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Indian Laws - Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 174 Records
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1963 (12) TMI 49 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of their possession by the creditors of the mortgagor, dispossession having taken place in 1937 the suit filed on July 12, 1946, regarded as one to enforce the claim to recover the mortgage money under s. 68 of the Transfer of Property Act was barred by the law of limitation. This appeal will therefore be partially allowed. The decree passed by the High Court will be set aside and there will be a decree in favour of the plaintiff only in respect of the mortgage dated August 27, 1922. The trial Court will draw up an appropriate decree in that behalf. The plaintiff's appeal will fail in respect of the mortgage dated June 14, 1922. The plaintiff will pay the costs of the fourth defendant who alone has defended this appeal. The plaintiff will be entitled to her costs in respect of the mortgage dated August 27, 1922, from the original mortgagor's heirs and the transferees-in-interest of the property which was the subject-matter of the said mortgage. Appeal partly allowed.
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1963 (12) TMI 46 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ble into money does not also alter this position. Hence, we are of opinion that the lower Court was in error in treating the sale proceeds of the house as movable property and applying the law of succession applicable to Ezhavas in Travancore. 36. As a result of the foregoing discussion, we dismiss the appeal excepting regarding a half of the net proceeds of sale of house No. 75-Wood House Road. Regarding this half we allow the appeal; and the appellant 1st defendant will get this half for himself and the other half will be divided among all the other sharers, because the 2nd defendant has already agreed to such a course, and the plaintiffs will get their share from out of it. Regarding the other assets of Dr. Krishnan in Schedule C the decision of the lower Court is confirmed. In the circumstances of the case, all parties will suffer their respective costs before us. The direction regarding costs of the lower Court given by the learned Subordinate Judge will, however, stand.
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1963 (12) TMI 45 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Courts dispose of cases on the basis of the submissions made by Counsel, it is not possible to say that the omission of Counsel absolves a Court from the duty of following clear provisions of law. We do not think that the omission of the tenant's Counsel to draw the Court's attention to the provisions of Section 57 can be a reason for the High Court to refuse to interfere. In our opinion, this was a proper case in which the High Court ought to have exercised its powers under Section 35 of the 1952 Act and made an order set-ting aside the order made by the Courts below striking out the tenant's defence against ejectment. 18. Accordingly, we allow the appeal, set aside the order passed by the Courts below and order that the plaintiffs application for striking put the tenant's defence against ejectment be rejected. In the peculiar circumstances of the case we order the parties to bear their own costs. We hope the suit will be dealt with expeditiously by the Act.
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1963 (12) TMI 40 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ehind a decree and probe into the genuineness of the debt on which it is founded, it is not necessary to consider the contention as to whether the Insolvency Court is a Civil Court or not for the purpose of s. 11 of the Act. 44. We therefore hold that the head of department had the power to decide, under s. 4 of the Act, whether the alleged defaulter was a defaulter or not, that no Civil Court can consider this matter in view of s. 11 of the Act and that the Insolvency Court is however not precluded from enquiring into the question whether the alleged debtor was really a debtor and liable to pay sums said to be payable by him. The Insolvency Court has found that the respondent had not executed the surety bond and that therefore he could not be liable to make good any payment under it. The order of the Court below in dismissing the insolvency petition is, therefore, correct. 45. We accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs, though for different reasons. 46. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (12) TMI 38 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hildren of those marriages could not have claimed to be legitimate. The Act was however in terms retrospective and validated marriages that had taken place before the Act between parties belonging to different castes, sub-castes and sects. It is idle to contend that the object of the Legislature was only to regularise the status of the husband and the wife. That certainly was part of the object. But equally important, or perhaps more important object was that the children of the marriages would become legitimate. 7. We have therefore come to the conclusion that even if the trial Court was right in thinking that Padmavathi was a Brahmin girl and not a Shudra, the position in law was, as found by the Court below, viz., it was a valid Hindu marriage and Bhakthavathsalam a legitimate son of Sadagopa with all the rights of a coparcener in regard to the joint family properties and other matters. 8. No other point was urged in appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1963 (12) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... out that even if the Division Bench was right in holding that the impugned order should be corrected by the issue of a writ of certiorari, it would have been better if it had not made its own findings on the evidence and passed its own order in that behalf. In writ proceedings if an error of law apparent on the face of the record is disclosed and a writ is issued, the usual course to adopt is to correct the error and send the case back to the special Tribunal for its decision in accordance with law. It would, we think, be inappropriate for the High Court exercising its writ jurisdiction to consider the evidence for itself and reach its own conclusions in matters which have been left by the legislature to the decisions of specially constituted Tribunals. In the result, the appeals are allowed, the orders passed by the High Court in the two writ petitions filed by the respondent are set aside and the said writ petitions are ordered to be dismissed with costs. Appeals allowed.
