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Indian Laws - Case Laws
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2016 (11) TMI 1461 - SUPREME COURT
Contempt Petition - invalidating the registration - Held that:- In the present case the Company and its Directors/servants were certainly guilty of transgressing or violating the Order of 08.05.2014 but as found hereinabove, the transferee and its Directors/servants have not violated the Order of 08.05.2014. The transferee and its Directors/servants were neither parties to the proceedings nor were they served with the Order of 08.05.2014. In para 38 of the judgment of this Court dated 13.11.2014, this Court had found the transfer in favour of the transferee to be questionable and had relegated the matter to the BIFR to consider the matter in the light of directions contained in said para 38. In the circumstances, no further orders are called for invalidating the registration dated 02.07.2014. Further, according to the record the transferee had parted with full consideration way back on 04.04.2013. In the totality of these circumstances we do not think it appropriate to exercise our power to invalidate the effect of registration of the document on 02.07.2014.
We thus find the Company and its Directors/servants namely alleged Contemnor Nos.1, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 guilty of having violated the Order of 08.05.2014. In our view, ends of justice would be met if fine is imposed on the Contemnors. We impose fine of ₹ 2,000/- on the Company. Further, fine of ₹ 2,000/- each is imposed on Contemnor Nos.4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. Fine shall be deposited with the Registry of this Court within four weeks from today. In case of failure by Contemnor Nos.4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 to deposit the amount of fine within the time stipulated, they shall undergo sentence of simple imprisonment for one month.
With these observations, we close Contempt Petition
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2016 (11) TMI 1444 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Winding up proceedings - commercially insolvent situation - Held that:- The alleged defences of pendency of civil suit filed by holding company against the manufacturers but not against petitioner-Aerotron Ltd., locus standi of petitioner company to file this winding up petition, there being chance of revival of the business etc., are all, moonshine and sham defences raised without any material basis for them. The respondent-company is commercially insolvent and is unable to pay its huge debts and there appears to be no useful purpose to keep this company out of the process of winding up or to keep these winding up petitions pending unnecessarily waiting for some magic to happen for a turnaround of this company, which has been left to fend for itself even by its own holding company, even though UBHL facing similar winding up petitions against itself filed allegedly for not discharging its own guarantee obligations for discharging the debts of its own subsidiary-the Respondent company, and UBHL is hotly contesting winding up petitions filed against itself. This is nothing but self serving suicidal contradiction of these two companies.
The failure of the respondent- company even to make any alternative arrangement to argue and oppose the present case and other such petitions on behalf of the respondent-company against the petitioning creditors also shows that the Company is not interested in seriously opposing these winding up petitions against it. The objections raised in the statement of objection though not pressed again were considered but are found to be unsustainable and flimsy. There is no bona fide dispute against the admitted liability of the respondent-company and no substantial defence has been put-forth by it to show that it is not commercially insolvent.
Therefore, this Court, considers it just and proper to wind up the respondent-company for failure to pay the admitted liability and accordingly, the said respondent, Company-Kingfisher Airlines Limited deserves to be wound-up. Therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that respondent-company, KFA Ltd., deserves to be wound up under the provisions of 433 (e) and (f) read with 439 of the Companies Act, 1956. Accordingly, the respondent-company, Kingfisher Airlines Limited having its registered office at U.B. Tower, Level-12, U.B. City, No. 24, Vittal Malya Road, Bangalore-560 001, is ordered to be wound up.
This winding up order be published in 'The Hindu' and 'Udayavani' having circulation in Karnataka in terms of Rule 114 of Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, read with relevant provisions and notice of this order may also be sent to Official Liquidator, Regional Director and the Registrar of Companies, Karnataka, the respondent company itself and the petitioner company.
