|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 628 Records
-
2004 (1) TMI 671 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... efore, the expenses incurred towards wharfage, etc., have been incurred by dealer. The fact that the aforesaid two parties have raised the bill in favour of the dealer and had charged the tax and deposited with their assessing officer is not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that the alleged cement have been imported by the aforesaid two parties, against their form XXXI and not by the dealer-opposite party against their form XXXI. In view of the fact that the Revenue has failed to prove that the railway receipts were endorsed in favour of the party during the movement of goods and the provisions of section 3(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act was applicable Tribunal has rightly treated the purchase by the dealer-opposite party from M/s. Janki Prasad and Sons, Lucknow and M/s. Hindustan Automobile, Kanpur, within the State of U.P. and has rightly declared the sales of such cement within the State of U.P. non-taxable. In the result, both the revisions, fail and are dismissed.
-
2004 (1) TMI 670 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... d hair or to clean, brush and generally smarten . Thus, any article used in dressing, or dressing hair or grooming, will have to be considered as a toilet article. The Allahabad High Court in Jai Shri Products 1974 34 STC 494 FB , and the Bombay High Court in Navarang Plastics 1975 35 STC 510, have held that hairpins and hair clips are toilet requisites, that is toilet articles, as they are used to hold hair in place after combing or after brushing. We respectfully agree. In common parlance also, hairpins, hair bands (elastic and plastic) and hair clips are treated as part of toiletry or toilet articles as they are used to keep the hair in place after grooming/dressing the hair. It is well-settled that the entries in the schedule should be interpreted with reference to their meaning attributed in common parlance by persons trading in them or using them. We therefore find no error in the clarification/advance ruling given by the authority. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
-
2004 (1) TMI 669 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nal what emerges is that in the absence of the material placed by the petitioner with regard to the prevailing market price of such goods in the local area on the date of entry of the goods to the local area, while the assessing authority has added 15.5 per cent to the price shown by the petitioner in stock transfer, the first appellate authority has modified it to ten per cent which is made applicable both for refrigerators and air-conditioners and its parts. The said order was affirmed by the Tribunal which is the second appellate authority. Therefore, we are unable to accede to the submission of Sri Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the assessing officer as well as the first appellate authority and the second appellate authority have proceeded to determine the entry tax on the basis of the sale price. In the light of the discussion made above, this petition is liable to be rejected. Accordingly, it is rejected. However, no order is made as to costs.
-
2004 (1) TMI 668 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... least same should have been considered on merits. It is also to be noted that when appellant on coming to know of dismissal of his revision, applied for restoration of the same then lenient view of the matter should have been taken so as to meet the ends of justice. From the conduct and attitude of the authority concerned, it appears that doors of justice were closed for present appellant at the threshold itself which does not appear to be proper and reasonable to us. In the light of aforesaid discussion, we hereby set aside order passed by the learned single Judge as also that of the Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Tax, dated April 10, 2003 and March 20, 2002 and restore appellant 39 s revision to file to be heard and disposed of on merits at an early date. Appellant agree that it shall appear before said revisional authority on February 10, 2004 for further participation. Appeal, therefore, stands allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove, but with no order as to costs.
-
2004 (1) TMI 667 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
... ...
... ... ..... dent-authorities. We have also gone through the impugned orders of C.T.O., A.C. and the D.C. The D.C. in his Order dated January 6, 2003 has given in detail the reasons as to why he affirms both the order of seizure and the order of penalty. In view of the reliable documentary evidence submitted we agree with the finding and the reasons behind the finding as made by the D.C. in his order dated January 6, 2003. That being the case we find the seizure as made is legal and valid. In the background of the mala fide intention for evading sales tax in the way as stated and in view of the reduction already made in the amount of penalty from Rs. 1,75,000 to Rs. 1,05,705 by the revisional authority, we do not find any reason to interfere with the decision. As such both the points are decided against the petitioner. The application therefore fails. Ordered that the application be and the same is dismissed without any order as to costs. S.S. CHATTOPADHYAY (Technical Member). - I agree.
