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Indian Laws - Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 71 Records
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2018 (5) TMI 2068 - SUPREME COURT
Accepting on record a Parliamentary Standing Committee's Report - breach of privilege of Parliament - restrictions in its reference and use as per the parliamentary privileges enjoyed by the Legislature of this country? - invitation of contempt of House in traversing and questioning the reports - Parliamentary Privileges - Privileges of House of Commons - Role of Parliamentary Committees - Publication of Parliamentary Reports - Rules and Procedures regarding Permission for giving evidence in Courts regarding proceedings in parliament - applicability of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 in the context of Parliamentary Proceedings - nature and extent of Parliamentary privileges regarding reports of Committees of British Parliament - exclusionary rules how far applicable in the Indian context - separation of powers and maintaining a delicate balance between the Legislature, executive and Judiciary - Article 121 and 122 of Constitution of India - comments on reports of parliamentary committee whether breach of privilege - adjudication of Courts and Parliamentary Committee Report.
HELD THAT:- Following conclusions are reached:
(i) According to Sub-clause (2) of Article 105 of Constitution of India no Member of Parliament can be held liable for anything said by him in Parliament or in any committee. The reports submitted by Members of Parliament is also fully covered by protection extended Under Sub-clause (2) of Article 105 of the Constitution of India.
(ii) The publication of the reports not being only permitted, but also are being encouraged by the Parliament. The general public are keenly interested in knowing about the parliamentary proceedings including parliamentary reports which are steps towards the governance of the country. The right to know about the reports only arises when they have been published for use of the public in general.
(iii) Section 57(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 makes it clear that the course of proceedings of Parliament and the Legislature, established under any law are facts of which judicial notice shall be taken by the Court.
(iv) Parliament has already adopted a report of "privilege committee", that for those documents which are public documents within the meaning of Indian Evidence Act, there is no requirement of any permission of Speaker of Lok Sabha for producing such documents as evidence in Court.
(v) That mere fact that document is admissible in evidence whether a public or private document does not lead to draw any presumption that the contents of the documents are also true and correct.
(vi) When a party relies on any fact stated in the Parliamentary Committee Report as the matter of noticing an event or history no exception can be taken on such reliance of the report. However, no party can be allowed to 'question' or 'impeach' report of Parliamentary Committee. The Parliamentary privilege, that it shall not be impeached or questioned outside the Parliament shall equally apply both to a party who files claim in the court and other who objects to it. Any observation in the report or inference of the Committee cannot be held to be binding between the parties. The parties are at liberty to lead evidence independently to prove their stand in a court of law.
(vii) Both the Parties have not disputed that Parliamentary Reports can be used for the purposes of legislative history of a Statute as well as for considering the statement made by a minister. When there is no breach of privilege in considering the Parliamentary materials and reports of the Committee by the Court for the above two purposes, we fail to see any valid reason for not accepting the submission of the Petitioner that Courts are not debarred from accepting the Parliamentary materials and reports, on record, before it, provided the Court does not proceed to permit the parties to question and impeach the reports.
(viii) The Constitution does not envisage supremacy of any of the three organs of the State. But, functioning of all the three organs is controlled by the Constitution. Wherever, interaction and deliberations among the three organs have been envisaged, a delicate balance and mutual respect are contemplated. All the three organs have to strive to achieve the constitutional goal set out for 'We the People'. Mutual harmony and respect have to be maintained by all the three organs to serve the Constitution under which we all live.
(ix) We are of the view that fair comments on report of the Parliamentary Committee are fully protected under the rights guaranteed Under Article 19(1)(a). However, the comments when turns into personal attack on the individual member of Parliament or House or made in vulgar or abusive language tarnishing the image of member or House, the said comments amount to contempt of the House and breach of privilege.
(x) The function of adjudicating rights of the parties has been entrusted to the constituted courts as per Constitutional Scheme, which adjudication has to be made after observing the procedural safeguards which include right to be heard and right to produce evidence. Parliament, however, is not vested with any adjudicatory jurisdiction which belong to judicature under the Constitutional scheme.
