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Indian Laws - Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 22 Records
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1998 (12) TMI 640
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... ... ..... the final decision rendered by the High Court in the impugned judgment to the effect that the advertisement dated 10th May, 1977 has to be quashed when it sought to fill up the post of Professor in the Department of Ophthalmology by direct recruitment, has to be sustained. The final decision of the High Court is upheld by us entirely on a different reasoning centering round the consideration of the new alternative point No. 3, though the reasoning adopted by the High Court for coming to the said conclusion is not accepted by us while deciding point No. 1 as seen in earlier part of this judgment. It is, therefore, held that the impugned advertisement was unauthorised and illegal as it was in connection with roster point No. 16 which in substance was roster point No. 11 and was to be filled in only by a departmental promotee. Point No. 4 18. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed. However, on the facts and circumstance of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1998 (12) TMI 639
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... ... ..... ution of the said award decree would result in injustice to the respondent so as to persuade us not to interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution of India with the impugned order of remand. In the fact situation of this case, it must be held that there is no equity in favour of the respondent which would require us not to interfere with these proceedings when under law and also in equity the appellant decree holder is entitled to get the fruits of his award decree especially when despite the award granting installments and interest at 24 per cent per annum, the award decree grants interest only at 8% per annum from the date of the decree till realisation. 15. In the result, these appeals are allowed, the impugned judgment and order date 10.02.1998 of the Division Bench of the High Court are set aside and the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge of the High Court dated 23.12.1997 is confirmed. In the circumstances of the case. There would be no order as to costs.
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1998 (12) TMI 638
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... ... ..... unsel for the appellant do not relate to amendment of procedural law, as such those cases are not applicable and finally further, no doubt the learned Counsel for the appellant made reference to a Single Judge decision of this Court in the case of D.P. Divakar v Chairman and Personnel Managing Director, Kudremukh Iron and Ore Company Limited, is not on the point involved in this case, and further in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court referred above, it has to be taken that the law declared by the Supreme Court is also binding on him, and may be said to have the effect of rendering nugatory the decision of learned Single Judge of this Court referred to above even if it touches point herein involved. 31. Thus considered on both the grounds the appeal can be said to have got no merits, is liable to be dismissed and it is hereby dismissed with costs to respondent. Let the amount deposited be sent to Workmen's Compensation Commissioner for being paid to claimant.
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1998 (12) TMI 637
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... ... ..... ntion. 12. The result, therefore, is that the appeal is allowed; the judgment and decree of the court below are set aside; and a decree for the amount claimed in the plaint with interest at 6% per annum from the date of suit is granted in favour of the 1st plaintiff against the defendants, the liability of the 3rd defendant being restricted to that of the agent of the 2nd defendant. The appellants-plaintiffs are entitled to their costs both in this court and the trial court. 13. Carbon copy of this judgment may be granted to the parties to the appeal on usual terms if applied for in that behalf. 14. Immediately after the judgment was pronounced the counsel for the 2nd respondent made an oral submission for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 134-A (b) of the Constitution of India. This case does not involve any subtantial questions of law of general importance which, in our opinion, require to be settled by the Supreme Court. Hence leave prayed for is rejected.
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1998 (12) TMI 636
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... ... ..... rs under sub-section (6) of section 11 of the Act. Having regard to the nature of the dispute, I am of the opinion that a technical person will be a fit person to act as a sole arbitrator. The respondents have furnished a list of 10 persons, any one of them, in their opinion, can be appointed as arbitrator to decide the disputes and differences arising in this case. In that list, one of the person is Mr. M.C. Desai, retired Chief Engineer of the Gujarat State. Miss Munim, learned Counsel for the petitioners, has also no objection to the appointment of Mr. M.C. Desai as the sole arbitrator. 6. Accordingly, Mr. M.C. Desai, retired Chief Engineer, B-14, River Drive Society, Adajan Road, Surat-395 009 is appointed as the sole arbitrator to decide the disputes and differences between the parties in this case. 7. This arbitration petition stands disposed of accordingly. 8. The Prothonotary and Senior Master to communicate this order to the learned arbitrator. 9. Order accordingly.
