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Indian Laws - Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 301 Records
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1997 (12) TMI 667 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ight of speedy justice is a fundamental right. It would bring within its sweep even the period spent in appeal. However, if an accused himself is delaying and adopting tactics in this regard, he will not be entitled to take the advantage of his own wrong to play the tune of speedy trial. Otherwise, if there is an inordinate delay, it would be a mitigating circumstance. In the present case, the appellants have already undergone more than 13 months of imprisonment during the course of trial and some time while the appeal was pending in this Court. The occurrence pertains to 12 years earlier. While they were on bail, there is nothing to indicate that any such event has taken place which may prompt this Court to take a serious view. Therefore, it is a fit case where the sentence should be reduced to the one already undergone. 30. For these reasons, the appeal fails and is dismissed. The order of the trial court is modified and the sentence is reduced to the one already undergone.
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1997 (12) TMI 666 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 's case is fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Having not succeeded in getting stay in Suit No. 3064/96, in our view, the Lawyer should have refused to move an application for stay in the second suit. 21. We are of the view that an attempt has been made by the respondent to over reach the court and the respondents have played fraud upon the Court as well as upon the opposite party and is thus clearly guilty of contempt. Respondents cannot be heard in the case unless it purges itself of the contempt so committed and in our view it can only be if we non suit the respondents in Suit No. 261/97. While, Therefore, we do not propose to take action against the respondent for contempt except to issue a warning to respondent No. 2 to be more careful in future, we direct the dismissal of the suit (being Suit No. 261/97) itself. While, Therefore, allowing this appeal, we dismiss Suit No. 261/97 and dispose of the contempt petition in the above terms.
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1997 (12) TMI 664 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s only when the liability of the insured has been upheld for the purpose of indemnifying the insured under the contract of insurance. There is, thus, a basic fallacy in the conclusion reached by the High Court on this point. 4. The question now is of the final order to make in the present case. We find that the insurer has made the payment to the claimants in the present case in satisfaction of the entire claim and it has been fairly stated by the insurer that this appeal was filed only for getting a decision on this point pertaining to its liability in such a situation. In the circumstances of the case, we deem it fit to say that the amount already paid by the insurer to the claimants is not required to be refunded by the claimants to the insurer. 5. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the High Court and Tribunal are set aside. However, as indicated earlier, the claimants are not required to refund the amount already paid to them by the insurer.
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1997 (12) TMI 663 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ould demand no indulgence from the Court in equity or in law. Such cases would be squarely hit by the maxim Malitiis Hominum Non Est Indulgendum. In my opinion the objector-petitioner is not entitled to any relief either in equity or in law. 40. The executing Court has passed a well reasoned order upon consideration of various judgments and I see no reason to interfere with the said order. There is no jurisdictional or any other error apparent on the face of the record which would call for any interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, which is of a limited scope. In the facts and circumstances of this case there can be no reason whatsoever, to hold that the impugned order is Coram Non Judice. The order is in consonance with the settled principles of law and squarely falls within the jurisdiction exercised by the executing Court. Consequently, this revision fails and is dismissed with costs which are assessed at ₹ 2,000/-. Revision dismissed.