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1963 (12) TMI 36 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s a decree for the whole amount due under Ex. C and realises the same, the plaintiff will not be entitled to ignore the decree in this case in respect of the above sum ₹ 3,792/2/1 and interest thereon". Learned counsel for the appellant -faintly suggested that the learned Judges were in error in passing a decree for this further sum of ₹ 3792/2/1 in this suit. It is, however, unnecessary for us to go into the merits as to whether the learned Judges were right in the construction of Ex. J and the legal results flowing therefrom as we are satisfied that the appellant is not entitled to raise this point. This was not one of the points raised in the grounds of appeal to this Court when an application was made for the grant of a certificate of fitness, nor is this objection to the decree to be found in the statement of the case filed. In the circumstances, we need say no more about it. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (12) TMI 35 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rt. 14 of the Constitution. For the same reasons Rule 149(3) cannot also be regarded as invalid. But the orders imposing upon the public servants determination of employment in exercise of the powers under Rule 149(3) made applicable to them when prior to the date on which the Rule was framed they were not applicable to them would be void as infringing Art. 311(2) of the constitution As, however, on this part of the case there has been no investigation by the High Court, I would remand appeals Nos. 837-839 of 1963 to the High Court and dismiss appeals Nos. 711-714 of 1962. ORDER BY COURT In accordance with the opinion of the majority Civil Appeals Nos. 711-713 of 1962 and Civil Appeal No. 714 of 1962 are allowed with costs. The writ petitions filed by the four appellants in the three High Courts are granted and Orders directed to be issued in terms of the prayers made by them. Civil Appeals Nos. 837-839 of 1963 are dismissed with costs. One set of hearing fees in each group.
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1963 (12) TMI 34 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... g himself into an investigating agency and there is therefore every possibility of the accused being prejudiced and that might be the very reason why the sub-section has been framed in a manner to avoid this result. The position is, of course, different under s. 251-A(2) where the examination is by virtue of the statute and so it stands in a class apart, and we are not concerned to consider whether an examination under that provision might prejudice the accused. We, therefore, hold that where there is no evidence recorded under sub-s. (4) of s. 207-A, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to examine an accused under s. 207-A(6) and consequently the Magistrate in the present case had no jurisdiction to direct the accused to appear before him for examination. We would accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the order of the Magistrate directing the accused to appear before him for being examined, ORDER In view of the Judgment of the majority, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1963 (12) TMI 33 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... adjudication; but the provision contained in s. 10(1) read with s. 12(5) clearly shows that even where a breach of s. 25F is alleged, the appropriate Government may have to consider the expediency of making a reference and if after considering all the relevant fact the appropriate Government comes to the conclusion that it would be inexpedient to make the reference, it would ’be competent to it to refuse to make such a reference. We ought to add that when we are discussing this legal position, we are necessarily assuming that the appropriate Government acts honestly and bona fide. If the appropriate Government refuses to make a reference for irrelevant considerations, or on extraneous grounds, or acts mala fide, that, of course, would be another matter; in such a case a party would be entitled to move the High Court for a writ of mandamus. o p /o p The result is, the appeal fails and is dismissed. There would be no order as to costs. o p /o p Appeal dismissed. o p /o p
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1963 (12) TMI 31 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ct it was the father who purchased the property with the intention of conferring the beneficial interest solely upon the mother. Such a transaction must therefore amount to - a gift. In that view the property would not fall under cl. (d) of s. 10 of the Act but under cl. (b) of that section. Therefore, the appellant would be -the sole heir of her mother and the non-joinder of her brothers would not defeat the suit so far as she is conceded. In the result I would set aside the decree of the courts below in so far as the property in question, Beverly Estates, is concerned and decree the appellant's suit with respect to it in addition to the property with respect to which she has already obtained a decree in the courts below. I would further direct that the respondents will pay to the appellant proportionate costs in all the courts. ORDER BY COURT In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. Appellant need not pay court fees.
