|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 181 to 200 of 2844 Records
-
2015 (10) TMI 2673 - CESTAT, NEW DELHI
CENVAT credit - outdoor catering service - denial on account of nexus - Held that: - reliance placed in the case of CCE Nagpur vs Ultratech Cements Ltd. [2010 (10) TMI 13 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] wherein it has been held that service tax paid by the employer on the outdoor catering service shall be eligible for cenvat credit - appeal dismissed - decided against Revenue.
-
2015 (10) TMI 2672 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Interpretation of statute - Section 18(3) of the Act - whether the petitioners are entitled to get back their Input Tax Credit on Zero Rate Sales, after the prescribed statutory period given under Section 18 of the Act?
Held that: - there is no dispute that the petitioners herein have filed the monthly returns in the form of Form-I in time by which they claim the refund of Input Tax Credit from the respondents. The respondents herein have turned down their request in refunding the Input Tax Credit on the primary ground that such claim is beyond the statutory period - It is true that the Input Tax Credit is a concession but such concession is extended to the Companies/Dealers in order to encourage them to do exports by which the foreign exchange will flow into the Country and give a fillip to the economy of our State or Country as the case may be. In a given situation, necessarily, this Court will have to answer as to whether, it can use its discretionary power by interpreting Section 18(3) of the Act.
When admittedly there is no dispute that the petitioners have exported the goods, the technicalities shall not stand in the way of claiming refund of Input Tax Credit in the form of 'Form W' - a direction is issued to the respondents herein to the effect that if the petitioners after following the conditions stipulated in Form-W issued by the respondents, except the time limit, the respondents shall then consider the claim of the petitioners afresh as per Section 22(2) of the Act, within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
Petition allowed by way of remand.
-
2015 (10) TMI 2671 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Delegation of powers - powers delegated to the Collector of Central Excise - offences punishable under Section 9 of the Central Excise Salt Act 1944 - omission of Rule 56A - the allegations against the accused were that in pursuance to the permission granted on 07/07/1983, the credit of ₹ 1,17,35,014/- was permissible, but instead, by making a dishonest and deliberate double entries of credit of the said amount, impermissible credit in the sum of ₹ 1,17,35,014/- was taken and thus an offence under the aforestated provisions were committed - effect of omission of Rule 56A on pending a complaint before the trial Court.
Whether the prosecution can subsist after omission of Rule 56A without a saving clause? - whether Sections and 3 and 38A of the Act or Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would be able to save the situation?
Held that: - While addressing the issue arising under Section 38A of the Act, it was observed that Section 38A operates in respect of amendment, repeal, supersession or rescinding of any rule, notification or order, but not in the eventuality of an omission. It was explained that omission and repeal are different things and omission does not amount to repeal. The Court also referred the dictionary meaning of 'rescind' and 'amend' and observed that the same are not synonymous with the word 'omit'. It was thus held that Section 38A of the Act would not save any obligation, liability etc. acquired, accrued or incurred under any rule, order or notification which has been omitted. Similar fact situation is prevalent in the present case and therefore on omission of the rule in absence of savings, the proceedings under Section 138A of the Act in question would not be saved.
Similar is the fact situation in the present case. As indicated earlier, the relevant notification in this case also does not make any provision akin to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. It also does not make any provision continuing the liabilities incurred under Rule 56A.
Immediately on omission of Rule56A during the pendency of the complaint, it is deemed to have disappeared from the statute book and therefore it can no more be relied upon. Consequently, no prosecution initiated during the subsistence of Rule 56A can continue after its omission and therefore penal consequences flowing therefrom would cease. It therefore can be said that the act or omission on the part of the petitioner was not punishable on and after the date of ‘omission’ of Rule 56A and in view of above discussion, the introduction of Section 38A with specified savings would not come to the aid of the prosecution as the act which was not punishable on omission cannot be punishable by virtue of explanation to Section 38A.