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2016 (11) TMI 1425 - CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSION
Right to information - sought information as held by the respondent Supreme court in their computer data-base - seeking information on impugned orders in relation to the cases as mentioned in the RTI application; to upload the details of the impugned orders on the Supreme Court’s website; and inspection of digital data of the cases - Held that:- It is observed that the appellant is not seeking any certified copy of the judicial record but has sought information on the impugned orders already publicly available on the kiosk maintained by Hon’ble Supreme Court in its premises viz. the name of Court/Agency which passed the order, date of judgment and the case number. In the alternate, the appellant has sought the inspection of the digital data in relation to the cases mentioned in his RTI applications.
It is observed that the sought for information is available in many cases in the database of the Hon’ble Court. No case to deny this information has been made out. Besides, provision of this information can help the general public, litigants, etc., in linking the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s orders with the impugned orders and thereby serve a larger public interest.
The respondent is directed to furnish, if available, the impugned order details of the cases mentioned in the RTI requests and provide the same within 30 days of this Order. The respondent is advised to update and upload the details (as available) of the impugned orders on the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s website in larger public interest.
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2016 (11) TMI 1396 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Correction of the typographical error - as contended that the date of listing of the appeal is 16.11.2016 and on account of the typographical error the same has been noted as 10.11.2016 also that counsel for the respondent had appeared not only for respondent no. 1 but also for respondent no. 3. - Held that:- The order dated 26.10.2016 is corrected.
The next date of the listing of the appeal is corrected to read as 16.11.2016 instead of 10.11.2016 and presence of Mr. Vikram Jetly, advocate in the said order shall be read for respondent no. 1 and 3.
Perusal of order sheet of the appeal shows that the final arguments in the appeal were concluded on 02.02.2016 and judgment was reserved. The judgment could not be delivered. Thereafter again arguments were heard on 26.07.2016 and the judgment was reserved.Thereafter the Chairman has since demitted office. The appeal is listed for hearing tomorrow i.e. 16.11.2016.
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2016 (11) TMI 1315 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Restraining the Bank from proceeding further with eauction with respect to the mortgaged property in question - Held that:- Though the original applicant claims to have purchased the mortgaged property in question by registered sale deed on 25.04.2014 and on payment of sale consideration and though according to him when the Bank took the actual, physical possession on 12.06.2014 pursuant to the order psased by the learned District Magistrate under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, from the panchnama it appears that at the time when the Bank Officers went to take the possession of the mortgaged property in question, in the month of February 2016, wife of the original owner / mortgagor was present in the bungalow / mortgaged property and the original applicant was not in possession of the mortgaged property in question.
From the panchnama it appears that at that time the wife of the original mortgagor after seeing the officers who had came to take the possession ran away. That thereafter the Bank had taken the actual, physical possession by drawing the panchnama and doing the videography. From the aforesaid it can be said that a systematic fraud has been committed by the mortgagor in connivance with the original applicant with malafide intention only with a view to dupe the legitimate dues of the Bank and the realization of large sum of amount by the Bank to the extent of ₹ 3,46,55,433 + further interest charges etc.
It is required to be noted that even the original borrower / mortgagor, M/s. Shukan Palace Infrastructure and its partners have duped so many investors who have purchased the residential bungalows in the scheme viz. Shukan Palace – I, Ghatlodiya, Ahmedabad. The possession was taken over from the wife of the mortgagor / mortgagor and not from the original applicant. The aforesaid has not been appreciated by the learned Tribunal while passing the impugned order.
Considering the above Tribunal has materially erred in passing the impugned order restraining the Bank from proceeding further with eauction of the mortgaged property which was mortgaged by the mortgagor while taking the huge loan / credit / financial assistance.
So far as the submission on behalf of the original applicant that as against the impugned order the petitioner Bank has a statutory remedy available by way of appeal before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Mumbai and therefore, the present petition may not be entertained is concerned, at the outset it is required to be noted that as such the post of Member/s of Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai is vacant and there is no incumbent and therefore, the petitioner is justified in approaching this Court.
