|
Advanced Search Options
Indian Laws - Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 680 Records
-
2016 (12) TMI 1147 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Recovery of amounts due under the SARFAESI Act - Failure to repay bank loan - bank initiated arbitration proceedings - Held that:- Mere pendency of the arbitration proceedings would not disentitle the said respondents from recovering the amounts due under the SARFAESI Act.
As regards the observations expressed by the Co- Operative Tribunal, the petitioners still have an opportunity of raising all the pleas legally available to them, including the aspect on which the Tribunal has made its observations, by availing the remedy under Section-17 of the SARFAESI Act against the measures initiated by respondent Nos.1 and 4 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal.Subject to the liberty given to the petitioners as above, the Writ Petition is dismissed.
-
2016 (12) TMI 1093 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Dishonour of cheques (PDC) - default sentence in case of non-payment of the compensation - High Seas Sale Agreements - loss of government dues / input duty (tax) liability - Held that:- The issuance of legal notices by the respondent/Govt. company to the revisionists are not disputed between the parties. It is also not in dispute that the payment so demanded was made by the revisionists within the stipulated period or subsequent period till date which attracts conviction under Section 138 read with Section 141of the Negotiable Instruments, Act, 1881.
However, all the aforesaid cheques issued by the revisionist to the respondent company were to meet their liability amounting to ₹ 9,94,98,634 which forms part of one single transaction giving rise to one cause of action and the same could not be said to be distinct offences committed in each of the complaint cases to attract the provisions of Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments, Act having different cause of action. Therefore, the substantive sentence awarded to the revisionists could have been one year concurrently rather than independent/consecutive sentence in each complaint cases
The conviction of the revisionists in the eighteen complaint case under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is affirmed.
The Court below went wrong while awarding substantive sentence to run consecutively rather than to award the sentence concurrently.
-
2016 (12) TMI 1092 - SUPREME COURT
Levy of property tax on “mobile towers” - Validity of Section 145A of the Gujarat Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 - Held that:- If the definition of “land” and “building” contained in the Gujarat Act is to be understood, we do not find any reason as to why, though in common parlance and in everyday life, a mobile tower is certainly not a building, it would also cease to be a building for the purposes of Entry 49 List II so as to deny the State Legislature the power to levy a tax thereon. Such a law can trace its source to the provisions Entry 49 List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
Though several other decisions of this Court and also of different High Courts have been placed before us we do not consider it necessary to refer to or to enter into any discussion of the propositions laid down in the said decisions as the views expressed in all the aforesaid cases pertain to the meaning of the expressions ‘land’ and ‘building’ as appearing in the definition clause of the statutes in question.
We, therefore, set aside the judgment passed by the Gujarat High Court and answer the appeals arising from the order of the Bombay High Court; transferred cases and the writ petitions accordingly.
-
2016 (12) TMI 1017 - SUPREME COURT
Applicability of Key provisions of SARFAESI ACT to the J&K - legislative competence of Parliament - whether SARFAESI cannot be held to apply to the State of Jammu & Kashmir? - Held that:- Section 140 of the Transfer of Property Act of Jammu & Kashmir will be respected in auction sales that take place within the State. This being the case, it is clear that there is no collision or repugnancy with any of the provisions of SARFAESI, and therefore it is clear that the High Court is absolutely wrong in finding that as Section 140 of the Transfer of Property Act will be infracted, SARFAESI cannot be held to apply to the State of Jammu & Kashmir.
The High court judgment begins from the wrong end and therefore reaches the wrong conclusion. It states that in terms of Section 5 of the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir, the State has absolute sovereign power to legislate in respect of laws touching the rights of its permanent residents qua their immovable properties. The State legislature having enacted Section 140 of the Jammu & Kashmir Transfer of Property Act, therefore, having clearly stated that the State’s subjects/citizens are by virtue of the said provision protected, SARFAESI cannot intrude and disturb such protection. The whole approach is erroneous. As has been stated hereinabove, Entries 45 and 95 of List I clothe Parliament with exclusive power to make laws with respect to banking, and the entirety of SARFAESI can be said to be referable to Entry 45 and 95 of List I, 7th Schedule to the Constitution of India. This being the case, Section 5 of the Jammu & Kashmir Constitution will only operate in areas in which Parliament has no power to make laws for the State. Thus, it is clear that anything that comes in the way of SARFAESI by way of a Jammu & Kashmir law must necessarily give way to the said law by virtue of Article 246 of the Constitution of India as extended to the State of Jammu & Kashmir, read with Section 5 of the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir. This being the case, it is clear that Sections 13(1) and (4) cannot be held to be beyond the legislative competence of Parliament as has wrongly been held by the High Court.