(xi) Admissibility of a Parliamentary Committee Report in evidence does not mean that facts stated in the Report stand proved. When issues of facts come before a Court of law for adjudication, the Court is to decide the issues on the basis of evidence and materials brought before it.
The questions having been answered, let these writ petitions be listed before the appropriate Bench for hearing.
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2018 (5) TMI 2066 - SUPREME COURT
Transfer the investigation of a criminal case to the Central Bureau of Investigation - illegal manufacture and sale of Gutkha and Pan Masala, containing Tobacco and/or Nicotine - HELD THAT:- The High Court has justly transferred the investigation to CBI after due consideration of all the relevant aspects, which approach is consistent with the settled legal position expounded in the decisions adverted to in the impugned judgment, including the decision in SUBRATA CHATTORAJ VERSUS UNION OF INDIA [2014 (10) TMI 328 - SUPREME COURT] which predicates that transfer of investigation to CBI does not depend on the inadequacy of inquiry/investigation carried out by the State police. We agree with the High Court that the facts of the present case and the nature of crime being investigated warrants CBI investigation - the conclusion reached by the High Court that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, it is but appropriate that investigation of the crime in question must be entrusted to CBI, is upheld.
The transfer of investigation of the crime in question to CBI is no reflection on the efficiency or efficacy of the investigation done by the State Vigilance Commission - SLP dismissed.
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2018 (5) TMI 2048 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Levy of Terminal Tax - Hindi version of the statutory provisions and that of English version has come before the Courts from time to time - Whether Hindi version or English version of The Terminal Tax (Assessment and Collection) on the Goods Exported from Madhya Pradesh Municipal Limits Rules, 1996, was ordered to be decided at the time of passing of the final order and if the Court finds contradictory position, then the matter would be referred to the High Court? - section 355 read with sections 127 and 129 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 - HELD THAT:- As per section 4 of the Language Act, the bills introduced in the State Legislature; the Acts passed by each House of the State Legislature; all orders, rules, regulations and bye-laws are published in Hindi. The bills are introduced in Hindi, passed in Hindi and assented to by the Hon'ble Governor. The language of the bill is in Hindi. In terms of Article 348, the translation is required to be published in English language under the authority of the Hon'ble Governor in the official gazette, which is deemed to be an authoritative text in the English language. Thus, the authoritative text prepared in terms of sub-clause (3) of Article 348 is not an authoritative text discussed and resolved by the State Legislature, but is an action performed by the Executive in exercise of the administrative powers of the State. The English version is not discussed by the State Legislature. Therefore, the Act has been passed in Hindi which is a Legislative action whereas the authoritative text in English is an Executive action. Therefore, in case of conflict between the two, the Legislative enactment will prevail rather than an Executive action of translation though published under the authority of the Hon'ble Governor. Such is the view taken by the Himachal Pradesh High Court as well.
The language of the State being Hindi and the Act having been passed in Hindi, the English version of such text in Hindi is an act of the Executive, which will not prevail over the legislation enacted by the State Legislature in Hindi. Therefore, in case of conflict between Hindi version and the English version, the Legislative version would prevail rather than the authorized version published under the authority of the Hon'ble Governor as an Executive function - Petition dismissed.
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2018 (5) TMI 2036 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Demand for liquidated damages after dissolution of AMC - plea of the petitioner is that the respondent suffered no damages due to delay in delivery of the handsets and hence the respondent is not entitled to any damages/penalty - fraud and unjust enrichment or not? - Whether the Claimant is entitled to claim no. 1? - HELD THAT:- It is clear that the same is absolutely without merits. It is a fact recorded by the learned Arbitrator based on the agreement and documents placed on record that a sum of ₹ 2,47,43,500/- became payable on account of the delays by the petitioner - the terms and conditions of the AMC clearly provides that if the petitioner fails to deliver the repaired handsets within the stipulated period of 14 days the petitioner shall be liable to pay a penalty @ ₹ 100/- per day per terminal. In view of the specific clause merely because there was a delay in raising of the bill would not do away the liability of the petitioner under the said clause.