The trial Court failed to address the legal proposition in its true perspective. It is settled legal position that though at the time of considering the application for discharge, the Court is not obliged to appreciate the evidence, but certainly it is required to see the evidence with an object to find out as to whether the material justifies framing the charge and whether the charge, if framed on the basis of existing material, would be groundless or not? The endavour of the Court would be to examine the material available and find out whether the material is good for trial. The charge would be certainly groundless if it is framed in ignorance of settled proposition of law on a given subject.
This Court has reason to interfere with the impugned order in exercise of powers conferred under Section 397 of the Cr.PC and thus the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside and the application for discharge deserves to be accepted - application allowed.
-
2015 (10) TMI 2670 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Winding up proceedings - proof required by the petitioning creditor to prove his case in the winding up application - Held that:- The standard of proof required by the petitioning creditor to prove his case in the winding up application is the same standard that is required to prove a plaintiff’s case in a summary suit. (see SRC Steel Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Bharat Industrial Corporation Ltd. - 2004 (8) TMI 684 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT).
The company must be in a completely defenceless position. It would suffice if the company raised a triable issue, for relegation of the winding up application to a civil forum.
From all the discussion it is absolutely clear that the company has been able to prima facie establish a strong case that the goods that the petitioning creditor shipped were in fact in lieu of payment for the goods shipped to them by Concast Bengal in 2009. Both the shipments have been proved by invoices, delivery, payment of VAT and so on. But there is no evidence of either party making payment of the price. There is also strong evidence produced by the company to show that each of the companies of the Concast Group was a part of one entity and carried on business as one entity. Shipment of goods by the petitioning creditor in 2011 was sufficient to extinguish its liability for the goods that it received in 2009.
The argument regarding equitable set off is premature, in my opinion. It has to be seen, upon scrutiny of the evidence at the trial whether the arrangement between the parties was such that the setting off took place at the time of the transaction or was it pleaded for the first time in the affidavits in opposition. That would determine whether the set off was legal or equitable and whether it could be claimed.
Having advanced a substantial defence there is no question of a winding up order being passed. The defence is so substantial that I am not even inclined to ask the company to provide security.
This winding up applications are disposed of, by refusing to admit the same and relegating the petitioning creditor to a civil remedy as available to it. The period during which these winding up applications have been pending in this Court may be excluded to compute limitation under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
-
2015 (10) TMI 2669 - SC ORDER
Entitlement to the benefit of Section 80P(2)(a)(i)denied - whether assessee is a Primary Co-operative Bank, thus hit by the exclusion provided in Section 80P(4)? - HC held that the three conditions as provided under Section 5 (CVV) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, are to be satisfied cumulatively and except condition (2) the other two qualifying conditions are not satisfied. Ergo, appellant cannot be considered to be a co-operative bank for the purposes of Section 80P(4) of the Act. Thus, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of deduction available under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) - Held that:- Delay condoned. Leave granted.
-
2015 (10) TMI 2668 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
Refund claim - rejection on the ground of time limitation - Held that: - appellant was required to file refund claim within 60 days from the date of end of relevant quarter. Admittedly, the refund claim is filed beyond that period of limitation - As refund claim has been filed beyond prescribed time limit under N/N. 41/2007-S.T., therefore, refund claim is barred by limitation - appeal dismissed - decided against appellant.
-
2015 (10) TMI 2667 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Recovery of service tax amount from the service recipient - scope and interpretation of the agreement - Lease agreement - Rent and the maintenance charges - declaration and injunction qua the service tax paid in respect of rented premises - Held that: - whether the service tax liability has been agreed not to be passed on to the recipient of the service would depend on the interpretation of clauses entered into between the parties - a contract has to be construed by looking at the document as a whole and the meaning of the document has to be what the parties intended to give to the document keeping the background in mind and conclusion that flouts business commonsense must yield unless expressly stated. In the present case it will also have to borne in mind whether the parties intend to include taxes which were not contemplated at the time of the agreement as indubitably the agreements between the parties in the three suits were entered into prior to the Finance Act, 2007 coming into force w.e.f. June 01, 2007.