Even otherwise considering the impugned order passed by the learned Tribunal and as observed hereinabove the learned Tribunal has exceeded in its jurisdiction in entertaining the securitization application and passing the impugned order at the instance of the original applicant, the transaction in whose favour is a nullity, we are of the opinion that this is a fit case to entertain the petition and exercise the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Impugned order passed by the learned Debts Recovery Tribunal – I, Ahmedabad in Securitization Application is hereby quashed and set aside and the petitioner Bank is permitted to proceed ahead with eauction of the mortgaged property in question viz. Bungalow No.15, Shukan Palace – I, Ghatlodiya, Ahmedabad. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. No costs.
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2016 (11) TMI 1259 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Condonation of delay - Divisional Commissioner exercising his jurisdiction under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 authority to condone delay - Held that:- In the facts of the present case, immediately after the order had been passed by the Registrar, the respondent preferred a Writ Petition which was dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy of preferring an appeal under Section 12-D(2) of the Act of 1860. After passing of such order, petitioner has immediately preferred an appeal, and delay has been condoned. Since the principles underlying Section 14 of the Limitation Act are attracted, as such, the period spent in pursuing a wrong remedy is liable to be condoned.
In the present case, if principles of Section 14 are not applied, grave hardship would be otherwise caused to respondent Pilgrim's Mission. The respondent in this case was diligently pursuing remedy against the order of Registrar by filing a writ petition, and unless delay is condoned, it would not be possible to challenge the order.
In the present case, Commissioner has condoned delay in filing of appeal, for which source of power can be traced to the principles contained under Section 14 of the Act of 1963. Although provisions of Section 14 ipso facto do not apply but its principles are clearly attracted. The Commissioner was thus right in condoning delay. No interference is thus warranted in exercise of writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with the order of Commissioner dated 13.6.2016. Writ petition fails and is dismissed.
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2016 (11) TMI 1258 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Seizure of contraband substance - contraband substance was found having presence of Methaqualone - whether, the effected 951.350 Kg of contraband substance from the vehicle make Toyota Fortuner bearing registration No. DL 13CA 1800 pursuant to the disclosure made by Manu Khosla does cover under the NDPS Act, 1985? - the NDPS Act, 1985 which is a special law as compared to the general procedural law mentioned herein above. The NDPS Act, 1985 is applicable over the general law for the purposes of the present case - Held that: - The Court below while dealing with the instant case went wrong on the point that, no offence under the NDPS Act was made out, for want of inclusion of Ketamine Hydrochloride in the Schedule of the NDPS Rules, 1985. The notification of the Department of Revenue of the Ministry of Finance with its Notification No.S.0.311.(E) dated 10.02.2011 declared Ketamine Hydrochloride to be a part of the schedule of the NDPS Act, thereby declaring it to be a psychotropic substance - The respondent is directed to surrender the vehicle make Toyota Fortuner bearing registration No. DL 13CA 1800 forthwith before the trial court, failing which the trial court will proceed further in accordance with law - petition allowed - decided against respondent assessee.
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2016 (11) TMI 1186 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Treatment to plot of land as commercial - payment of stamp duty - Held that:- Indisputably, there cannot be any access to Plot-A & it is only possible through Plot-B and if Plot-A is treated as commercial, we find no reason to still treat Plot-B from where there is an access alone to Plot-A, where the petrol pump has been installed and operational, not to be considered as commercial and that was a reason which initially prevailed upon the Collector (Stamps) and to the Rajasthan Tax Board and so also before the ld.Single Judge of this Court and merely because there was a separate description in the conveyance deed submitted before the Sub-Registrar (Stamps), no inference can be drawn in treating Plot-B in dispute as agricultural land for all practical purposes and taking into consideration the finding of fact, which has come on record and more particularly when no documentary evidence has been placed by the appellant on record in rebuttal the finding of fact remains uncontroverted that Plot-B is abutting to the State Highway No.30 and Plot-A, on which actually a petrol pump is installed, cannot be put to use and access only from Plot-B that is abutting to the State Highway No.30 and once this finding has been confirmed with supportive evidence on record, in our considered view, no error has been committed by the competent authority and confirmed by the Rajasthan Tax Board and so also by the ld.Single Judge of this court which needs any further interference in the intra-court appeal.