Whether the claim no. 1 or any part thereof is barred by limitation? - HELD THAT:- Where a sum is named in a contract as liquidated amount payable by way of damages, the party complaining of a breach can receive such amount only if the amount is a genuine pre-estimate of damages fixed by both the parties and found to be such by the Court. In other cases where a sum is named in the contract as liquidated amount payable by way of damages, only reasonable compensation can be awarded not exceeding the amount, so stated. Reasonable compensation is to be fixed on well known principles that are applicable to the law of contract. Damage/loss caused is a sine qua non for applicability of the section.
A perusal of the cross-examination of Shri Ramesh Singh shows that he has clearly pointed out that the customers of the respondent had to suffer as there was delay in return of the handsets. It is manifest that the reputation of the respondent suffered. In an industry disgruntled customers do not help in expansion of business. It is quite clear that when a manufacturer of mobile telephones is unable to speedily repair defective telephones supplied to its customers it is bound to cause a loss of reputation/image. Such loss of reputation/image would lead to loss of revenue. Such damages/loss of revenue cannot easily be quantified as is sought to be argued - this was clearly a case where the respondent had suffered damages. The nature of damages suffered would be such where it would not be easy to lead evidence to assess the nature of damages suffered. The damages quantified in the contract can be said to be a genuine pre-estimate of the damages. The learned Arbitrator rightly concluded that award of the said damages as stipulated in the contract does not lead to unjust enrichment of the respondent.
It is not for this Court to reassess the evidence to negate the findings of fact recorded by the learned arbitrator - Further, the learned Arbitrator on account of the fact that part of the claim of the respondent was barred by limitation only awarded about 50% of the amount claimed by the respondent as damages for late repairing of the handsets. The above is in any case a reasonable compensation for damages suffered by the respondent and cannot be said to be contrary to Section 74 of the Contract Act.
Petition dismissed.
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2018 (5) TMI 2028 - SUPREME COURT
Constitution of Committee - HELD THAT:- In terms of order dated 7th May, 2018, we direct that a committee be constituted. We, however, clarify that a former Judge of this Court need not have worked in a Tribunal as earlier directed.
We further direct that wherever qualification required for appointment to a Tribunal/Commission is of a former Chief Justice or a former Supreme Court Judge, and no suitable person of that category is available, it will be open to make appointment of any suitable former Judge of a High Court till any legislative amendment in that regard is brought out so that a Tribunal/Commission may not remain headless - Subject to this, the constitution of the Committee is left to the Government. The Committee may be constituted within two months and may give its report within three months thereafter. Union of India may take a call thereon and take such further action as found appropriate. An affidavit of further developments be filed in this Court by 31st October, 2018.
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2018 (5) TMI 2027 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Dishonor of Cheque - insufficiency of funds - case of applicant is that the order is against the statutory provision of law and realization of fine ought to have been stayed by the Appellate Court during the pendency of the appeal specially when the bail has been granted to the applicant - HELD THAT:- It is evident that the Appellate Court may impose a condition while suspending the sentence, however, the power of imposing conditions is discretionary and the Court while suspending the sentence can always direct the applicant to deposit fine in the court but the amount of such condition must not be unreasonable, onerous and unjust so as to deprive the applicant from being released on bail.
Admittedly, in the present case, the applicant has been convicted under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act and in the circumstances of the case, he would be ordinarily granted bail during the trial in view of the facts that the offence is bailable. Even during the course of trial, he has been on bail, therefore, while exercise of appellate power, a person must not be made to suffer by imposing such condition for being released on bail, which may be onerous - In the case in hand, although the applicant has been directed to be released on bail but a pre-condition has been imposed to deposit 1/4th of amount of the fine of ₹ 75,00,000/- for suspension of sentence, which appears to be onerous and harsh.
