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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 266 Records
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1983 (11) TMI 281 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ence to that item. 16. Shri Gaur had referred to the fact that prior to the coming into force of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, these goods were classified for the levy of basic Customs duty under Item 87 of the old Customs Tariff and not under Item 58(1) ibid as “asbestos manufactures, not otherwise specified”. We need only observe that the wording of Item 22F of the Central Excise Tariff Schedule is different from, and far more comprehensive than, the wording of Item 58(1) of the old Customs Tariff Schedule. The fact that the goods were not considered as falling under Item 58(1) would not stand in the way of their being classified for the purpose of countervailing duty under Item 22F of the Central Excise Tariff Schedule, which as pointed out above, is clearly comprehensive enough to cover them. 17. For the reasons given above, we find that the orders of the Appellate Collector were correct. We accordingly confirm those orders and reject these appeals.
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1983 (11) TMI 280 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... cation was slightly different, because the applicant Collector had invoked Section 35H as well as Section 35G, and had sought a reference to the Supreme Court in view of a conflict stated to exist between the decisions of different High Courts. On this it was pointed out to him that Section 35H had to be read with Section 35G. It could be invoked only on an application made under Section 35G, if the Tribunal was of opinion that on account of conflict in the decisions of High Courts, it was expedient that a reference should be made direct to the Supreme Court. Thus, in order to have Section 35H invoked, there had first to be a reference under Section 35G. If that reference itself was not maintainable, there could be no question of entertaining it and of making a reference under Section 35H. 5. As Shri Tayal had no further submissions to make, we hold the present reference application as incompetent and not maintainable, and accordingly reject it. Announced in open Court.
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1983 (11) TMI 279 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ealized that they have no case on merits and it is, therefore, they brought in the question of equity. This Tribunal can only interpret the Notification as it stood at the material time. We agree with the reasoning adopted by the Appellate Collector and the arguments advanced by the Departmental Representative. 6. The appellants have referred to a latter import of what they call “Derline” which, according to the appellants, was cleared at the concessional rate of duty and on production of the end-use certificate, the bond and bank guarantee were released by the Bombay Customs. However, they have not produced any evidence in this behalf and we are not aware of the circumstances about the said release. In any event, as we have noted earlier, we have to go by the words employed in the Notification which do not cover the product Delrin 500. 7. In the circumstances stated above, we uphold the order of the Appellate Collector of Customs and reject the appeal.
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1983 (11) TMI 278 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... cause notice issued by the Collector on 7-6-1980, there was no allegation of any suppression of facts or mis-statement. Therefore, in the absence of such an allegation the extended time limit provided in Section 11A is not applicable here. It would appear that there could not be a question of such a suppression of fact or mis-statement inasmuch as there were earlier proceedings in the matter and the Assistant Collector passed the order in July, 1979. We also take note that in the Collector’s order there is no finding that there is any suppression or mis-statement. In view of these facts and the legal position we hold that the show cause notice was time-barred as it was issued after the expiry of six months from the date on which the Assistant Collector’s order which were sought to be reviewed by the Collector was received by the appellants. 12. On this ground the appeal succeeds and is allowed. We are not examining the other grounds in view of our decision.
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1983 (11) TMI 277 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... 1962 stands, therefore, established against the appellants, the confiscation of the goods under the said Section is also justified. 12. In the light of the above discussion of the case with regard to valuation of the goods and infringement of the ITC Regulations, we order as follows. 13. For the purposes of valuation, the goods shall be assessed with reference to the value declared by the appellants in the relevant import documents and not with reference to the enhanced appraised value. Consequential relief in this behalf flowing from this direction should be made available to the appellants. 14. The confiscation of the impugned goods for infringement of I.T.C. Regulations is upheld. We observe that the Additional Collector has already taken a lenient view in fixing the redemption fine of ₹ 70,000/-. We do not see any reason to give any further relief to the appellants in this behalf. 15. In the result, we partly allow the appeal in the above terms.