It is thus clear that the State of Jammu & Kashmir has no vestige of sovereignty outside the Constitution of India and its own Constitution, which is subordinate to the Constitution of India. It is therefore wholly incorrect to describe it as being sovereign in the sense of its residents constituting a separate and distinct class in themselves. The residents of Jammu & Kashmir, we need to remind the High Court, are first and foremost citizens of India.
-
2016 (12) TMI 1016 - SUPREME COURT
Demonetization - Undisclosed income disclosure - petitioner submitted that the Union of India could have come with a better scheme regard being had to the Statement of Objects and Reasons behind the scheme - Held that:- Appreciating the submission of Mr. Kapur, we are disposed to think that he is suggesting a different scheme to be implemented by the Union of India. Needless to say, this Court cannot enter into or encroach upon the policy making arena and suggest a different policy on the foundation that the policy framed by the Union of India could have been better. That is not within the domain of the Court. There is a distinction between assailment of the constitutional validity of a policy and conception of framing of a better policy.
In view of the aforesaid analysis, we do not find any justification to issue notice in the present writ petition and it is, accordingly, dismissed.
-
2016 (12) TMI 1015 - SUPREME COURT
Demonetization - Forbid the District Cooperative Banks from accepting deposits and exchanging demonetized notes - Held that:- The learned Attorney General on instructions submitted that the policy of replacement of legal tender notes as applicable to Public Sector Banks and other Banks will be applied even in the case of District Cooperative Banks for exchange of demonetized currency with the legal tender currency. We accept the assurance given by the learned Attorney General in this behalf.
Extension of time limit for exemption for use of demonetized currency notes of ₹ 500/- and ₹ 1000/- at specified counters - Held that:- Whether the exemption period should be extended or not must be best left to the judgment of the Government of the day with a hope that the Government will be responsive and sensitive to the problems encountered by the common man. Accordingly, we decline to issue any interim direction to the Government in the matter of extending the period of exemption and leave it open to the Government to take appropriate decision in that behalf, as may be advised.
Denial of right to withdraw the prescribed amount of ₹ 24,000/- per week per account holder, in spite of Notification issued by the Reserve Bank of India permitting such withdrawal - Held that:- Considering the stand taken by the learned Attorney General, we may commend to the Authorities to fulfill their commitment made in terms of the stated Notification permitting withdrawal of ₹ 24,000/- per account holder of the Bank per week to the extent possible and review that decision periodically and take necessary corrective measures in that behalf.
In our opinion, besides the observations made hitherto, no other direction can be given at this stage by way of an interim relief.
Writ Petitions/proceedings pending - Held that:- It would be just and proper to withdraw all the Writ Petitions/proceedings pending in different High Courts across the country and to be heard by this Court along with the Writ Petitions which are already pending in this Court raising same or similar issues, to avoid multiplicity of hearing and conflicting decisions on the same subject matter. Accordingly, we issue notice in the respective Transfer Petitions and by way of interim direction, stay the further proceedings of the Writ Petitions/proceedings in the concerned High Court.We further direct that no other Court shall entertain, hear or decide any Writ Petition/proceedings on the issue or in relation to or arising from the decision of the Government of India to demonetize the old notes of ₹ 500/- and ₹ 1000/-, as the entire issue in relation thereto is pending consideration before this Court in the present proceedings.
-
2016 (12) TMI 957 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Dishonor of cheques - Complaint filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,1881 - Held that:- The revisionist tried his best to run away from its liability by showing the cards of Share Purchase Agreement, i.e. Ex.CW1/D2, dated 22.06.2010 as well as profit sharing project. So far as the acting upon the agreement Ex.CW1/D2 is concerned, the same is not acted upon by the parties.
There is nothing proved on record by the revisionist in rebuttal to say that the money received by them was not in consideration of the loan amount but was an investment on profit sharing basis.