Pre-condition to deposit 1/4th of amount of the fine of ₹ 75,00,000/- for being released on bail being onerous and harsh is liable to be modified to the extent of only 10% of the fine of ₹ 75,00,000/- imposed by the appellate Court - Application allowed in part.
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2018 (5) TMI 2023 - SUPREME COURT
Work undertaken by the said codeveloper and the promoter - time limit for completion for undertaking the project - HELD THAT:- There are certain unsold units in the various projects that have to be firstly adjusted by making swapping as agreed to, after that the remaining available units may also be permitted to be sold. In this regard, a proposal would be submitted as and when swapping process is completed and the details of property to be sold and amount of offer by the prospective buyers, be indicated by this Court. The proposal will be submitted for consideration so that appropriate orders may be passed by this Court. Let the Committee constituted by us also to supervise the swapping part - Eight weeks’ time is granted to the buyers for the purpose of applying for swapping and decision shall be taken within 15 days from the date of application for the purpose of swapping is filed before the promoters. In case there is any difficulty in swapping, the Committee is authorized to take care of the grievances and to guide the promoters as well as the buyers.
There are certain ‘C’ category projects. With respect to those projects also, as they are not taken care of during swapping or there may be certain buyers not willing for swapping or certain amount may be required to be refunded to the buyers, who are not intending to purchase now and not opting for swapping or/and is not feasible, to take up those projects. The promoter shall also file its proposal with respect to such buyers who want their money to be refunded. Let that proposal be also filed after swapping is done indicating therein as to how many persons require to refund the money. The buyers in ‘C’ category projects only who are intending to obtain refund, may also submit their proposal to the concerned promoter in the meantime, within one month from today - The promoters with respect to Silicon Valley have applied for connection for electricity, sewerage and water, as per order passed by this Court on 10.5.2018. The aforesaid order be carried out punctually. The promoters of the Silicon Valley has undertaken to make the payment of dues onwards.
The matter has been heard in part and requires further hearing. List on 18.7.2018 at 2.00 p.m.
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2018 (5) TMI 1999 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Leave to amend the plaint - Whether plaintiff is entitled to proceed against sister vessels after having filed a Suit for arrest of one of the sister vessels M.T. PRATIBHA NEERA and after having obtained an order of arrest? - HELD THAT:- As provided in Article 3 plaintiff can arrest either a particular ship in respect of which the maritime claim arose or any other ship which is owned by the person who was, at the time when the maritime claim arose, the owner of the particular ship.
The position under the Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Act, 2017, which came into force on 1st April, 2018, may also be noted. Section 5 of the said Act makes it clear that the High Court may order arrest of any vessel in respect of a maritime claim if the person who owned vessel is liable for the claim and is the owner of the vessel when arrested. This means the particular vessel in question. Section 5(2) provides that the High Court may also order arrest of any other vessel in lieu of the vessel against which a maritime claim has been made. Thus, under this Act too, plaintiff can arrest either the particular vessel or a sister vessel. Only one vessel can be arrested and not multiple vessels.
Considering the position under the Brussels Convention 1952, and also under the position under the Admiralty Act, 2017 it is clear that it is not open to plaintiff to arrest more than one vessel in respect of its claim. The plaintiff has already arrested the vessel MT PRATIBHA NEERA. Consequently, plaintiff is not entitled to arrest any of the other sister vessels. The purpose of impleadment is only to assert a claim against the sister vessels and seek a decree against the vessels and/or the sale proceeds. Consequently, if the relief of arrest of the sister ship cannot be granted then the sister ship or its sale proceeds cannot be proceeded against and a decree granted. Hence no question arises of impleadment of the sister vessels.
The submission that plaintiff would not be able to stake its claim against sale proceeds of other defendant is fallacious. Plaintiff cannot obtain decree against sister ship of the offending vessel at all. Question of other creditors being prejudiced or not do not arise in as much as that has no bearing on the additional defendant being impleaded. Once the company goes into liquidation, all the properties of the company including various vessels become the “properties available to all” other than such claimant who has executed warrant of arrest against any vessel prior to commencement of liquidation proceedings.
