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Indian Laws - Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 219 Records
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1991 (12) TMI 294 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e scheme on the pattern of the scheme governing Central Government employees and to extend the benefit to those Bank employees who had demanded the same. 17. For the above reasons we do not find any substance in the allegation that the cut-off date had been arbitrarily fixed by the Bank Authorities Or the Central Government while giving its approval or that it is devoid of rational consideration and is wholly whimsical. In fixing the cut-off date the respondents had not acted malafide with a view to deprive those who had retired on or before 31st December, 1985 of the benefit of the pension scheme but for reasons stated above it was not practicable to extend the benefit to such retirees. The rationale for fixing the cut-off date as 1st January, 1986 was the same as in the case of Central government employees based on the recommendation of the Fourth Central Pay Commission. 18. We, therefore, do not see any merit in this petition and dismiss the same with no order as to costs.
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1991 (12) TMI 293 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t. In this case too, the principle affirmed is that a legal representative brought on record in place of mortgagor cannot raise a defence in the final decree proceedings that the mortgage being without legal necessity is not binding on them. 22. It would be evident that none of the decisions support the proposition that even where the subject matter of the suit is right to property and the legal representatives wish to continue the suit as originally framed, they cannot be permitted to do so if they are not natural heirs or if they claim on the basis of a deed of settlement and/or will. 23. The Civil Appeal, accordingly, succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree of the Orissa High Court in the three first appeals mentioned hereinabove are set aside. The High Court shall now hear and dispose of the said appeals on merits, in accordance with law. The appellants/defendants are entitled to costs in this appeal and costs of the appeals in the High Court from the defendants.
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1991 (12) TMI 292 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... lly operative and effective. We see no inconsistency in saying so. Indeed, saying otherwise would introduce an element of inconsistency. It has been held by this Court in Kanthimathy Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Kerala and Ors. that the effect of amendment of Sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the principal Act is the same as the repeal of the Kerala Act and that same consequences follow. It has been held that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act 1897 applies in such a situation, even though, as a matter of fact, the Kerala Act becomes inoperative not by any repealing provision but by virtue of Clause (1) of Article 254 of the Constitution. Accordingly we reject the contention of Shri Iyer. 18. For the reasons recorded hereinabove the matter is referred to a larger Bench for considering the correctness of the decision in Zora Singh's case (supra). The papers may accordingly be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders in this behalf.
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1991 (12) TMI 289 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as any objection to the election he would be entitled to make adequate representation before the Additional District Judge, 5th Court, Alipore who will consider the representation and pass necessary orders. For all other purposes not specifically indicated in our order, the parties should be at liberty to take proper directions and/or orders from the learned 5th Additional District Judge. The election should be held by secret ballot as indicated by the learned Single Judge. All necessary police protection including posting of public personnel at the time of election should be provided by Deputy Commissioner, Port in consultation with O.C. South Port Police Station. 14. The appeal accordingly, stands disposed of. There will be no order as to costs. 15. Let a xerox copy of the operative portion of this order be made available to all the parties concerned through their respective learned Advocates, countersigned by Assistant Registrar (Court). G.R. Bhattacharjee, J. 16. I agree.
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1991 (12) TMI 287 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Bar Associations, and particularly Delhi Bar Association which , I understand, is the largest Association in Asia have to put their heads together and devise and formulate their responsibilities in this regard. The members of the Bar should refrain from going on strike to avoid inconvenience to general public and thus facilitate administration of justice. Order Of The Court In view of the majority decision, we make the following order We do not propose to award the sentence at present and defer it as we would like to further watch their conduct and behavior for a period of one year from today. In case any of them repeats any act which tantamounts to contempt of court or undermining the judiciary, he will be called upon to appear in Court to receive the sentence. But if they maintain orderly, good and disciplined behavior and do not indulge themselves in the repetition of such acts within the stipulated period, then the rule shall stand discharged on the expiry of the period.
