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Indian Laws - Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 68 Records
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2013 (10) TMI 1484 - KERLA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... (d) Right of appeal under the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C. is available in all cases where the judgments are rendered after 31-12-2009. (e) In case of acquittal in a private complaint by the Sessions Court, if the complainant is also the victim, he has a statutory right of appeal as per proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C. and the stipulation in Section 378(4) Cr.P.C. to obtain special leave may not apply in such a case. Hence, it is held that in all cases where the judgment is rendered after 31-12-2009, appeal lies to the court made mention of under the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C. The Registry will return the records to the respective parties to enable them to prefer appeals before the appropriate forum. If they so choose to file appeals within a month from the date of this order before the competent forum, the time during which the matter was pending before this Court will be taken note of in applying Section 14 of the Limitation Act. These matters are disposed of as above.
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2013 (10) TMI 1479 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT (NAGPUR BENCH)
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... ... ..... ni, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of Kakumanu Pedasubhayya and another vrs. Kakumanu Akkammaa and another, reported in AIR 1958 SC 1042, specially paragraph 14 therein, to urge that a right of the minor is involved and the proposed amendment directly reflects upon the right of the minor. He, therefore, submits that the amendment needs to be allowed on that count. It is not in dispute that it was a joint written statement filed by the defendant nos. 1 to 5. The plea raised by way of amendment could have been raised when the written statement was filed. Apart from this, no such case is made out in the application for amendment of the written statement. Hence, under the garb of protecting rights of a minor, the circuitous way cannot be adopted, to get the amendment allowed at the instance of the defendants. In the result, no interference is called for in the order impugned. The writ petition is dismissed.
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2013 (10) TMI 1478 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... are disposed of with the following directions - (i) the copies of office notings recorded in the file of UPSC as well as the copies of the correspondence exchanged between UPSC and the Department by which its advice was sought, to the extent it was sought, shall be provided to the respondent after removing from the notings and correspondence, (a) the date of the noting and the letter, as the case may be; (b) the name and designation of the person recording the noting and writing the letter and; (c) any other indication in the noting and/or correspondence which may reveal or tend to reveal the identity of author of the noting/letter, as the case may be; (ii) if the notings and/or correspondence referred in (i) above contains personal information relating to a third party, such information will be excluded while providing the information sought by the respondent; (iii) the information in terms of this order shall be provided within four weeks from today. No order as to costs.
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2013 (10) TMI 1476 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ers from this Court within three weeks from today. b) Till the respondent furnishes bank guarantee of the amount as directed, all the assets which are hypothecated in favour of the petitioner by the respondent shall be continued to be charged in favour of the petitioner. Respondent shall not create any further encumbrances in respect of the immovable properties of the respondent and other assets including the shares and current assets. c) Respondent is restrained from finalizing and/or implementing in any manner Corporate Debt Restructuring Scheme in terms of prayer clause (k) of the petition. (d) In the event of the respondent furnishing bank guarantee as directed, liberty is granted to the respondent to apply for modification of this order. In case of the respondent failing to comply with the direction aforesaid, petitioner would be at liberty to apply for further interim measures. (e) Both the petitions are accordingly disposed of in aforesaid terms. No order as to costs.
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2013 (10) TMI 1471 - SUPREME COURT
Misuse of power - Police officers - "At best acts of omission towards official duty" - Unwarranted search - Invading the privacy of the complainant - Insult and Humiliation - Forcible medical examination - Undressing and dragging to police station - unsubstantiated by any lawful justification - "Test of direct and reasonable connection between the official duty of the accused & acts allegedly committed by them" - HELD THAT:- The alleged acts of the respondent cannot, therefore, be said to in discharge of his official duties or in the purported discharge of such duties. Public functionaries cannot under the cloak of purported discharge of official duties resort to harassment and humiliation of the citizens on the pretext of a complaint having been received by them, especially when the same does not disclose the commission of any offence triable by the Executive Magistrate or cognizable by the police; nor was there any other proceeding in connection with which such conduct could be justified in law. The plea of the respondent that the prosecution was barred under Section 197 Cr.P.C. has, therefore, to be rejected.
The decision in this case GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING VERSUS CBI & ANR. [2012 (5) TMI 612 - SUPREME COURT] followed.
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2013 (10) TMI 1467 - SUPREME COURT
100% EOU - Review of earlier order - Non-issuance of SCN - Doctrine of Audi Alteram Partem -fundamental right under article 14 - HELD THAT:- no order could be passed against a person without issuing a show cause notice to him/it. Thus, the order passed by the Development Commissioner is in contravention to the principles of natural justice., therefore cannot be sustained.