In the agreement between HDFC Bank and Meattles Clause 4(v) imposes liability of municipal taxes, rates, charges and other outgoings in respect of the demised premises that would be determined/fixed/varied from time to time by the Municipal Corporation/Municipality/Gram Panchayat or any other local authority only. It is well settled that the Municipal Corporation, Municipality, Gram Panchayat or local authority is distinct from the government and thus the clause inter se the parties cannot be said to cover the exemption of HDFC Bank to pay to Meattles service tax paid by it to the government pursuant to the Finance Act, 2007.
Appeal dismissed - decided against appellant.
-
2015 (10) TMI 2665 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Memorandum of Settlement - Held that:- Memorandum of Settlement is recorded and the Company Petition is closed in terms of the settlement. Memorandum of settlement dated 12.10.2015 shall form part of this order. However, it is made clear that in case of default of any of the conditions, as agreed to by the parties in the Memorandum of settlement, the petitioner is at liberty to revive the company petition. Consequently, connected Applications are closed.
-
2015 (10) TMI 2664 - ITAT LUCKNOW
Registration u/s 12AA denied - non establishment of carrying out activities for charitable purposes - assessee incurred expenses in all the three years on account of National Championship, State Championship and affiliation entry fees was also paid to Wrestling Federation of India - Held that:- We find that the query letter issued by the Ld. CIT (Exemptions) on 11.03.2015 is available and as per the reply submitted by the assessee before Ld. CIT (Exemptions), we find that on all the query of the Ld. CIT (Exemptions), reply of the assessee was submitted before Ld. CIT (Exemptions) along with copy of letter of confirmation of affiliation by Wrestling Federation of India and U.P. Olympic Association.
In the facts of the present case, when the assessee has produced independent evidence to establish regarding its charitable activities by submitting certificate from Wrestling Federation of India and U.P. Olympic Association and when as per receipt and payment amount of the assessee for the last three years ending on 31.03.2012, 31.03.2013 and 31.03.2014, the assessee is incurring expenses on account of National Championship and State Championship and paid affiliation and entry fees to Wrestling Federation of India, the claim of the assessee cannot be rejected on this basis alone that books of accounts were not produced. Such affiliation certificate from Wrestling Federation of India and Uttar Pradesh Olympic Association are available on pages 9 and 10 of the paper book before us also. This is not the case of the Ld. CIT (Exemptions) that promoting Wrestling is not charitable activities. We feel that the assessee deserves registration u/s 12AA. Appeal of the assessee is allowed.
-
2015 (10) TMI 2663 - SUPREME COURT
Rectification of Revenue Records by incorporating their names as owners and possessors in respect of the suit land - Held that:- In the instant case, the plaintiffs joined together and filed the suit for rectification of the revenue record by incorporating their names as the owners and possessors in respect of the suit land on the ground inter alia that after the death of their predecessor-in-title, who was admittedly the Pattadar and Khatadar, the plaintiffs succeeded the estate as sharers being the sons of Khatadar. Indisputably, therefore, all the plaintiffs had equal shares in the suit property left by their predecessors. Hence, in the event of death of any of the plaintiffs, the estate is fully and substantially represented by the other sharers as owners of the suit property. We are, therefore, of the view that by reason of non-substitution of the legal representative(s) of the deceased plaintiffs, who died during the pendency of the appeal in the High Court, entire appeal shall not stand abated. Remaining sharers, having definite shares in the estate of the deceased, shall be entitled to proceed with the appeal without the appeal having been abated. We, therefore, do not find any reason to agree with the submission made by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants.
In the instant case, although the Trial Court decided the Interlocutory Application for injunction not only on consideration of documentary evidence, but also admission made by the appellant State admitting possession of the plaintiff over the suit land but in the final judgment, no finding recorded with regard to possession of the suit land except that these documents do not prove title of the plaintiff on the suit land.
One of the learned Judges of the Division Bench on consideration of all the documentary evidence and the Revenue Records recorded the finding in favour of the plaintiff. The said finding of the learned judges has been affirmed and upheld by the learned third Judge of the High Court and allowed the appeal and set aside the finding of the Trial Court.