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1998 (12) TMI 635
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... ... ..... vices useful to the community, namely, maintenance of water works, lighting or filling of water troughs for cattle. It also protects any land taken under management by a civil, revenue or criminal court as set out therein. There is a further safeguard ensuring that the income from such lands is appropriated for the purposes of a trust covered by Section 129(b). The explanation provides for the grant of a certificate by the collector after holding an inquiry, thus, the clear intention of Section 129 is to protect certain lands from tenancy legislation where the lands or income from such lands is being utilised for public purposes set out there. In this context, if the tenancy of such lands are not made heritable, this would clearly be in furtherance of the purpose of exempting such lands under Section 129. 17. We, therefore, allow these appeals and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court in each of the appeals. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
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1998 (12) TMI 630
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... ... ..... judgment are applied to the facts of this case, the irresistible conclusion is that the defendant has failed to raise any triable issue in this case, The defense taken by the defendant by no stretch of imagination can be said to be fair, bona fide or reasonable. The defense which the defendant has set up is totally frivolous, false, illusory or sham or practically a moonshine. 12. On consideration of the totality of the fact and circumstances, the defendant's application of leave of defendant is liable to be rejected. The transaction between the plaintiff and the defendant is purely a commercial transaction. The parties have evolved their own terms including the rate of interest and no inference by the court is warranted. Consequently, the plaintiff's suit is liable to be decreed alongwith the interest at the agreed rate of 22 per cent (as per agreement) from the date of filing of the suit until realisation. The plaintiff is also entitled to costs from the defendant.
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1998 (12) TMI 629
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... ... ..... sfer warrant is to be given effect to immediately, which is likely to happen as a result of my judgment in this case, then the prisoner would be transferred to the respective Courts without any further delay and in that event, his appeal before the Honourable Supreme Court of India would become infructuous. Therefore the learned senior counsel submitted that the prisoner transfer warrants concerned in the cases before me, shall be kept in abeyance till 4-1-1999 so as to enable the petitioner to move the Honourable Supreme of India and obtain appropriate orders. The learned Government Advocate opposed stating that any further delay is likely to hamper the investigation in the crimes registered outside the city of Chennai. Applying my mind, I do find some force in the submission made by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner. Accordingly I am inclined to direct the prisoner transfer warrants concerned in this order, be kept in abeyance till 4-1-1999. Petition dismissed.
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1998 (12) TMI 627
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... ... ..... presence could have been procured and they could have been produced before the Enquiry Officer to prove the charge framed against the appellant. He has acted so arbitrarily in the matter and has found the appellant guilty in such a coarse manner that it becomes apparent that he was merely carrying out the command from some superior officer who perhaps directed "fix him up". For the reasons stated above, the appeals are allowed. The judgment and order dated 28th February, 1997, passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, is set aside. The order dated 3rd of May, 1991, passed by Deputy Commissioner of Police by which the appellant was dismissed from service as also the order passed in appeal by Addl. Commissioner of Police are quashed and the respondents are directed to reinstate the appellant with all consequential benefits including all the arrears of pay up-to-date which shall be paid within three months from today. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1998 (12) TMI 624
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... ... ..... ions involving personal liberty "since such a case stands on a different footing altogether. o p /o p We have no doubt that the above rule of public policy, for the very same reasoning, should apply to special leave petitions filed under Art.136 of the Constitution also. o p /o p Even otherwise, the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court on 3.5.1998 does not warrant interference on merits as the learned judges of the High Court have taken into account all the relevant facts and came to the correct conclusion. o p /o p We also agree with the Division Bench of the High Court that the order dated 3.5.1996 does not require any clarification. In fact the attempt of the petitioner was to get the order reviewed. Since there was no error apparent on the face of the record the petitioner termed his petition as one for clarification. The Division Bench of the High Court has dismissed it rightly. o p /o p Accordingly we dismiss these Special Leave Petitions. o p /o p
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1998 (12) TMI 623
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... ... ..... the instance of a party which does not fulfil the requisite criteria itself and whose offer is higher than the offer which has been accepted, It is also obvious that by stopping the performance of the contract so awarded, there is a major detriment to the public because the construction of two thermal power units, each of 210 MWs., is held up on account of this dispute. Shortages of power have become notorious. They also seriously affect industrial development and the resulting job opportunities for a large number of people. In the present case there is no overwhelming public interest in stopping the project. There is no allegation whatsoever of any mala fides or collateral reasons for granting the contract to M/s. Raunaq International Ltd. In our view the High Court has seriously erred in granting the interim order. The appeals are, therefore, allowed and the impugned order is set aside. M/s IVR Construction Ltd. shall pay to the appellants herein the costs of the appeals.