Matter restored back.
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2013 (10) TMI 1466 - SUPREME COURT
Revision petition - Challenged the compulsory retirement - Mercy petition - Departmental inquiry - disciplinary proceedings -
HELD THAT:- Once, we find that the revision or second representation to the higher authority was made within prescribed period (in fact within few days of the rejection of representation by the IGP) and such a representation to the higher authority was permissible, it cannot be said in this case that the order of the DGP, Haryana was without jurisdiction i.e. on a representation “which was not permissible” in law. Once, we find this to be the factual position, we are constrained to hold that three years thereafter, the case could not be re-opened and order dated 25.2003 could be interdicted by the successor.
As a result, this appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court is set aside. Result would be to allow the writ petition filed by the appellant before the High Court and quash the orders dated 25.10.2006 passed by the DGP, Haryana.
Since, we have allowed C.A. No. 396 of 2008, the effect thereof is that adverse remarks for the period in question no longer remain in the service record of the appellant and for this period his rating now is “good” to which he was upgraded vide orders dated 2.5.2003. In so far as award of “warning” is concerned, leaned Counsel for the State could not dispute that “warning” is not a punishment prescribed under the Rules. It was not given to him after holding any inquiry. Therefore, such a warning recorded administratively in a service record cannot be the sole basis of compulsory retirement.
The appellant's writ petition has been dismissed by the High Court vide orders dated 26.12.2011. We, thus allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court. As a consequence, the appellant shall be reinstated in service in the same position on which he was working as on the date of compulsorily retirement with consequential benefits in case he has not already attained the age of superannuation. However, if he has already attained the age of superannuation, he shall be treated as deemed to be in service throughout as if no compulsory retirement orders were passed and will be given consequential benefits including pay for the intervening period and pensionary benefits on that basis.
Mercy petition - In the scheme of things, as provided, it is clear that Rule 16.28 is different from Rule 16.32. While Rule 16.28 deals with Review, Rule 16.32 deals with Revision which is permissible under certain specified circumstances, after the appeal is rejected. It is this provision in Rule 16.32 which talks of Revision on certain grounds namely (a) material irregularity in the proceedings or (b) on provision of fresh evidence.
In the present case, we also find that the mercy petition was not filed within one month. Further, it was not filed on the ground of material irregularity in the proceedings or by producing any fresh evidence. On the contrary, as pointed out above, the DGP while allowing the mercy petition specifically recorded that there was no irregularity in the conduct of departmental proceedings. In spite thereof, he cancelled the order of penalty without giving any cogent reasons. Such a order was palpably illegal and was rightly set right departmentally. We thus do not find any merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
Thus, we are of the view that the order allowing the mercy petition without reason was clearly untenable and was rightly recalled. We thus, do not find any merit in this appeal either which is accordingly dismissed.
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2013 (10) TMI 1465 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ch that the goods cannot be supplied by the appellant/defendant no.1 concern, it takes help from its sister concerns to make up the deficiency and in this way the goods are supplied. 30. In my view, the said explanation does not meet the argument of the counsel for the respondent/plaintiff. The sole witness of the appellants/defendants in the same breath had also admitted that the debit notes on the basis of which the payments admittedly due to the respondent/plaintiff were sought to be avoided had no concern with the transactions between the respondent/plaintiff and the appellant/defendant no.1. It was for the appellants/defendants to plead and prove the constitution of the other concerns and an agreement with the respondent/plaintiff of adjustments of dues of one concern against the dues of the other. Neither any such plea has been taken nor any such evidence led. 31. No other argument has been raised. 32. There is thus no merit in the appeal which is dismissed with costs.
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2013 (10) TMI 1462 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the part of the Commission to impose penalty on the Board. However, we may hasten to add that under the 2003 Act constitution of the State Commission is governed by Section 82. Section 86 deals with the function of the State Commission. On a reading of Section 86 we find that at present no notification is required to be issued to confer any power on the State Commission. It is conferred and controlled by the statute. If anything else is required to be done in praesenti, the Commission is at liberty to proceed under the provisions of the 2003 Act. Be it clarified, our grant of liberty may not be understood to have said that the Commission can take any action arising out of its earlier order dated 29.10.2001 or any subsequent orders passed thereon. We have said so, for the Commission and a statutory Board can really work to achieve the objects and purposes of the 2003 Act. 35. The appeals stand disposed of in the above terms leaving the parties to bear their respective costs.