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1983 (11) TMI 276 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... r attention to Tribunal’s decision reported vide 1983 ECR 156 D(CEGAT) M/s. Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation (India) Ltd., Madras v. The Collector of Customs, Madras 1983 E.L.T. 364 (CEGAT). The terms of the contract in each case have to be seen for their proper effect; and the facts of the contract with M/s. Tekassulf Inc., New York do not apply to the present case. 8. From the above discussion, we are satisfied that the authorities below were not justified in enhancing the assessable value of 500.000 MT of goods, which had come in the bigger lot. The terms of the contract have to be meticulously applied when the price had been rightly shown in the invoice. This fact is also established from the statement of the average price of Copper Wire Bars from which the figure of £ 630.76 MT was taken. 9. For the reasons stated above we are unable to uphold the order of the Appellate Collector, the same is set aside and the appeal is consequently allowed.
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1983 (11) TMI 275 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... les were brand new and did not show signs of use. As regards the observation of the Assistant Collector that the appellant did not know how to use the articles, it seems somewhat unlikely that in these days even a person of normal education (and particularly one who has held a job abroad as an Assistant Sales Manager) would not know how to operate a TV set or a Video recorder. In any case, as pointed out by Shri Singh, it is sufficient for the purposes of the Transfer of Residence Rules if the articles have been used by the family of the passenger and not necessarily by the passenger himself. Prima facie, therefore, the appellant deserves to be given the benefit of the Transfer of Residence Rules in regard to these articles. 10. On our indicating our tentative conclusions as above, Shri Ramanathan, appearing for the Department, had no particular submissions to make. We accordingly confirm the above tentative conclusions and allow the appeal. Announced in the open Court.
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1983 (11) TMI 274 - SUPREME COURT
Whether it was proper exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution to have issued a writ of mandamus ordaining the Deputy Commissioner to grant the licence?
Whether it was impermissible for the High Court to have embarked upon an inquiry into the facts and on a reappraisal of the evidence come to a finding contrary to that reached by the Board of Revenue based on appreciation of evidence that one set of rival claimants i.e. Parag Saikia and Prafulla Barua, respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were entitled to grant of such privilege in preference to the appellant under the note beneath r. 223(2) of the Assam Excise Rules, 1945?
Held that:- It was impermissible for the High Court to have embarked upon an inquiry into the facts to adjudge the suitability or otherwise of the rival pairs of claimants and upon a reappraisal of the evidence come to a finding contrary to that reached by the Board of Revenue. There was nothing on record to show that the Board had acted in excess of jurisdiction or there was an error apparent on the face of the record which resuited in manifest injustice. That apart, it was not a proper exercise of jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution for the High Court to have issued a writ of mandamus ordaining the Deputy Commissioner to grant the liquor licence to respondents Nos.1 and 2 in preference to the appellants.
There was no question of the Board disclosing the contents of the report to respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Further, respondents Nos.1 and 2 never made a demand for a copy of the report, and even if such a request was made the Board would have been fully justified in not furnishing the same. Such a refusal would not amount to denial of natural justice for the obvious reason that the rules of natural justice must necessarily vary with the nature of the right and the attendant circumstances. The grant of a liquor licence was not a matter of right but merely in the nature of privilege, Furthermore, the Board was entitled to call for a report of the Deputy Commissioner in an appeal of this nature
We cannot also subscribe to the view expressed by the High Court that respondent No.2 Prafulla Barua who is a student of B.Sc. class still undergoing his studies falls within the description of 'educated unemployed youth' appearing in the note beneath r.223 of the Rules. Also the procedure adopted by the High Court in separately dealing with the writ petition filed by respondents Nos.1 and 2 making a grant of the licence to them for the country spirit shop in question while the earlier writ petition filed by the interveners was still pending was not in consonance with law and rules of fairplay and justice - set aside the judgment and order of the High Court - Appeal remanded.
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1983 (11) TMI 273 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Department. Their task, in our opinion, is to unearth the suppression of turnover resulting in evasion of tax due to the State and not to differ from the view taken by the Commissioner in a matter like this. 6.. The sole ground on which the Deputy Commissioner revised the assessments and brought the disputed turnover to tax was that the chappals manufactured by the assessee were not exclusively of leather but were made of rubber mainly. This conclusion by the Deputy Commissioner even if it is borne out from the records, was neither called for nor was he competent to take a view contrary to the recognition granted by the Commissioner in exercise of his powers conferred by the statute. His order seeking to annul the assessment was wholly without jurisdiction. In the result, therefore, the revision petitions are allowed. The orders of the Tribunal as well as that of the Deputy Commissioner are set aside and the original orders of the assessment granting exemption are restored.