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1991 (12) TMI 286 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... can be a 'District Court' for purposes of section 44-A(1) C.P.C. The Delhi decision operates in a different setting. The decision in Raja Soap Factory (supra) goes against the 1971 Calcutta decision, when it says that even a State's Court at the apex is not to be construed as having ordinary original civil jurisdiction, unless the law so expressly states. Appellant's Counsel refers to the long standing practice in Bombay to file such suits in the City Court, and never an exception having been taken thereto. I would have considered this aspect of the matter for acceding to his request for a reference to a larger Bench, were it not for the patent lack of jurisdiction in the City Court. 10. Holding that the City Court did not have the jurisdiction to try the suit, I set aside the impugned order on that very ground. The status-quo shall continue for 8 more weeks to enable appellant to consider his position. Appeal allowed with costs left to be costs in the suit.
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1991 (12) TMI 285 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nt case and that the order of termination (simpliciter) cannot be challenged. 33. Notwithstanding of the above conclusion, we cannot lose sight of the patent fact that the appellant was allowed to continue in service for more than 18 years in different capacity and the competent authority did not think of terminating his service in spite of a number of adverse entries in his Character Roll and allowed him to continue to work. Had the termination been effected at the earlier point of time, the appellant could have possibly secured some other employment. Having regard to the special facts and circumstances of the case and considering the equities arising in this matter, we feel that an amount of ₹ 50,000 should be paid as an ex-gratia payment. We, therefore, direct the Government of Uttar Pradesh to make payment of the said sum of ₹ 50,000 to the appellant within 4 months from today. 34. Subject to the above directions the appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1991 (12) TMI 284 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the trial Court are modified in the following terms The suit of the plaintiff as against defendant-4 and defendant-5 is dismissed with costs. There shall be a decree in favour of the plaintiff for a sum of ₹ 26,06,811.99 ps. against defendants 1 to 3A and 38 and 6 to 9, jointly and severally, and defendants 2 and 6 to 9 are also personally liable, with proportionate costs throughout, with interest at 15 on the principal amount of ₹ 15,63,690/- on OSL Account 17/82, and at 15.5 on the principal sum of ₹ 9,11,765/- under SODH Account 8/82, and at 18.5 on the principal amount of ₹ 1,31,356.99 ps. under PCL loan Account 1/82 from the date of the suit till the date of realisation. The liability of the defendants 3A and 38 is confined to the extent of the estate of the third - defendant devolved upon them. The parties shall give and receive costs proportionate to their success throughout. In all other respects, the decree of the trial Court is affirmed.
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1991 (12) TMI 282 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... lasticity, to meet myriad situations presented by man's ingenuity in given facts and circumstances, but always is hedged with sound exercise of judicial discretion to meet the ends of justice. The facts are eloquent and speak for themselves. It is well nigh impossible to find from facts prima facie case and balance of convenience. The respondents can be adequately compensated on their success. 7. In our considered view, the High Court committed manifest error of law in jumping to the above conclusion to allow the appeal. This appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The order of the High Court is set aside and that of the trial Court is confirmed. It is made clear that any observations made either by the trial Court or the High Court or of this Court should be taken to be not relevant at the trial on merits. These are our only prima facie observations, subject to adduction of evidence and proof at the trial on merits in the suit. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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1991 (12) TMI 281 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... itional Registrar (Admn.). Since these are matters which require a more careful examination, it would be appropriate if a Committee of Judges is constituted which can go in the matter in greater detail and the matter is considered by the full Court in the light of the report of such a committee. We hope and trust that the recommendation that are made by the High Court after such consideration would receive due weight and regard from the State Government and a solution would be devised which would meet the aspirations of the staff and would also be acceptable to the Government. 25. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the judgment and order of the Learned Single Judge and the order of the Division Bench of the High Court are set aside and the Writ Petition field by the respondents is dismissed. The High Court, on its administrative side, may reconsider the matter relating to amendment of the rules in the light of the observations made above. There will be no orders as to costs.
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1991 (12) TMI 278 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e purpose of taxation and there is no provision for taxation of building and land of which the annual letting value is up to ₹ 1800. But when aggregation of annual letting value of all buildings or lands is permitted, then, all such buildings or lands have to be taken as one unit for the purpose of taxation. Any other construction would render the proviso nugatory and defeat the object of the Act. The legislature could not have intended that all buildings or lands owned by a single individual should get exemption from taxation even if their total letting value exceeds ₹ 1800. 6. The decisions of the High Court taking contrary view cannot be said to have laid down the law correctly. 7. In the result we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court. We, however, direct that this decision should be given effect prospectively and there shall not be recovery from or refund to any person with regard to the period antecedent hereto. 8. No costs.