We have given our thoughtful consideration on the finding recorded by the learned Judges of the Division Bench and finding recorded by the third learned Judge to whom the matter was referred for passing the final judgment. In our view, there is no material on the record to reverse the finding of the two learned Judges of the High Court.
-
2015 (10) TMI 2662 - ITAT MUMBAI
TDS on commission payment - nature of payment- Held that:- We find that the agreement governing the commission was changed during the year under appeal, that the commission was to be paid after the receipt of the sale proceeds as per the new agreement, that the assessee had filed details of foreign commission for the year under consideration as per the revised agreement, that the details are available at page no.9 of the paper-book. A perusal of the details clearly show the full foreign commission expenses for the year under appeal and lead to the conclusion that the assessee had correctly made a claim about it. In our opinion, the said expenditure cannot be treated as prior period expenses. In our opinion, it is not necessary that agreement should be registered to be a valid agreement. We do not find any – thing illegal or wrong in the method adopted by the assessee for the year under appeal, So, we are reversing the order of the FAA and deciding the ground no.1 in favour of the assessee.
Addition on account of netting off of interest - treatment as ‘income from other sources' - Held that:- We find that the assessee had netted off the interest and made necessary entries in the books of account, that remaining interest was capitalised as stipulated by AS-16, that the loan taken by it was a term loan, that it could not be used for any other purpose except for the object it was taken, that due to delay in commissioning the plant it had parked the loan money with the bank. In our opinion, interest earned by it was directly linked with the business activity of the assessee. Therefore, same could not be taxed under the head ‘income from other sources’.
As the interest received by the assessee is inextricably linked with the process of setting up its plant and machinery, so in our opinion treatment given by the assessee in its books of accounts to the interest income is as per the provisions of Act. See Commissioner of Income-Tax Versus Bokaro Steel Limited [1998 (12) TMI 4 - SUPREME Court ] - Decided in favour of assessee.
Deduction claimed u/s. Section 80IB disallowed as relying on the previous assessment year assessment. - Decided against assessee.
-
2015 (10) TMI 2661 - SC ORDER
Writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India - for direction to the respondents to deliver goods mentioned in the 3 bills of entry, without payment of detention and demurrage charges and award of exemplary costs - the decision in the case of M/s Monika India & Anr. Versus Union of India & Ors. [2012 (4) TMI 235 - DELHI HIGH COURT] contested - Held that: - Having considered the entire gamut of facts commencing with the detention of the goods in the year 1991 and the decree passed by the High Court of Delhi in C.S. (OS) No. 1397 of 2000 on 18th March, 2015, we dismiss the present Special Leave Petitions affirming the impugned order dated 23rd February, 2012 passed by the High Court of Delhi in Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 17976-77 of 2004.
-
2015 (10) TMI 2659 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Temporary injunction - Restriction on transferability of the equity shares holding by the Opposite Party No. 1 under the said agreement - Held that:- The reasonable interpretation which can be assigned to a different sub Clauses under the assignment Clause is that the right to assign the rights under the agreement can be exercised by the investor subject, however, to signing the Deed of Adherence in the prescribed form. Sub Clause 28.3.1 of the assignment Clause put a fetter on the part of the company and the promoter to assign any right or obligation under the agreement without prior consent of the investor. Sub Clause 28.3.2, from its meaningful reading does not put any restrictions on the investor to assign any of their rights under the agreement to a third party but such assignment should be followed by a Deed of Adherence strictly in terms of Annexure 13.2 thereof. Sub Clause 28.3.3 is an additional Clause which permits the investor to assign its right under the said agreement to any of its affiliates in the same manner as indicated in a proceeding Clause.
There is no quarrel to the proposition of law that the temporary injunction is passed in aid of the final relief. An application for injunction is considered and decided on a well recognized three parameters, namely, existence of prima-facie case, plans of convenience and inconvenience and irreparable loss and injury. It admits no ambiguity to say that if the Court lacks inherent jurisdiction the prayer for injunction can be refused as the said order shall be a nullity. Though several provisions of SICA is placed before this Court to demonstrate that the allegations contained in the plaint can very well be agitated before the BIFR and therefore the provisions contained under Section 26 of the SICA bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to determine such dispute it would be too early to accept such proposition and can be said with certainty that the Civil Court’s jurisdiction is completely ousted under the said provision.