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1963 (12) TMI 28 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... mber 3, 1955 and possession was delivered in 1957. We were informed that a sum of ₹ 11,800 per year was deposited in court by way of mesne profits. 24. Now the mortgagees cannot claim to hold the lands and use the amount paid as price of redemption. Even if they were not required to hand over possession till the amount together with the compensation for improvements was paid in full to them, they could not have the use of the money as well. In our opinion, the mortgagees must pay interest on the amount paid by the mortgagors from the date of withdrawal of the amount till possession was delivered to the mortgagors at 6 per annum simple. The extra amount due to the mortgagees by way of compensation will be deductible and accounts shall be adjusted between the parties accordingly. 25. The appeal is thus partly allowed as indicated above. In view of the failure on the main point, the appellants must pay the costs of the appeal to the respondents. 26. Appeal partly allowed.
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1963 (12) TMI 27 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... eover, that application was made by him in his own suit No. 20 of 1953 and the other two suits had also naturally to be adjourned as all the three of them were consolidated. The adjournment of those two suits, therefore, cannot be said to be at the instance of the defendant." Learned counsel was unable to point any Raw in the facts here stated. It would, therefore, follow that the terms of O. XVII, r. 3 were not attracted at all and that suit 134 of 1956 was decreed not on merits but really ex parte as had been expressly stated by the learned Civil Judge when he passed that decree. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the application filed by the appellant under O. IX, r. 13 for setting aside the ex parte decree passed in suit 134 of 1956 is remanded to the trial Judge for disposal on the merits in accordance with law. The appellant will be entitled to his costs throughout. The cost incurred after this remand will be provided for by the Courts below. Appeal allowed.
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1963 (12) TMI 26 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t does not enjoin actual partition and does not enable the mother fo reduce her share into possession. The explanation is intended to be of general application and cannot be treated as saving the abovesaid rule of partition. To uphold the contention would produce most unjust results which could never have been intended by the legislature. 6. We therefore hold that the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener available for division under this section will be such share in the properly as would be allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death amongst the coparceners according to the rules of Hindu law with the qualification that the rule of Hindu law providing a share to the mother and maintenance and marriage expenses of the daughters must be treated as abrogated in view of Section 4 which give; the Act overriding effect. 7. In the result the. appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 8. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (12) TMI 25 - SUPREME COURT
Whether for the purpose of computing the period of 30 days prescribed under s. 116A (3) of the Act the provisions of s. 12 of the Limitation Act can be invoked.