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1991 (12) TMI 277 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed above that the realisation of fine had been stayed in one of the appeals which was none other than the case in which fine was imposed and it is clear from the order dated 16.12.1970 that there was stay of recovery of fine during the pendency of the appeal before the Supreme Court. Therefore, as observed by the Supreme Court in the earlier appeal, limitation for recovery of fine could not begin till the passing of the order by the Supreme Court dated 10.1.1975 confirming conviction and sentence. The recovery proceedings had been initiated on 4.6.1975 and they were thus within time. 15. It is most unfortunate that the order of the Supreme Court passed earlier in the recovery proceedings against Mehtab Singh was not brought to the notice of the High Court. 16. Thus the impugned order of the High Court dated 9.1.1980 is set aside and the order dated 2.2.1979 passed by the IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Mainpuri is restored. Parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.
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1991 (12) TMI 276 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed contrast with other fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution, it has to be read subject to the power of the State to regulate education, educational standards and allied matters. In Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College Society v. State of Gujarat ( 1974 (1) SCC 717 1975 (1) SCR 173) which was the decision of a nine Judge Bench, Ray, C.J., with whom Palekar, J., concurred, observed (at SCR pp. 197 - 200 SCC p. 7490 that upon affiliation to a University, the minority and non-minority institutions must agree in the pattern and standards of education. Regulations which will serve the interest of the students, regulations which will serve the interests of the teachers are of paramount importance in good administration. Regulations in the interest of efficiency of teachers, discipline and fairness in administration are necessary for preserving harmony among affiliated institutions. It was further observed (SCC p. 752, para 46)" That the ultimate goal of a minority.
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1991 (12) TMI 275 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... vestigation in respect of the offences committed between the night of July 12 and 13, 1990 as per the FIR lodged at Police Station, Gajraula. 11. We are, however, not inclined to accept the prayer of the petitioners to transfer the criminal case from the file of IXth Additional Sessions Judge, Muradabad. 12. We, therefore, direct the CBI to take up the investigation of the case immediately. We further direct the Senior Superintendent of Police, Muradabad and the Station House Officer, Gajraula Police Station to assist the CBI in conducting the investigation. The State of Uttar Pradesh through its Chief Secretary and the Home Secretary is further directed to provide all assistance to the CBI in this respect. 13. The CBI shall complete the investigation within three months from today and submit its report in accordance with law. The proceedings before IXth Additional Sessions Judge, Muradabad shall remain stayed till March 16, 1992. 14. The writ petition is, thus, disposed of.
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1991 (12) TMI 274 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... l of the case alone will bring out the truth. Thus, on a consideration of circumstances appearing for and against, we are of the opinion that quashing of the charges and/or criminal proceedings at this stage would not be just and proper. The proper order to make in this case is to request the Delhi High Court to dispose of Criminal Revision No. 191 of 1986 as early as possible, preferably within a period of two months from the date of copy of this order is communicated to it. After the Criminal Revision Petition is disposed of, the trial Judge will take up the matter and proceed with it with as much expedition as possible in the circumstances and preferably on a day-to-day basis. 57. Writ Petition No. 833 of 1990 and Writ Petition No. 268 of 1987 are accordingly dismissed with the directions aforementioned. Criminal Appeal No. 126 of 1987 preferred by State of Bihar against the judgment of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court is also dismissed for the reasons hereinbefore.
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1991 (12) TMI 273 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t and had given cogent reasons for disbelieving this part of the prosecution case, yet the High Court merely refers to the evidence of the handwriting expert without examining the veracity of the prosecution evidence to conclude if the trial court had not correctly appreciated their evidence, not realising that the evidence of the expert was not decisive unless the prosecution version inspired confidence. By relying on the opinion of the handwriting expert, the High Court concluded that it lent corroboration to the confession, thus treating the confession as the base document around which the rest of the evidence must circle. We on a critical examination of the prosecution evidence in this behalf, find this part of the prosecution case highly artificial and unconvincing. 8. We accordingly allow the appeals, set aside the conviction and sentence and acquit the appellants on all the charges giving the benefit of doubt. We direct that the appellants be set at liberty forthwith.