The respondent/complainant has proved the complaint, i.e. Ex.CW1/A, the cheques nos. 246320 and 246321, i.e. Ex. PW1/10 and Ex.PW1/8 respectively, both dated 15.05.2011 and the legal demand notice dated 02.06.2011. It is pertinent to mention, that the defence of the revisionist is sham having no roots to see the twilight of the day.
Consequently, the order on conviction passed by learned Metropolitan Magistrate dated 04.09.2015 is upheld and does not require any interference.
So far as the enhancement of sentence awarded by the learned Additional Session Judge, i.e. rigorous imprisonment for three months to rigorous imprisonment for one year, is concerned the learned appellate Court has rightly appreciated the facts on record as the revisionist at the initial stage has admitted its liability and despite admitting the liability the revisionist kept on taking undue benefit of the legal process and harassed the respondent/complainant and backed out many times during the court proceedings too as per the order sheet of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate dated 29.03.2012 and 15.05.2012.
Consequently, the order on conviction dated 04.09.2015 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate and the subsequent order of enhancement of sentence passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge dated 22.12.2015 remains upheld and requires no interference by this Court.
-
2016 (12) TMI 810 - SUPREME COURT
Maintainability of appeal - application filed by the appellant under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC was rejected mainly for the reason that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings under the provisions of Section 1(4) of the DRT Act as the value of the suit was less than ₹ 10 lakh - Held that:- The application submitted by the appellant bank under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC should have been granted by the trial Court as, according to Section 34 of the Act, a Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any appeal arising under the Act.
Thus, we hold that the Debt Recovery Tribunal constituted under the DRT Act has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal as per Section 17 of the Act even if the amount involved is less than ₹ 10 lakh. But, the said appellate jurisdiction need not be misunderstood with the original jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
For the aforestated reasons, the impugned judgment as well as the order rejecting the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 are set aside. The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.
-
2016 (12) TMI 689 - SUPREME COURT
Rejection of application moved under Section 5 read with Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to get the dispute referred to arbitral tribunal - whether filing of an application for extension of time to file written statement before a judicial authority constitutes – ‘submitting first statement on the substance of the dispute’ or not? - Held that:- We find it difficult to agree with the High Court that in the present case merely moving an application seeking further time of eight weeks to file the written statement would amount to making first statement on the substance of the dispute. In our opinion, filing of an application without reply to the allegations of the plaint does not constitute first statement on the substance of the dispute. It does not appear from the language of sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the 1996 Act that the Legislature intended to include such a step like moving simple application of seeking extension of time to file written statement as first statement on the substance of the dispute. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, as already narrated above, we are unable to hold that the appellant, by moving an application for extension of time of eight weeks to file written statement, has waived right to object to the jurisdiction of judicial authority.
Before disposing of application under Section 8 of the 1996 Act the High Court has not looked into questions as to whether there is an agreement between the parties; whether disputes which are subject-matter of the suit fall within the scope of arbitration; and whether the reliefs sought in the suit are those that can be adjudicated and granted in arbitration. In view of the above, we think it just and proper to request the High Court to decide the application afresh in the light of law laid down by this Court in para 19 of the judgment in Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Homes Finance Limited and others (2012 (10) TMI 459 - SUPREME COURT ) except the point, which has already been answered in the present case by us.
-
2016 (12) TMI 688 - SUPREME COURT
Arbitration proceedings - Held that:- Disputes have arisen between the parties, resulting in an exchange of e-mails. The Petitioner has a claim for unpaid dues. The Petitioner invoked arbitration by an e-mail dated 2 November 2015 addressed by its advocate to the respondent. The Petitioner claimed an amount of USD 38,13,723.76 together with interest by its e-mail and suggested the names of two former judges of the Delhi High Court. The Petitioner sought the concurrence of the Respondent to the appointment of one of them as sole arbitrator, in terms of the arbitration agreement. Finding no response, these proceedings were instituted under Section 11(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Notice was issued in these proceedings on 8 March 2016. On 7 October 2016 the Respondent informed this Court that it was willing to negotiate an amicable settlement with the Petitioner and would either finalize a settlement or file its objections to the petition for appointment of an arbitrator within four weeks. Neither has any settlement been arrived at between the parties nor has a reply been filed to the Arbitration Petition.