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1998 (12) TMI 619
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... ... ..... ies where two views were possible and unless those findings were found to be patently bad and suffering from clear errors of law. As we have already discussed earlier while considering point nos. 1 and 3, the findings reached by the Labour Court on the relevant terms were patently erroneous and dehors the factual and legal position on record. The said patently illegal findings could not have been countenanced under Article 227 of the Constitution of Indian by the High court and the High Court would have failed to exercise its jurisdiction if it had not set aside such patently illegal findings of the Labour Court. Consequently, on this point the appellant has no case. Point No. 4 is, therefore, answered in negative against the appellant and in favour of the respondent. Point No. 5 In view of our conclusions on the aforesaid points, the inevitable result is that this appeal fails and is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no orders as to costs.
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1998 (12) TMI 618
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... ... ..... late court. The High Court erred in setting aside the concurrent findings of both courts. For the aforesaid reasons the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained. We accordingly set aside the same and restore the judgment of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The learned counsel for the respondent- tenant, however, submitted that some time may be granted to respondent to vacate the premises. We accordingly grant time up to 30th June, 1999 for the respondent to vacate the suit shop subject to the condition that the respondent files an undertaking in this Court within 2 weeks from today. If the said undertaking is not filed within the said period of 2 weeks or in the event the conditions mentioned in the said undertaking are committed breach of, the order granting time up to 30th June, 1999 shall stand recalled and the appellant will be entitled to execute the decree of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court.
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1998 (12) TMI 617
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... ... ..... atements and gave a clear finding of the appellant accepting a bribe and even recommended his termination. All these were done behind the back of the appellant. The Managing Director passed the termination order the very next day. It cannot in the above circumstances be stated, by any stretch of inspection that the report is a preliminary inquiry report. It's findings are definitive. It is not a preliminary report where some facts are gathered and a recommendation is made for a regular departmental inquiry. In view of the principles laid down in the cases referred to above, this case is an obvious case where the report and its findings are the foundation of the termination order and not merely the motive. The Tribunal was right in its conclusion. The High Court was in grave error in treating such a report as a preliminary report. For all the above reasons, we set aside the High Court's Judgment and restore the Tribunal's order. There will be no order as to costs.
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1998 (12) TMI 616
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... ... ..... g in the parent establishment, its Service Rules, including the Standing Orders, and would be in a better position, than an outsider, to assist the delinquent in the domestic proceedings for a fair and early disposal. The basic features of the Model Standing Orders are thus retained and the right of representation in the disciplinary proceedings through another employee is not altered, affected or taken away. The Standing Orders conform to all standards of reasonableness and fairness and, therefore, the Appellate Authority was fully justified in certifying the Draft Standing Orders as submitted by the Appellant. o p /o p The appeals are consequently allowed. The impugned judgment dated 28.6.1996, passed by the Bombay High Court, in so far as it relates to the Clauses in question which is the subject matter of these appeals, is set aside and the order passed by the Appellate Authority certifying the Draft Standing Orders is upheld. There will be no order as to costs. o p /o p
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1998 (12) TMI 615
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... ... ..... . A party may not be allowed to by-pass the normal channel of civil and criminal litigation. High Court does not act like a proverbial 'bull in china shop' in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226. We, therefore, hold that appellant is an authority controlled by the State Government and the service condition of the employees of the appellant particularly with regard to disciplinary proceedings against them are statutory in nature and thus writ petition was maintainable against the appellant. To this extent, we agree with the High Court. However, disciplinary proceedings were held against the respondents in accordance with law with due observance of the rules of natural justice. The judgment of the High Court is, therefore, not correct to that extent. The appeals are, therefore, allowed impugned judgment of the High Court holding that the dismissal of the respondents was not legal is set aside and the writ petitions filed by the respondents are dismissed.