-
2004 (1) TMI 666 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 8 cannot give any benefit to the assessee. (Emphasis Here italicised. supplied). MODVAT credit does not operate as a reduction or discount in the purchase price paid to the supplier. MODVAT is only a procedure whereby the manufacturer utilises the credit for specific excise duty on inputs against duty payable on the final product. MODVAT credit taken on inputs is in the nature of set-off available against the payment of excise duty on the final product. Therefore, the decisions relating to cost for purposes of excise duty, have no relevance for determining the value of goods under section 2(A)(8a) of the KTEG Act for purposes of entry tax. We therefore hold that for determining the value of goods for levy of entry tax, MODVAT credit availed by assessee on such goods cannot be deducted. The assessing officer was justified in rejecting the request for deducting Rs. 57,65,64,884 in determining the taxable turnover. The petitions have no merit and accordingly they are dismissed.
-
2004 (1) TMI 665 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... se as stated above, the goods were accompanied by the requisite documents as contemplated under section 28-A of the Act. The declaration was made voluntarily at the check-post and, therefore, it cannot be said to be a case of attempt to evade tax. The slight difference in the description of the goods cannot be a ground for seizure of the goods and for the levy of penalty under section 15-A(1)(o) of the Act. The difference in the description of the goods, if at all, has effect in the assessment proceeding, hence the same may be considered at the time of assessment. For the reasons stated above, I do not find any justification for the levy of penalty under section 15-A(1)(o) of the Act and accordingly, I do not find any justification in remanding back the case to the assessing officer. Penalty is accordingly, quashed. In the result, revision is allowed. Order of Tribunal dated February 26, 1994 is set aside and the penalty levied under section 15-A(1)(o) of the Act is quashed.
-
2004 (1) TMI 664 - JHARKHAND HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e date of application as reasonable and has provided that interest should be paid after the expiry of six months. This scheme of the Act cannot be defeated by the respondents by a lethargic approach. On receipt of an application for refund, it is their duty to look into the relevant documents in time and to make the refund in time and with interest, if necessary as envisaged by the statute, if they are not able to complete the process within the stipulated time. We, therefore, direct the respondents to verify as undertaken by them in paragraph 7 of the supplementary counter-affidavit, the details of payment which have been made and refund what is found further payable, expeditiously. This exercise would be completed by the respondents within six weeks of the receipt of a copy of this order. Obviously, whatever interest is payable under section 43 of the Bihar Finance Act will also have to be paid to the petitioner. The writ petitions is disposed of with the above directions.
-
2004 (1) TMI 663 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ate sale of sugar . . . . It is thus clear that the assessing authority had proceeded on the basis that the learned single Judge had directed him to grant exemption and then complete the assessment, which he has accordingly done. In the result, the appeal is allowed, judgment of the learned single Judge dated December 18, 2002 set aside and O.P. No. 35879 of 2002 dismissed. The assessing officer will now proceed to make the assessment in accordance with law after taking into account all the contentions raised by the company in its detailed replies to the aforesaid notices and pass a speaking order thereon. Since we have set aside the judgment of the learned single Judge, the consequential order(s) passed by the assessing officer during the pendency of the writ appeal is/are also set aside and the assessing authority will proceed to make the assessment in accordance with law de hors the observations/directions issued by the learned single Judge. There is no order as to costs.
-
2004 (1) TMI 662 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nterest could be levied on the petitioner by the assessing authority looking to the facts involved in the case. Learned counsel for the State placing reliance on section 27 of the Act contended that power to impose interest being available with the taxing authorities, no fault can be found in imposition of interest. I am inclined to accept what is urged by the learned counsel for the State. It cannot be disputed that in a taxing statute what is required to be seen is whether there exists power to impose an interest on delayed payment of tax in accordance with the provision of the Act? If under Reported at page 423 supra. these circumstance, the taxing authorities have imposed interest on the petitioner then it cannot be faulted with being against the provision of Act, or de hors the Act, or without authority of law. 12.. In view of aforesaid discussion, I find no merit in these writs. As a consequence, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
-
2004 (1) TMI 661 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ree months. In the instant case, the application was submitted as early as on June 20, 2001. In spite of directions issued by this Court, the application was disposed of only on June 8, 2003, that is approximately after two years. Therefore, I direct the second respondent to take a decision on exhibit P8 application afresh within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The second respondent will pass a reasoned order adverting to the various documents produced or to be produced by the petitioner in support of the contention that the petitioner has taken effective steps for setting up the industrial unit prior to the first day of January, 2000. The interim stay already granted will continue till orders are passed as directed and communicated to the petitioner. Original petition is disposed of as above. Order on C.M.P. No. 1488 of 2003 in O.P. No. 8563 of 2003 disposed of vide Judgment dated January 7, 2004. Petition disposed of accordingly.