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2016 (11) TMI 1071 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
E-auction and sale of immovable properties of a defaulting debtor - Held that:- The petitioner company has an alternative remedy under Section 17 of the Act of 2002 as amended effective 1-9-2016. The petitioner shall be free to file an application before the Debt Recovery Tribunal challenging the public notice dated 11-7-2016 or any other order/ notice issued by the respondent bank. The application under Section 17 of the Act of 2002 if filed by the petitioner company within three weeks from today be decided on merits.
As the petitioner company is enjoying protection of this court effective interim order dated 26-8-2016 passed prior to amendment of Section 17 of the Act of 2002 on 1-9- 2016, the said interim protection shall continue for the benefit of the petitioner company for a period of three weeks from the date of this order. It is however made clear that this extended interim protection granted by this court is in the special facts of the case and will not influence any order interim or otherwise to be passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal in the application under Section 17 of the Act of 2002 against the impugned public notice dated 11-7-2016. All orders both interim and final be passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal in its wisdom only on merits of the case with reference to facts and law applicable.
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2016 (11) TMI 840 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Remedy of appeal under section 17 of the SARFAESI Act - Held that:- It is trite principal to be followed stead-fast in commercial matters that rather than straightway invoking the jurisdiction of the high court under Article 226 of the of the Constitution, an aggrieved party avails and exhausts the alternative remedy. The aforesaid principle unequivocally stem from the decisions of the apex court and of this court referred to hereinabove.
In the aforesaid circumstances, the Court is not inclined to exercise writ jurisdiction against the present challenge. The petitioner is required to be relegated to the remedy of Appeal before Debts Recovery Tribunal and he is being so relegated hereby.
Petition is dismissed only on the ground that the petitioner has alternative remedy of filling of an appeal before the Debt Recovery Tribunal under section 17 of the Act. The petitioners are hereby relegated to the said remedy. It is open to the petitioners to raise all the contentions before the Tribunal in the appeal which they may now file.
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2016 (11) TMI 682 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Seeking of information - Right to Information Act - Held that: - gross injustice has been caused to the petitioner by virtue of the impugned order. There was no response from the respondents regarding the information supplied to the petitioner or atleast the order does not mention so. The information sought by the petitioner when examined in the light of Annexure P5, the response given to him in the first instance is much short of the information sought by the petitioner.
Evidently, the State Information Commissioner failed to apply her mind to the facts of the case and passed an order which can be termed to be cryptic, non speaking and thus, unsustainable in law - The impugned order set aside and the petition is disposed off - matter remanded back to the State Information Commissioner, Punjab to look into the entire issue and ensure that the grievance of the petitioner is redressed.
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2016 (11) TMI 608 - SUPREME COURT
Auction notice - Held that:- Upon hearing the learned counsel and going through the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal as well as the High Court, we have no doubt about the fact that undue haste was made by the creditor bank in holding the auction. The creditor bank could have waited for some time when the proceedings were pending before the Tribunal as well as the High Court before conducting the auction and confirming the sale. We do not find any reason to disturb the concurrent findings arrived at by the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal as well as the High Court about the irregularities committed in holding the auction.
A submission had been made on behalf of the Appellant that the second application filed under Section 17 of the Act was not maintainable and therefore, it ought not to have been entertained by the Tribunal. We are not in agreement with the said submission for the reason that when another application was filed under Section 17(1) of the Act, the cause of action was different. At an earlier point of time, the issuance of notice as well as notice for sale of the flat had been challenged, whereas the subsequent application had been filed after the auction had been held. The cause of action in respect of both the applications was not same and therefore, in our opinion, the second application for a different cause of action was maintainable.
Thus we do not intend to disturb the judgment delivered by the High Court. However, looking at the nature of litigation faced by the auction purchaser, we modify the order and direct that the amount already paid by the auction purchaser shall be returned to the auction purchaser with simple interest at the rate of 10% till the said amount is paid.