Chamber summons accordingly stands dismissed.
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2018 (5) TMI 1998 - CENTRAL ELECTRICITY REGULATORY COMMISSION, NEW DELHI
Correct legal position on quorum for hearing the review petition - HELD THAT:- From the provisions of the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Conduct of Business) Regulations, 1999 (CBR), it is evident that proceedings before the Commission include proceedings of all nature that the Commission may hold in discharge of its functions under the Act which includes petitions for review of its own decisions, directions and orders. Further, the quorum for the proceedings before the Commission is two which means that no proceedings can take place without the presence of at least two members including ex-officio member of the Commission. However, as regards the review petition, only timeline for filing of petitions for review and disposal of such petitions has been indicated. The CBR is silent about the quorum for hearing the review petitions i.e. whether the review petitions shall be heard by lesser number of members than those who heard the main petition or what should be the quorum if any of the Members including Chairperson retires before the review petition is filed or during the course of the proceedings of the review petition.
The general principle as per the CPC is that a review petition must always be heard by the same Court/Bench. However, there are situations in which this is not possible particularly in the present case where the Chairperson of the Hon'ble Commission who signed the orders in the main petitions is unavailable due to reason of superannuation. For the said situation, Order 47 Rule 5 provides that if a judge or judges or any one of the judges who passed the decree or made the order, a review of which is applied for, such judge or judges or any of them shall hear the review application, and no other judge or judges of the court shall hear the same, unless the judge or judges is not or are not precluded from absence or other cause for a period of six months next after the decree or order is made.
The Commission shall be guided by the principles given in the provisions of Section 114 of CPC and Order 47 thereunder while dealing with the review petitions - If the members constituting the quorum which heard and passed the order in the main petition are available, those members only shall hear and issue order in the review petition. No other member shall be associated at the review stage.
The review petitions shall be listed before the appropriate quorums.
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2018 (5) TMI 1989 - SUPREME COURT
Acquittal of accused - framing of charges - vicarious liability of the Accused Under Section 149 - It is the grievance of the Appellant that in spite of the gravity of the offence and the evidence of the 5 injured witnesses, most of the Accused went scot free without any punishment and, hence, this appeal - HELD THAT:- There is a failure of justice in the case on hand looked at from the point of view of either the victims or even from the point of view of the convicted Accused. The most normal consequence thereafter should have been to order a fresh trial, but such a course of action after a lapse of 26 years of the occurrence of the crime, in our opinion, would not serve any useful purpose because as already indicated some of the Accused have died in the interregnum. We are not sure of the availability of the witnesses at this point of time. Even if all the witnesses are available, how safe it would be to record their evidence after a quarter century and place reliance on the same for coming to a gist conclusion regarding the culpability of the Accused?
This is a classic illustration of how the State failed in its primary constitutional responsibility of maintaining law and order by its ineffectiveness in the enforcement of criminal law. In our opinion, the reasons for such failure are many. Some of them are-(i) inefficiency arising out of either incompetence or lack of proper training in the system of criminal investigation; (ii) corruption or political interference with the investigation of crime; (iii) less than the desirable levels of efficiency of the public prosecutors to correctly advise and guide the investigating agencies contributing to the failure of the proper enforcement of criminal law; and (iv) inadequate efficiency levels of the bar and the members of the Judiciary (an offshoot of the bar) which contributed to the overall decline in the efficiency in the dispensation of criminal justice system - Over a period of time lot of irrelevant and unwarranted considerations have crept into the selection and appointment process of Public Prosecutors all over the country. If in a case like the one on hand where three people were killed and more than five people were injured, if charges are not framed in accordance with the mandate of law, the blame must be squarely taken by both the bar and the bench. Another distressing feature of the record in this case is the humungous cross examination of the witnesses by the defense which mostly is uncalled for.
Appeal disposed off.
