|
Advanced Search Options
Indian Laws - Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 271 Records
-
1998 (10) TMI 537 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... as a parent High Court. It does not exclude Judges who have occupied the office of a Judge or Chief Justice of that High Court on transfer. 6. "Strong cogent reasons" do not have to be recorded as justification for a departure from the order of seniority, in respect of each senior Judge who has been passed over. What has to be recorded is the positive reason for the recommendation. 7. The views of the Judges consulted should be in writing and should be conveyed to the Government of India by the Chief Justice of India along with his views to the extent set out in the body of this opinion. 8. The Chief Justice of India is obliged to comply with the norms and the requirement of the consultation process, as aforestated, in making his recommendations to the Government of India. 9. Recommendations made by the Chief Justice of India without complying with the norms and requirements of the consultation process, as aforestated, are not binding upon the Government of India.
-
1998 (10) TMI 536 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he matter, we are of the opinion that the first respondent be given some reasonable time to vacate the premises and which in this case wed consider will be a period upto 30th of June, 1999 subject to the filing of usual undertaking within four weeks from today. In the event such an undertaking is not filed before this Court, it would be open to the appellant to seek for immediate eviction in addition to the condition that he shall vacate the premises and deliver the same on or before 30th of June, 1999. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5040 OF 1998 ARISING OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 4557 OF 1998. In view of the decision rendered by us in Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 6836 of 1996, the view taken by the High Court has got to be upheld and this appeal deserves to be dismissed. However, the appellant is granted time to vacate the premises on or before 30th of June, 1999 upon his furnishing the usual undertaking in this Court within four weeks from today.
-
1998 (10) TMI 534 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s the death of the life assured has occurred before the expiry of three years from the date of the policy i.e. 31.3.1990. Even though we have construed the provisions of Clause 4-B as aforesaid but so far the amount of compensation payable to the respondent is concerned we find from the letter of the Corporation dated 2.2.1995 that the Claims Review Committee has examined the facts of the case and had decided to pay a sum of Rupees two lacs on ex-gratia basis and we see no reason why the respondent should not be entitled to receive the said amount together with the interest thereon. The said offer of the Corporation having been made on 2nd of February, 1995 and more than three and half year having been elapsed since then, we think that the Corporation-appellant should pay a total sum of three lacs to the respondent-claimant in full satisfaction of the claim of the respondent and this amount should be paid within eight weeks from today. This appeal is disposed of accordingly.
-
1998 (10) TMI 531 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... as dismissed on the ground that the relationship of landlord and tenant existed on the date of application and therefore, the proper course for the tenant was to make an application under Section 29 of the Tenancy Act. It is only after this finding by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal on 30.6.1961, the tenant on the very same day filed an application under Section 29(1) of the Act. The High Court, therefore, was right in holding that the tenant was prosecuting the proceedings under Section 84 of the Act bona fide and in good faith and consequently justified in condoning the delay in filing the application under Section 29 of the Act on 30.6.1961. The judgment of the High Court in our view, dies not suffer from any infirmity. It also needs to be stated that the Watandar Mahadeo Mohite who had suffered an aoverse order in the High Court did not leave petition or joining himself as an appellant in this appeal. In the result, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs.
-
1998 (10) TMI 530 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... aforesaid period for closing prosecution evidence. The above directions will be in addition to and without prejudice to the directions issued by this Court in "Common Cause" Vs. Union of India (1996)(4) SCC 33) as modified by the same bench through the order reported in "Common Cause" a registered Society Vs. Union of India (1996) (6) SCC 775). 17. In the result, we set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court and direct the Special Judge, C.B.I. South Bihar, Patna to pass appropriate orders in the case of the petitioner in pursuance of this judgment. The appeal is allowed accordingly. 18. We issue the following additional direction in so far as the State of Bihar is concerned - The State of Bihar shall constitute, within a period of three months from today, at least five Special Courts, to try the cases involving offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 or its corresponding previous Act with or without other offences allied to them.
-
1998 (10) TMI 529 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... t is unsustainable and it is set aside. The Writ Petition filed by respondents 3 and 4 is dismissed. The parties will bear their respective costs. 27. Before parting with the case, we wish to place on record our strong disapproval of the stand taken by the State Government in this appeal. In the High Court, Government stood by the seniority list and justified it. When the High Court allowed the writ petition, the Govt. ought to have filed an appeal in this Court particularly because the promotees were not made parties to the writ petition. Not only did the Govt. fail to do so but in this Court it actively supported the case of the writ petitioners. The conduct of the Govt. is highly reprehensible. It is only because of such attitude, the disputes between direct recruits on the one hand and promotees on the other became perennial. It is hightime the Govt. released that if the employees are made to live through endless litigations, administration cannot be carried on properly.
-
1998 (10) TMI 510 - SUPREME COURT
Cancellation of the Certificate of Registration/Renewal of trademark - Held that:- Appeal allowed. In view of the pendency of these proceedings in the High Court and specially in view of Section 107 of the Act, the Registrar could not legally issue any suo motu notice to the appellant under Section 56(4) of the Act for cancellation of the Certificate of Registration/Renewal already granted. The appeal is consequently allowed and the show-cause notice issued by the Deputy Registrar (respondent No.2) on 26th of Sept. 1997 under Section 56(4) of the Act is hereby quashed.
