gifted properties was delivered to the donee who accepted the same. 14. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the Court below are set aside and the suit is dismissed with costs throughout. Kanhaiya Singh, J. 15. I agree.
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1962 (12) TMI 94 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 133 under formula D which we have held was the correct formula to apply. The Corporation was entitled to set-off ₹ 6,00,000 representing the assets of the controlled business. Interest on the balance (₹ 18,91,133) will be payable at four per cent per annum simple from February 14, 1957, till October 31, 1957, when ₹ 5,51,464 were withheld and the balance was paid to the Company. Interest on ₹ 5,51,464 at four per cent shall be payable from November 1, 1957, till December 26, 1957. There shall be no interest payable on ₹ 6,00,000 as claimed by the appellant. 34. In the result this appeal fails except for the grant of interest. It is dismissed except for interest granted by us. The Company shall bear its own costs and pay that of the Corporation. The appeal of the Corporation is dismissed with costs. There will be a right to set-off the costs in the two appeals. 35. C.A. No. 551 of 1960 dismissed except for interest. C.A. No. 552 of 1960 dismissed.
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1962 (12) TMI 93 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... which she intended to acquire for her own use and enjoyment. But for the fact that she was compelled to part with the property in favour of her sister-in-law, as a result of trouble caused by the sister-in-law, and the mother-in-law, the assessee offered evidence to show that she would herself have continued to possess and enjoy the property. There was no dominant intention at the time of the purchase of effecting a resale of the property. It was in these circumstances that this Court held that there was no adventure in the nature of trade involved in that transaction. That case did not lay down any proposition that the purchase and sale of a decree would in no case contain the elements of an adventure in the nature of trade. 10. It seems to us that the Tribunal reached the right conclusion that the profit arising from this transaction was assessable. Both the questions are answered against the assessee, who will pay the costs of the department. Counsel's fee ₹ 250.
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1962 (12) TMI 92 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the judgment were the result of some misconception. Counsel relies in support of this submission upon an affidavit sworn by one Surhid Mohan Sanyal constituted attorney of the appellants filed in this Court on the day on which special leave to appeal was granted. Apart from the circumstance that the affidavit is couched in terms which are vague, and the denial is not sworn on matters within the personal knowledge of the deponent, it is a somewhat singular circumstance, that Sanyal who swore the affidavit relied upon, did not when he swore an affidavit in support of the petition for certificate under Art. 133 of the Constitution before the High Court, make any such assertion. But on the view expressed by us, we deem it advisable not to express any opinion on the question as to the law applicable to the contract. It will be for the Court trying the suit to deal with that question, and to decide the suit. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (12) TMI 90 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion and depends not upon it but upon the time allowed by the Court in the order fixing the amount or security. In this case the appellants applied for the requirements of the proviso being dispensed with and they were dispensed with by the Court; it is wholly irrelevant that they were dispensed with after the expiry of the period of limitation for an application under the rule. After the dispensation there could not arise any question of non-compliance with Clause (b) of the proviso and the application could not be dismissed on that ground. The question whether the application could be dismissed under Clause (a) of the proviso requires reconsideration as pointed out by my learned brother; the Civil Judge will have to go into the question whether the objection raised by the appellants in their application could not have been raised by them earlier. The appeal should, therefore, be remanded. I agree that the appellants should get their costs of this appeal from the respondents.
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1962 (12) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... word “agent” in a commercial sense on which the learned Attorney-General relies is wholly inapplicable in the context of Art. 19(6)(ii). Therefore, we must hold that the agreement which has been produced before us is invalid inasmuch as it is wholly inconsistent with the requirements of s. 3(1)(c). 34. The result is, the petitioner succeeds only partially inasmuch as we have held that Rule 7(5) is bad and the agreement is invalid, and that means that the State Government cannot implement the provisions of the Act with the assistance of agents appointed under the said invalid agreement. We accordingly direct that a direction or order to that effect should be issued against the State Government. The main contentions raised by the petitioner against the validity of the Act and its relevant provisions on which specific reliefs were claimed, however, fail. The petition is accordingly partially allowed. There would be no order as to costs. 35. Petition allowed in part.