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1983 (11) TMI 272 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... amounts pertaining to such cancelled orders. That come to Rs. 3,170. It is, therefore, unnecessary to remit this question to the assessing authority. The amount of Rs. 3,170 must be excluded from the suppressed turnover. 12.. The third and the last contention urged by Sri Bhat relates to the legality of the penalty. There is no doubt that the petitioner has suppressed some of the sales turnover. That was found out from his diary exhibit P. 5. That book was seized in the course of inspection by the Assistant Commercial Tax Officer. However, since we have reduced the suppressed turnover and also given some relief under the benefit scheme, the penalty also must be reduced. We are inclined to reduce the same by fifty per cent. 13.. In the result, this revision petition is allowed in part the orders of the authorities are modified to the extent indicated above and the assessing authority shall issue a revised demand notice. Excess penalty, if already recovered, shall be refunded.
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1983 (11) TMI 271 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... de the movement of goods or the free flow of trade. Even assuming that the Act is within the mischief of article 301, it is certainly a law made by Parliament in the public interest and is saved by article 302. There is nothing in the Act which offends article 303(1). I am thus clearly of the view that in the present case there is no question of putting any restriction on the freedom of trade and commerce by the amendment made under section 5CC by amending Act No. 8 of 1982. It may be further mentioned that by this amendment the industries are now required to pay 1 per cent tax on raw materials required for manufacture of goods and this 1 per cent is itself a concessional rate which has been made available to the industries which are commissioned before 31st March, 1984 for a period of 5 years from the date of their commission. The above provision suffers from no illegality. The writ petition is thus totally devoid of force and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1983 (11) TMI 270 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r point. It was for the first time that in the year 1979, as noticed earlier in this judgment, that a separate entry relating to knitting wool whether woollen, acrylic or of any other kind, as a taxable entry at the rate of 6 per cent in the hands of the manufacturer or importer, came into existence. It is obvious that till the time that a separate entry about it came into existence, acrylic yarn sold by the dealer was taxable as an unclassified item. It has been nobody s case, prior to the submission made today, that acrylic yarn sold by the dealer, could also be used for weaving purposes. It is not possible, therefore, to entertain this submission and seek further investigation of facts in this regard now. The conclusion is inevitable that the Tribunal was in error in upholding the view that the turnover of acrylic yarn sold by the dealer-opposite party during the year 1976-77 was liable to tax at the rate of 2 per cent. The order dictated on 13th April, 1982, shall stand.
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1983 (11) TMI 269 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... see a dealer in such articles. 10.. We respectfully agree with the above observations. Here also, the unwanted rosewood trees or other trees in the assessee s estate have been cut, sized and sold or converted into charcoal for convenient disposal. They were not converted into stock-in-trade for the purpose of business of the company. The sale proceeds therefore cannot be taxed as a turnover under the Sales Tax Act. Before parting with the case we may also place on record the submission made at the Bar. It is said that income realised by the company by the sale of the trees was subjected to capital gains tax and this Court has also upheld the company s liability to pay capital gains tax for the years in question. That being so, the State cannot still contend that the transactions were in the nature of business and the realisations should be taxed under the Sales Tax Act. In the result, these petitions fail and are dismissed. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs.
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1983 (11) TMI 268 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... his contribution towards charity, it is not correct to treat it as a part of the assessee s trading receipts since it was never intended to be a part of the price and the contribution so made by the purchaser is for the sole purpose of charity. This argument has to be rejected in the view we have taken as to how the bill as a whole should be considered. 13.. It therefore follows from the above discussion that the charity collections made by the assessee should necessarily form part of the aggregate amount for which the goods are sold. Such collection made is inextricably connected with the sale and is collected on the occasion of sale and should necessarily form part of the turnover also. It cannot therefore escape from being considered as forming part of turnover of the dealer. 14.. In the result, the revision petition is allowed, the orders of the Tribunal and the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeals) are set aside and that of the assessing officer is restored.
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1983 (11) TMI 267 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ompany to the sugarcane growers cannot be said to be voluntary or unilateral for the purpose of maintaining good relationship of the sugarcane growers. The sugarcane growers were disputing the adequacy of the price payable by the company for the sugarcane supplied by them for the year 1969-70. That dispute was terminated by the award of the arbitrator. For the year 1971-72 the company agreed to pay the extra payment to the sugarcane growers at the rate of Rs. 3.74 per metric ton. These payments so far as the growers are concerned would be the price for their sugarcane and not for any other work. They received extra price over and above the minimum price fixed by the Central Government. Such payments, in our opinion, cannot escape the turnover as defined under section 2(1)(v) of the Act since they form part of the aggregate amount for which the goods were purchased. 10.. In the result, these petitions fail and are dismissed. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs.