It is a settled law that the Court should read the plaint a whole and not in isolated manner. This Court, therefore, cannot accept the contention of the Opposite Party at this stage that the issues involved in the suit is squarely comes when the purview of SICA so as to apply the embargo created therein.
Since this Court does not find the existence of a prima facie case having made out in application for temporary injunction in view of the findings recorded hereinabove, there is no infirmity and / or illegality in the impugned order by which an application for temporary injunction is rejected by this Trial Court.
-
2015 (10) TMI 2658 - ITAT DELHI
Levy of penalty u/s 221 (1) - Tax Deductor continued deducting the tax, but failed to deposit the same into the Central Govt. account within the stipulated time - assessee in default - binafied belief - CIT-A deleted the penalty - Held that:- No reason to interfere with the order of the CIT(A). The order was passed in the light of the Hon’ble Supreme Court decision in the case of Amit Mohan Bindal [2009 (8) TMI 44 - SUPREME COURT] saying that the penalty (in the context of section 271(1)(c)) is a civil liability albeit a strict liability. Irrespective of tfe fact whether the tax was deducted at source at the time of making payment of salary to the employees and paid beyond prescribed time limits or not deducted at the time of payment of salary but deducted and paid late, there remains no dispute that the appellant was in default in terms of the provisions of section 201(1) of the Act.
The only aspect that is to be seen is whether there was good, sufficient or bonafide reasons for not making compliance to the provisions of law. There is no doubt that the issue of deduction of tax at source from the salary of non residents expatriated to India has been debatable issue in as much as whether the tax was required to be deducted by their employer abroad while making payment in their country or by their joint venture partners in India. In the context of provisions of section 192 read with section 9 of the Act vis-a-vis the deduction of tax at source, the Hon 'ble Apex court in the case of CIT vs. Eli Lilly and Co. (312 ITR 225) has held that this was the first instance' that such an issue was examined by the Court. The Hon'ble Court also went ahead in holding that where the tax deductor was under a genuine and bonafide belief that it was not under an obligation to withhold taxes, there was no question of imposition of penalty as the assessees had been able to discharge the burden of showing reasonable cause for non deduction of taxes. The Hon'ble Court held that only those persons will be liable to penalty who do not have good and sufficient reason for not deducting the tax.
The present case is not the case of the Revenue that the tax has been deducted but not paid to the credit of the company. Hence, we uphold the order of ld. CIT(A) and dismiss the appeal filed by the Revenue. - Decided in favour of assessee.
-
2015 (10) TMI 2657 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Oppression and management - Held that:- The appeal filed by Lesaffre is maintainable. The petition filed by Nafan was rightly not dismissed by the Board on the ground of suppression of facts. The declaration given by the Board that MOU is valid, effective, and enforceable document and its terms are binding, cannot be sustained as it is beyond the jurisdiction of the Board, and needs to be agitated in the suit, which is pending. Prima facie, no unquestionable intention can be culled out from the MOU. The Board meetings held on 29 January 2009, 23 May 2009, and 25 May 2009 and the resolutions passed therein, are invalid, illegal, and oppressive, so also the issuance of duplicate share certificates. The Board has rightly discarded the valuation report and the reliance upon the same by Muthu Group is an act of oppression.
The comments made by the Board on the valuation report, were justified. The direction of the Board to Muthu Group to rectify register of SAF Yeast by restoring the shareholding of Nafan and Lesaffre is valid and proper. The direction given by the Board to Nafan and Lesaffre to transfer their shareholding to Muthu Group is not sustainable and has to be set aside. Nafan is entitled to a buyout as prayed for in its petition. However, it will be in the interest of SAF yeast that the litigation ends and if Muthu group agrees to withdraw the suit and undertake not file further proceedings based on the MOU then the dispute can be put an end to by holding a forward competitive bid. If Muthu Group is not agreeable then buyout in favour of Nafan will follow. For overseeing the two options, as suggested by the Board, Justice J.N.Patel is appointed as an Administrator. M/S Ernst and Young is appointed as Chartered Accountants to carry out the valuation. A regards the modalities for holding the auction and the buy out, the modalities suggested by Nafan are proper and can be adopted.