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1997 (12) TMI 662 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s limited purpose. 39. Our conclusion is that on the induction of the second respondent,' the existing firm was only reconstituted on the facts of this case and, therefore, there is no necessity to get a fresh registration. If by virtue of non-compliance of certain mandatory provisions in not informing the Registrar of Firms about the change in the Constitution of the firm, certain penalties provided in the Act alone are attracted and that will not lead to the conclusion that the registration of the firm ceased. This conclusion is based on a conjoint reading of Sections 58-63 and the Forms prescribed thereunder. Further, this conclusion does not in any way militate the object of the Maharashtra Amendment introduced by Act 29 of 84. 39. In the result, we hold that the suit in question is not hit by Section 69(2A) of the Act and, therefore, the Division Bench is right in allowing the Appeal. Consequently, the Appeal is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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1997 (12) TMI 661 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... against the appellants, in that, they have assisted the operations of ULFA (which has been declared as an unlawful association Under Section 3 of the Act) through contributions and also in other ways. However, when those material allegations leveled against the appellants are considered vis-a-vis the 'unlawful activities' envisaged under the Act it cannot be said that they are liable for an offence Under Section 13 of the Act, much less the aforesaid offences under the Indian Penal Code. Resultantly, the question of granting anticipatory bail to the appellants Under Section 438 of the CrPC cannot and does not arise for an offence Under Section 10 of the Act is bailable; and a direction under the former can be issued only in respect of a non-bailable offence. Viewed in that context the merits of the appellants' contention that they have not committed any offence alleged against them need not be gone into. 10. With the above observations we dispose of these appeals.
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1997 (12) TMI 660 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ng. Since there is no command issued to the judgment-debtor to obey, the civil process cannot be issued for the compliance of that mandate or command. The decree-holder is free to seek his legal remedies by way of suit or otherwise on the basis of the declaration given in his favour." In our view, it is a correct statement of law except that it may not be fully applicable in the case of a Government servant who acquires a status and his service conditions are governed by statutory rules as noticed above. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the courts below did not exercise their jurisdiction properly and the respondent could not have sought execution of the declaratory decree when no relief was granted to him towards arrears of salary and other consequential benefits. The appeal is allowed with costs, impugned order of the High Court as well as orders of the courts below are set aside and the execution application filed by the respondent is dismissed. Appeal allowed.
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1997 (12) TMI 657 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... egations and orders made by the learned Judge in connection with and relating to the disposed of Writ Petition No. 2949/96 in the impugned order, are illegal, misconceived and without jurisdiction. The same are quashed and are hereby directed to be expunged from the record. 69. The direction to issue show cause notice to the Chief Justice of the High Court Respondent No. 2, being wholly unwarranted, unjustified and legally unsustainable is hereby quashed and set aside. 70. Nothing said hereinabove shall however be construed as any expression of opinion on the pending criminal revision petition filed by respondent No. 1, which has been admitted to hearing and in which respondent No. 1 has been granted bail. That criminal revision petition shall be decided by the High Court on its own merits. 71. Before parting with this Judgment, we wish to say that we hope there shall not be any other occasion for us to deal with such a case. 72. The appeal therefore succeeds and is allowed.
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1997 (12) TMI 656 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... decision to withdraw from acquisition can be challenged on the ground that power has been exercised mala fide or in an arbitrary manner. Therefore, we cannot accept the submission of the learned counsel for the State that the discretion of the State Government in this behalf is absolute and not justiciable at all. 11. We, therefore, allow this appeal and quash the impugned order dated 16.4.1996. However, we make it clear that it will be open to the State Government to reconsider this question of withdrawal from acquisition and take an appropriate decision in accordance with law. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Writ Petition (c) No. 716 of 1996 12. As we are allowing the appeal the learned counsel for the petitioner does not press the writ petition at this stage and reserves his right to challenge the validity of Section 48 if such an occasion arises in future. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed as not pressed.
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1997 (12) TMI 655 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... bail" the following words be substituted - "he shall be released on bail unless the court for reasons recorded in writing otherwise directs". The Report observed "We are unable to accept the suggestion either. Its acceptance would practically amount to an abolition of distinction between bailable and non-bailable offences" I have no manner of doubt that the argument of Mr.Chaudhary, if accepted, too would completely wash away the distinction between bailable and non-bailable offence. We cannot allow it to happen. 14. Keeping in view the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, I have absolutely no doubt that equipping the petitioner with an order as sought by her, would be hazardous to the victim and dangerous to the society in general. It may even impede the trial. Public interest would thus suffer as a consequence. The petition is thus dismissed. However, nothing said in this order shall be read as an expression of opinion on the case.