As learned counsel have not disputed the existence of the arbitration agreement. Disputes have evidently arisen between the parties and a mutual settlement has not been possible.
We hereby appoint Mr Justice FM Ibrahim Kalifulla, former judge of the Supreme Court of India to act as a sole Arbitrator in terms of the arbitration agreement. The learned arbitrator shall be at liberty to determine the fees payable to him for the arbitration
-
2016 (12) TMI 626 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
Application filed under Section 47 (Part II) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for enforcement of the foreign arbitration award dismissed - whether the District Court would cease to have jurisdiction to proceed with the execution of the foreign arbitration awards, after coming into force of the Explanation to Section 47 by way of the Amended Ordinance-2015 and the execution pending before the District Judge has to be filed in the High Court? - Held that:- There is no dispute that in the execution application filed by the petitioner, the District Judge, Gurgaon had the jurisdiction in terms of the un-amended Explanation to Section 47 of the Act but during the pendency of the execution, with the amendment in the Explanation to Section 47 of the Act, the forum for the purpose of execution of the foreign arbitration award was changed from the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction to the High Court.
In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Dhadi Sahu's case (1992 (11) TMI 2 - SUPREME Court ) wherein held that the general principle is that a law which brings about a change in the forum does not affect pending actions unless intention to the contrary is clearly shown. One of the modes by which such an intention is shown is by making a provision for change-over of proceedings, from the court or the tribunal where they are pending to the court or the tribunal which under the new law gets jurisdiction to try them, it can safely be held that the impugned order passed by the Additional District Judge, Gurgaon, is illegal.Consequently, the present writ petition is hereby allowed and the impugned order dated 14.12.2015 passed by the Additional District Judge, Gurgaon, is set aside.
-
2016 (12) TMI 562 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Possession notice issued by the respondent Bank under Section 13(4) of the Securtization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 challenged - Held that:- The proper course was to relegate the petitioner to avail the remedy. The alternative remedy has to be adhered to steadfast, instead of allowing the petitioner to straightway approach the High Court in a writ jurisdiction
No case is made out for interference under the writ jurisdiction on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. Accordingly, this petition is not entertained and the same is dismissed.
-
2016 (12) TMI 509 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Order of dismissal from service challenged - Held that:- If an employee intends to enforce his constitutional rights or a right under a statutory Regulation, the civil court will have the necessary jurisdiction to try a suit. If, however, he claims his right and corresponding obligations only in terms of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act or the sister laws so called, the civil court will have none. In this view of the matter, in my considered opinion, it would not be correct even to contend that only because the employee concerned is also a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the 1947 Act or the conditions of his service are otherwise governed by the Standing Order certified under the 1946 Act ipso facto the Civil Court will have no jurisdiction.
In a case where no enquiry has been conducted, there would be violation of the statutory Regulation as also the right of equality as contained in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In such a situation, a civil suit will be maintainable for the purpose of declaration that the termination of service was illegal and the consequences flowing therefrom. However, the Court may hasten to add that if a suit is filed alleging violation of a right by a workman and a corresponding obligation on the part of the employer under the Industrial Disputes Act or the Certified Standing Orders, a civil suit may not lie. However, if no procedure has been followed as laid down by the statutory Regulation or is otherwise imperative even under the common law or the principles of natural justice which right having arisen under the existing law, subpara (2) of paragraph 23 of the law laid down in Premier Automobiles Ltd. vs. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay & others [1975 (8) TMI 124 - SUPREME COURT ] shall prevail. [Vide Bal Mukund (2009 (2) TMI 807 - SUPREME COURT )]
For all the foregoing reasons, the preliminary objection as regards the maintainability of this writ application is upheld. I hold that this writ application is not maintainable against the Reliance Industries Limited.
This writ application is disposed of with liberty to the legal heirs of the original writ applicant to approach any other forum for the redressal of their grievance if so advised. The time spent by the writ applicant in prosecuting the present proceeding shall be taken into consideration for the purpose of limitation in case the writ applicant choose any such remedy where the question of limitation would be relevant.