ORDER
A. The declaration by the Board that the MOU dated 23 January 2009 is valid, effective and enforceable document and the terms thereof are binding upon the Petitioner and Lesaffre Group, is quashed and set aside in light of what is observed above.
B. The declaration by the Board that the Valuation Report prepared by Sharp and Tannan is biased, partial and in contravention of the statutory guidelines and rules to carry out the valuation of shares of a going concern and the direction to set it aside, is confirmed.
C. (i) The declaration by the Board that the Board Meeting held on 29 January 2009 is invalid and illegal, is confirmed.
(ii) The declaration that the Resolutions passed in the Board Meeting held on 29 January 2009 are not oppressive, is quashed and set aside.
(iii) It is declared that the Resolutions passed in the Board Meeting held on 29 January 2009, are oppressive.
D. (i) The declaration by the Board that the Board Meetings held on 23 May 2009 and 25 May 2009 are non-est, illegal and void, is confirmed.
(ii) The direction by the Board that the Resolutions passed in both these meetings are set aside being illegal and oppressive to the Nafan and Lasaffre, is confirmed.
E. The directions by the Board setting aside the transfer of shares in favour of the A.M.Muthiah and canceling the duplicate shares issued in favour of the A.M.Muthiah, are confirmed.
F. The direction by the Board that the shareholding of Nafan and Lasaffre stands restored, is confirmed.
G. The direction by the Board to Muthu Group to rectify the Register of Members of the SAF Yeast as per law, is confirmed
H. The direction by the Board to Nafan and Lasaffre to transfer the 80,722 shares held by them to the Muthu Group proportionately to their respective shareholdings, is quashed and set aside.
I. If within six weeks from today Muthu group withdraws the civil suit and associated proceedings filed by them and files an undertaking on affidavit in the registry of this court that they will not take any proceedings on the basis of the MOU in question, then Part-I of this order will come in operation. If the above mentioned steps are not taken by Muthu Group within the stipulated period as above, Part-II of the order will come into effect forthwith and prayer clause (a) sought for by Nafan in its company petition will stand granted on the terms mentioned in Part II.
J. Interim orders operating in these appeals shall continue for period of six weeks from today.
-
2015 (10) TMI 2656 - ITAT JAIPUR
Validity of reopening of assessment - whether CIT(A) grossly erred in initially in not deciding the ground challenging the validity and legality of initiation of the proceedings u/s 147 and subsequently during the proceedings u/s 154 before him, rejected this ground by holding summarily that assessment u/s 147 was properly reopened? - Held that:- In the case of Ranbaxy Laboratory (2011 (6) TMI 4 - DELHI HIGH COURT ), the Hon'ble High Court held that addition is not made by the AO on the ground of re-opening of assessment. As per explanation 3, no addition can be made. However, assessee's case is that the AO made addition u/s 80IB which has been allowed by the ld. CIT(A). However, he confirmed the addition by considering the explanation 3 of Section 147 of the Act. No such case laws were brought to the notice of the Bench where reopening was made by the AO on certain issue which has been considered for addition and also explanation 3 was applied. Thereafter, the ld. CIT(A) deleted the addition on reopening of the assessment u/s 147 of the Act. However, he confirmed the addition as per Explanation 3 of Section 147 of the Act. We therefore, dismiss assessee's Ground
Case reopened by applying explanation 3 of Section 147 - non affording any opportunity to the appellant regarding the applicability of this Explanation - Held that:- Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court in the case of CIT vs. Shri Ram Singh (2008 (5) TMI 200 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COUR ) held that if case is reopened on reason to believe of the AO but on that reason to believe no addition is made by the AO. The explanation 3 of Section 147 cannot be applied. Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in the case of N. Govindaraju vs. ITO and Another (2015 (8) TMI 271 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT) has considered the issue of explanation 3 of Section 147 of the Act dissented view and held that even there is no addition on account of reason to believe, even addition can be made as per explanation 3 of Section 147 on other items. When there are two views on same issue, the issue favouable to the assessee should be considered in view of the decision in the case of CIT vs. Vegetable Products Ltd. (1973 (1) TMI 1 - SUPREME Court). Thus Ground of the assessee is allowed.