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1983 (11) TMI 266 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt of tax in lump sum. That amounts to directing the subordinate officers to act contrary to the provisions of the Act. For the reasons stated above, the respondents are hereby restrained from collecting the arrears of sales tax due from the petitioners in lump sum but may realise the arrears of sales tax in instalments as directed by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes in his order dated 3rd August, 1982. These writ petitions are accordingly allowed to the extent indicated above. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150 in each. On pronouncement of the judgment, the learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondents sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We are unable to certifiy that these writ petitions involve such substantial questions of law of general importance as require consideration by the Supreme Court or that these are otherwise fit cases for grant of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Leave refused.
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1983 (11) TMI 265 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ts. A term in a contract, contrary to the expressed provisions of a statute is illegal and void and the contract would be read as if no such illegal condition exists in a contract. There is no merit in the respondents contention on this point. The petitioners have challenged the validity of the amendment to special conditions of contract in these petitions. This relief would not be possible in the arbitration proceedings. So also the question of legality of incorporation of an illegal term in a contract would also be beyond the arbitrator. The writ petition was, therefore, the proper remedy. I, therefore, hold that Office Order No. 120 dated 28th December, 1981, is illegal particularly in relation to the sales which are not the sales taxable at the first point. The petitioners would be entitled to the benefit of deduction/ exemption as if the conditions imposed by Office Order No. 120 do not exist. The writ petition, therefore, succeeds with costs. The rule is made absolute.
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1983 (11) TMI 264 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... are not taxable sales. It is not the case of the Revenue that Messrs. Premier Steel Distributors are not dealers and the sales effected by them were only casual and the sales have not been effected in their capacity as registered dealers. Once Messrs. Premier Steel Distributors are found to be dealers engaged in the manufacture or purchase or in the business of purchase and sale of stainless steel vessels, all sales effected by them are taxable sales. It has been held by this Court in Govindan and Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu 1975 35 STC 50 and State of Tamil Nadu v. Chamundeswari Enterprises 1983 52 STC 124 that if there is a prior sale in the State, the subsequent sales cannot be taken to be exigible for tax under the Act as second sales. The goods in question are admittedly governed by single point scheme of taxation. In this view of the matter, we do not have any justification for interfering with the order of the Tribunal. The tax case is, therefore, dismissed. No costs.
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1983 (11) TMI 263 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t 2 per cent and having driven the assessee to go before the Tribunal to get a decision and the Tribunal having given a decision in favour of the assessee though for the earlier years, it cannot now turn round and say that the assessee has wrongly collected the tax at 4 per cent instead of 2 per cent. There appears to be a mutual mistake as to the rate of tax payable on the sale of cloth bags. Even the Department has been proceeding on the basis, till the Tribunal has rendered its decision on 24th November, 1976, that the sale is taxable only at 4 per cent. When the assessing authority himself was of the view that the turnover relating to cloth bags is taxable at 4 per cent, the assessee cannot be said to have intentionally violated the provisions of the Act. On the special circumstances of this case, we are inclined to agree with the Tribunal that the penalty provisions will not stand attracted in this case. 7.. The tax case is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (11) TMI 262 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ndant caution if the decision in the tax case were to go against the assessee. As a result of the levy of penalty the assessee, Jaya Pharmacy, was not able to refund the excess tax collected to its buyers. As a result of the Tribunal s judgment that the arishtam is taxable only at 4 per cent multi-point, the assessing authority proceeded to assess the purchaser of arishtam from the assessee at 4 per cent. It is at this stage, this purchaser, Dharmasingh, for various assessments, filed these writ petitions for issuing a writ certiorarified mandamus thereby directing to forbear the respondents Nos. 3, 4 and 5 from proceeding further and from doing any act detrimental to the interests of the petitioner in pursuance of the order of the second respondent dated 2nd November, 1981, in T.A. Nos. 747, 724, 723 and 722 of 1981. In view of the assessee succeeding in T.C. No. 1449 of 1980, these writ petitions have become infructuous. Hence, these writ petitions are dismissed. No costs.
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