-
2004 (1) TMI 660 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... n either view of the matter, I am of the opinion that there is no scope to include a person like the petitioner-bank as a person falling within the meaning of a person or persons as contemplated under section 13(2-A) of the Act who can file an application seeking waiver or reduction of the penalty amount. It is held that the petitioner-bank cannot be a person who can seek the relief under section 13(2-A) of the Act on an interpretation of this provision. 25.. There is no need to look into the other disputed aspects such as if the order had been passed earlier as it would not make any difference on the outcome of the ultimate result. For the same reason petitioner cannot also question the legality of a demand which includes interest or penalty on any outstanding amount due under the Act. 26.. In the result there is no merit in the writ petition for interference as prayed for in the exercise of writ jurisdiction. Writ petition is accordingly dismissed. Writ petition dismissed.
-
2004 (1) TMI 659 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... tition. 2.. During the pendency of the writ petition, the petitioner has been granted permission to change the land use vide letter dated June 9, 2003, annexure P. 17. Request of the petitioner for the grant of eligibility certificate in view of the subsequent event, i.e, grant of permission of change of land use was declined by Higher Level Screening Committee on September 15, 2003 on the ground that his case has already been decided by the Committee and the matter is sub-judice in the High Court. 3.. In view of the subsequent event of granting permission of change of land use, the order declining eligibility certificate to the petitioner is set aside. The Higher Level Screening Committee is directed to decide the claim of grant of eligibility certificate in view of the changed circumstances such as the grant of change of land use certificate on June 9, 2003 vide annexure P 17. 4.. With the said observation the writ petition is disposed of. Petition disposed of accordingly.
-
2004 (1) TMI 658 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... a country spirit and not liable to tax. Tribunal further observed that merely because duty had been charged by assessee on the sale of molasses spirit, it could not be treated other than country liquor. 6.. Learned Standing Counsel is not able to show any material by which a distinction can be drawn between plain molasses spirit and molasses spirit. Certificate of Excise department shows that country liquor (country spirit) includes plain molasses spirit and merely because dealer had charged duty on the sale of molasses spirit its real nature cannot be disputed and it cannot be treated other than of country liquor. I do not find any error in the order of Tribunal. View taken by the Tribunal that molasses spirit is country liquor is based on certificate of Excise department which has not been disputed by the Revenue. In the absence of any contrary material no interference is called for. 7.. In the result, revision lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.
-
2004 (1) TMI 657 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... grounds are relevant and have a nexus with the formation of belief regarding escaped assessment, the assessing authority would be clothed with jurisdiction to take action under this section. The same view has been taken in the case of Samrat Trading Company v. State of U.P. 2003 UPTC 1269, in which following the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer 1961 41 ITR 191 (SC) and a division Bench decision of this court in Harbans Lal Malhotra v. Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax, Ghaziabad 1997 107 STC 98 1994 UPTC 1041, the proceedings under section 21 on mere change of opinion was quashed. In view of the above we are of the opinion that the impugned notice dated January 16, 2003 and initiation of reassessment proceedings for the assessment years 1996-1997 to 1999-2000 both under the U.P. Sales Tax Act and Central Sales Tax Act are illegal and they are hereby quashed. Petition is allowed. No order as to costs.