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1962 (12) TMI 86 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ropriate for the Receiver to show in the cause title that it was the firm which was the real plaintiff and that the firm was suing through him- it was merely a case of misdescription and that the plaint could be amended at any time for the purpose of showing the correct description of the plaintiffs We agree with the High Court that where there is a case of misdescription of parties it is open to the court to allow an amendment of the plaint at any time and the question of limitation would not arise in such a case. His Lordship then dealt with the point regarding the rate of interest. x x x x x x x x x Accordingly we set aside the decree of the High Court, allow the appeal in part and pass a decree in favour of the respondent-firm for ₹ 5,639/3/- with -interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of the transaction till realization. The respondent-firm will proportionate costs throughout from the appellant-firm, which would bear its own costs. Appeal allowed in part.
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1962 (12) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... h it remains idle, for no fault of its own. Charges for that are levied from the person who required that labour and is responsible for its remaining idle. Of course, if the idle time was due to the default of the labour, no such charges are required to be paid by the ship-owner. We are therefore of opinion that the impugned charges were rightly levied by scale 'E' on the master, owner or agent of the vessels and that the Board could insist on the steamer- agent requisitioning the shore-labour to express an undertaking in the form for requisitioning labour that he will pay the charges laid down in the Board's scale of rates from time to time in respect of labour rendered idle or not properly utilised and also for working more than one hook simultaneously at a vessel's hatch. We therefore allow the appeals with costs here and the Courts below, set aside the order of the Court below and dismiss the writ petitions. There will be one hearing fee. Appeals allowed.
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1962 (12) TMI 73 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ence of sub-r. (6) and other consequential provisions makes it clear that the State Government which made r. 23 provided for the decision of the dispute by the arbitrator or arbitrators subject to an appeal against the award. It will be sheer speculation to say that the State Government would have made provision for the dispute to be settled by arbitrators if it had known that it could not make any provision for an appeal against that order. I am therefore of opinion that the entire r. 23 is to be struck down both because in its present for it is discriminatory and because sub-r. (6) is void inasmuch as the State Government had no power to enact it and it is not servable from the rest of the rule. I would therefore allow the appeal with costs and order the issue of a writ quashing the proceedings pending before the Cane Commissioner and prohibiting him to continue those proceedings. By COURT In accordance with the opinion of the majority, this Appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1962 (12) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tion, it is agreed between parties that it should be considered by the Receiver when the assets are distributed. We may also mention that during arguments it was stated before us on behalf of Banarsidas that he had installed some new machinery for the efficient running of the mill and that before the mill is sold he should be allowed to remove the machinery. It was suggested that perhaps it would be in the interest of all the parties if the mill is sold along with the new machinery at the date of sale. The other parties, however said that it would be best if Banarsidas removes the machinery before the expiry of the lease. In the circumstances, we can give no direction in the matter. It will be open to the parties, however, to agree upon the course to be adopted when the Receiver sets about selling the machinery, or if they do not agree, to obtain directions from the High Court. While we dismiss the Civil Miscellaneous Petitions, we make no order as to costs. Appeals allowed.
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1962 (12) TMI 70 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ourt. Is the age of the offender to be reckoned as at the date of the judgment of the trial judge or is it the date when the accused is, for the first time, in a position to claim the benefit of s. 6. We consider that on the terms of the section, on grounds of logic as well as on the theory that the order passed by an appellate court is the correct order which the trial court should have passed, the crucial date must be that upon which the trial court had to deal with the offender. In this view as Basist was admittedly below 21 years of age at the time of the judgment of the Assistant Sessions judge, s. 6 was not inapplicable to him even assuming he was above that age by the date of the order in appeal. The appeal is accordingly allowed in part i.e., in regard to the second appellant-Basist and is remanded to the High Court to consider the proper order to be passed in his case by applying the provisions of s. 6 of the probation of offenders Act, 1958. Appeal allowed in part.
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1962 (12) TMI 69 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t the tenant, he has nothing to lose by the order of the Rent Controller. These proceedings cannot affect the interest of one who is not a party to the present case. Furthermore, a second appeal lay from the appellate order of the Rent Control Tribunal dismissing the appellant's appeal against the order striking out his defence. No such second appeal was taken to the High Court, though as already stated a second appeal was preferred against the order of the Rent Control Tribunal dismissing his appeal against the order of eviction. The position is that the appellate order of the Rent Control Tribunal, dated March 6, 1962, dismissing the appeal against the order striking out his defence became final between the parties and is no more open to challenge. Hence, it is no more open to the appellant to challenge the jurisdiction of the authorities under the Act. In our opinion, therefore, there is no merit in his appeal. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (12) TMI 68 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... de to refer only to such notification issued by the Government under s. 4 or 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. I would, therefere, hold that when- ever the Trust seeks to acquire land for the purpose of the implementation of the scheme for which it was constituted, it can only acquire land in the manner prescribed by the Act, that is to say, in accordance with the land acquisition provisions incorporated in the Act by reference. As in the present case the notifications issued by the Government under s. 4 of the LandAcquisition Act, 1894, for the acquisition of the land in question for trust purposes 'do not fall under the exemption, the said notifications were void. The High Court was right in quashing the said notificatonsunder Art. 226 of the Constitution.The appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. By COURT In accordance with the majority view the appeals are allowed and the case remitted to the High Court. The costs will abide the event. One hearing fee in this court.