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2018 (5) TMI 1969 - SUPREME COURT
Compensation for loss - execution of awards - Section 25 and 27 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 - whether the interpretation adopted is in the process of giving a true effect to the decree or they have gone beyond the decree by drawing a new decree?
HELD THAT:- In a contractual matter, when the decree is silent with regard to the reckoning date of conversion of foreign currency in to Indian rupees, what would be the methodology to be followed by the executing court is no more res integra, as this court has an occasion to deal with elaborately in the case of Forasol v. ONGC, [1983 (10) TMI 234 - SUPREME COURT], the facts of that case revolved around a contract entered into between ONGC and Forasol for carrying out structural drilling in relation to the exploration of oil in the Jaisalmer area. The contract mandated a part payment in the foreign currency i.e., French francs. Due to belligerent situation prevalent between India and Pakistan in 1965, the contract was suspended.
We are unable to agree with the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant that the NCDRC has gone beyond the decree and the NCDRC ought not to have gone into clause 17 are meritless hence rejected. In a case of this nature the only remedy available to the court is either to look at the terms of the contract or in the absence of the same to follow the procedure laid down by this court in the above stated judgment. The order passed by NCDRC is strictly in accordance with the settled legal position and we do not find any infirmity with the order.
Without undertaking a piece meal approach as suggested by the appellant herein, interpreting the decree in a manner which may amount to substitution of a new decree is not countenanced under law. Therefore, it is clear that as per the insurance contract, the respondent insurer was required to pay the insurance claim in accordance with the conversion rate of the invoiced foreign currency in Indian rupee as per the bank buying rate of interest at Mumbai on the date of subject shipment for which the invoice was issued.
There are no grounds to interfere with the order of the NCDRC which is based on sound principles of law - appeal dismissed.
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2018 (5) TMI 1955 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Denial of registration to the students who acquired qualification of ANM/GNM from the Singhania University - he Singhania University is established by law - HELD THAT:- Once the controversy has already been adjudicated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of B.L. ASAWA VERSUS STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ORS. [1982 (3) TMI 282 - SUPREME COURT] then there is no question to hold that any error has been committed by the learned Single Judge in directing the appellant RNC so as to deny the registration on the pretext that recognition is necessary from the appellant Rajasthan Nusing Council.
If any University is established by law and imparting the course in the form of diploma and degree or qualification, that cannot be questioned by the appellant RNC for the purpose of registration.
Appeal dismissed.
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2018 (5) TMI 1952 - SC ORDER
Negligence and incorrect assessments without proper appreciation of evidence - appellant is a retired Commissioner of Income Tax, who was charge-sheeted by the Under Secretary, Central Board of Direct Taxes on 13.09.2002 - HELD THAT:- The appellant has since retired in the year 2014. We notice that, on facts, there is a massive unexplained delay of 9 years between the date of the Enquiry Report and the date of the show cause notice. It is obvious that the Disciplinary Authority, if it is going to upset the Enquiry Report, must do so within a reasonable period of time, which reasonable period has long since elapsed.
Appeal allowed.
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2018 (5) TMI 1939 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Condonation of delay of 65 of days in filing - Time limitation - grant of Arbitral award - Section 5 of the Limitation Act - HELD THAT:- A careful reading of the application would show that the application is highly casual in nature, it lacks material particulars and does not disclose sufficient cause for condoning the delay.
While considering the application seeking condonation of delay, the period of delay is not the criteria. A short delay may not be condoned in the absence of an acceptable explanation while a large delay may be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory. Courts cannot lose track of the fact that normally after the expiry of the period, the right to sue extinguishes and the other side acquires a right which should not be usually disturbed as it would cause injustice to the opposite party.
In this case, the application seeking condonation of delay is completely silent as to when the certified copy of the impugned judgment was received and the causes for the delay in filing the present appeal. Reading of the application would show that delay was caused on account of times spent in seeking opinion from some counsel - This in our view cannot be treated as sufficient grounds as no details have been provided and only a bald statement has been made. In the absence of any satisfactory explanation, it cannot be said that the delay was caused due to bonafide reasons and not on account of negligence or inaction. The Court cannot lose track of the fact that the appellant is not an illiterate litigant but a company which admittedly has its own legal department which is evident from reading para 2 of the application.