Addition on account of sundry creditors treating as cash creditors - Held that:- We find from the records that the additional evidences were produced by the assessee before the ld. CIT(A) at the time of appeal hearing which can be verified from page 7 of the ld. CIT(A)’s order. Further the AO gave only one date i.e. 3-12-2007 and order was passed on 13-12-2007. Therefore, in the interest of justice, we admit additional evidence furnished by the party for disposal of this appeal. It is undisputed fact that these are old trade creditors except in once case the purchases during the year were made by the assessee. These are not the loans at all. The AO gave only one date to furnish the confirmation as to genuineness, creditworthiness and identity of the creditors which is not possible within a week’s time. The ld. CIT(A) was not right to hold that number of opportunities were provided to the assessee. In such a situation and facts of the case, we delete the addition confirmed by the ld. CIT(A).
-
2015 (10) TMI 2655 - CESTAT, MUMBAI
Service charges - Auction of warehoused goods - whether proceed of auction of warehoused imported goods, in case of importer abandoned the goods, shall be considered as service charges towards storage or warehouse and is liable for service tax? - Held that: - Board vide instruction F.No. B11/1/2002-TRU dated 1/8/2002 has clarified that no cargo handling service can be said to have been rendered in case of abandoned cargo, therefore, service tax is not leviable - Since cargo handling is precursor to the warehousing, the Circular can be logically applied to he warehousing of abandoned cargo also and the said clarification can be applied to the instant case since no warehousing service can be said to have been rendered.
The auction charges adjusted towards warehousing charges cannot be considered as receipt of any services and hence not liable to demand of service tax.
Appeal dismissed - decided against Revenue.
-
2015 (10) TMI 2654 - HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT
FIR against the petitioner - Code of Criminal Provisions - Held that:- Petitioners will suffer irreparable loss and injury in case interim directions are not issued at this stage. The CBI is directed to go ahead with the investigation but the statements of the petitioners shall not be recorded without the leave of the Court. Mr. Ashok Sharma, learned ASGI, submitted at the Bar that there is no proposal of petitioners’ arrest at this stage. However, by way of abundant precaution, it is made clear that the petitioners shall not be arrested. It is also made clear that as and when the dossier is complete, it shall be open for the Central Bureau of Investigation to approach this Court for permission to interrogate the petitioners in accordance with law. The Central Bureau of Investigation shall not file challan without the express leave of this Court in FIR No.RCAC-1 2015 A-004. The observations made hereinabove shall have no bearing on the pendency of any case, including before the Hon’ble Delhi High Court.
-
2015 (10) TMI 2653 - ITAT BANGALORE
TPA - selection of comparable - Held that:- The assessee company is engaged in the manufacture of Printed Circuit Board Assembly which has application in the telecom, industrial electronics and consumer products segment. It also operated a shared services division for providing back office services relating to accounts payable processing and human resources record maintenance, thus companies functionally dissimilar with that of assessee need to be deselected from final list of comoarable.
Deduction under section 10A computation - setting off losses - Held that:- Since the issue is covered in the case of ACIT, 12(3) v. Yokogawa India Ltd., (2011 (8) TMI 845 - Karnataka High Court ), we are of the view that the DRP has erred in upholding the AO’s reasoning in recomputing the relief u/s 10A and thereby computed the relief u/s. 10A at Nil as against the amount of ₹ 60,892,020 claimed by the assessee in its return of income. This ground of appeal is allowed.
-
2015 (10) TMI 2652 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Interrogation under section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 - Held that: - The petitioner would be permitted to be accompanied by his counsel to DRI Office when he next goes there for being interrogated under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 - petition allowed - decided in favor of petitioner.
............
|