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1962 (12) TMI 67 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... sustaining or protecting their action. So understood, it must be held that the petitioner’s freedom under Art. 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution is also infringed. It is not necessary in this case to express our view whether some of the other freedoms enshrined in Art. 19 of the Constitution are also infringed by the said Regulation. In the result, we would issue an order directing the respondents not to take any measure against the petitioner under Regulation 236 of Chapter XX of the U. P. Police Regulations. The respondents will pay the costs of the petitioner. By COURT In accordance with the opinion of the majority this Writ Petition is partly allowed and Regulation 236 (b) which authorises “domiciliary visits” is struck down as unconstitutional. The Petitioner would be entitled to the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the respondent not to continue domiciliary visits. The rest of the petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1962 (12) TMI 64 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Court has the constitutional power and the correlative duty-a difficult and delicate one to prevent encroachment, either overtly or covertly, by the Union of State field or vice versa, and thus maintain the balance of federation. The present is a typical case where the Court should stop the Union from overstepping its boundary and trespassing into the State field. I would, therefore, hold that the impugned Act, in so far as it confers a power on the Union to acquire the lands owned by the State, including coal mines and coa bearing lands, is ultra vires. I find on issues 1, 2 and 3 against the defendant; In view of my findings on the said issue, I do not propose to express my opinion on the additional issue. In the result, there will be a decree in favour of the plaintiff in terms of cls. (a), (c) and (d) of paragraph 11 of the plaint. The plaintiff is entitled to costs. By COURT In view of the judgment of the majority, the suit stands dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (12) TMI 59 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a draft-scheme under the Act has to be approved as a whole and the procedure of approving a part of the scheme once and another part later is illegal, and therefore, the approval given to the draft-scheme by the Legal Remembrancer does not result in approving the scheme, as required by law.
Whether it was not open to the Legal Remembracer to review his order dated May 31, 1962 even after the decision of the High Court, and insofar as the Legal Remembrancer did so in obedience to the order of the High Court he abdicated his own judgment, and the approval therefore after such abdication of his own judgment, is no approval in law.
Whether there was discrimination inasmuch as the operators of the twelve partially overlapping routes were left out of the scheme?
Held that:- in the circumstances of the hearing to be given by the Legal Remembrancer, it is enough if he takes evidence of the witnesses whom the objectors bring before him themselves and if he helps them to secure their attendance by issue of summonses. But the fact that the Rules do not provide for coercive processes does not mean in the special circumstances of the hearing before the Legal Remembrancer that there can be no proper hearing without such coercive processes. We are therefore of opinion that the Legal Remembrancer did give a hearing to the objectors after the order of the High Court and that in the circumstances that hearing was a proper and sufficient hearing. The challenge therefore to the validity of the scheme as published on June 16, 1962, on this ground must be rejected.
No ground to uphold the plea of discrimination in the present case, for routes completely covered by the route taken over stand on a different footing from the routes only partially covered. The contention therefore that the final scheme as published on August 31, 1962 is bad because it discriminates in this manner, must be rejected. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (11) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ings which could no longer benefit them and could only ensure for the good of their transferees. It is, therefore, obvious that this circumstance clinched the case in favour of the executants. The crucial circumstance in the present case, namely that a smaller extent was sold for a higher amount in discharge of an earlier mortgage of a larger extent for a smaller amount was not present in that case. The said crucial circumstances make the two cases entirely dissimilar and therefore the said judgment of this court is not of any help in construing the document in question. On a consideration of the cumulative effect of the terms of the document in the context of the surrounding circumstances we hold that the document in question is not a mortgage but a sale with the condition of repurchase. The conclusion arrived at by the High Court is correct. 8. The appeal fails and as the advocate for the respondent is not present in Court it is dismissed without costs. 9. Appeal dismissed.
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