Application dismissed.
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2018 (5) TMI 1919 - SUPREME COURT
Condonation of delay of 15 years and 54 days in filing written statement - Failure to refund the money or handover possession of certain flats - recovery of dues allegedly payable by the respondents to the appellant of about ₹ 11.9 crores with additional interest - HELD THAT:- The circumstance which weighed with the High Court in condoning the delay was that though the suit was filed in the year 2000, summons were served only in the year 2009. Plea of the appellant that summons were actually served in the year 2000 itself was not accepted. On this basis, the High Court came to the conclusion that since appellant itself took time of 9 years after institution or following of the suit, to serve the summons upon the respondents herein, equities were balanced by allowing the respondents to file the written statement, more so, when no irreparable loss or prejudice was caused to the appellant and no case of mala fides was made out against the respondents.
It has to be borne in mind that as per the provisions of Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the defendant is obligated to present a written statement of his defence within thirty days from the date of service of summons. Proviso thereto enables the Court to extend the period upto ninety days from the date of service of summons for sufficient reasons - In such a situation, onus upon the defendant is of a higher degree to plead and satisfactorily demonstrate a valid reason for not filing the written statement within thirty days.
This reason of the High Court that delay was condoned ‘by balancing the rights and equities’ is farfetched and, in the process, abnormal delay in filing the written statement is condoned without addressing the relevant factor, viz. whether the respondents had furnished proper and satisfactory explanation for such a delay. The approach of the High Court is clearly erroneous in law and cannot be countenanced - Notice of Motion seeking condonation of delay was rejected - Appeal allowed.
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2018 (5) TMI 1888 - SC ORDER
Extension of time to comply with the order - HELD THAT:- The time to comply with the order dated 28.3.2018 passed by this Court, is extended by four weeks. It is, however, made clear that no further extension in this regard will be granted.
Application disposed off.
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2018 (5) TMI 1874 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Territorial jurisdiction - plea of the appellant is that the proceedings can be instituted where instituting party is residing or carrying on its business - Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 - HELD THAT:- No doubt, the appellant has an office at Bhopal but according to the averments in the plaint the violation of the Trade Mark took place at Rajpur, District Barwani, Madhya Pradesh.
The Court at Bangalore has jurisdiction to decide the case in accordance with law - appeal allowed.
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2018 (5) TMI 1834 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Decree for recovery - It was the case of the Plaintiff that it is only after complete satisfaction of the work carried out is done under Rules 65 to 69 of the Electricity Rules, that the fees for inspection by the electrical inspector is paid - Held that:- A perusal of the evidence and the pleadings on record clearly shows that the only justification being raised to withhold the payment was non-certification by REL, the obligation of which was not upon the Plaintiff. In the absence of any deficiencies being pointed out in the work executed by the Plaintiff, there can be no justification in withholding payments. The arrangement between the Defendant and its own Joint Venture Partner i.e. REL is an internal arrangement between them, and the Plaintiff cannot be saddled with outstanding amounts in this manner owing to their own internal issues. The Defendant having not led any evidence whatsoever to justify the withholding of the payment and having not pointed out any deficiencies in the work executed and further having deducted the TDS and deposit of the said tax with the government for the entire bill amount, there can be no justification in withholding the outstanding payments.
The witness of the Defendant categorically admits that this contract was not a part of the work order between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. Though the electrical inspector’s approval is required for all installations, Clause 1.1 (h) does not fix the burden of obtaining the inspector’s approval upon the Plaintiff/Contractor. As stated by the Plaintiff’s witness, it was the Defendant’s responsibility and in fact the Defendant had paid the fee required for obtaining the electrical inspector’s approval. It is clear that it was the Defendant’s responsibility to get the approval of the electrical inspector.