-
1998 (10) TMI 129 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Precedent - Appellate Tribunal - Powers of ... ... ... ... ..... ve no hesitation to say that the Judicial Officer erred in passing inconsistent orders. In other words, he erred in consistency. In order to uphold the consistency, in judicial judgments, for that reason alone, I declare that petitioner is also entitled to similar treatment as was done to the applicant in the case of Ext. P6 judgment. Hence in exercise of the extra-ordinary jurisdiction conferred on me under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India I direct the Regional Transport Authority, Ernakulam, to treat both the applicants alike and issue four months rsquo temporary permit. 5. emsp I make it clear that this order is passed without prejudice to the right of third parties, if any. This Court is not expressing any opinion on merits. It is only for the reason that two inconsistent orders have been passed on the same day on the same fact situation, I directed the Regional Transport Authority, Ernakulam to grant four month rsquo s temporary permit to the petitioner.
-
1998 (9) TMI 697 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... professional money lender. I am fortified in this view by the judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Mrs. K. Sundersanam v. S. Venkatarao, MANU/AP/0186/1963 AIR1963AP442 . In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that the plaintiff had adopted money lending business as a profession. In my view, the lower Appellate Court has rightly held that the plaintiff not being a money lender was not required to comply with the mandatory provisions of the Bombay Money Lenders Act. No fault can be found with the said findings recorded by the lower Appellate Court. I, therefore, find no substance in the aforesaid submissions made by the learned Counsel for the appellant. 5. No other point was urged before me. 6. In this view of the matter, there is no reason to interfere with the judgment and decree passed by both the courts below. 7. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 8. Appeal dismissed.
-
1998 (9) TMI 696 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ing the situation so that the High Court can in its inherent powers or revisional powers direct the committing Magistrate to rectify the committal order by issuing process to such left out accused. But we hasten to add that the said procedure need be resorted to only for rectifying or correcting such grave mistakes. For the foregoing reasons we find it difficult to support the observations in Kishun Singh s case that powers of the Session Court under Section 193 of the Code to take cognizance of the offence would include the summoning of the person or persons whose complicity in the commission of the trial can prima facie be gathered from the materials available on record. In the result we set aside the impugned order of the Session Court adding the appellant as an accused in the case. However, we make it clear that we do so without prejudice to the powers of Session Court to add any person in the array of the accused under Section 319 of the Code. The appeal is thus allowed.
-
1998 (9) TMI 694 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ges were also found live by him. 5. It was lastly contended by the learned counsel that the accused had raised a specific defence in this case and therefore the evidence of defence witnesses should have been accepted. The defence was that the appellant was taken into custody by the police 15 days before the date of incident and that the complaint in that behalf was made to the Panchayat which had passed a Resolution protesting against the detention of the appellant. This defence was considered by the Designated Court and was found not acceptable. There was no reason for the police to falsely involve the appellant. Moreover, the Designated Court has pointed out that no complaint was made to the police authorities by the Panchayat regarding alleged unlawful detention of the appellant. In our opinion the Designated Court was justified in not accepting the defence raised by the appellant. 6. As we find no substance in any of the contentions raised in this appeal, it is dismissed.
-
1998 (9) TMI 693 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... r specific performance without trial. 28. In conclusion, we opine to say that it shall not be proper to extend this wide power to grant of injunction where the case admits a disputed term of contract, which fact requires to be established at the trial. 29. Any opinion expressed in this order or in the order impugned is only for the purpose of disposal of the application for injunction and it shall in no way influence while deciding the issued involved in the suit at the trial. The trial Court to decide all questions uninfluenced by these findings, as they are only tentative and based on pleadings and having no evidence regarding the context and circumstances in which those documents relied on were emanated between the parties. 30. In the result, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs in this proceeding. In view of the order passed on this appeal, the C.M.P. No. 9036 of 1998 does not survive for consideration and the same is also dismissed.
-
1998 (9) TMI 689 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... enrolment. This statement has remained unrebutted and has also gone unchallenged in the cross-examination. Even the complainant in his evidence did not depose that the appellant carried on with his taxi business after his enrolment as an advocate. 10. In the face of this material on the record, it is not possible to say that the complainant has established that after the enrolment of the appellant as an Advocate, he was personally engaged in taxi business. The evidence on the record is vague, indefinite and scanty. It does not establish the charge of misconduct against the appellant. The disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India, thus, fell in error in holding the appellant guilty of professional misconduct. The charge against the appellant has not been established at all, let alone being established beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, we allow this appeal and set aside the order of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India dated 11-4-1998. No costs.
-
1998 (9) TMI 688 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... o its being maintained as such and not to be treated as just any other public place for being hired at convenience by anyone. The justification sought here that the State would be richer by two lacs of rupees as rental for the day does not convince us a wee bit. That understanding is totally alien to the purpose for which Stadia are built and most of all the present one. 9. Thus, for the afore-reasoning and under standing, we permit just this once, and not ever hereafter, partial use of the Stadium for holding the function confining the user only to the space occupied by the lower and upper galleries, totally isolating the area within the fence above described saving the turfs-natural as well as synthetic. To this extent, the impugned orders of the High Court as also the terms and conditions on which permission has been granted would stand modified. The order of this Court would rule over other orders. 10. The appeal is allowed in this manner and to he extent afore-indicated.