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1997 (12) TMI 650 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nd against the respondent. That has to be done by the Court Martial. Therefore, the matter has to be remanded back to the Court Martial for deciding that question. 26. Consequently the appeal is partly allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside except with reference to its conclusion on charge No.9. The sentence awarded by the Court Martial is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Court Martial for considering and passing an appropriate sentence on the basis of findings on Charges 2, 3 and 8. 27. In the facts and circumstances of the case we find it necessary to invite attention of appellants 2 to 4 to consider initiating appropriate proceedings against PWs 6, 21 26, 30 and 32 who deposed at the Court Martial that they had signed or prepared official record on the oral directions of the respondent without verifying the correctness thereof which act of their was in direction of duties. These state of affairs is highly distressing. We record our displeasure.
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1997 (12) TMI 649 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... red us that this Model law will be taken into consideration in the framing of the proposed new Rent Control Act. We, accordingly, dispose of these appeals without granting any immediate relief but we hold that the decision of the High Court upholding validity of the impugned provisions relating to standard rent was not correct. We however refrain from striking down the said provision as the existing Act elapses on 31.31998 and we hope that new Rent Control Act will be enacted with effect from 1st April, 1998 keeping in view the observations made in this judgment in so far as fixation of standard rent is concerned. It is, however, made clear that any further extension of the existing provisions without bringing them in line with the views expressed in this judgment, would be invalid as being arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and therefore of no consequence. The respondents will pay the Costs. In view of the aforesaid the writ petitions are disposed of.
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1997 (12) TMI 648 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o far as new inam estates with which we are concerned, to rebut the presumption in Section 65(1) of the Act 26/1963. In other words, while the presumption under Section 65(1) might operate against other land holders claiming ryotwari patta under Section 9(2)(a), the position so far as temples governed by the Madras HR & CE Act, 1959 are concerned, proof of personal cultivation is statutorily dispersed with, even for the period of three years mentioned in Section 9(2)(a). That is now, the statutory presumption gets rebutted. For the above reasons, we uphold the conlusion arrived at by the Madras High Court which affirmed the grant of ryotwari patta to the respondents. It is therefore held that the authorities were right in granting ryotwari patta to the respondent-temple and in treating the Dr. Devadoss only as an ordinary cultivating tenant in the private land of the temple. In the result, the appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances, without costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1997 (12) TMI 647 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... reason to fault procedure prescribed or the qualifications prescribed or to set aside these selections and consequent appointments since none of the grounds on which the amendments, circulars and selection have been challenged, is sustainable in law. We have been informed that after the stay of the judgment of the Tribunal by this Court, those who were selected/appointed under the prescribed procedure have been given appointments and they have been functioning as Assistant Teachers. In the case of selected candidates not joining, the persons kept on the relevant waiting list in order of merit have been given appointments. There is no reason to set aside these appointments. In the premises, the impugned amendments to the Recruitment Rules as also the circulars relating to the procedure for selection and the criteria for selection are upheld. All these are allowed and the impugned judgments and orders of the Tribunal are set aside. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1997 (12) TMI 645 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s nothing on the record to show as to whether the petitioners had the notice of the hearing of the case on that day. we are of the view, when Mr. Adhia withdrew from the case, the interests of justice required, that a fresh notice for actual date hearing should have been sent to the parties. In any case in the facts and circumstances of this case we feel that t he party in person was not at fault and as such should not be made to suffer." In view of what we have said above, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order of the trial Court dated 18.11.1991 and the ex-parte decree dated 8.2.1991 and the ex-parted decree dated 8.2.1992 are set aside. we also set aside the order of the District Judge and that of the High Court dismissing the civil revision petition. The case is remanded to the trial court for its disposal in accordance with law. The trial court shall proceed with the case from the stage, where the case was on 18.11.1991. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1997 (12) TMI 644 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in disturbing the settled position which is not justifiable. There was inordinate delay in the present case for making such a grievance. This alone was sufficient to decline interference under Article 226 and to reject the writ petition. In view of the above conclusion it is not necessary for us to express any opinion on the merits of the point raised buy B.S. Bajwa and B.D. Gupta. We make it clear that the view thereon taken by the High Court is not to be treated as concluded or having affirmation of any kind. The appeals of B.S.Bajwa and B.D.Gupta are dismissed and the appeal filed by D.P.Bajaj and Jagir Singh is allowed. With the result that the judgment of the Single Judge of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed by B.S.Bajwa and B.D.Gupta stand dismissed. CA7411-7614/96 For the reasons stated above, these appeals are dismissed. CA Nos 8914-15/97 in SLP (C) No23599-23600/97 (CC Nos. 8677-8678/97) For the reasons stated above, these appeals are allowed.