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2016 (11) TMI 552 - JHARKHAND HIGH COURT
Production of the documents with respect to appointment and educational qualifications - A.N.M in the Health Center, Meral - whether the information sought for is the personal information and is required to be produced or not? - Held that: - the information being sought for from the petitioner relates to her appointment to a Govt. job, and the educational qualification of the petitioner. In my considered view, these are not the personal information of a person who is appointed to a Govt. job and the people at large are entitled to have the information about the appointment of such person and the fact whether the person concerned is holding the required educational qualification for the same or not. As such the information, which are sought for from the petitioner, are not the personal information which could not be furnished under the RTI Act - writ application dismissed.
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2016 (11) TMI 544 - SUPREME COURT
Reference to arbitration - Non-filing of either original or certified copy of retirement deed and partnership deed along with application entailed dismissal of the application as per section 8(2) of 1996 Act - entitlement to make the reference relying on arbitration agreement - Whether dispute pertaining to unregistered partnership deed cannot be referred to an arbitration despite there being arbitration agreement in the deed of retirement/partnership deed - Held that:- The original Retirement Deed and Partnership Deed were filed by the defendants on 12th May and it is only after filing of original deeds that Court proceeded to decide the application I.A.No. IV.
Section 8(2) has to be interpreted to mean that the court shall not consider any application filed by the party under Section 8(1) unless it is accompanied by original arbitration agreement or duly certified copy thereof. The filing of the application without such original or certified copy, but bringing original arbitration agreement on record at the time when the Court is considering the application shall not entail rejection of the application under Section 8(2). In the present case it is relevant to note the Retirement Deed and Partnership Deed have also been relied by the plaintiffs. Hence, the argument of plaintiffs that defendants' application I.A.No. IV was not accompanied by original deeds, hence, liable to be rejected, cannot be accepted. We are thus of the view that the appellants submission that the application of defendants under Section 8 was liable to be rejected, cannot be accepted.
In the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that merely because one of the defendants i.e. defendant no. 6 was not party to the arbitration agreement, the dispute between the parties which essentially relates to the benefits arising out of Retirement Deed and Partnership deed cannot be referred.
When the partners and those who claim through partners agreed to get the dispute settled by arbitration, it is not open for the appellants to contend that partnership being unregistered partnership, the dispute cannot be referred. The petitioners have not been able to show any statutory provision either in 1996 Act or in any other statute from which it can be said that dispute concerning unregistered partnership deed cannot be referred to arbitration. We thus do not find any substance in the third submission of the appellant.
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2016 (11) TMI 543 - SUPREME COURT
Interpretation of the terms “mineral” and “processing” under the definition of “mine” as defined under Explanation (b) of Part-B of Madhya Pradesh Electricity Duty Act, 1949 - It is urged that Ferromanganese is an alloy and is not a mineral - Held that:- To bring to the Ferro Manganese Plant of the appellant within the meaning of ‘mine’, the State has argued before this Court that the Ferro Manganese Plant is being “used for crushing, processing, treating or transporting” the mineral, that is, manganese ore. This is clearly unsustainable as the appellant is neither crushing or processing or treating or transporting manganese ore but rather using it as one of the raw materials and consuming the same while manufacturing ferromanganese alloy. The state of crushing, treating, processing, etc. of the manganese ore (mineral) was in the IMB Plant (second stage), where the appellant is paying electricity duty at 40%. The same rate cannot be applied in the Ferro Manganese Plant (the third stage) as it cannot be taken to be within the meaning of ‘mine’ for the aforesaid reason.
Thus, the Ferro Manganese Plant, being a unit involved in manufacturing of ferromanganese alloy as opposed to a unit involved in crushing, treating, processing, etc. of manganese ore, cannot be treated within the extended definition of ‘mine’ within the Explanation (b) of Part B of Table of Rates of Duty to Section 3(1) of the Act.