Held that:- The requirement of a prescription by the special law "of a period different" from that prescribed by the First Schedule is satisfied in the present case. Even on the narrowest construction of the words "different from those prescribed therefor in first schedule" occurring the opening part of s. 29(2), the exclusion of time provided for by Art. 12 of the Limitation Act would be permissible in computing the period of limitation for filing the appeal to the High Court in the case before us. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (12) TMI 23 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he property went from one hand to the other. The aforesaid decisions are sufficient authority to show that the property passed from one hand to another. In that view of the matter, the rule must be discharged. Mr. Pal took an objection at a late stage that no rule might have been issued as the petitioner will have complete remedy in appeals if and when occasion arises. It was not taken as a preliminary but was taken as a part of the argument of Mr. Pal who supported the order on its own merits. As the matter was argued by the advocates of both sides, I thought it desirable to express my views over the matter. Mr. Mukherjee argued that all the properties referred to in the order did not come into the hands of the petitioner. These are questions of fact which the petitioner will have ample opportunity to agitate before the trial authority. The rule is, therefore, discharged and the interim order vacated. There will be no order as to costs. Rule discharged interim order vacated.
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1963 (11) TMI 105 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n the stipulated time. In fact, he was in arrears to a considerable extent. A purchaser of goods like the defendant who commits default in his obligation to pay for the goods within 15 days of the delivery thereof cannot be heard to complain that the plaintiff committed breach in withholding supply. The plaintiff, the seller, is not bound to go on supplying goods without having payment. That will not be business. On this ground also the counter claim must fail. 8. Accordingly, on issues 1, 6 and 7, I find that the plaintiff will be entitled to the suit amount, calculating interest as indicated in this judgment and under issue 5 he will be bound to give credit for Rs. 500, the initial deposit, in final adjustment. The plaintiff will have the costs on the amount decreed after lessening it by the sum of Rs. 500. The counter claim is dismissed, without costs. The defendant is given four months time for payment. But the amount decreed will carry interest from the date of the suit.
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1963 (11) TMI 104 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of such country". It the expression "foreign law" had been used in Section 38, the drafting would not have been so pretty. In this connection, we have also to remember the provisions of the Indian Law Reports Act. Section 4 of that Act clearly provides that that Act has no bearing on the effect of judgments. 43. The declaration of law made by the Supreme Court in 1960CriLJ1156 is binding on all Courts and High Courts- cannot take a view which is inconsistent with that declaration of law and which may lead to orders being passed which would be invalid according to the declaration of law made by the Supreme Court. It would be wrong for me to follow a High Court ruling which is inconsistent with a declaration of law made by the Supreme Court. I must hold that a single appeal by the State against the orders of acquittal of several persons is not maintainable under the Criminal Procedure Code. 44. I, therefore, hold that this appeal is not maintainable and rejected.
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1963 (11) TMI 103 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... gard to his poor performance Roy became eligible to be dealt with under clause 10 of the Order. It was not open to the Corporation to require Roy to accept an assignment in a lower or different category. What the regulations are authorised to do is merely to determine his salary in the category of Development Officers, and so, we do not see how the order terminating his services because he refused to take an assignment as an Assistant can be justified. It would have been open to the Corporation to fix Roy's salary at the minimum in the grade prescribed by clause 5 of the Order and if he had refused to take it, an occasion may have arisen for the operation of s. 11(2) of the Act. Therefore, we are satisfied that the case of Roy cannot be distinguished from the cases of other respondents in the present group of appeals. 26. The result is, the orders passed by the High Court are confirmed, and the appeals are dismissed with costs. One set hearing fees. 27. Appeals dismissed.
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1963 (11) TMI 101 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... viding for the procedure to be followed by them in that regard. We have already expressed our agreement with these conclusions of the High Court. In this view we intimated to learned Counsel for the appellant that it would not be open to him to invite our attention to the evidence which was led before the Settlement Officer for proving that the original grant was of both the warams and that the Settlement Officer and the Subordinate Judge who tried the suit erred in recording that the shrotriem grant of the village was of the melvaram alone. 32. Learned Counsel for the State pointed out that the legislature of Andhra Pradesh has in 1956 and 1957, effected amendments to the Abolition Act which would render any arguments about the merits of the original grant being of both the warams, wholly academic but we have not thought it necessary to refer to it as this is hardly relevant for the points arising for disposal in the appeal. 33. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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