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2013 (10) TMI 1430 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the workmen will be entitled to 25 backwages over and above the last drawn wages that they have received under Section 17B of I.D. Act. The backwages shall be calculated until the date as mentioned in clause (iii) above. (v) All the workmen will be entitled to the same retirement benefits, if any (depending on their eligibility), as given to the other group of 10 workmen viz. Pandurang Vishnu Sandage and others. (vi) All the aforesaid payments shall be made directly to the workmen concerned or their heirs, as the case maybe, within three months from the date of this judgment. (vii) There shall not be any order of reinstatement. (viii) The appellants will, thereafter, file a compliance report in the Labour Court at Sangli, with a copy thereof to the Registry of this Court. (ix) Order accordingly. (x) Registry to send a copy of this judgment to the Labour Court, Sangli. 30. Both the appeals and all the I.As. moved therein stand disposed off as above, with no order as to costs.
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2013 (10) TMI 1429 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Seeking to withdraw the Lookout Circular (L.O.C) issued - Offence punishable u/s 304(ii) IPC - 'EVP Theme Park' - mishap occurred while having ride in the Octopus - HELD THAT:- L.O.C. containing full particulars of the person is being sent throughout the world. Even to Interpol also. It is being sent using software techniques. Its effect is that the person against whom L.O.C. has been issued, if lands in an Indian Airport, he will be apprehended. There will be difficulty for him to land in a foreign country also as he will not allowed to enter the country from the Airport.
Petitioners are facing criminal prosecutions. They are granted bail/anticipatory bail. They are holders of valid Indian Passports. They have strong roots in the society. They are business people. They need to travel abroad often. So far there is no valid restriction on their movement by any Court order or Ministry of Home Affairs or External Affairs. They are not stated be involved in any heinous crimes. They are not terrorists. Nor anti-social elements. There is no allegation that they have absconded. Thus, they cannot be brought under any one of the categories with respect to whom L.O.C. orders are being issued .
In the facts and circumstances of this case and due to the subsequent developments, so far as the petitioners are concerned, L.O.C. orders becomes irrelevant.
Thus, the 1st respondent, namely, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Ambattur Range, Chennai is directed to withdraw the Look Out Circular order issued as against the petitioners.
Accordingly, this criminal Original Petition is disposed of.
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2013 (10) TMI 1428 - SUPREME COURT
Private complaint under Section 200 of Cr.P.C - Investigation u/s 156(3) CrPC by the Deputy Superintendent of Police - Non-production of a valid sanction order u/ 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - HELD THAT:- the law on the issue of sanction can be summarized to the effect that the question of sanction is of paramount importance for protecting a public servant who has acted in good faith while performing his duty. In order that the public servant may not be unnecessarily harassed on a complaint of an unscrupulous person, it is obligatory on the part of the executive authority to protect him. If the law requires sanction, and the court proceeds against a public servant without sanction, the public servant has a right to raise the issue of jurisdiction as the entire action may be rendered void ab-initio.
Decision in the case of Subramanium Swamy v. Manmohan Singh and another[2012 (2) TMI 140 SUPREME COURT] and STATE OF U.P. VERSUS PARAS NATH SINGH [2009 (5) TMI 973 - SUPREME COURT] followed.
In the result the principles laid down by the Court in the above referred judgments apply to the facts of the present case. Therefore, no error was found in the order passed by the High Court. The appeals lack merit and are accordingly dismissed.
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2013 (10) TMI 1427 - SUPREME COURT
Inherent Jurisdiction of High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint u/s-482 CrPC - Criminal court's power for compounding the offences u/s 320 of CrPC is distinct & different - No power of quashing heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity - Commitment of offences w.r.t. Banking activities & offences under Sections 420/471 IPC - Harmful effect on the public - Threatens well being of society - HELD THAT:- when the specific allegation is made against the respondent-accused that he obtained the loan on the basis of forged document with the help of Bank officials, yet on investigation it was found that the ingredients of cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property of the bank (Section 420 IPC) and dishonestly using as genuine a forged document (Section 471 IPC), charge sheet was required to be submitted under Sections 420/471 IPC against the accused persons.
Offences w.r.t. Banking activities - HELD THAT:- The debt which was due to the Bank was recovered by the Bank with an order passed by Debts Recovery Tribunal. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is a compromise between the offender and the victim. The offences when committed in relation with Banking activities including offences under Sections 420/471 IPC have harmful effect on the public and threaten the well being of the society. These offences fall under the category of offences involving moral turpitude committed by public servants while working in that capacity. Further it may be claimed that the bank is the victim in such cases but, actually, the society including Bank's customers are infirm. There was neither an allegation regarding any abuse of process of any Court nor anything on record to suggest that the offenders were entitled to secure the order in the ends of justice.