The Ferromanganese Alloy so manufactured by the appellant using the mineral Manganese at its Ferromanganese plant is an entirely different product from its mineral raw material both physically and even chemically. Moreover, unlike Manganese ore a ferromanganese alloy can never be found in the natural state and it has to be manufactured from the manganese ore and other minerals only. The same logic applies to copper concentrate as a different and distinct product comes into existence.
Thus analyzed, we find that in both the cases, the different products in commercial parlance have emerged. Hence, we are inclined to think that the principle of noscitur a sociis has to be applied. As a logical corollary, tariff has to be levied as meant for manufacturing unit. Therefore, the analysis made by the High Court is not correct and, accordingly, the judgments rendered by it deserve to be set aside and we so direct. However, during this period if any amount has been paid by the appellants to the revenue, the same shall be adjusted towards future demands.
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2016 (11) TMI 458 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. moved in complaint case filed under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - petitioner seeks an order quashing/setting aside the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Dwarka, Delhi dismissing the appeal against the order passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate Dwarka in his application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. moved in complaint case filed by respondent No.1 under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
Held that:- Additional Sessions Judge by taking note of the fact that in the criminal complaint in which the application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. was filed by the petitioner herein, respondent No. 1 had submitted that loan was taken by the petitioner for commencing his business from her husband and she has given a cheque only. The admission of respondent No. 1 in her pleadings including the affidavits regarding the date, time and execution of all the affidavits and contents thereof cannot tantamount to commission of offence of perjury. Finding the contents of the complaint filed by the complainant/respondent No. 1 being neither false nor contradictory to the story of advancing loan to the petitioner through her husband/respondent No. 2, the learned Additional Sessions Judge agreed with the reasoning of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate taking a view that no offence of perjury has been committed by the respondents.
This court does not find any irregularity or infirmity in the impugned orders. In addition, in view of the foregoing discussions on the principles relating to exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., this Court does not find the present case being fit for exercising the inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. in the present case.
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2016 (11) TMI 165 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Pre-deposit requirement - Validity of Section 45- AA of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 as it imposes a condition of pre-deposit of 25% of the demanded amount for entertaining the appeal - Held that:- The requirement of pre-deposit under Section 45-AA is not mandatory and the Appellate Authority is empowered to waive, either partially or completely, the requirement of predeposit in the same circumstances and conditions as explained in detail in the PSPCL case (2016 (2) TMI 245 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT ). To summarize, the Appellate Authority is empowered to partially or completely waive the condition of pre-deposit in given facts and circumstances. It is, however, not to be exercised in a routine manner or as a matter of course. Only when a strong prima facie case is made out, will the Appellate Authority consider, whether to grant interim protection/ injunction or not. Partial or complete waiver will be granted only in deserving and appropriate cases where the Appellate Authority is satisfied that the entire purpose of the appeal would be frustrated or rendered nugatory because of the condition of pre-deposit for hearing the appeal and a reasoned order would require to be passed.
Accordingly, the order dated 21.02.2014 (Annexure P-20) passed by the Appellate Authority is quashed. The matter is remitted to the first appellate authority where the petitioners may file an application for interim injunction/protection before the appeals are taken up for hearing by the first appellate authority who shall adjudicate the application for grant of interim injunction/protection to the petitioner in the light of the principles set out above.
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2016 (11) TMI 81 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Determination of the “Market Value” of an immovable property based on “Proposed Land Use” - whether information obtained by the Registering Officer on the basis of the details provided by the applicant in the appropriate form mentioned in Appendix V of the West Bengal Registration Rules, can mandatorily include such information required to be provided under the column specifically relating to “Proposed Land Use”? - Held that:- The rate per square feet of market value of any flat or structure for residential use shall be determined on the basis of the highest rate on which such flat or structure of similar nature in the same locality or a comparable locality has been transacted during the five consecutive years immediately preceding the year of preparation of annual statement of rate of such flat or structure. While determining the rate per square feet of market value of any flat or structure for commercial use or semi-commercial use, the rate per square feet of market value of flat or structure for residential use in the same locality shall be appreciated following the same methodology as elucidated in clause (13) under Rule 3B. Thus, following the scheme of the Rules as introduced by the 2010 amendment of the West Bengal Stamp (Prevention of Undervaluation of Instruments) Rules, 2001, this Court is of the view that there cannot be an indefinite period of time attached to the details as required to be filled-up under the column “Proposed Land Use” and it is imperative to attach a time frame to the details to be filled-up under the said column. Such time frame should be in sync with the scheme of Rules 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D and 3E and ideally, five years.