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1991 (12) TMI 272 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... romised to place the services of a mining engineer/expert at the disposal of the arbitrator to assist him on the technical aspects of the matter. The name of the nominee should be communicated to the arbitrator within four weeks from today. It will be open to the arbitrator to avail himself of the services of such nominee. Parties may settle the terms of arbitration with the arbitrator. The company and Union of India should, however, deposit ₹ 10,000 each with the arbitrator as soon as the terms are settled to enable him to start the proceedings without delay. The Arbitrator may enter upon the reference within four weeks of the date of communication of this order to him. He may make his award within a period of four months thereafter. He will not be obliged to give reasons for his conclusions. A copy of this order may be sent to the learned Arbitrator by the Registry. The writ petitions disposed of in the above terms. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs.
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1991 (12) TMI 271 - SUPREME COURT
Scope of Section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 - Held that:- Letting under Section 21 is not hedged with any restriction. Throwing the whole or part of the premises by landlord for letting out is not linked with his existing accommodation, its number or sufficiency. The one is not dependent on the other. Even letting for paying instalment of loan, for constructing the premises or its re-letting has not been held to be contrary to Section 21. Validity of permission has to be judged on the date of grant of application. Availability of premises for indefinite letting cannot be judged by subsequent events or the failure of the landlord to occupy immediately for personal, financial, economic or other reasons. Therefore, the authorities committed manifest of error of law, both in entertaining the application of the tenant resisting the objection of the landlady by placing the burden on her erroneously and deciding against her by misapplication of law and misconstructions of the provisions of Section 21.
Sri Rajeev Dhavan rightly urged that both the Controller and the Tribunal misdirected themselves in placing the burden on the landlady to prove that the permission obtained by her was genuine. According to him the primary burden was on the tenant to establish that the permission was obtained by playing fraud. Unfortunately, it appears, the authorities assumed fraud and misrepresentation on mere averment in the objection of the tenant and proceeded to record the finding on premise that the landlady was required to prove it. Apart from the procedural error even the finding that the premises were not needed by her after three years is not well founded. Appeal allowed
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1991 (12) TMI 269 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there was an unreasonable delay in executing the order of detention from the date of passing of the detention order throwing considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority as regards the necessity to detain the petitioner/
Held that:- In the present case, the circumstances indicate that the detaining authority after passing the detention order was indifferent in securing the detenu by not taking proper action with greater promptitude. The police officials have treated the warrant of arrest in a very casual manner and unduly delayed its execution. In particular, the Inspector of Police to whom the warrant was forwarded for execution, as pointed out ibid, was indolent inspite of the repeated reminders and was giving evasive answers till the detenu was secured in his native place itself. This recalcitrant and refractory conduct of the Inspector has allowed the detenu to remain at large for such a long period and has consequently defeated the very purpose of the impugned order.
For all the aforementioned reasons, we set aside the impugned order of detention and direct the detenu to be set at liberty forthwith.
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1991 (12) TMI 268 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Award was vitiated as it contained no reasons?
Whether the Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to award pendente lite interest?
Held that:- Where the agreement between the parties does not prohibit grant of interest and where a party claims interest and that dispute (alongwith the claim for principal amount or independently) is referred to the arbitrator, he shall have the power to award interest pendente lite. This is for the reason that in such a case it must be presumed that interest was an implied term of the agreement between the parties and therefore when the parties refer all their disputes-or refer the dispute as to interest as such-to the arbitrator, he shall have the power to award interest. This does not mean that in every case the arbitrator should necessarily award interest pendente lite. It is a matter within his discretion to be exercised in the light of all the facts and circumstances of the case, keeping the ends of justice in view.
Thus the Arbitrator acted with jurisdiction in awarding pendente lite interest and the High Court rightly upheld the award. In the result both the appeals fail and are, accordingly, dismissed
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