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1998 (12) TMI 610
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... ... ..... As we have held above, at the instance of the landlord the suit was only maintainable if it was based on the inadequacy of the reasonable annual rent and for that purpose the necessary jurisdictional fact to be found was the date of the construction of the accommodation and if the court wrongly decided that fact and thereby conferred jurisdiction upon itself which it did not possess, it exercised jurisdiction not vested in it and the matter fell within the rule laid down by the Privy Council in Joy Chandlal Babu v. Kamalaksha Chaudhury (1949) L.R- 76 I.A. 131. The High Court had the power to interfere and once it had the power it could determine whether the question of the date of construction was rightly or wrongly decided. The High Court held that the Civil Judge had wrongly decided that the construction was of a date after June 30, 1946, and therefore fell within s. 3-A. In these circumstances the appeal must fail and is dismissed with costs throughout. Appeal dismissed.
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1998 (12) TMI 608
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... ... ..... e and the nature of offence allegedly committed by the employee. There being no material before the Review Committee, in as much as there were no adverse remarks in the character roll entries, the integrity was not doubted at any time, the character roll entries subsequent to the respondent’s promotion to the post of Asstt. Food Controller (Class II) were not available, it could not come to the conclusion that the respondent was a man of doubtful integrity nor could have anyone else come to the conclusion that the respondent was a fit person to be retired compulsorily from service. The order, in the circumstances of the case, was punitive having been passed for the collateral purpose of his immediate removal, rather than in public interest. The Division Bench, in our opinion, was justified in setting aside the order passed by the Single Judge and directing reinstatement of the respondent. We find no merit in this appeal which is dismissed without any order as to costs.
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1998 (12) TMI 607
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... ... ..... ly and there was no indifference lethargy or negligence in dealing with the same. The file was not unnecessarily held up at any level but moved from level to level promptly. We are, therefore, satisfied that the explanation tendered by the Deputy Secretary in this behalf is acceptable and does not detray any lack of sense or urgency in dealing with the representation. We, therefore, do not see any merit in the first contention." In the present case, however, there is no explanation forth coming as to why the representation could not be dealt with by the Minister concerned from 9.2.1998 to 14.2.1998. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the delay from 9.2.1998 to 14.2.1998 remains unexplained and such unexplained delay has vitiated further detention of the detenu. The corollary thereof is that further detention must necessarily be disallowed. We therefore allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment. We direct the appellant-detenu to be set at large forthwith.
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1998 (12) TMI 606
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... ... ..... e disability to the extent of 80%. Such District Medical Officer wherein the disabled ordinarily reside will constitute a Board with Specialist in Orthopaedic and one other Specialist whom he thinks suitable for the purpose and examine the person and would grant necessary certificate for that purpose. We are quite conscious of the financial position of the Indian Airlines but yet we are issuing the aforesaid direction keeping in view the broad objectives of the Act, as already narrated, and keeping in view the fact that concession is already being granted by the Airlines to the persons suffering from blindness. With these direction and observations the Writ Petition is disposed of. Before we conclude the matter we cannot but thank the petitioner who appeared in person and brought this matter to the notice of the Court which resulted in acceleration of the implementation of different provisions of the Act not only by the Union Government but also by the State Governments.
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