Appeal dismissed - decided against appellant.
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2018 (5) TMI 1825 - SUPREME COURT
Validity of Section 4(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Ministers (Salaries, Allowances and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1981 - allotment of government accommodation to former Chief Minister - conflict with the provisions of Section 4 of the 1981 Act - principles of equality - State of Uttar Pradesh has sought to defeat the writ petition by contending that the same being Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India a direct infringement of the fundamental rights of the Petitioner must be established which is nowhere apparent even on a close scrutiny - maintainability of petition.
Whether retention of official accommodation by the functionaries mentioned in Section 4(3) of the 1981 Act after they had demitted office violate the equality Clause guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution of India?
Held that:- While it is true that Article 32 of the Constitution is to be invoked for enforcement of the fundamental rights of a citizen or a non citizen, as may be, and there must be a violation or infringement thereof we have moved away from the theory of infringement of the fundamental rights of an individual citizen or non citizen to one of infringement of rights of a class. In fact, the above transformation is the foundation of what had developed as an independent and innovative stream of jurisprudence called "Public Interest Litigation" or class action - Along with the aforesaid shift in the judicial thinking there has been an equally important shift from the classical test (classification test) for the purpose of enquiry with regard to infringement of the equality Clause Under Article 14 of the Constitution of India to, what may be termed, a more dynamic test of arbitrariness.
The allocation of government bungalows to constitutional functionaries enumerated in Section 4(3) of the 1981 Act after such functionaries demit public office(s) would be clearly subject to judicial review on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This is particularly so as such bungalows constitute public property which by itself is scarce and meant for use of current holders of public offices. The above is manifested by the institution of Section 4-A in the 1981 Act by the Amendment Act of 1997 (Act 8 of 1997). The questions relating to allocation of such property, therefore, undoubtedly, are questions of public character and, therefore, the same would be amenable for being adjudicated on the touchstone of reasonable classification as well as arbitrariness.
The present Petitioner had earlier approached this Court Under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the 1997 Rules. Not only the said writ petition was entertained but the 1997 Rules were, in fact, struck down. In doing so, this Court had, inter alia, considered the validity of the 1997 Rules in the light of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The insertion of Section 4(3) by the 2016 Amendment as a substantive provision of the statute when the 1997 Rules to the same effect were declared invalid by the Court would require the curing of the invalidity found by this Court in the matter of allotment of government accommodation to former Chief Ministers.
Natural resources, public lands and the public goods like government bungalows/official residence are public property that belongs to the people of the country. The 'Doctrine of Equality' which emerges from the concepts of justice, fairness must guide the State in the distribution/allocation of the same. The Chief Minister, once he/she demits the office, is at par with the common citizen, though by virtue of the office held, he/she may be entitled to security and other protocols. But allotment of government bungalow, to be occupied during his/her lifetime, would not be guided by the constitutional principle of equality.
Not only that the legislation i.e. Section 4(3) of the 1981 Act recognizing former holders of public office as a special class of citizens, viewed in the aforesaid context, would appear to be arbitrary and discriminatory thereby violating the equality clause. It is a legislative exercise based on irrelevant and legally unacceptable considerations, unsupported by any constitutional sanctity.
Thus, Section 4(3) of the 1981 Act cannot pass the test of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and is, therefore, liable to be struck down - Section 4(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Ministers (Salaries, Allowances and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1981 is ultra vires the Constitution of India as it transgresses the equality Clause Under Article 14 - petition allowed.
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2018 (5) TMI 1806 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Release on Bail - sections 109 read with section 120B IPC and 13(2) and 13[(1) (e) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Held that:- Without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case and considering the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the sentence awardable to the applicants, the applicants Garima Bhushan and Karuna Singh are entitled to be released on bail.
As regards Sunny Yadav, we are not inclined to grant him bail, hence, his bail application is accordingly rejected.
Registrar General is directed to send a copy of this order to the trial court for necessary information and compliance forthwith.
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