-
2004 (1) TMI 656 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... RFO and furnace oil have admittedly been used in the manufacture of camphor and allied products for which recognition certificate was granted. Hence it cannot be deemed that the petitioner has issued any wrong or false certificate. It is evident from the facts that the petitioner has not issued any wrong or false certificate or declaration in form III-B inasmuch as both RFO and furnace oil have been used for the same purpose, namely, in the process of manufacture of goods, i.e., camphor, and another allied products. 32.. In these circumstances, the order of respondent No. 2 for the assessment year 2000-2001 dated January 24, 2003 in Writ Petition No. 318 of 2003 and the order dated March 31, 2003 for the assessment year 2001-2002 in Writ Petition No. 682 of 2003, in so far as they relates to imposition of tax under section 3-B of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 is concerned, are illegal and are quashed. 33.. The petition is allowed. No order as to costs. Writ petition allowed.
-
2004 (1) TMI 655 - JHARKHAND HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... d that the petitioner was not quite diligent. It applied for electric connection in September, 1995 but the same was given on December 22, 2000, i.e., after a delay of about five years but it did not take this delay seriously. Even after the said notification was published in March, 2000, the petitioner applied for prior permission for the first time in June, 2000 and that too not before the proper authority. In Hitech Electrothermics and Hydropower Ltd. case 2003 129 STC 464, the Supreme Court exercised its power under article 142 of the Constitution of India, which we cannot. The said notifications were issued under the said Industrial Policy of 1995. As already noted, there was no prior permission in favour of the petitioner, prior to expiry of the policy. 11.. After considering the case from different angles, we are of the view that no relief can be granted to the petitioner, as prayed for. In the result, these writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. Petitions dismissed.
-
2004 (1) TMI 654 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... refore, we do not consider it a fit case for directing the first respondent to refund the amount collected as tax. It is open to the petitioner to seek a refund from the State Government under section 18-AA(4) of the Act. As and when such application is made, the State Government will have to consider and dispose of the same in accordance with law and the observations made above. 25.. Accordingly, we allow this writ petition in part as follows (i) Damaged wheat and rice sold by FCI as fit for cattle/poultry feed will fall under entry 15 of the Fifth Schedule (from April 1, 1998 and earlier under entries 64 and 40A of the Fifth Schedule) and therefore exempted from tax. (ii) The demand dated May 30, 2000 made by first respondent for payment of sales tax and cess (annexure L) is quashed. (iii) Liberty is reserved to petitioner to seek and obtain refund of tax from the State Government in accordance with law. (iv) Parties to bear their respective costs. Petition partly allowed.
-
2004 (1) TMI 653 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ere a decree has been passed on the equitable mortgage created by the defaulter in favour of the bank and the question was left open, the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in 2002 126 STC 1 (2002) 10 KTR 366 (State of Madhya Pradesh v. State of Bank of Indore) covers the said question also where the Supreme Court has taken the view that even in cases where a decree has been obtained by the bank prior to the creation of the charge in favour of the State, still the State will have a priority over the debts due to the bank. The division Bench of this Court by the judgment in W.A. No. 74 of 2003 (printed below), in the case of Indian Bank, relying upon the aforesaid decisions, rejected a similar contention taken by the State Bank. 25.. In the light of the above authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court and the division Bench of this Court mentioned above, there is no merit in these writ petitions. Writ petitions are accordingly dismissed. Writ petitions dismissed.
-
2004 (1) TMI 652 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ory right. This right is notwithstanding even a provision to the contrary contained in any other law. Thus, it would override a right under any agreement, etc. In view of the statutory right vesting in the State, the view taken by the learned single Judge is correct. 5. Mr. Subramani submits that the land was mortgaged with the bank prior to the raising of demand by the State. He submits that the bank being a secured creditor, it was entitled to recover the amount due. 6.. The issue has been considered by their Lordship of the Supreme Court in Dena Bank v. Bhikhabhai Prabhudas Parekh Co. 2000 120 STC 610 (SC) (2000) 5 SCC 694, and State of Madhya Pradedsh v. State Bank of Indore 2002 126 STC 1 (SC) (2002) 10 KTR 366. The ratio of these decisions is clear. It has been held that the public dues will have precedence over all others. 7.. No other point has been raised. 8.. In view of the above, we find no merit in this appeal. It is consequently dismissed. Writ appeal dismissed.
........
|