Decision in the case of GIAN SINGH VERSUS STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANR [2010 (11) TMI 1058 - SUPREME COURT] was followed.
In the instant case, the High Court did not consider the above factors while passing the impugned order. Hence, Supreme Court was of opinion that the High Court has erred in addressing the issue in right perspective.
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2013 (10) TMI 1413 - SUPREME COURT
Public servant Prosecution for an offence under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act - Held that:- It is an admitted position that in none of the judgments relied on by the appellant, this Court had considered any provision similar to Section 87 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act and, therefore, those judgments cannot be read to mean that a Municipal Councillor in no circumstance can be deemed to be a public servant. Mr. Adhiyaru points out that provisions pari materia to that of Section 87 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act did exist in the respective enactments under consideration in these cases and, therefore, it has to be assumed that this Court, while holding that Municipal Councillors are not public servant, must have taken note of the similar provision. However, in fairness to him, he concedes that such a provision, in fact, has not been considered in these judgments. We are of the opinion that for ascertaining the binding nature of a judgment, what needs to be seen is the ratio. The ratio of those cases is that Municipal Councillors are not public servants under Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. But Section 87 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, as discussed above, make Councillor and member of Board a public servant within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. Hence, all the judgments of this Court referred to above are clearly distinguishable.
Not only this, in the case in hand, we are concerned with the meaning of the expression ‘public servant’ as defined under Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and, hence, decisions rendered by this Court while interpreting Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code, which in substance and content are substantially different than Section 2(c) aforesaid, shall have no bearing at all for decision in the present case.
As the trial is pending since long, we deem it expedient that the learned Judge in seisin of the trial makes an endeavour to dispose of the trial expeditiously and in no case later than six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
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2013 (10) TMI 1409 - SUPREME COURT
Presumption of marriage results into claiming of maintenance under Section 125,Cr.P.C. - Wider Interpretation of the term “wife” - HELD THAT:- if man and woman have been living together for a long time even without a valid marriage, then term of valid marriage entitling such a woman to maintenance should be drawn and a woman should be entitled to maintain application under Section 125,Cr.P.C. On the other hand, in the present case, it was proved, by cogent and strong evidence, that they had been married to each other.
Where a woman married a man with full knowledge of the first subsisting marriage then she must be aware that second marriage with such a person is impermissible and there is an embargo under the Hindu Marriage Act and therefore she has to suffer the consequences thereof. But, it would not apply to those cases where a man marries second time by keeping that lady in dark about the first surviving marriage.
Court gave a purposive interpretation of Section 125,Cr.P.C by considering the application of destitute wife or hapless children or parents, the Court is dealing with the marginalized sections of the society. The purpose is to achieve “social justice”, enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution of India. Preamble to the Constitution of India states that India has chosen the democratic path under rule of law to achieve the goal of securing for all its citizens, justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. It specifically highlights achieving their social justice.
The decision of Capt.Ramesh Chander Kaushal vs. Veena Kaushal (1978) 4 SCC 70
For this reason, Court was not inclined to grant leave and dismiss this petition
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2013 (10) TMI 1400 - SUPREME COURT
No proper regulatory regime - For monitoring harmful effects of soft drinks on human health, particularly children - Mandatory disclosures on the labels of soft drinks - Disclosure of warnings with particular ingredient, and its harmful effects - Proper mechanism to check & control “Food Additives” - Check and control the misleading advertising - HELD THAT:- Food and Safety Standards Authority of India, to gear up their resources with their counterparts in all the States and Union Territories and conduct periodical inspections and monitoring of major fruits and vegetable markets to ascertain whether they conform to such standards set by the Act and the Rules. Penal provisions are also provided in the Act. It is, therefore important that the provisions are properly and effectively implemented so that the State can achieve an appropriate level of human life and health, safeguarding the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
The Writ Petition is disposed of with the above directions to strictly follow the provisions of the FSS Act as well as the Rules and Regulations framed thereunder.