The concerned authority of the State of West Bengal is directed to incorporate such time frame in the column, “Proposed Land Use”, accordingly. Such incorporation shall be carried out as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of eight weeks, but not later than twelve weeks from date of communication of a photostat certified copy of the order.
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2016 (11) TMI 78 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Cheques in question issued by the deceased Managing Director - Negotiable instruments act - summons issues - Held that:- Instant is a case where the learned Magistrate has not gone into the depth of From-32, where the petitioner i.e., Ms. Richa Aggarwal, was not even an existing Director of the Company at the time of issuance of the said cheques in question. The learned Magistrate has not gone into the depth of the cause of action arisen qua against the petitioner, i.e., Ms. Mohini Aggarwal, as the cheques in question were issued by the deceased Managing Director, i.e., Mr. Vineet Aggarwal, of the Company on 20.09.2014 and subsequently, there was no occasion of actus reus on the part of Ms. Mohini Aggarwal. It is because of this reason she had replied to the notice dated 12.11.2014 that she does not owe any liability as alleged in the said notice.
There is no other factor or circumstance which could show any change of state of mind of Ms. Mohini Aggarwal after issuance of the cheques in question by the deceased, i.e., Mr. Vineet Aggarwal, till the filing of the complaint petition CC. No. 2011/1/14 by the respondent to attract the provisions of Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The aforesaid facts on record only indicates liability if so there is, it could be of civil liability and not criminal liability, which could be put into motion under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
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2016 (11) TMI 25 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Rights under the SARFAESI Act - continuation of ad-interim order - Held that:- The Petitioner, in exercise of its powers under Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act took possession of the properties. Thereafter, this Notification and which we have declared to be not binding on the Petitioner, came to be issued. In the meanwhile, on 6th June, 2013, the Collector and District Magistrate, Kolhapur (Respondent No.3) called upon the Petitioner to hand over possession of the properties. The Petitioner requested thirty days time to adopt appropriate proceedings. The order passed on 11th June, 2013 wrongly refers to Respondent No.4 as Petitioner. The Petitioner is an ARC and which would not ordinarily ask for any interim relief. However, it was forced to apply for interim reliefs as the property in question, the possession of which was with it in terms of the measures under the SARFAESI Act, was to be handed over or returned back to Respondent No.4. Accordingly, whilst granting interim reliefs in favour of the Petitioner, it was directed to maintain status-quo. However, it was permitted to proceed with the auction but not finalize the sale pursuant thereto, until further orders. This Court did not prevent Respondent No.4 from adopting proceedings either before this Court or the DRT under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. Now, the order passed by this Court records that the Collector and District Magistrate cannot insist on the Petitioner handing over the possession of the property in question to Respondent No.4.
We do not have any record of the further steps taken either by the Petitioner or by Respondent No.4 - Borrower. In these circumstances, we do not see any purpose of continuing this order. We do not know whether the Petitioner before us has conducted the auction, finalized it, and is now keen to hand over the possession of the property to the successful bidder. Even if all this has been done, we do not know what steps the successful bidder or auction purchaser proposes to take. In these circumstances, and on some vague understanding of the parties, we cannot continue this ad-interim order. Rather, after the Petitioner has succeeded, there is no point in restraining it from exercising its rights under the SARFAESI Act. This is more so in the facts of the present case because Respondent No.4 - Borrower is indebted to the Petitioner and other consortium banks for more than ₹ 250 Crores (approximately), and has not taken any steps to clear the debts. The request is therefore refused.
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