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1997 (12) TMI 640 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... uired to be placed for decision before a larger Bench of three learned Judges of this Court for reconsideration of the judgment in Bihar Distillery Case (Supra). We therefore direct the Registry to place all these appeals for disposal before a larger Bench of three learned Judges. Registry to obtain orders of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India in this connection so that the matters can be disposed of at the earliest. We make it clear that learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Sanghi, appearing for one of the appellants, also sought to challenge the decision of the High Court even on merits and submitted that according to him, final order passed by the Commissioner runs counter to the show-cause notice issued to the appellant and similar contentions were also advanced by learned counsel appearing for the appellants in the cognate appeals. These questions also will obviously be considered by the larger Bench as all the matters are being referred for decision of the larger Bench.
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1997 (12) TMI 639 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rugs and which has its office in the suit premises since 1966 and as there is an air conditioned godown in the said premises, may be given reasonable time to vacate the premises so that it can search out any alternative premises. Learned senior counsel for the respondent has fairly left to us this question of giving time to the appellant. In the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, while dismissing this appeal we deem it fit to grant time to the appellant company to vacate the suit premises till 31st December 1998 on the appellant filing a usual undertaking within four weeks in this Country. If such an undertaking is not filed or if any of the conditions of the undertaking is committed breach of by the appellant , the grant of time to vacate the premises will stand recalled. Appeal is dismissed subject to the aforesaid grant of time to vacate, with no order as to costs n the facts and circumstances of the case. Ad interim relief granted earlier will stand vacated.
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1997 (12) TMI 635 - SUPREME COURT
Acquittal of a government servant from graft charge - Held that:- The reasoning of the High Court that reliability of the trap was impaired as the solution collected in the phial was not sent to chemical Examiner is too puerile for acceptance. We have not come across any case where a trap was conducted by the police in which the phenolphtalein solution was sent to the Chemical Examiner. We know that the said solution is always used not because there is any such direction by the statutory public servant would have really handled the bribed money. There is no material discrepancy in the evidence regarding preparation of recovery-memo and the minor contradiction mentioned by the learned single judge is not worth considering.
No doubt that the High Court has misdirected itself by such patently wrong and tenuous considerations and it resulted in the unmerited acquittal of accused against whom the prosecution succeeded in making out a fool-proof case under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. Allow that state appeal and restore the conviction passed by the trial court.
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1997 (12) TMI 615 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ptly submitted to this Court for its satisfaction that the concerned authorities have not failed to perform their legal obligations and have reasonably come to such conclusion. No such report having been submitted by the CBI or any other agency till now in this Court, action on such a report by this Court would be considered, if any when that occasion arises. We also direct that no settlement should be arrived at nor any offence compounded by any authority without prior leave of this Court. We may add that on account of the great public interest involved in this matter, the CBI and other Government agencies must expedite their action to complete the task and prevent pendency of this matter beyond the period necessary. It is needless to observe that the results achieved so far do not match the available time and opportunity for a full investigation ever since the matter came to light. It is of utmost national significance that no further time is lost in completion of the task.
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