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2013 (10) TMI 1394 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... parties concerned. 5) Even in the 2nd batch of cases arising out of Writ Petition No. 975 of 2004 whereby the High Court has struck down the 4th and 5th amendment to the Rules, the State shall be free to make recoveries in terms of the 3rd amendment in regard to the forest produce removed from within the State of U.P. The operation of the orders passed by the High Court shall to that extent remain stayed. 6) This modification shall not apply to exempted goods or industrial by products like Klinker and fly ash. List SLP(C) No. 19445 of 2004, SLP(C) No. 24889 of 2004, SLP(C) No. 23547 of 2005, SLP(C) No. 24106 of 2007,SLP(C) No. 21868 of 2010,SLP(C) No. 22363 of 2010, SLP(C) No. 12318 of 2009,SLP(C) No. 12530 of 2009,SLP(C) No. 21930 of 2009,SLP(C) No. 26825 of 2011,SLP(C) No. 18094 of 2011,Civil Appeal No. 1007 of 2011,Civil Appeal No. 2047 of 2006, SLP(C) No. 2294 of 2008,SLP(C) No. 11846 of 2009 and SLP(C) No. 33180 of 2010 (relating to State of Uttarakhand) on 12.11.2013.
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2013 (10) TMI 1385 - SUPREME COURT
Interpretation of Section 33 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 - whether the reservation provided for the disabled persons under Section 33 of the Act is dependent upon the identification of posts as stipulated by Section 32 - Held that:- the computation of reservation for persons with disabilities has to be computed in case of Group A, B, C and D posts in an identical manner viz., “computing 3% reservation on total number of vacancies in the cadre strength” which is the intention of the legislature. Accordingly, certain clauses in the OM dated 29.12.2005, which are contrary to the above reasoning are struck down and we direct the appropriate Government to issue new Office Memorandum(s) in consistent with the decision rendered by this Court.
(i) We hereby direct the appellant herein to issue an appropriate order modifying the OM dated 29.12.2005 and the subsequent OMs consistent with this Court’s Order within three months from the date of passing of this judgment.
(ii) We hereby direct the “appropriate Government” to compute the number of vacancies available in all the “establishments” and further identify the posts for disabled persons within a period of three months from today and implement the same without default.
(iii) The appellant herein shall issue instructions to all the departments/public sector undertakings/Government companies declaring that the non observance of the scheme of reservation for persons with disabilities should be considered as an act of non-obedience and Nodal Officer in department/public sector undertakings/Government companies, responsible for the proper strict implementation of reservation for person with disabilities, be departmentally proceeded against for the default.
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2013 (10) TMI 1377 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... debtors to pay this amount which was to be paid by 11.11.92. However, before that the judgment debtor filed another revision petition. This revision petition is decided by the impugned order passed on 8.6.2004. No doubt, the amount calculated is found to be correct but the High Court chose to give one opportunity to the judgment debtor to deposit the amount as upto that stage the controversy regarding actual payment had not been settled. 8. In these circumstances, exercise of discretion in the aforesaid manner cannot be found to be erroneous and contrary to law which warrants interference of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Further, we do not find any substantial question of law. It is also to be kept in mind that immediately after the impugned order of the High Court the judgment debtors had deposited the amount. There should not be made to lose the property, in the aforesaid circumstances. 9. We thus, dismiss the Special Leave Petition in limine.
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2013 (10) TMI 1347 - SUPREME COURT
Disciplinary proceedings against the errant employee - The respondent offered his unconditional apology for consumption of alcohol and requested the Disciplinary Authority to take a sympathetic view of the matter and pardon him. - Held that:- When the punishment is found to be outrageously disproportionate to the nature of charge, principle of proportionality comes into play. It is, however, to be borne in mind that this principle would be attracted, which is in tune with doctrine of Wednesbury Rule of reasonableness, only when in the facts and circumstances of the case, penalty imposed is so disproportionate to the nature of charge that it shocks the conscience of the Court and the Court is forced to believe that it is totally unreasonable and arbitrary.
The High Court has totally downplayed the seriousness of misconduct. It was a case where the - respondent employee had gone to the place of work in a fully drunken state. Going to the place of work under the influence of alcohol during working hours (it was 11.30 a.m.) would itself be a serious act of misconduct. What compounds the gravity of delinquency is that the place of work is not any commercial establishment but a school i.e. temple of learning. The High Court has glossed over and trivialized the aforesaid aspect by simply stating that the respondent was not a “habitual drunkard” and it is not the case of the management that he used to come to the school in a drunken state “regularly or quite often”.
Entering the school premises in working hours i.e. 11.30 a.m. in an inebriated condition and thereafter forcibly entering into the Principal’s room would constitute a serious misconduct. Penalty of removal for such a misconduct cannot be treated as disproportionate. It does not seem to be unreasonable and does not shock the conscience of the Court. Though it does not appear to be excessive either, but even if it were to be so, merely because the Court feels that penalty should have been lighter than the one imposed, by itself is not a ground to interfere with the discretion of the disciplinary authorities. - Decided against the employee.
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