-
2016 (12) TMI 462 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Liability to pay the property tax - petitioners have purchased the shops in question in the Bank auction conducted by the Bank in exercise of powers of the Securitization Act and in public auction / auction notice - whether the petitioners can be held liable to pay the property tax on the aforesaid properties /shops for the period prior to they purchased the properties in Bank auction or not? - Held that:- The petitioners have purchased the shops in Bank auction conducted by the Bank under the provisions of the Securitization Act and Rules and prior to their purchase it was not brought to the notice of the petitioners – purchasers that there is any property tax due for the properties /shops and after their purchase, the same is recovered from the petitioners, the impugned action of respondent no.1 in recovering the property tax for the properties /shops for the period prior to the petitioners purchased the shops i.e. prior to 05/03/2014 cannot be sustained.
Present petition succeeds. The action of respondent no.1 in recovering the property tax for the aforesaid shops /properties, which the petitioners have purchased in bank auction for the period prior to 05/03/2014 is hereby quashed and set aside. Consequently, any amount recovered towards the property tax dues for the period prior to the petitioners purchased the properties /shops, the same may be refunded to the petitioners within a period of four weeks from today. However, it is observed that it will be open for respondent no.1-Corporation to recover the property tax dues for the period prior to 05/03/2014 from the erstwhile owner.
-
2016 (12) TMI 461 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Demand notice issued under section 13(2) of the SRFAESI Act - publication of the demand notice in the newspapers - whether the petitioner is at all entitled to be compensated or not having regard to the conduct of the second respondent? - Held that:- No record maintained by the respondents in relation to having “reasons to believe” that publication of the demand notice in the newspapers has become absolutely essential for making the borrower/guarantor aware of what is required of him/them. The ‘sine qua non’ is thus conspicuous by its absence. That apart, no answer could be given by Mr. Saha as to why the photograph of the second petitioner was published despite the admitted fact of he having received the demand notice. Evasion of notice by the said Sushil Kumar Paul, if at all, could not have given rise to any situation warranting publication of the photograph of the second petitioner. There cannot thus be any doubt that the second respondent has conducted himself in a manner not authorized by law by publishing the demand notice in the newspapers with the photograph of the second petitioner.
Interestingly, the second respondent had the photograph of the second petitioner published in the newspapers not at the stage of taking measures under section 13(4) of the Act but at a point of time when at the end of the PNB itself, the right to invoke measures under section 13(4) had not even crystalized.
Over and above all these, it appears that the second respondent did not also care to abide by the circular letter dated March 22, 2013 issued by another senior officer of the PNB. It would, therefore, appear that the second respondent has acted in breach of the circular letter dated March 22, 2013.
Considering the overall facts and circumstances, it appears to be crystal clear that the second respondent has grossly abused his authority.
This is not a fit and proper case for any compensation to be awarded by the court of writ to the petitioners. While declining compensation, liberty to approach the appropriate forum for recovery thereof in accordance with law is reserved.
As having regard to the findings recorded above that the second respondent grossly exceeded his authority in publishing the demand notice in the newspapers with, inter alia, the photograph of the second petitioner, this writ petition stands disposed of with the direction that the respondents shall publish an apology in the said newspapers (Ananda Bazar Patrika and The Times of India) expressing regret for having published the photograph of the second petitioner, within 30 days from date. The petitioners shall also be entitled to costs of proceedings assessed at ₹ 50,000/-, to be paid within the same period as aforesaid. Liberty of the PNB to recover the publication charges as well as costs of proceedings from the second respondent, in accordance with law, is also reserved.
-
2016 (12) TMI 420 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Admissibility of vakalatnama filed by a new advocate in the absence of ‘no objection’ of the advocate already on record - Held that:- On discharging the advocate, the party has the right to have the case file returned to him from the advocate, and any refusal by the advocate to return the file amounts to misconduct under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961. In any proceeding, including civil and criminal, a party has an absolute right to appoint a new Advocate. Under no circumstance, a party can be denied of his right to appoint a new advocate of his choice. Therefore, it follows that any rule or law imposing restriction on the said right can’t be construed as mandatory. Accordingly, Courts, Tribunals or other authorities shall not ask for ‘no objection’ of the advocate already on record, to accept the vakalatnama filed by a new advocate.