-
1998 (9) TMI 687 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... learned single Judge that it is not a situation warranting interference of this Court for issuance of any writ. Incidentally, be it recorded that this Court has not been informed, during the course of hearing, of any time limit for declaration of a new comprehensive policy in the near future, as such we need not detain ourselves in that perspective. 15. In the premises, the order of the learned single Judge thus cannot be sustained and is therefore set aside and quashed. 16. The appeal is allowed accordingly. No order as to costs. 17. After this order has been pronounced in open Court, it has been brought to our notice that there are pending applications with the Government even before the issuance of the Memorandum. On the wake of fresh factual score being brought to our notice at this juncture and to avoid farther litigation we deem it fit and expedient to direct the respondents to dispose off all the pending applications within a period of eight weeks from the date hereof.
-
1998 (9) TMI 686 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... rced to accept equivalence of certain qualifications and to accept such equivalence for all times to come. 33. In the result, we conclude that there is no force in the contention of the petitioners that the amended qualifications shall not apply to them because they had acquired the equivalent qualifications prior to the amendment of the rules. In, our opinion, the amended rule and the qualifications will apply even to the candidates who have obtained the equivalent qualifications prior to the date of enforcement of amended rule. However, the amended qualifications shall not be applicable to the vacancies which had occurred prior to the date of enforcement of the amended rule and such vacancies shall be filled in in accordance with the qualifications prescribed as on the date of occurrence of vacancies. We, therefore, answer the reference accordingly. The petitions shall now be listed before appropriate Bench for decision in accordance with law in the light of this decision.
-
1998 (9) TMI 685 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ach State to do so as early as possible. (4) Until the State Government takes any decision on such recommendations every prisoner must be paid wages for the work done by him at such rates or revised rates as the Government concerned fixes in the light of the observations made above. For this purpose we direct all the State Government of fix the rate of such interim wages within six weeks from today and report to this Court of compliance of this direction. (5) We recommend to the State concerned to make law for setting apart a portion of the wages earned by the prisoners to be paid as compensation to deserving victims of the offence the commission of which entailed the sentence of imprisonment to the prisoner, either directly or through a common fund to be created for this purpose or in any other feasible mode. The appeals and the writ petitions are disposed of in the above terms. registry will despatch a copy of this judgment to the Chief Secretary to every State Government.
-
1998 (9) TMI 684 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... lusion that the defence is highly improper or fantastic, it can put the defendant upon term before granting leave to defend. 40. Therefore, in the above situation, we feel that the trial Court has rightly and justifiably imposed a conditional direction to the defendant to put in ₹ 5,00,000/- as Bank Guarantee as a condition precedant for grant of leave to defend. Therefore, we are not in favour of granting any interim stay till the disposal of the appeal. Since there are divergent opinion on the points as regards appealability of the conditional order directing the defendant to furnish security and on fulfilling that condition the leave could be granted whether or not would come within the expression 'Judgment' therefore, it is desirable that the matter shall be placed before a larger Bench to resolve the dispute once and for all. Therefore, the Hon'ble Chief Justice is requested to constitute a larger Bench for deciding the above appeal. 41. Appeal allowed
-
1998 (9) TMI 681 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nsurance amount should be accepted and the other set, which interpreted to deduct, is to be rejected. For all these consideration we have no hesitation to hold that such High Courts were wrong in deducting the amount paid or payable under the life insurance by giving restricted meaning to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act basing mostly on the language of English statutes and not taking into consideration the changed language and intends of the legislature under various provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1 "39. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned judgment dated 9th September, 1985 and restore the judgment of the tribunal dated 29 September, 1980 and hold that the amount received by the claimant on the life insurance of the deceased is not deductible from the compensation computed under the Motor Vehicles Act. The concerned respondent shall make the payment accordingly, if not already paid in terms thereof. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. Cost on parties.
-
1998 (9) TMI 679 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the slight distinction is not material for us in this case. Vide, a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Ottapiurakkal Thazath Suppi & ors. vs. Alabi Mashur Koyanna Koya Kunhi Koya (AIR 1917 Madras 448) a Single Judge of the Patna High Court in Nawal Kishore Singh & ors. vs. Rajendra Prasad Singh & Ors. (AIR 1976 Patna 56) which was subsequently approved by a Division Bench of the same High Court. Kapildeo Upadhyay vs. Raghunath Pandey AIR 1978 Patna 212 . We, therefore, disagree with the interpretation placed by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order regarding the scope of Rule 2A of Order 39 of the Code. However, we are in agreement with him that in view of the subsequent actions done by the respondent (by removing the obstruction and tendering unconditional apology to the court) it is not necessary to put the respondent in prison. We, therefore, dismiss this special leave petition subject to the clarification made above regarding the legal position.
........
|