Under no circumstance, a party can be denied of his right to appoint a new advocate of his choice. The right is absolute and not conditional. Hence, the objection raised by the Registry on the vakalatnama is overruled. Hereafter, the Registry shall not ask for ‘no objection’ of the advocate already on record, to accept the vakalatnama filed by a new Advocate.
-
2016 (12) TMI 419 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Grant of electricity connection to the share holders of the company owning the property / joint owners - excess meters provided - Held that:- CESC Limited says in their affidavit that at the time of the installation of the meters there was no objection from any quarter. They have also said in paragraph 6 (a) of their affidavit that the premises is a big bungalow known as “Mody House”. The security guard and the care taker of the building told the CESC officials that the sixth and seventh respondents belonged to the Mody family. CESC also found them to reside in this house on the ground and first floors. In such a situation, I do not think that “wayleave” permission assumes any specific importance because members of the same family were found be CESC to occupy the property which seemed like a family property, and nobody came forward to object to the grant of electricity connection. In those circumstances, in my opinion, CESC Limited cannot be said to be in breach of their statutory duty.
Furthermore, the first petitioner is a family company and the private respondents are members of that family. It is very usual for family companies in India to hold its assets as in a partnership business. The courts have also consistently recognised that the principles of partnership may be applied to this kind of a family corporation. Not surprisingly the private respondents have asserted that they have almost a 50% stake in the company and thus a 50% share in the property. They feel they had rightly applied for electricity connection and obtained meters to service certain parts of the joint property. In my opinion, in this kind of a situation when electricity connection has already been given the court should not interfere with it in its writ jurisdiction.
It is much better if such a dispute is resolved in a civil forum like a Court, arbitration of the Company Law Board.
-
2016 (12) TMI 365 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Entitlment to sell the properties - auctioning the secured assets in exercise of powers under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act - Held that:- In the present case, as noted a clear remedy of Appeal is available under Section 17 of the Act. The dispute between the parties fall in the commercial realm where the dispute of such nature, namely commercial, are to be agitated, rule of alternative remedy has to be adhered to steadfast. As the alternative forum would be expert body equipped and competent to dealt with the factual aspects and investigate into the matters into the special realm. Therefore, it is trite that the petitioners are relegated to the alternative remedy.
Accordingly the petitioners cannot be allowed to invoke writ jurisdiction of this Court straightway. The petitioners are hereby relegated to approach the Tribunal to avail alternative remedy of Appeal. All the contentions which are raised in this petition may be raised in accordance with law while pursuing the alternative remedy. This Court has not gone into the merits of the case of the petitioners and this petition is not entertained on the aforesaid ground alone.
-
2016 (12) TMI 364 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Notice under SARFAESI Act challenged - Held that:- It is trite that the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would be loath to entertain the petition straightway when aggrieved person has got an alternative statutory remedy. The remedy before the Tribunal is not only statutory remedy available, it is efficacious remedy where the parties can lead evidence in support of their case. All the contentions which are sought to be raised in this petition by the petitioners could well be raised and agitated in the Appeal before the Tribunal. The matter in commercial realm. In such cases, rule of availment of alternative statutory remedy has to be adhered to steadfast.
This petition is not entertained and is hereby dismissed. It is clarified that this Court has not gone into the merits of the case of the petitioners. It will be open for the petitioners to raise all the contentions and prayers before the Tribunal in the Appeal which they may opt to prefer. Dismissed as above.
-
2016 (12) TMI 307 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Notices under the provisions of SERFAESI Act challenged - prayer to direct the respondent Bank to release working capital in favour of the petitioner No.2. - Held that:- In view of the remedy available, this Court is not inclined to entertain the petition for the sole reason that petitioners have alternative statutory remedy available of preferring Appeal under Section 15 of the SERFAESI Act, 2002 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. Section 17 of the Act, as amended by the Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of Debts Laws and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment) Act, 2016, entitles an aggrieved person to prefer Appeal.
It is trite that the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would be loath to entertain the petition straightway when aggrieved person has got an alternative statutory remedy. The remedy before the Tribunal is not only statutory remedy available, it is efficacious remedy where the parties can lead evidence in support of their case. All the contentions which are sought to be raised in this petition by the petitioners could well be raised and agitated in the Appeal before the Tribunal. The matter is under commercial realm. In such cases, rule of availment of alternative statutory remedy has to be adhered to steadfast.
........
|
